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$EVWUDFW 
We need to stop being afraid and realise that as individuals we have power 
and that power is the ability to use your own reason and just try and look 
beyond this. (Saif, 27, male, academic activist)  
This thesis presents findings from an ESRC-funded doctoral study on the 
cultural politics of young adult Muslims who participate in political and civic 
activism within British civil society. Based on ethnographic research in the 
Midlands area, it offers an empirically informed understanding of how these 
forms of activism relate to themes of political participation, citizenship, security 
and governance in Britain today. The thesis argues that the diverse mobilisations 
examined by the research collectively constitute a social movement to resist the 
marginalisation and stigmatisation of Muslim identities in a post 9/11 context. The 
war on terror, in response to the international crisis of militant Islam, has placed 
Muslim citizenship in many Western liberal democracies under fierce scrutiny, 
prompting uneasy and hard to resolve questions around issues of security, 
diversity, cohesion and national identity. In Britain, as in Europe, political and 
public responses to these questions have precipitated a climate of fear and 
suspicion around Muslims, rendering their citizenship contingent and precarious 
and undermining their ability to identify with the nation and participate in its 
political processes. This thesis reveals how young Muslim activists negotiate 
these challenges by engaging in a range of activities typical of social movements, 
not only in terms of distinctive modes of action but also with respect to their 
transformative social and political visions and imaginaries. Muslim activists 
engage in cultural politics to demand a more inclusive and post-national notion of 
citizenship, by seeking to turn negative Muslim differences into positive ones. 
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶ engagement in democratic processes through political repertoires 
commonly adopted by other progressive social movements challenges the moral 
panic engendered by the exceptionalism ascribed to Muslim identity politics.  
This thesis argues that these cultural politics constitute a British Muslim 
social movement to contest Islamophobia through resistance to two dominant 
forms of power in contemporary Western societies. Firstly, this movement is a 
response to WKHPXOWLSOHWHFKQRORJLHVRISRZHUDUWLFXODWHGE\)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSW
RIµJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶ZKLFKDUHdifficult to distinguish and confront due to their 
imperceptible and socially dispersed nature. Secondly, cultural politics is 
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necessitated by direct threats of force that Foucault GHVFULEHGDVDµrelationship 
RIYLROHQFH¶DQGZKLFKDUHGLVFHUQLEOHLQWKHULVHRIWKHsecuritisation of 
citizenship in the wake of 9/11. The nature of resistance from Muslim activists 
suggests that their cultural politics are not only a strategic but also a less risky 
political response to both these prevailing forms of power. Foucault¶VDUJXPHQW
that the nature of power can be deciphered from the forms of resistance it 
provokes suggests responsive rather than reactive political strategies by young 
Muslims. The thesis concludes that these cultural politics represent forms of 
active citizenship premised on a more equal, participatory and radically 
democratic social contract than nationalist and neoliberal forms of governance 
presently concede.  
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This thesis set out as an exploratory research project to uncover, 
understand and give an account of the political and civic activism of young adult 
Muslims in Britain who have come to personify a number of key concerns around 
security, diversity, social cohesion and citizenship after 9/11. As such this study 
is as much about political participation as it is about citizenship because the two 
not only anticipate each other but are necessary conditions for the other to 
flourish. The process of conducting this research has also raised several other 
key conceptual, empirical and theoretical questions and insights related to the 
topic which position this work within an interdisciplinary domain that is primarily 
situated within political sociology but also intersects with politics, cultural studies, 
anthropology, social policy and discourse studies.  
Immigration and cultural diversity have routinely provoked anxieties about 
social and cultural atrophy in the West (Vertovec, 2011) but since the Rushdie 
Affair Muslim citizenship has become particularly prone to fomenting moral 
panics over the feared loss of national identity and erosion of liberal values 
(Kundnani, 2014; McGhee, 2008; Modood, 2010; Parekh, 2008). Previously seen 
WKURXJKWKHOHQVRIµ$VLDQSDVVLYLW\¶6DHHGas DUHODWLYHO\µSHDFHDEOH
law-DELGLQJVXFFHVVIXO¶$OH[DQGHUFRPPXQLW\the pictures of Muslims 
taking to the streets in vociferous and sometimes violent protests came as 
something of a shock to the British political establishment. If the Rushdie Affair 
put Muslim political consciousness and assertiveness on the map of British 
politics then 9/11 marks the moment when Muslim identity politics become 
synonymous with a number of pathological tendencies, from radicalisation and 
terrorism to self-segregation and dangerous cultural separatism (Brown, 2010; 
Hickman et al 2011; Kundnani, 2007; Modood, 2003, 2007). At a domestic level 
in Britain, 9/11 followed a turbulent summer of 2001 when clashes between the 
police and Asian youths on the streets of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham 
instigated a new crisis of integration. Although Western vilification of Islam has a 
long and troubling history (Kumar, 2012; Said, 1997), the positioning of Muslims 
DVWKHµQHZVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOSDULDKV¶$OH[DQGHUKDVLQWHQVLILHGDIWHU
9/11, making Muslim citizenship in the West one of the most contentious and 
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divisive political issues of our times. The topic of Muslim citizenship raises 
perturbing questions which defy quick or simple answers and invokes debates 
across disciplinary lines focused on migration, class, gender, religion and 
geography. However, there are two key dimensions which dominate the political 
and public imagination; namely the issues of security (radicalisation, terrorism, 
extremism) and nationalism (integration, social cohesion, diversity, identity). In 
terms of security Muslim citizenship has become inexorably linked with the threat 
of militant Islam and the ever-present risk of terrorism. In relation to national 
cohesion there is a µperception that Muslims are making politically exceptional, 
culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands upon European states¶ 
(Modood, 2010:33). Responses to these critical issues have been consequential 
for the meaning and practice of citizenship and political participation for all British 
citizens but with a disproportionately detrimental impact on Muslims, as 
elaborated in Chapter 2.  
Given the centrality of Muslims to these long-standing and fierce political 
debates in Europe and the surfeit of literature in the wake of 9/11, this thesis felt 
like an ambitious project. As there is hardly any aspect of Muslim citizenship that 
has not been prodded and poked at from multiple angles this study faced a rather 
daunting task of narrowing down µhow¶ to approach the topic and µwhat¶ to focus 
the empirical gaze upon.    
This necessitated examination of extant representations of Muslim politics 
and citizenship. A common thread running through dominant discourses on 
Muslims, in the years following the Rushdie Affair, is the tendency to accentuate 
the alterity and exceptionalism of Muslim migrants and minimise their affinities 
and belonging to their countries of settlement. A great deal of what has been said 
about Muslims, in the media, in the political sphere, in the public domain, as well 
as in many academic studies and reports, has effectively done little to diminish 
WKHµabsolute OWKHUQHVV¶(Semati, 2010:257) of Muslims rooted in a long Western 
history of treating Islam with suspicion and fear (Kumar, 2012; Said, 1997). Since 
9/11 the most pressing questions about Muslims have centred around issues of 
radicalisation and terrorism, integration and social cohesion and cultural 
difference and national identities, which draw upon an existing 'racialized all-
purpose framework' of 'ready-made pathologies' in relation to Muslims 
(Alexander, 2000:xii). Little attention has been paid to aspects of Muslim 
citizenship which might contradict this disturbing spectre of an alien body that 
threatens to ostensibly undermine or reverse Europe¶s valued traditions of 
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liberalism and secularism. While Muslim contributions to British economy, society 
and culture sometimes receive lip service from politicians and the media such 
token gestures of acknowledgement are a tiny murmur compared to the clamour 
of anti-Muslim sentiment that fills the public sphere. This state of affairs not only 
risks representing a partial and misguided view of the social world it also 
constitutes a glaring injustice since the consequences are a radically 
GHFRQWH[WXDOL]HGLPDJHRIDOO0XVOLPVDVWKHµHQHP\ZLWKLQ¶(Fekete, 2009:44). 
Approaching a study of Muslim citizenship from the vantage point of the 
experiences, perspectives and attitudes of young Muslims, active in civil society, 
presents itself as an area of study which can turn this established view on its 
head by inverting the gaze inside out.  
A study of political participation and citizenship can be framed in a number 
of different ways, it may focus on any number of categories, from class and 
gender to the state and public policy, to political party involvement, local council 
representation or lobbying and interest groups. However, as Dalton (2008:xv) 
says:  
We understand the nature of democracy and its citizens not by watching 
talking heads on television, but by talking to the public, learning how they 
think about politics, and learning how they act on their beliefs.  
A study of Muslim citizenship does not necessitate a focus on activism. 
However, since it cannot be taken for granted that all citizens are interested in or 
cognizant of the political dilemmas surrounding this topic, those who publically 
register an interest in politics by being engaged in activism arguably make for a 
better informed and potentially more promising and rich source of data as 
research participants. This study therefore sought to hear from such politically 
engaged individuals from a Muslim background who may be better placed to 
provide answers to some of the hotly contested questions about Muslim 
citizenship. To be clear this is not a study of religious politics or the politics of 
faith but rather it is a study of the politics of Muslims, framed in this research as a 
marginalised social group rather than a predefined religious group, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
The answer to the question of what the study should fix its gaze upon came 
from a need to move beyond the two binary positions that appear to epitomise 
Muslim politics. Focus on Muslim politics has either been through a lens of 
deviance looking at extremism and risks of terrorism or the lens of traditional 
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politics exploring the role of Muslims in elections and voting, with few studies 
attempting to examine participation beyond these two ends of the spectrum. 
Where a handful of studies have examined ethnic minority politics from 
alternative perspectives the established view of Muslim disengagement and 
propensity for violence has begun to unravel (Ansari, 2009; Home Office, 2005; 
Mirza et al, 2007) to reveal political features and choices reflecting a changing 
cartography of citizen participation in democracy (Beck, 1997; Dalton, 2008; 
Leftwich, 2008; Hay, 2007; Marsh et al, 2007; Norris, 2002, 2003, 2011; Putnam, 
2000). As Back et al (2009:3; original emphasis) explain these studies highlight 
the need to re-examine existing categories for understanding political 
engagement: 
Having started with an investigation that was about the participation of 
minority groups in mainstream British politics, the ethnography rapidly 
GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWERWKWKHDFWLRQVWKDWTXDOL¿HGDVparticipation and the 
aUHQDVWKDWTXDOL¿HGDVthe political were over time being rapidly changed.  
Such studies have identified the new spaces for political participation (Back 
et al 2009) as well as µnew institutional forms recognising alternative political 
agendas¶6RORPRV, 2005:2; original emphasis). These revelations signal the 
HPHUJHQFHRIµQHZSROLWLFDOVXEMHFWLYLWLHV¶WKDWDUHµFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DSUHIHUHQFH
for forms of direct, hands-RQSROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQW¶2¶7RROHDQG*DOH
These new sites, forms, institutions, agendas and subjectivities mark the 
empirical topography of the present research. 7KLVVWXG\¶VIRFXVRQDFWLYLVP
within the domain of civil society, on activities loosely associated with what 
theorists have referred to as WKHDUHDRIµVXESROLWLFV¶%HFN 1997) or social 
movements (Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Melucci, 1996; Nash, 2010) operating 
outside mainstream electoral channels, is based on a number of considerations.  
x Ignoring this area of participation perpetuates the belief that Muslims are 
disengaged because their faith ostensibly encourages separation from 
democratic secular politics, or that Muslims are only interested in violent 
forms of action inspired by the innately militant faith of Islam. 
x Existing knowledge about these forms of engagement among Muslims is 
limited. A great deal of attention has been devoted to new social 
movements of the 1960s and more recently the Arab Spring (Castells, 
2012), Occupy (Maharwal, 2013), the global justice movement (Nash, 
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2010), anti-austerity movements (Della Porta, 2013) or anarchist activism 
in the US (Portwood-Stacer, 2013) in efforts to understand the distinctive 
historical features and demands of such politics and their role in 
redefining notions of political participation in modern democracies. As far 
as this research is aware, this body of knowledge has not been applied to 
Muslim citizens due to a mode of exceptionalism that assumes their 
politics are determined by religion (Kundnani, 2014; Roy, 2004; Sen, 
2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005).  
x As marginalised, demonised and suspect citizens young Muslims face 
exceptional barriers to inclusion in mainstream political processes 
2¶/RXJKOLQDQG*LOOHVSLHmaking alternative means of political 
participation a promising and fruitful area to explore the political 
subjectivities of young Muslims.  
x While studies about Muslims have been prolific since 9/11, there is a 
notable absence of engagement with those who are at the sharp 
receiving end of the War on Terror, as identified by Garner and Selod 
ZKRVWDWHWKHUHLVDµUHODWLYHO\ZHDNSUHVHQFHRIILHOGZRUN-
based studies (particularly those in which Muslims are the subjects of 
LQWHUYLHZVDQGRUHWKQRJUDSKLHV¶A great deal of research has examined 
the problematic and threatening nature of Muslim citizenship from the 
PDMRULW\¶VSHUVSHFWLYH (Brown, 2010; Mythen, 2012) and as Spalek and 
Lambert (2008:263) point out: µIn a post 9/11 context it seems that a large 
volume of work is being produced around Muslim identities and 
perspectives, however, in-depth qualitative work that seeks to engage 
critically with the social world, in both academia and other arenas, 
appears largely to be missing.¶ 
This study addresses the need for such research by focusing attention on 
the political and civic activism of 34 young adult Muslims based in the Midlands 
region of the UK. The study is based on interviews with 34 male and female 
participants, aged from 17 to 37 years, currently resident in the Midlands region, 
who engage in a range of activities defined as non-electoral or µVXESROLWLFDO¶
activism, including campaigning on anti-war, anti-fascism and Palestinian issues, 
religious and cultural education, charity work, youth work, blogging, photography 
and poetry. The research employs a multi-sited ethnographic approach using 
mixed methods including interviews, observations and documentary evidence in 
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order to gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the complex social 
and political context in which these young people mobilise. The aim is to gain a 
more balanced picture of Muslim citizenship in Britain at the current historical 
juncture by going beyond the surface of appearances and seeking depth through 
more comprehensive methods that gain greater proximity to the lived social 
experience.  
 
Research questions  
Based on the aims and objectives described above the following research 
questions frame this study:  
1. What is the nature and range of political and civic activism by young adult 
Muslims within British civil society outside mainstream political channels? 
2. How is activism conducted through different modes of action and what 
are the targets and desired outcomes?  
3. How do young Muslims perceive available democratic spaces to express 
political agency and how does their activism relate to traditional/electoral 
politics?  
4. What is the scope for national citizenship within the political and civic 
activism of young adult Muslims in this study? 
 
Contribution to knowledge  
This study makes a distinct contribution to knowledge through the following 
achievements:  
x Addresses a gap in knowledge on Muslim citizenship engendered by the 
exaggerated emphasis on security and deviance and the relative lack of 
engagement with Muslims who have been at the sharp receiving end of a 
whole gamut of political and policy responses in the War on Terror.  
x Brings to light a lesser known area of Muslim politics by exploring the 
cultural politics of a new generation whose political priorities and 
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subjectivities are likely to be distinct from older generations, particularly in 
the wake of 9/11.  
x Presents a contemporary case study of activism to add a new dimension 
of understanding to social theory in the areas of social movement studies, 
cultural politics, citizenship and political participation.  
x Applies the work of Michel Foucault to a new case study of citizenship, 
politics and resistance, demonstrating the continuing importance of his 
work in understanding contemporary societies.  
x Offers important insights into both the normative framing and practical 
experience of citizenship and political participation for young adult 
Muslims, which is a valuable resource for scholars, policy-makers and 
other stake-holders interested in addressing concerns around youth 
disengagement, integration, security, social cohesion and citizenship.  
x Makes a contribution to methodological debates on combining 
ethnography and discourse analysis by presenting a substantive case 
study to demonstrate their mutually corroborative strengths.  
 
Outline of chapters  
Chapter 2 provides a succinct history of Muslim political participation and 
citizenship in Britain, eliciting momentous events and developments in the 
evolution of a British Muslim civic consciousness and political profile. Muslim 
engagement in governance and the politics of racism and identity conveys the 
picture of a migrant community settling into Britain and making increasingly 
assertive demands on the nation. This history unfolds against shifting 
generational dynamics as well as the socio-political context in Britain in which 
9/11 and the ensuing war on terror marks an intensification rather than break 
from past responses to politics of difference and diversity. This sets the context 
for examining the political subjectivities of young adult Muslims as a new 
generation of minority citizens emerging from the shadows of past mobilisations 
into the light of future possibilities.  
Chapter 3 explores the conceptual and theoretical parameters of this study. 
Contemporary and changing forms of political participation WKURXJKµQHZFLWL]HQ
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SROLWLFV¶ are elaborated in order to contextualise Muslim politics within broader 
social patterns in Western liberal democracies, which direct attention to cultural 
politics and social movements as a promising and constructive framework to 
study the topic.  The chapter also devotes a great deal of attention to Michel 
)RXFDXOW¶V theories of power, knowledge and governance which underpin this 
VWXG\¶V focus on cultural politics as well as offering a sound theoretical link 
between bottom-up processes of political contestation and top-down structures of 
domination embedded in contemporary power relations in society.  
To clarify how these findings are generated Chapter 4 details the research 
GHVLJQDQGSUDFWLFHDQGWKHVWXG\¶Vepistemological and methodological 
commitments. This chapter outlines the interpretive epistemology of the research 
based on a subtle realist ontological approach to knowledge production. This 
stresses belief in an objective social reality but acknowledges that there are limits 
to how this reality may be accessed, which makes the findings discussed in this 
thesis provisional and reliant on interpretations that are mediated by the cultural, 
historical and ideological position of the research participants and the researcher. 
However, it is argued that the adoption of mixed methods using interviews, 
participant observations and documentary evidence to gain a comprehensive 
view of the research field generates confidence in a more rigorous and credible 
explanation compared to single methods or reductive quantitative approaches. 
This research combines a multi-sited ethnography with discourse analysis 
techniques as a guide and sensibility to gain insights that go beyond the µcontent¶ 
to also interrogate the µform¶ of texts and talk)RXFDXOW¶VLQWHUHVWLQGLVFRXUVHDV
DµV\VWHPRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶+DOOZKLFKSURGXFHVREMHFWVLQWKHVRFLDO
world is of greater interest to this analysis than the internal structures or 
dynamics of language itself. This focus complements WKHVWXG\¶VLQWHUHVWLQ
cultural politics as a framework to study activism.  
Foucauldian theory is returned to in the penultimate chapter where the 
main findings of the study are re-examined from a macro level explanation of 
social power relations but in order to reach this point the thesis has to first 
expound the nature and range of activities that constitute a social movement and 
elaborate the conflictual relations in which it operates. These micro levels of 
activism in their local and quotidian iterations and their enactment on the meso 
plane of social and historical contingencies in the war on terror provide building 
blocks in chapters 5 to 8 for the concluding arguments in chapters 9 and 10.  
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Chapter 5 highlights the distinctive features of the political and civic 
activism of young adult Muslims in this study to demonstrate how these 
correspond to the definition of social movements described in Chapter 3. The 
findings discussed in this chapter highlight different dimensions of activism that 
are closely interrelated and constitutive of each other, foregrounding lifestyle 
politics and individualised modes of activism in response to the perceived lack of 
efficacy and credibility of established institutions, with an almost ubiquitous 
dismissal of mainstream mass media. This necessitates reliance on dense 
informal networks to organise and share resources to mobilise and foster 
solidarity. This brings into sharp relief the important role of networking through 
local and online social media platforms to disseminate and consume authentic 
knowledge and ideas which are the mainstay of cultural politics. These distinctive 
features reveal the affinities between the repertoires of action of young adult 
Muslims and other progressive social movements by marginalised groups 
seeking equality and justice. They also resonate the model of cultural politics 
outlined in Chapter 3 and GHVFULEHGE\1DVKDVµQRQ-LQVWUXPHQWDO«>
@«VXVSLFLous of institutions, oriented towards changing public views, concerned 
with aspects of culture, lifestyle, organised loosely in flexible ways, highly 
GHSHQGHQWRQPDVVPHGLD¶ 
Chapter 6 brings into focus two further essential dimensions in the 
constitution of a social movement by revealing the active processes of collective 
identity production and the conflictual relations that structure them. This chapter 
describes the tensions and conflicts through which collective identity is decisively 
constructed by participants in response to endogenous and exogenous 
pressures and provocations. The complexity and ambiguity of constructing a 
unified Muslim identity alludes to the political importance of subsuming multiple 
individual identities into a primary collective unit. Internal struggles which 
contradict and complicate the production of a unified collective identity are 
highlighted to reveal how coherence is achieved through agency and choice. The 
salience of faith is demystified by revealing malleability and inventiveness in the 
variable modes of religiosity among participants who reject dogmatic conformity 
to tradition and interpret faith through personalised and reflexive idioms. These 
understandings of collective identity and the role of faith are put into a broader 
FRQWH[WRIWKHSROLWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHVRSHUDWLQJRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶QHHGWRGHIHQG
stigmatised identities post 9/11 through various forms of civic engagement aimed 
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at turning negative difference into positive difference as argued by Modood 
(2007; 2010).  
While individually the features of activism described in Chapters 5 and 6 
may not amount to a comprehensible picture of collective action, particularly in 
light of the tensions and conflicts that hamper unity, when viewed as a whole 
these multiple sites of resistance constitute a social movement to counter the 
insidious and ubiquitous threat of Islamophobia. The presence of distinctive 
social movement features of activism, active processes of collective identity 
construction and a distinct social conflict to which it directs itself brings the 
diverse activities of participants in this study within the scope of a social 
movement.  
Chapter 7 begins to locate the dynamics of the social movement discussed 
in the previous two chapters within a broader framework of extant political 
structures to examine some of the reasons why political agency is expressed 
through cultural and identity politics outside mainstream electoral processes. This 
chapter highlights the failure of traditional electoral politics to provide an avenue 
for political participation as well as the high costs of protest politics oriented 
towards the state, which makes cultural and identity politics a strategic choice to 
pursue political ends3DUWLFLSDQWV¶adoption of cultural politics, through various 
modes of action including lifestyle, art, education and charity work, are premised 
on an underlying argument about public apathy and passivity as a major factor in 
WKHIDLOXUHRISROLWLFVWRPHHWFLWL]HQV¶QHHGV. This echoes a common trait among 
social movements to reject representation and mediation as the norm of political 
participation in traditional politics and to prioritise cultural forms of dissent and 
resistance based on direct action and intervention in the social domain (Melucci, 
1996).  
Chapter 8 explores the aims of cultural politics by examining the way in 
which participants¶ conceptions of citizenship challenge the hegemony of 
dominant models, particularly the resurgence of nationalism and neoliberal 
notions of active citizenship promoted by British governments in recent decades. 
The struggles and contradictions involved in identifying with Britishness reveals 
the continuing presence of structural and symbolic constraints that impede the 
inclusion of Muslims into British society. Activists resist dominant neoliberal 
notions of citizenship based on individual profit and success by adopting 
strategies of active citizenship informed by ethical, faith-based and humanist 
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values, where civic and political efforts are directed towards educating, enabling 
and empowering other citizens to become agents of change. Two models of 
activism DUHLGHQWLILHGRQHPDUNHGE\µH[SOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶DQGWKHRWKHUUHYHDOLQJ
µLPSOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶ERWKFRQVWLWXWLQJDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLSWRGHIHQGDJainst 
Islamophobia and make British politics and society inclusive of Muslim identities 
and values.   
The findings discussed in chapters 5-8 are recontextualised in Chapter 9 
by applying the theories of Michel Foucault to make a concluding argument about 
the nature of Muslim cultural politics and its relation to existing social structures. 
7KLVDUJXPHQWGUDZVRQ)RXFDXOW¶VWKeorisation of power, knowledge and 
governmentality, as well as theories of securitised citizenship in the wake of 9/11 
(Brown, 2010; Fekete, 2009; Hyatt, 2011; Mavelli, 2013; McGhee, 2008; 2010; 
2¶/RXJKOLQDQG*LOOHVSLH3HQWD]LVDQG3HPEHUWRQ9HUWLJDQV
2010). It is argued that the participants in this study respond to the prevalence of 
historically specific and particular relations of power in contemporary society 
which were made perceptible by Foucault (1978; 1980; 1988; 1994a,b,c; 1995) 
and which render cultural politics an inescapable but also tactical form of 
resistance to marginalisation and exclusion. The political discourses and 
grammars of action demonstrated by activists in this study not only presuppose 
such a model of power but also deploy the technologies of power that constitute 
LWLQRUGHUWRVXEYHUWLWV¶UDWLRQDOLWLHVDQGRSHUDWLRQs.  
In conclusion Chapter 10 summarises the key themes of the thesis, 
discusses its implications and future research prospects, and offers some 
tentative reflections on the scope of such politics for social transformation and 
democratisation of society.  
  





This chapter sets the context for a study of political and civic activism by 
focusing on important historical and conceptual developments in the area of 
Muslim political participation and citizenship in Britain. The first three sections are 
devoted to tracing the background and theoretical concerns related to Muslim 
politics starting with the history of mainstream politics and followed by civil 
society activism. After this issues that have been central to Muslim identity 
politics and the debates around these are described.  
The latter three sections of this chapter turn to the concept of citizenship as 
an important and relevant sociological category that is both consequential to 
political engagement as well as one of its outcomes. These discussions frame 
the wider social context in which Muslim political and civic participation is located, 
as well as the complex ways in which ideas of citizenship, belonging and the 
relationship between the citizen and the state are shifting and how this impacts 
on political participation. Three broad dimensions are highlighted: the resurgence 
of nationalism, securitisation and the shifting balance between rights and 
responsibilities.   
 
Electoral and party politics 
Primary causes of anxieties around Muslim citizenship in the West are 
related to the assumed disengagement and disaffection of Muslims from British 
society because these are considered to be high risk factors for radicalisation 
and terrorism (Cantle, 2001; Home Office, 2005; Martin, 2011; Maxwell, 2010; 
Mirza et al, 2¶7RROHDQG*DOH These fears are based on a 
questionable premise of Muslim disengagement which is difficult to substantiate 
as most of the research on minority participation in politics has focused on 
µHWKQLF¶UDWKHUWKDQµUHOLJLRXV¶JURXSVPDNLQJLW hard to separate Muslims from 
other groups. There is also a tendency to use Pakistanis and Bangladeshis as a 
proxy for Muslims since they comprise the largest Muslim population in Britain 
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(Ansari, 2009). Due to the different parameters and variables employed to study 
the role of ethnic minorities in politics, it may be challenging to pinpoint the 
precise level of Muslim engagement but there are reasons to doubt the gloomy 
picture of mass disaffection and disengagement. Muslims have been active in 
voting, membership of political parties and contesting elections, albeit the latter 
has been primarily at a local rather than national level due to the residential 
FRQFHQWUDWLRQRIPLQRULWLHVLQSDUWLFXODUXUEDQDUHDV2¶7RROHHW al, 2013). Recent 
research has revealed that ethnic minority electoral turnout in the 2010 elections 
surpassed the average white voter (Sobolewska et al. 2011 in Dobbernack et al, 
2012; Sanders et al, 2014) and it is also claimed that Muslims have a much 
higher level of trust in the government compared to Christians, indicating a 
greater likelihood to engage politically (Maxwell, 2010). While exact levels of 
engagement are difficult to prove, there is also no compelling evidence to 
suggest Muslims have a lower level of participation in British politics compared to 
the majority white population or other ethnic minority groups (Ansari, 2009; Heath 
and Khan, 2012). What is clear is that despite being seen as disloyal citizens 
who place their religious identity above national loyalties (Adamson, 2011; 
Parekh, 2008; Pew, 2006) Muslims have often voted on the basis of their class 
rather than religious identity. This is evidenced by the fact that despite having 
more ideologically common ground with the Conservative Party, a majority of 
Muslims have voted for Labour because of its support for working class and anti-
racism issues (Akhtar, 2012; Ansari, 2009; Modood, 2010; Purdam, 2001). 
Ansari (2009:240) states that:  
Successive general election results have shown that Muslims do not simply 
vote for Muslim candidates. For instance, conservative Muslim candidates 
have not been successful in Muslim areas even against white or other non-
Muslim labour candidates. 
This was witnessed in the Bradford West constituency with a 38% Muslim 
population, where the Respect Party candidate George Galloway swept the by-
election of March 2012, defeating Labour candidate Imran Hussein by over 
10,000 votes (BBC News, 2012). *DOORZD\¶VVXFFHVVFDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKH
perception, particuODUO\DPRQJ\RXQJHU0XVOLPVWKDWµhe is talking positively 
about Muslims: in a climate that many Muslims would view as anti-Islamic or 
IslamaSKRELF¶$NKWDU,Qthe same constituency Sikh Labour 
candidate, Marsha Singh, beat Muslim candidates from other parties in four 
successive general elections from 1997, revealing that Muslim political choices 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  22 
are not dictated by religious identification. This also accounts for why political 
parties set up exclusively for Muslims, like the Islamic Party of Britain, have had 
little success (Akhtar, 2012; Ansari, 2009).  
Muslims have also been more directly involved in party politics and 
governanceZKLFKLVVHHQDVDµPHDVXUHRIWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIPLQRULW\JURXSVLQ
HTXDOLW\WHUPV¶DVZHOODVµWKHGHYHORSPHQWof civic relations between the minority 
FLWL]HQDQGWKHVWDWH¶0LFKDHO The first Muslim MP Mohammad 
Sarwar was elected in 1997 and since then the number of Muslims in parliament 
has doubled at the last election in 2010 to eight, with the addition of three female 
Muslim MPs (DeHanas et al, 2010). Muslim MPs have served as ministers in 
*RUGRQ%URZQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWDQG%DURQHVV6D\HHGD:DUVLEHFDPHWKHILUVW
0XVOLPIHPDOHPLQLVWHULQ'DYLG&DPHURQ¶VJRYHUQPHQW2¶7RROHHWDO At 
the local level it is estimated there were 208 Muslim Councillors in 2004 
accounting for 1.1% of the population (Beckford et al, 2006). However, Muslims 
do remain underrepresented in government in relation to their population and 
Ansari (2009:244) suggests this is due WRIHDUVRIDµZKLWHEDFNODVK¶WKDW
discourages parties from fielding more Muslim electoral candidates. There are 
also allegations that racism and discrimination against Muslims has hampered 
their chances of progress in political party structures (Ansari, 2009; Michael, 
2009; Purdam, 2001) while others have blamed the highly centralised nature of 
WKH%ULWLVKSROLWLFDOSDUW\V\VWHP&ODUNHWDOLQ2¶7RROHDQG*DOH
Muslims have been increasing their representation on consultative and advisory 
bodLHVDWORFDODQGQDWLRQDOOHYHOVVLQFHWKHVEXWKHUHWRR2¶7RROHHWDO
(2013) caution against making generalisations since that the patterns of progress 
are varied across the country.  
Muslim participation in mainstream politics is not without controversy 
particularly around the issue of biraderi or kinship politics whereby community 
leaders who gain political capital tend to favour members of their sect or family 
over others. This is often thought to be linked to early Muslim settlers maintaining 
close ties with politics from their home countries but others argue that biraderi 
politics evolved through the particularities of British political parties that engaged 
with minority groups through their designated leaders rather than communicating 
with them directly (Akhtar, 2012; Michael, 2004). While still carrying traces of 
subcontinental customs, biraderi politics is largely attributed to the way in which 
Muslim leadership was promoted by politicians reliant on gatekeepers to give 
them access to the ethnic minority vote (Akhtar, 2012; Michael, 2004). These 
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self-VW\OHGFRPPXQLW\OHDGHUVDFWHGDVµEURNHUVEHWZHHQWKHVWDWHDQGWKHLU
FRPPXQLWLHVDUROHQRWGLVVLPLODUWRWKDWSOD\HGE\µLQGLJHQRXV¶OHDGHUVXQGHU
FRORQLDOSDWURQDJH¶$QVDUL7hese leaders failed to gain the 
confidence of younger Muslims because of their pusillanimous co-optation into 
the state and the fact that biraderi politics not only has a reputation for being 
sectarian and gendered it is also unfavourable to younger constituents (Akthar, 
2012; DeHanas et al, 2010; Lewis, 2007; Michael, 2004, Ouseley, 2001). Michael 
(2004) maintains that community leaders have marginalised younger Muslims 
because the arrangement of gatekeeping has served their own interests. Akthar 
(2012:762) echoes this view.  
This younger generation of Pakistani voter sees little value in the biraderi 
system, and does not identify with their community leaders, who very often 
do not engage in the issues which concern them.  
According to a government report on tackling extremism the dominance of 
biraderi SROLWLFVLVDOVROLQNHGWRUDGLFDOLVDWLRQDVµYoung Muslims are often 
doubly disaffected ± (1) from wider society and (2) from conventional leadership 
UROHVDQGWUDGLWLRQVZLWKLQWKHLURZQFRPPXQLWLHV¶+RPH2ffice, 2005:12). 
Academics view the role of biraderi politics in the alienation of younger Muslims 
differently, placing a greater emphasis on politicians who rely on community 
elders as a conduit to reach other community members rather than direct 
communication (Akhtar, 2012). One of the consequences of biraderi politics has 
been that politicians have neglected some sections of the community, like youth 
and women, isolating them from the political system (Akhtar, 2012; 2013). While 
the promotion of selected leaders granted Muslims some access to political 
LQIOXHQFHWKHSURFHVVRIIHUHGOLWWOHµSHQHWUDWLRQRIPDLQVWUHDPLQVWLWXWLRQV¶ZKHUH
real power resides (Ansari, 2009). The area of civil society, where this thesis 
focuses its attention, may for all the above reasons have had much greater 
purchase for Muslims seeking to make their political mark in Britain, as the next 
section explores.  
 
Civil society and identity politics  
While 9/11 marks a rise in the prominence given to Muslim politics in 
Britain it is not the definitive event it is often assumed to be. The Rushdie Affair 
more than a decade earlier is an equally iconic landmark µLGHQWLILHGLQPXFKRI
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the literature as a key moment in the development of British Muslim identity 
SROLWLFV¶&KRXGKXU\, 2007:8). Prior to this Muslims were largely seen through the 
OHQVRIµ$VLDQSDVVLYLW\¶6DHHGas a homogenous community that 
ZDVUHODWLYHO\µSHDFHDEOHODZ-DELGLQJVXFFHVVIXO¶$OH[DQGHU:KHUH
Muslim engagement in civil society transpired it was largely subsumed under 
class politics or black and anti-racist movements (Ansari, 2009; DeHanas et al, 
2010; Malik, 2009; Michael, 2009; Modood, 2005; Ramamurthy, 2006; 2013). As 
already intimated Muslims have predominantly supported the Labour Party in line 
with their class interests (Ansari, 2009) but they have also organised over racism 
and cultural struggles µDURXQGGD\-to-day issues they face as ordinary citizens of 
WKLVFRXQWU\¶.KDQ. $V'REEHUQDFNHWDOLQIRUPXVµin the 
1950s, initial mobilisations on an ethnic minority-basis were largely in response 
to local experiences of racial discrimination.¶  
Amongst early migrants, mostly labourers and unskilled workers, links with 
trade unions and leftist organisations in the sub-continent remained strong and 
this encouraged them to join forces with British trade unions and socialists. 
However, experiences of racism and a failure to gain support for ethnic minority 
issues from the British left compelled these early activists to seek alternative 
ways to organise politically (Ansari, 2009; Ramamurthy, 2006; 2013). Many set 
up their own organisations to meet the needs of ethnic minorities through bodies 
like the Indian Workers Association and Pakistani Workers Association 
(Ramamurthy, 2006; 2013). These organisations largely focused on issues of 
UDFLVPDQGGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGZRUNHUV¶ULJKWVDVZHOODVFXOWXUDODFFHSWDQFH
According to Parekh (2008:101) while the first generation of Muslim migrants 
initiated the process of politicisation, it was the second generation that played a 
FUXFLDOUROHLQGULYLQJ0XVOLPDFWLYLVPIRUZDUGDVWKH\µGLGQRWVKDUHWKHLUSDUHQWV¶
inhibitions and diffidence, and knew how to find their way around well in the 
SROLWLFDOV\VWHP¶This confidence found expression in the emergence of the 
Asian Youth Movement organisations in various British cities in the 1980s, largely 
in response to frustration at the µLQWHJUDWLRQLVWDSSURDFKWRSROLWLFV¶(Ramamurthy, 
2006:42) conducted by organisations like the IWA and PWA who eschewed 
confrontational tactics.  While the early workers associations chose to represent 
themselves under their different ethnic origins, the Asian Youth Movement 
VRXJKWEURDGHUVROLGDULW\XQGHUWKHLGHQWLW\ODEHORIµ$VLDQ¶ZKHUHµWKHUHZDVD
conscious GHFLVLRQWR¿QGDQLGHQWLW\WKDWZRXOGVHrve to unify rather than divide¶
(Ramamurthy, 2006:43). The rise of Asian Youth Movements also saw people of 
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South Asian origin begin to assert their distinctiveness from the identity label of 
µblack¶DQGµUDFH¶although Ramamurthy (2006; 2013) argues that the emphasis 
on Asian was not a break from the political category of black but rather 
transcended the national and ethnic sectarianism of their parents which they 
could not identify with.  
Although those involved in youth movements were Asian, they 
simultaneously saw themselves as blacks in a white society.  
(Ramamurthy, 2006:44).  
While this may hold for Asian Youth Movements, Modood (2005; 2010) has 
DUJXHGWKDWWKHODEHORIµEODFN¶KDVQHYHUUHVRQDWHGSROLWLFDOly with many Asian 
and Muslim minorities in Britain. Nevertheless Muslims did play a part in the 
Asian Youth Movement ZKLFKZDVFRQFHUQHGZLWKLVVXHVRIµVWUHHWUDFLVP
institutional racism, the criminalisation of minorities and police racism¶
(Ramamurthy, 2013:193) albeit within a framework of mobilisation that has been 
characterised as distinctly secular in relation to later Muslim identity politics 
(Malik, 2009; Ramamurthy, 2006; 2013). Although the Union of Muslim 
Organisations was formed in UK and Ireland in 1970 this failed to gain support 
from Muslims (O'Toole et al, 2013) since early political mobilisation often 
converged around issues of ethnicity and culture rather than religion (Ansari, 
2009). This began to change towards the end of the 1980s.  
ThHHPHUJHQFHRIµ0XVOLP¶DVDµVDOLHQWpolitical category or discursive 
field¶LVDPRUHUHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWLQGHEWHGWRµstrategies of both political 
mobilisation and the incorporation of so-FDOOHGµLPPLJUDQW¶SRSXODWLRQVLQ:HVWHUQ
Europe¶$GDPVRQ00; original emphasis). The Rushdie Affair was 
significant in marking the emergence of Muslim identity politics on the basis of 
religious affiliation which brought into focus the inadequacy of anti-race and 
political black movements to represent the cultural differentiation and recognition 
sought by Muslims (Michael, 2009; Modood, 2005). The rise of organisations 
representing Muslim interests owes a great deal to the outrage felt over 
5XVKGLH¶VERRNZKLFKZDVQRWVKDUHGE\RWKHUVLQWKHORRVHO\DOOLHGILHOG of anti-
racism or left politics, leaving Muslims feeling politically isolated (Akhtar, 2013; 
Modood, 2005; 2010). For those who questioned the ability of Muslim migrants to 
integrate into Western liberal cultures there could not have been a better 
illustration of their misgivings than the image of angry young Muslims burning 
FRSLHVRI5XVKGLH¶VQRYHOThe Satanic Verses in British city centres, a reaction 
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that was cited as evidence of ,VODP¶VLQFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWKsecular values of 
tolerance and free speech. $VQRWHGDIWHUWKHHYHQWµQRPLQRULW\LQWKHFRQWH[WRI
British race relations has been as friendless as Muslims in spring 1989¶(Modood, 
2010:13) with condemnation uniting both left and right critics.  
The emergence of Muslim identity as an important driver for activism can 
be partly explained by generational differences, as British Muslims who were 
born and raised in the West were beginning to confront a new social, political and 
economic order compared to their migrant parents. Facing new challenges with 
the confusing and contradictory experience of being a religious minority in a 
secular society, young Muslims could not easily resolve these issues through the 
cultural and ethnic traditions of their parents to which they had little affinity 
(Ansari, 2009; Cesari, 2007; Lewis, 2007, Roy, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005). 
Alienated from parental cultures and excluded from British society due to rising 
Islamophobia, many younger Muslims found a sense of integrity and belonging 
through identifying with Islam (Cesari, 2007; Parekh, 2008; Ramadan, 2009; Roy, 
2004).   
A differing view is that Muslim identity politics marks the maturation of 
Muslim civic consciousness through a proliferation during the 1980-90s of 
organisations like Muslim Council of Britain, Council of Mosques and Council of 
Imams and Mosques (O'Toole et al, 2013). According to this perspective the 
increasing salience of Muslim identity politics is not merely a negative 
consequence of events like the Rushdie Affair and 9/11 but rather it is the 
product of the dynamic and assertive action of Muslim civil society organisations. 
As a recent study argues: 
..the current political visibility of Muslims in the UK has also been an 
outcome of Muslim activism ± in lobbying for state recognition of Muslim 
distinctiveness and seeking inclusion within governance ± as well as 
significant institutional innovation in the ways in which government has 
recognised and engaged with Muslims since the late 1990s. 2¶7RROHHWDO 
2013:9; original emphasis).  
In this report, EDVHGRQWKHµODUJHVWDQGPRVWFRPSUHKHQVLYHVWXG\RI
Muslim participation in governance¶(O¶7RROHHWDO, the role of Muslims 
in civil society is described as progressing in three stages. Early efforts to tackle 
racism and structural disadvantages constitute 'disparate' attempts to establish 
representative bodies¶ (O'Toole et al, 2013:17). Although the report does not 
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mention them as such, organisations like the IWA and AYM can be seen as part 
of these efforts. After the Rushdie affair the 1990s are seen as a 'phase of 
consolidation' with the inception of the Muslim Council of Britain as an umbrella 
organisation representing the distinctive concerns and issues of Muslims. The 
third phase following 2005 is considered to be marked by 'pluralism and 
diversification', where a variety of bodies representing different Muslim interests, 
identities and concerns emerged and were variously recognised by government 
(O¶7RROHHWDO). A consequence of this latest proliferation of Muslim 
representative bodies has been the government's recognition that it needs to 
GLYHUVLI\LWVHQJDJHPHQWZLWK0XVOLPVDQGVWRSUHO\LQJRQDµVPDOOFRWHULHRI
OHDGHUV¶2
7RROH et al, 2013:22) who perpetuate the biraderi system.  
As this and the previous section have demonstrated, Muslim engagement 
in British politics has made incremental gains in bolstering the visibility and 
capacity of Muslims to mobilise, which is viewed optimistically by some as 
marking new levels of accommodation and respect for Muslim cultural demands 
LQ%ULWDLQ.KDQZKLOHRWKHUVKDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKH%ULWLVKVWDWH¶V
concessions to Muslim demands sometimes exceed the limits of a liberal state 
(Joppke, 2009). However, it is important to remember that many of these forms 
of politics have failed to adequately engage with younger Muslims who often feel 
alienated from biraderi politics as well as the national organisations like Muslim 
Council of Britain run by older Muslim men (Akhtar, 2013; Lewis, 2007; Michael, 
2004). For many young Muslims the Iraq War and the war on terror have been 
more decisive in mobilising political and civic activism (Akhtar, 2013). 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the gains made by past mobilisations have 
opened up possibilities that newcomers to this field can capitalise upon. In the 
next section some of these gains are explored within a discussion of the rise of 
identity politics as the conceptual category that explicates Muslim claims-making.  
 
The stakes in identity politics 
Before exploring the central issues which have animated Muslim 
mobilisation under the rubric of identity politics it is necessary to define what 
identity politics refers to. 7KHWHUPµLGHQWLW\SROLWLFV¶is usually seen as marking a 
departure from previous class-based labour movements. Fraser (2001) considers 
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class politics to be concerned with redistribution while identity politics focuses on 
recognition. Comparing the two Fraser (2001:21) claims: 
Members of the first camp hope to redistribute wealth from the rich to the 
poor, from the North to the South, and from the owners to the workers. 
Members of the second, in contrast, seek recognition of the distinctive 
SHUVSHFWLYHVRIHWKQLFµUDFLDO¶DQGVH[XDOminorities, as well as of gender 
difference. 
However, the distinction between redistribution and recognition has been 
questioned as being conceptually and empirically unsound (Isin and Wood, 
1999). Honneth (2001:53) claims identity politics cannot be reduced to demands 
for cultural recognition alone and that Fraser has constructed a false dichotomy 
that is challenged by revealing how various struggles for equality since the late 
19th century have been based on demands for recognition as well as 
redistribution. Hall (2001:442) has similarly cast doubts over such a division 
between two paradigms within politics, which views identity politics as a 
UHSODFHPHQWIRUFODVVSROLWLFVVLQFHSROLWLFVGRHVQRWµSURFHHGE\ZD\RIDVHWRI
oppositions and reversals of thLVNLQG¶Young (2000:1324) claims that identity 
SROLWLFVLVQRWVLPSO\DFODLPIRUUHFRJQLWLRQEXWIXQFWLRQVDVµSDUWRIRUPHDQVWR
claims against discrimination, unequal opportunity, political marginalization, or 
XQIDLUEXUGHQV¶ 
Identity politics is often associated with movements and struggles based on 
claims of marginalisation, oppression and stigmatisation based on differences 
between groups that are structurally and culturally disadvantaged. This is why 
identity politics is also equated with the µpolitics of difference¶ pursued by 
feminists, gays and ethnic minorities who have critiqued liberal ideals of equality 
based on universal rights as disguising the interests of white middle class 
heterosexual males (Parekh, 2000; Young, 1990; 2000). Modood (2003) claims 
that Muslim identity politics is a game of catching up where lessons have been 
drawn from other movements for emancipation and inclusion, like feminist and 
gay rights struggles, that have challenged class and colour-racism as the sole 
basis of social discrimination and inequality. However, the Muslim case has not 
been a straight-forward one of extending the existing accommodation offered to 
other group-based demands, due to Muslim differences being seen as 
particularly challenging to liberalism¶s strong secularist tradition (Cesari, 2009; 
Meer and Modood, 2009; Mavelli, 2013).  
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Despite significant challenges Muslim identity politics has made impressive 
gains in Britain, particularly in bringing religious discrimination on an equal 
footing with the higher standards of legal safeguards and penalties accorded to 
racial or ethnic discrimination. Previously while religious groups like Jews and 
Sikhs were recognised as ethnic groups, Muslims were denied this on grounds 
that they are an ethnically diverse group (Choudhury, 2007b; Meer, 2008). 
Although Muslims had recourse to equality legislation under their ethnic 
categorisation as Pakistanis or Bangladeshis, claims against religious 
discrimination were denied despite the established presence and rise of the 
phenomenon of µ,VODPRSKRELD¶(Allen, 2007; The Runnymede Trust, 1997). A 
highly contested concept, the word Islamophobia was first officially defined in a 
report by The 5XQQ\PHGH7UXVWDVµXQIRXQGHGKRVWLOLW\WRZDUGV,VODP¶
but its credence has been questioned by those who accuse it of confusing 
discrimination with criticism of Muslims, stifling free speech and deflecting 
attention away from structural inequalities (Joppke, 2009; Malik, 2005). This 
study follows a significant body of literature by scholars who contradict this latter 
view by framing Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism marked by fear and 
hatred of Muslims that causes real harms and injustices (Brown and Saeed, 
2014; Frost, 2008; Kumar, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; Lentin, 2014; Semati, 2010).  
In a landmark moment, the introduction of the Equality Act of 2010 brought 
Muslims in line with other groups through an integrated law covering all forms of 
disFULPLQDWLRQLQFOXGLQJµDJHGLVDELOLW\JHQGHUUDFHUHOLJLRQRUEHOLHIVH[XDO
orientation and gender reassignment¶(Weller, 2011:2) and marking a radical shift 
LQWKHVWDWH¶VSRVLWLRQ: 
The Government has moved from arguing that there was no evidence of 
religious discrimination (making legislation unnecessary) to religious 
discrimination legislation that goes beyond EU directives or indeed 
anything found in Europe. (DeHanas et al, 2010:5) 
Another significant demand within Muslim identity politics has been for the 
provision of state funding for Muslim faith schools which has frequently been 
portrayed as a step too far (Ansari, 2009; Meer, 2009; Tinker and Smart, 2012). 
After 9/11 /DERXU037RQ\:ULJKWGHFODUHGWKDWµ>E@HIRUH6HSWHPEHULWORRNHG
like a bad idea, it now looks like a mad idea¶%%&1HZV:LWKµWKH
existence of over 4700 state funded Church of England schools, over 2100 
Catholic, 33 Jewish and 28 Methodist schools¶(Meer, 2009:381) it is often 
overlooked that Muslim demands for faith schools are based on a bid for equality 
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rather than exceptional treatment. State funding for Muslim schools was first 
approved in 1997 with two schools getting voluntary aided status and later 
increasing to seven with continuing parental demand for more (Meer, 2010).  
Another major achievement of Muslim mobilisation has been the inclusion 
of a question on religion and religious identification for the first time in the 2001 
FHQVXV$GDPVRQ2¶7RROHHWDOThe success of many of the above 
campaigns can be attributed to the efforts of Muslim civil society activists and 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVOLNHWKH0XVOLP&RXQFLORI%ULWDLQ2¶7RROHHWDOAs Yip 
(2012:129) has argued in relation to sexual minorities, legislation can be a very 
empowering first step towards equality although it is less effective against the 
damaging effects of negative views ZLWKLQµHQWUHQFKHGVRFLDODWWLWXGHV¶. Such 
µFRYHUW¶forms of discrimination are evident in the negative characterisation of 
Muslim demands for equality under identity politics which are seen as separatist 
and harmful to Western liberal values.  
This is related to what Solomos (2001:202) has argued is a major problem 
with contemporary debates on µidentity politics¶ based on the µpresumption that 
one¶s identity necessarily defines one¶s politics and that there can be no politics 
until the subject has excavated or laid claim to his/her identity.¶ What is 
problematic in this understanding of identity politics is that it fails to grasp the 
µway in which identity grows out of and is transformed by action and struggle¶ 
(Solomos, 2001:202). This raises the inherent paradox of identity politics in that it 
is driven by the need to both challenge essentialist ideas about the group and 
reinforce them by asserting and amplifying differences (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 
2008; Phillips, 2007). While identity is central to Muslim politics its' political 
positioning with reference to external discrimination becomes obscured by 
essentialised views about Muslims. This is what Roy (2004) refers to as the 
misguided 'culturalist' approach which assumes Islam explains everything about 
Muslims. Cesari (2009:1) argues that such essentialised views perpetuate 
notions that:  
Islam is steeped in history and absolutely incapable of innovation, and 
Muslims are defined by an almost compulsive conformity to their past and 
an inability to address the current challenges of political development and 
religious liberal thinking. 
In this thesis I argue that such an essentialist view of Muslim identity 
politics persists because of a form of exceptionalism that positions faith-based 
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politics as isolated from other more secular political trends and struggles for 
inclusive citizenship. This is challenged in the next chapter which argues for the 
advantages of locating Muslim politics within broader theories of political 
participation. The theme of essentialism is also explored more fully in a later 
section in relation to its impact on Muslim citizenship.  
The next four sections focus on contemporary challenges to Muslim 
citizenship as a means of anticipating some of the key issues that might motivate 
young Muslims to mobilise. As the concept of citizenship has gained salience in 
VRFLDOVFLHQFHVWKURXJKDQµH[SORVLRQRILQWHUHVW¶.\POLFNDDQG1RUPDQ
in recent years so has it become more a more contested notion. This is because 
under conditions of globalisation citizenship is changing in multiple ways.   
 
Citizenship and resurgent nationalism 
At the most basic level citizenship may be understood as membership of a 
µOHJDOO\FRQVWLWXWHGSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\ZKLFKPD\EHFDOOHGFLYLOVRFLHW\¶
(Delanty, 2000:4). Mouffe (1992 in Lister 2010:195) has observed that citizenship 
LVDPDWWHURIµWKHNLQGRIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\ZHZDQW¶7KHLGHDRI
citizenship emerged in conjunction with the establishment of nation-states and 
this association remains strong to this day, along with the understanding that it is 
constituted by VLQJOHGRPLQDQWJURXSVLQWKHµVXJJHVWLYHXQLW\RIWhe seemingly 
homogenous nation¶(Habermas, 1998 in McGhee, 2010:138). This dominance of 
one group which asserts its will and values on national life often renders 
minorities as marginal and their cultures and ways of life as invisible (Hall, 1993; 
Meer, 2010). Therefore, the terms of inclusion in citizenship are consequential for 
those who may be on the social periphery, as this section seeks to demonstrate, 
by highlighting the ways in which changing citizenship regimes have impacted on 
British Muslim citizens. In both the legal and the cultural sense citizenship 
remains an exclusionary concept since it draws distinctions between those who 
belong and those who do not (Kivisto and Faist, 2007; Lister, 2010, Marx, 2002).  
In recent decades, the imperatives of globalisation have opened up 
possibilities for new modes of citizenship as migrant receiving nations confront 
WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIµVXSHU-GLYHUVLW\¶9HUWRYHF7KLVKDVOHGWRWKH
proliferation of terms like transnationalism (Samad and Sen, 2007; Kivisto and 
Faist, 2007) post-nationalism (Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 2012a), cosmopolitanism 
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(Stevenson, 2003), µglobally oriented citizenship¶ (Parekh, 2008:248) and 
µcitizens without frontiers¶ (Isin, 2012). Although globalisation has played a major 
part in reframing how citizenship is imagined Delanty (2000:2) argues that it is 
µFDSLWDOLVPQRWFLWL]HQVKLSWKDWLVWUXO\FRVPRSROLWDQWRGD\¶:KLOHJOREDOLVDWLRQ
has undoubtedly diluted the µpotency of the sovereign nation-state in control of its 
borders¶ (Isin, 2012:863), citizenship remains subject to the political and legal 
structures that are controlled by nations (Lister, 2010). As Delanty (2000:4) 
UHPLQGVXVWKHUHLVRQO\µDYHU\OLPLWHGFLYLOVRFLHW\EH\RQGWKHQDWLRQVWDWH¶
which diminishes the opportunities for enacting cosmopolitan or post-national 
citizenship.  
While on one level globalisation has displaced the centrality of the nation-
state to the idea of citizenship, the events of 2001 and beyond have seen many 
Western governments in Europe respond with new modes of resurgent 
nationalism which seek to reaffirm the central place of nations as the purveyors 




has been translated into a number of practical steps, such as the launch of 
mandatory citizenship education in schools, oath-taking ceremonies, English 
language proficiency and citizenship tests, as the government attempted to foster 
social cohesion by promoting national identity and unity (Grillo, 2005; Fekete, 




The resurgence of nationalism in Britain can also be linked to new moral 
panics around failed integration and social atrophy in a µEDFNODVKDJDLQVW
PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶9HUWRYHFDQG:essendorf, 2010:6) that came in the wake of 
riots in northern English towns in the summer of 2001. Social cohesion and 
national identity became a focal point of debates after official reports into the 
violent disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley blamed the riots on 
FRPPXQLWLHVOHDGLQJµSDUDOOHOOLYHV¶ (Cantle, 2001:9) prompting Werbner 
(2005:748) to remark on the irony that:  
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Not economic deprivation or racism, or the sense of threat to community 
provoked by the presence of racist organisations in the towns where the 
riots took place, but a lack of community cohesiveness and leadership 
were thus blamed in the report for the riots. 
Multiculturalism has come to signify such a multitude of concepts and ideas 
WKDWRIWHQLWLVGLIILFXOWWRZRUNRXWZKDWLVEHLQJUHMHFWHGLQWKHµZKROHVDOHretreat¶
(Joppke, 2004:244; original emphasis) from the notion. Although multiculturalism 
can refer to a political ideal or struggle for cultural inclusion (Modood, 2007) what 
is being referred to as multiculturalism here is the dominant policy of the British 
government from the late 1970s for accommodating difference and diversity. 
Following the disturbances the policy of multiculturalism came under fierce attack 
for promoting segregation, a reaction that was compounded by 9/11 when the 
µVHOI-VHJUHJDWLRQ¶RI0XVOLPV ZDVGHHPHGWREHDµVOLSSHU\VORSH¶WRµWHUURULVP¶, 
(Kundnani, 2007:124). The fact that the retreat from multiculturalism took a 
particularly nationalist shape and form is significant for Muslim citizenship since 
the outcome has been to associate the failure of the policy with the refusal of 
Muslims to integrate (Cesari, 2009; Lentin and Titley, 2011; Lentin, 2014; 
Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2008; Phillips, 2007). This was signalled by a new 
approach to integration which was articulated in efforts to promote a more 
vigorous and µactive¶ notion of British national µcitizenship¶ based on µshared 
identity¶, which was contrasted to µan unbridled multiculturalism which privileges 










of multiculturalism (BBC News, 2011). The fact that loss of social cohesion was 
ascribed to the failings of the Muslim community rather than structural conditions 
was evident in the focus on the conduct and values of Muslims as the main 
problem as Mr Cameron stated:  
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We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to 
belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving 
in ways that run counter to our values. (BBC News, 2011).  
These kinds of arguments that became pervasive among European 
political leaders after 9/11 (Lentin, 2014) have been branded as a form of 
µFXOWXUDOIXQGDPHQWDOLVP¶ (Kundnani, 2007:85) that is driving attitudes towards 
minorities in a monocultural direction. The retreat from multiculturalism has been 
linked to new forms of racism which paradoxically adopt a cultural form by 
disregarding the political, social and economic origins of social conflict and 
blaming too much diversity and alterity as the culprit (Goodhart, 2004; Grillo, 
2005, 2007; Lentin and Titley, 2011; Lentin, 2014; Modood, 2005; Vertovec, 
2011). 5HIHUULQJWRDQHZZDYHRIµQDWLYLVP¶VZHHSLQg Europe Fekete (2009:13) 
FODLPVWKHLQWHQWLRQLVµQROHVVWKDQWKHFXOWXUDOFOHDQVLQJRI(XURSHRIDOOIRUHLJQ
LQIOXHQFHVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHµDOLHQ¶UHOLJLRQRI,VODP¶ 
However, despite now being seen as defunct, Modood and Meer (2009) 
have argued that the multicultural approach has done much to create a political 
climate in Britain where Muslim demands for inclusive and equal citizenship can 
be heard and addressed. As such it is argued WKDWWKHVRFDOOHGµUHWUHDW¶IURP 
multiculturalism marks a rejection of its language rather than its principles 
(McGhee, 2008). Despite this positive note, the policy was officially abandoned 
DQGLQLWVSODFHFRPPXQLW\FRKHVLRQWRRNFHQWUHVWDJHDVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VQHZ
integration programme (Brown, 2010).  While delivering some real benefits to 
disadvantaged areas (Thomas, 2006), community cohesion has been decried as 
µa reinvigorated and assimilative national project¶ ZLWKµDQHPSKDVLVRQVRFLDO
FRQWUROUDWKHUWKDQVRFLDOMXVWLFH¶(Alexander, 2007:2436, 2468).  Without wishing 
to dismiss the deep psychological benefits that national identity can afford 
individuals (Skey, 2013) the concern being highlighted here relates to the 
assimilative tenor of nationalism that has placed the burden of integration on 
Muslim citizens by casting their cultural values as incompatible with Britain 
(Alexander, 2004; 2007; Lentin and Titley, 2011; McGhee, 2008).  
$WWKHKHDUWRIJRYHUQPHQWHIIRUWVWRVWUHQJWKHQµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶OLHFRQFHUQV 
about Muslim lack of loyalty to the nation, as evidenced by a number of studies 
highlighting alienation and disillusionment among British Muslims (Ameli, 2002, 
2004; Choudhury, 2007; Jayaweera and Choudhury, 2008; Joppke, 2009). When 
Muslim identities have been appraised through the lens of Britishness and 
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national identity a highly negative picture of alienation and disenchantment has 
emerged from studies such as $PHOL¶VLondon-based research (2002) on 
processes of globalisation. Ameli (2002) found that Muslims often differentiated 
notions of home from citizenship, so although they considered themselves 
FLWL]HQVRI%ULWDLQµWKH\GLGQRWKDUbour any great affinity with Britain as being 
WKHLUQDWXUDOKRPHODQG¶$PHOL6LPLODUO\$QVDULKDV
UHYHDOHGWKDWLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWK%ULWLVKQHVVFDQEHµSUDJPDWLF¶EDVHGRQOHJDO
FLWL]HQVKLSULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVZLWKQRUHDOµGHHSOy-held emotional and cultural 
ERQGVKDUHGZLWKWKHZKLWHVHFXODURU&KULVWLDQPDMRULW\¶ 
These studies have been challenged by alternative research revealing that 
young Muslims do have a strong sense of pride and ownership of British 
citizenship, although they do not relate to Englishness in the same way due to its 
association with whiteness (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005; Thomas, 2009b; 
Thomas and Sanderson, 2011). O¶Loughlin and Gillespie¶s (2012:155) research 
has reported µdissenting rather than disaffected citizenship¶ among British 
Muslims which they believe represents an attitude of µfrustration but hope¶. In a 
more recent study Nandi and Platt (2013:24) reported that Muslims from different 
ethnic backgrounds µare particularly likely to identify more strongly as British¶ 
compared to the white majority.  
Despite these varying accounts questions over Muslim loyalty have formed 
the basis of discourses and policies that place them on the µmargins of 
citizenship¶ (Brown, 2010:171). These concerns are partly fuelled by concerns 
DERXWWKHSULRULWLVDWLRQRI,VODPRYHUµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶DVDSULPDU\VRXUFHRILGHQWLW\
for younger Muslim. It has been revealed that for many young Muslims Islam 
provides a more positive and empowering sense of identity which mitigates the 
negative experiences of disadvantage and exclusion associated with their 
SDUHQWV¶FXOWXUDODQGHWKQLFLGHQWLW\$QVDUL/HZLV6DPDGDQG6HQ
2007). Learning and adopting a more scriptural and non-cultural form of Islam 
also gives many young Muslims, particularly women, the means of resisting 
cultural restrictions imposed by parents by asserting their own religious authority 
(Briggs, 2010; Choudhury, 2007, Glynn, 2002; Samad and Sen, 2007). Others 
like Thomas and Sanderson (2011:1039) consider religious identification to be a 
UHDFWLRQWRWKHµV\VWHPDWLFUDFLVWYLOLILFDWLRQRI0XVOLPFRPPXQLWLHVRYHUWKHSDVW
WZRGHFDGHV¶DVZHOODVDUHVXOWRIWhe alienating state policies on 
multiculturalism and terrorism.  
Active citizenship, dissent and power  36 
 
As migrants many Muslims experience Islam as a faith that is dislocated 
from its territorial specifications and encountered instead as a common bond with 
other Muslims with different cultural, ethnic and national backgrounds. The 
experience of living in secular, non-0XVOLPVSDFHVUHTXLUHV0XVOLPVLQWRGD\¶V
world to constantly invent Islam through discursive and scriptural rather than 
traditional means since a Muslim identity can no longer be taken for granted as 
part of the dominant social norm (Cesari, 205R\+HQFHµLGHQWLWLHV
that are integrated elements in Muslim countries are automatically deconstructed 
LQWRWKHLUUHOLJLRXVVRFLDODQGHWKQLFFRPSRQHQWV¶&HVDUL7KH
SUHVHQFHRIµQHZ0XVOLPV¶LQ(XURSHZKRDUHHPEUDFLQJWKHLQGLYLduality, 
postmodernity and urban character of the West through interaction with its 
secular traditions is reflected in the way in which Muslims have incorporated the 
ideals of autonomy and independence in their beliefs and practices by breaking 
with traditional rituals and observing their faith in a more spiritual and personal 
PDQQHU$FFRUGLQJWR&HVDULWKLVH[SODLQVZK\µ1HZ0XVOLPVKDYH
chosen to primarily anchor their identity within the transnational concept of the 
Ummah (the timeless commuQLW\RIEHOLHYHUVUDWKHUWKDQLQQDWLRQDOFXOWXUH¶
According to these arguments a strong Muslim identity is attributed to 
modernising influences rather than atavistic ones (Cesari, 2007; Roy, 2004; 
Ramadan, 2009).  
Although religion is making a 'comeback' amongst believers of other faiths 
(Roy, 2010) the growing religiosity of Muslims causes alarm because it is often 
spuriously linked to segregation and dangerous radicalisation (Brown, 2010; 
Lewis, 2007; Mythen, 2012; Parekh, 2008; Thomas and Sanderson, 2011). 
Research on Muslim identity and religiosity has made an interesting and valuable 
contribution to understanding Muslim citizenship in the West but it has also 
generated some questionable and pathological assumptions about the lack of 
compatibility between religious identification and Britishness. This may be the 
consequence of viewing identity separately from its political and social 
positioning by agents both inside and outside the group (Alexander, 2000; 
Solomos, 2001). As Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins DUJXHµ,WLVRQO\
when terms and concepts are analysed in the context of their usage that they 
WDNHRQULFKHUDQGPRUHQXDQFHGPHDQLQJV¶Therefore, this thesis pursues an 
understanding of the salience of religion in Muslim identities by reframing the 
QRWLRQRIFLWL]HQVKLSLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHµSROLWLFVRIIHDU¶0F*KHH[[WKDW
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has dominated questions of nationalism and cohesion post 9/11, as examined in 
the next section.  
 




enduring and ubiquitous theme in debates on citizenship in a post 9/11 context 
but as Bauman (2004) reminds us the notion of security in WKHµULVNVRFLHW\¶ 
diverges from previous understandings which underpinned the welfare  state. 
Security no longer invokes anxieties linked to loss of employment, self-respect or 
status but raises fears and uncertainties related to the body and material 
SRVVHVVLRQVHQJHQGHULQJVXVSLFLRQVZKLFKDUHGLUHFWHGDJDLQVWµWUHVSDVVHUVRQ
RXUSURSHUW\DQGVWUDQJHUVDWWKHGRRUZD\¶%DXPDQ 
Whilst one of the motivations for this study was to depart from a pattern of 
research that pathologises Muslim citizenship by viewing it exclusively through 
the lens of security and terrorism, these issues are difficult to escape when they 
are so dominant in social and media discourses and representations of Muslims, 
as well as being a pervasive and shadowy presence in the experience of 
everyday life for Muslims (Brown, 2010; Brown and Saeed, 2014; Frost, 2008; 
Gillespie, 2007; McGhee, 2010; Mythen et al, 2009; Pentazis and Pemberton, 
2009; Spalek and Lambert, 2008). This section reveals how the securitisation of 
citizenship has two salient features which are consequential for Muslim 
citizenship, firstly that government responses have been responsible for the 
demonisation and criminalisation of Muslim citizenship and secondly that these 
responses have a cultural dimension that positions Muslim identities and faith as 
being antithetical and threatening to British society. To begin with, a definition of 
securitisation is needed. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998 in McGhee, 
2010:42) describe it as: 
If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential 
threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or 
rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of 
securitization.  
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Therefore, securitisation is not a condition where the rule of law is violated 
in the face of real or imagined existential threats but when these threats 
legitimise the suspension of normally valid rules or exceptional measures are 
introduced even at the cost of cherished civil liberties (Brown, 2010; Mavelli, 
2013; McGhee, 2010; Vertigans, 2010). The irony of curtailing freedoms in the 
name of safeguarding liberties has not been lost on scholars who have 
expressed concerns about the repressive and decivilising impact of the war on 
terror (Buck-Morss, 2003; Butler, 2006; Dworkin, 2003; McGhee, 2010; 
Vertigans, 2010). One example of such a discursive construction of security that 
serves to legitimise new and more authoritarian forms of governance can be 
found in a RUSI journal (Prins and Salisbury, 2008:22) which states that security 
LVµQRWRQO\DTXHVWLRQIRU&KLHIVRIWKH'HIHQFH6WDII,WPDWWHUVWRHYHU\FLWL]HQ
RIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶WKXVSURMHcting security as a public issue which 
QHFHVVLWDWHVH[WUDRUGLQDU\VWDWHPHDVXUHVVLQFHVHFXULW\µLVWKHSULPDU\IXQFWLRQ
RIWKHVWDWHZLWKRXWLWWKHUHFDQEHQRVWDWHDQGQRUXOHRIODZ¶+HQFHWKH
exceptional measures are justified on grounds of performing necessary state 
functions. The role of the state in securitising Muslim citizenship is most apparent 
in the way in which counter-terrorism strategies have been targeted specifically 
at Muslims who are  µLQVWUXPHQWDOL]HGDQGVHFXULWL]HGZKHUHWKHLUQHeds are 
seen almost exclusively through the security lens, rather than in relation to the 
UDQJHRIRWKHUQHHGVWKH\KDYHDVLQGLYLGXDOVDQGFRPPXQLWLHV¶%ULJJV
274).  
Two important studies have shown how processes of criminalisation occur 
through counter-terrorism measures, by drawing comparisons between past Irish 
and present Muslim communities. Comparing more than 2700 media reports and 
over 800 policy documents Hickman et al (2011:5) report that:   
Despite anti-discrimination legislation, Muslim communities today are 
subjected to a VLPLODUSURFHVVRIFRQVWUXFWLRQDVµVXVSHFW¶DV,ULVK
communities in the previous era.   
Based on their findings and drawing lessons from the Irish experience 
Hickman et al (2011) are pessimistic about the chances of success with current 
counter-terrorism strategies which they believe legitimate public suspicion and 
hostility towards Muslims, while at the same time failing to address the underlying 
issues that may explain acts of terrorism. Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) 
present a detailed examination of counter-terrorism measures in the last few 
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GHFDGHVWRH[SOLFDWHSURFHVVHVWKURXJKZKLFKDµVXVSHFWFRPPXQLW\¶LV
constructed. Also adopting a comparative approach, Pentazis and Pemberton 
GUDZRQ3DGG\+LOO\DUG¶V seminal work on the 1974 Prevention of 
Terrorism Act and subsequent amendments which introduced the notion of a 
µsuspect community¶WRFDSWXUHWKHGHYDVWating impact of the legislation on Irish 
FRPPXQLWLHV+LOO\DUGLGHQWLILHGDµGXDOV\VWHPRIMXVWLFH¶WKURXJKZKLFK
Irish communities were marked by suspicion, where on the one hand a criminal 
MXVWLFHV\VWHPH[LVWHGIRUµ2UGLQDU\'HFHQW&ULPLQDOVZKRKDGFRPPLWWHG
FRQYHQWLRQDOFULPHVVXFKDVEXUJODU\PXUGHUDQGUDSH¶ZKLOHon the other hand 
an alterQDWLYHµGUDFRQLDQV\VWHPGHYHORSHGWRGHDOZLWKWKRVHVXVSHFWHGRI,ULVK
µWHUURULVP¶¶3DQWD]LVDQG3HPEHUWRQ)ROORZLQJ+LOO\DUGWKHFRXQWHU
terrorism laws introduced in the last two decades are analysed by Pentazis and 
Pemberton (2009:653) to reveal how security forces have tackled the threat of 
terrorism by indiscriminately targeting all Muslims without any need to establish 
JURXQGVIRUDµUHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQ¶Criminalisation becomes inevitable in the 
µIL[LQJRI0XVOLPFRPPXQLWLHVUDWKHUWhan individual suspects within the gaze of 
counter-WHUURULVPSROLFLQJ¶, made possible through the extension of police powers 
in new terrorism acts passed in 2000 and 2006 (Pantazis and Pemberton, 
2009:653). Despite the damaging impact of this approach on community 
UHODWLRQVDVKLJKOLJKWHGE\+LOO\DUG¶VUHVHDUFKRQWKH,ULVKFDVHWKHUHKDVEHHQ
a failure of political will to appreciate how discriminating counter-terrorism 
measures are for Muslims. This is evident in a statement made by the then 
minister responsible for counter-terrorism, Hazel Blears, to parliament:  
«the fact that at the moment the threat is most likely to come from those 
people associated with an extreme form of Islam, all falsely hiding behind 
Islam, if you like, in terms of justifying their activities, inevitably means that 
some of our counter-terrorist powers will be disproportionately experienced 
by people in the Muslim community. That is the reality of the situation. 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2005:46) 
One example of the blurring of lines between security and citizenship can 
be found in the way in which community cohesion was delivered through counter 
terrorism measures by the last Labour government (Thomas, 2009a) which 
µcriminalized Muslim communities and depoliticized the real threat¶ (Brown, 
7KHLVVXHRIWHUURULVPEHFRPHVGHSROLWLFLVHGZKHQWKHVWDWH¶VHIIRUWV
to tackle it divert attention away from legitimate political grievances towards 
cultural issues of integration and cohesion (Brighton, 2007). Thus criminalisation 
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occurs through the welding of explanatory factors for radicalisation and 
extremism with assumed characteristics of Muslim communities like segregation 
and religious fundamentalism which are seen as fixed, intrinsic and difficult to 
reconcile with British values (Goodhart, 2004; Phillips, 2006, 2013). Not only are 
such pejorative ascriptions based on unsubstantiated generalisations, they 
simply ignore warnings that the rise of extremism is linked to British foreign 
policy, particularly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that a majority of Muslims, as 
well as non-Muslims, strongly oppose. In a leaked letter to a newspaper a top 
official at The Foreign Office warned that:  
British foreign policy and the perception of its negative effect on Muslims 
globally plays a significant role in creating a feeling of anger and impotence 
DPRQJHVSHFLDOO\WKH\RXQJHUJHQHUDWLRQRI%ULWLVK0XVOLPV>«@7KLV
seems to be a key driver behind recruitment by extremist organizations. 
(BBC News, 2005) 
Despite these warnings multiculturalism and lack of integration continued to 
EHDUWKHEUXQWRIWKHEODPHIRUFUHDWLQJµKRPHJURZQWHUURU¶DV%ULJKWRQ(2007:3) 
has pointed out:  
The issue of foreign policy is raised, its central importance is noted, but 
little if any account is offered of its relationship with domestic radicalization. 
Instead, WKHUHLVDUHWXUQWRWKHQHHGIRUµLQWHJUDWLRQ¶DQGE\H[WHQVLRQIRUD
reworking of the domestic framework of multiculturalism.  
Another demonstration of the permeation of security into Muslim citizenship 
lies in the controversial counter-terrorism VWUDWHJ\RIµ3UHYHQW¶under which the 
government sought to win the µhearts and minds¶ of Muslim citizens but which 
was critically dubbed as the government¶s µIslam policy¶ (Kundnani, 2009:8). As 
with community cohesion, Prevent has also been a mixed bag of fortunes which 
has impacted on Muslim communities variably through different local 
implementation practices as described by a recent report on the participation of 
%ULWLVK0XVOLPVLQJRYHUQDQFH2¶7RROHHWDO$OWKRXJKWKHUHSRUW
suggests that µMuslim civil society actors were not merely subject to the Prevent 
agenda, but were actively involved in (re) shaping and contesting the 
implementation of Prevent¶ LWLVQHYHUWKHOHVVYLHZVWKHSROLF\DVµDOLPLWHGDQG
securitized model of state-0XVOLPHQJDJHPHQW¶2¶7RROHHWDO 
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3UHYHQW¶VIRFXVRQµSURPRWLQJVKDUHGYDOXHVVXSSRUWLQJORFDOVROXWLRQV
building civic capacity and leadership and strengthening the role of faith 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGOHDGHUV¶'&/*FDQEHVHHQWRUHIOHFWVLPLODUUDWLRQDOLWLHV
DVWKHLPSHUDWLYHVWRSURPRWHµDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLS¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIUHVXUJHQW
nationalism (Home Office, 2004). The principle RIµDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLS¶
XQGHUSLQQLQJµcontemporary criminal justice policy¶ZDVLQYRNHGDIWHUWR
define the terms of Muslim citizenship as Spalek and Lambert (2008:257-8) 
argue:  
,QDSRVWFRQWH[W0XVOLPV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDVDFWLYHFLWL]HQVDUe being 
increasingly framed by anti-terror measures, which encourage internal 
community surveillance so that the responsible Muslim citizen is expected 
to work with the authorities to help reduce the risk of terrorism.  
 It is no surprise then that the policy is seen largely as an exercise of 
surveillance intended to coerce Muslims to spy on each other. Although the 
coalition government¶s Prevent (2011) policy tried to address this by separating 
community cohesion from counter-WHUURULVPµWKHUHUHPDLQVFRQViderable overlap 
EHWZHHQ3UHYHQWDQG&RKHVLRQZRUN¶GXHWRµQRUPDWLYHREMHFWLRQV¶WRVHSDUDWLQJ
WKHWZRDUHDV2¶7RROHHWDO-62). For all of the above reasons it is 
argued that government policy has been instrumental in cultivating anti-Muslim 
haWHWKURXJKµmore punitive and hard-line anti-terror legislation and measures 
that adversely affect Muslim communities¶)URVW 
As with resurgent nationalism the issue of securitisation has also been 
punctuated by concerns of a cultural kind, reflecting the culturalist approach 
which frames Islam as an explanation for all the real and imagined problems 
associated with Muslim citizenship (Brown, 2010; Cesari, 2007; Lentin, 2014; 




acceptable forms of Islam through support for groups like MINAB and special 
training for imams the government has created a pernicious distinction between 
PRGHUDWHDQGH[WUHPH0XVOLPV%URZQDQG6DHHG2¶7RROHDQG*DOH
0RGHUDWHRUµJRRG¶0XVOLPVDUHH[SHFWHGWRVXSSRUWJRYHrnment policies, 
particularly counter-terrorism measures that encourage them to spy on their 
FRPPXQLWLHVZKLOHWKRVHZKRUHIXVHWRGRVRDUHFRQGHPQHGDVGDQJHURXVµEDG
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MuslLPV¶%URZQ0DPGDQL). This alienates many Muslims, inflames 
Islamophobia and as Kundani (2014:1041) argues: µ,QGRLQJVRFXOWXUDOLVWV
displace what are essentially political conflicts onto a more comfortable cultural 
SODQH¶ 
7KHHYHQWVRIDGGHGWRFRUSRUHDOQRWLRQVRIVHFXULW\DQLPSHUDWLYHµWR
protect not only geograSKLFDOERXQGDULHVDQGSHRSOHEXWDOVRFLYLOL]DWLRQ¶
(Vertigans, 2010:26). This cultural dimension of the war on terror is reflected in 
the urgent need to protect Western values and ideals from the taint of foreign and 
particularly Islamic aberrations. As BURZQDVVHUWVµThe ability to 
represent British Muslims as subversive, dangerous and threatening therefore 
becomes pivotal to the contemporary articulation oIVHFXULW\LQWKH8.FRQWH[W¶ 




discursive realm is consolidated through repeated commentaries of Muslim 
pathology reiterated in events such as the fallout from the 2001 riots, moral 
panics over hijab and scarves, the Rushdie affair and the Danish cartoons 
controversy. Against this background existing flames of hostility towards Muslims 
are stoked by the discourses of politicians like Tony Blair (2013; my emphasis) 
who GHFODUHGDIWHUWKHPXUGHURI/HH5LJE\WKDWZKLOHWKHUHLVQRSUREOHPµwith¶
,VODPµthere is a problem within Islam¶. While 9/11 has brought it into sharp relief, 
this consolidated discursive realm has historical roots in WKH:HVW¶VGHHS-seated 
attitude of cultural dominance and supremacy towards formerly colonised people 
(Kumar, 2012; Said, 1997) whereby Islam has always been perceived as 
µXQHQOLJKWHQHGDQGXQVRSKLVWLFDWHG¶The Runnymede Trust, 1997:6).  
Through such associations securitisation has become centred on the 
identities and beliefs of Muslims rather than political grievances as the lever to 
radicalisation and terrorism, promoting the view that Muslims are the ³¿IWKFROXPQ
HQHP\ZLWKLQ´(Spalek, 2010:795). Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010:889-890) 
relate this process to a misguided but µFRQYHQWLRQDOZLVGRP of radicalization¶
which asserts that µa sense of Islamic difference «DPRQJ0XVOLPFRPPXQLWLHV
has the dangerous potential to mutate issues of differing identities into support 
IRUYLROHQWµ,VODPR-IDVFLVP¶¶ 
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This makes citizenship more precarious impacting on the everyday 
experiences of Muslims (Brown and Saeed, 2014; Mythen et al, 2009; Spalek 
and Lambert, 2008) who not only face physical attacks necessitating risk 
management through avoidance of certain public spaces, but also creates 
SV\FKRORJLFDODQGV\PEROLFIRUPVRIDJJUHVVLRQµcharacterized more by the 
intensity of the gaze of suspicion rather than the volatility of random violence¶
(Mythen, 2012:403). As a consequence of securitisation of citizenship µ\RXQJ
Muslims inhabit a contradictory and ambiguous space in relation to their values 
and identities, being depicted as a high-risk group whilst simultaneously being 
exhorted to assimilate more fully into British society¶0\WKHQHWDO
'HVSLWHVXFKµFDYHDWVRQ0XVOLPFODLPVRIFLWL]HQVKLS¶%URZQ 
research has revealed surprising levels of resilience and creativity in the way that 
young Muslims respond to the conditionality of citizenship at the current time. 
2¶/RXJKOLQand Gillespie (2012:115) discovered µdissenting rather than 
GLVDIIHFWHGFLWL]HQVKLSLVDJURZLQJWUHQG¶while Mythen (2009:402) identified 
µDFWVRIUHVLOLHQFH««through which a sense of self and faith were sustained¶
The paucity of research in this area (Mythen et al, 2009; Spalek and Lambert, 
2008; Vertigans, 2010) calls for further investigation to understand the impact of 
securitised citizenship on young Muslims which this study addresses in Chapters 
7 and 8.  
 
Rebalancing rights and responsibilities  
Citizenship has always been subject to perennial tensions between µthe 
nature of and relationship between rights and responsibilities¶ (Lister, 2010:195). 
In post-war Britain, citizenship was predominantly shaped by Marshall¶s (1950 in 
Turner 2001:15) triad of rights; µcivil, political and social¶ designed to safeguard 
citizens from the µinjustices caused by the capitalist market¶ (Soysal, 2012a:1). 
0DUVKDOO¶VPRGHOKDVEHHQFULWLFLVHGIRUIDLOLQJWRFRQVLGHUFXOWXUDOULJKWVZKLFK
FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVµDQHZEUHHGRIFODLPVIRUXQKLQGHUHGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
recognition without marginalization, acceptance and integration without 
³QRUPDOL]LQJ´GLVWRUWLRQ¶3DNXOVNLLQ6WHYHQVRQMore recently 
arguments for post-national citizenship have foregrounded human rights as the 
basis for claiming equality and justice thus blurring the distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens and undermining the hegemony of the nation-state 
(Delanty, 2000; McGhee, 2010; Nash, 2009; Soysal, 2012b). These processes 
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are paralleled by resurgent nationalism, as discussed earlier, which places 
increasing demands on citizens as citizenship moves from µa prima facie right¶ to 
becoming a µprized possession that is to be earned and can be lost if not properly 
cultivated¶ (van Houdt et al, 2011:408).  
$VQRWHGHDUOLHUµDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLS¶DVDUHYLVHGPRGHRILQWHJUDWLRQXQGHU
community cohesion (Jayaweera and Choudhury, 2008; McGhee, 2008) is a 
coded demand for Muslims to prove their compatibility with Britain and comply 
with government initiatives on counter-terrorism and foreign policy. This has 
created a sense of contingency and precariousness around citizenship which is 
further FRPSRXQGHGE\DFRUUHVSRQGLQJHPSKDVLVRQµDFWLYH citizenship¶ through 
WKHµQHROLEHUDOWXUQ¶in Western democracies (Brown, 2005; Marinetto, 2003). As 
with citizenship the term neoliberalism is also an indeterminate one which at a 
broad level signifies a µtheory of political economic practices¶ premised on the 
primacy of µprivate property rights, free markets, and free trade¶ (Harvey, 2005:2) 
but applied to governance it has taken variable forms and economic 
configurations since the 1970s. Rather than its economic formulations this study 
is more concerned with neoliberal rationality which involves µextending and 
disseminating market values to all institutions and social action¶ (Brown, 2005:40; 
original emphasis). The move towards the neoliberalisation of citizenship is 
evinced by the pervasive use of the term µactive citizenship¶ which emphasises 
citizen duties, with an attenuating focus on their rights.  
Marinetto (2003:106) argues that the neoliberal turn marks a point of 
departure from liberal notions of citizenship under which citizens played a 
µSDVVLYHUROHLQWKHSROLWLFDODQGGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJSURFHVV¶, usually limited to 
voting every few years. According to Kymlicka and Norman (2000:6) changes in 
global politics have UHIUDPHGWKHPHDQLQJRIGHPRFUDF\WRJREH\RQGWKHµMXVWLFH
RILWVLQVWLWXWLRQV¶ WRGLYHUWJUHDWHUDWWHQWLRQWRµWKHTXDOLWLHVDQGDWWLWXGHVRI
FLWL]HQV¶DVDmarker of the health and quality of a nation. While active citizenship 
is important for the functioning of democracy (Home Office, 2004) its definition 
and deployment through neoliberal governance has been problematic because it 
espouses µresponsible self-help¶ (Marinetto, 2003:109) while cutting back on 
welfare provision (Isin and Wood, 1999). Dominant in the discourses of 
successive British governments, the notion of active citizenship has been 
interpreted as hegemonic (Davies, 2012) which, rather than empowering citizens, 
has effectively been µan efficient means for regulating the population¶ (Marinetto, 
2003, 110). This approach to citizenship redirects attention from its inalienable 
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ULJKWVWRWKHGXWLHVWKDWLWHQWDLOVDV%ODLUVXPPDULVHGµIRU too long the 
demand for rights from the state was separated from the duties of individuals and 
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶7KHHPSKDVLVRQDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLSKDVHPHUJHG since the 1980s as 
part of efforts by the state µWRJURXQGFLWL]HQVKLSRQWKHSULQFLSOHVRIGXW\
REOLJDWLRQDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ZKLFKµKDVFKDOOHQJHGWKHWUDGLWLRQDOVRFLDO
democratic preference for a solidarity grounded on universal and egalitarian 
VRFLDOULJKWV¶)LW]SDWULFN 
The concept of active citizenship under the Conservatives made the 
individual the subject of active citizenship, privileging individualistic values as 
inscribed in the New Right agenda of marketising social arrangements, often at 
the expense of community engagement (Davies, 2012; Marinetto, 2003). In 
contrast even thoXJK1HZ/DERXUµPDGHVHULRXVHQGHDYRXUVWRGHYHORSSROLFLHV
WRSURPRWHFRPPXQLW\LQYROYHPHQW¶0DULQHWWRLWVLQLWLDWLYHVKDYH
been framed around a very passive idea of participation without any real transfer 
of power. Employing a Foucauldian perspective, Cruikshank (1994 in Marinetto, 
KDVDUJXHGWKDWWKHLGHDRIHPSRZHULQJFRPPXQLWLHVµFXOWLYDWHVD
certain type of subjectivity which encourages the active engagement of the poor 
in the provision of social services, thus reducing their deSHQGHQF\RQWKHVWDWH¶
While reduction of dependency can be empowering for citizens, the mechanisms 
through which this is being achieved under neoliberalism simply absolves the 
state of its responsibilities while vulnerable citizens are being asked to take a 
much greater slice of the burden than they are equipped to endure (Soysal, 
2012a).  
One of the distinguishing features of the neoliberalisation of citizenship is 
that it links good citizenship to economic self-sufficiency. As Lemke (2000:12) 
VWDWHVµOne key feature of the neo-liberal rationality is the congruence it 
endeavours to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an 
economic-rational individual.¶&RQYHUVHO\WKRVHZKRODFNVHOI-sufficiency and 
social capital are deemed to be bad citizens who are less deserving of rights 
(Kennelly, 2011; Soysal, 2012a). The new language of good (deserving) and bad 
(undeserving) citizens, who are characterised according to their ability to 
succeed in the market place, further burdens those who already experience 
structural barriers to inclusion as they now face demands to take responsibility 
for their unequal status (Soysal, 2012a). Since Muslims constitute one of the 
most disadvantaged and underachieving groups in terms of employment, 
education and other markers of social capital (Frost, 2008) this adds to existing 
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pressures on their citizenship which is already made precarious by post 9/11 
policies on integration and counter-terrorism. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature on the history of Muslim 
political participation and citizenship in Britain, reflecting on momentous events 
that have created precarious conditions for belonging and participation for 
Muslims in Britain. The emergence of new forms of nationalism, securitised 
citizenship and neoliberal notions of individual responsibility set the hegemonic 
conditions in which the political and civic activism of young adult Muslims is 
located. Against this context one of the tasks of this thesis is to examine how 
much these issues constrain or enable activism and how it relates to the politics 
of the past and the current regimes of citizenship. The following chapter 
examines the broader theories of political participation that frame these 
investigations.  
  




The previous chapter set out the empirical context of Muslim politics and 
citizenship, in the process touching on some of the specific theoretical debates 
around Muslim identity politics. This chapter draws on more general political 
theories of politics, power and participation which can be appropriated to gain a 
better sociological understanding of the political and civic activism of young adult 
Muslims.  
This chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which challenges the 
exceptionalism of Muslim identity politics by revealing its consistencies with the 
changing patterns of political behaviour among citizens in the West. This 
discussion shifts the focus, in the next two sections, to cultural politics and social 
movements respectively, which play an important role in framing Muslim identity 
politics as a contemporary expression of political agency.  
The final section focuses on Foucauldian theories of power and politics as 
a strong basis from which to develop an overarching theoretical understanding of 
politics in contemporary societies. Foucauldian analysis of power extends the 
traditional view of politics into areas of political engagement previously relegated 
to the private and personal. It is also a compelling and important sociological, 
political and philosophical model of the social world that allows this study to 
connect the microdynamics of political participation in the quotidian context, 
explored through the use of social movement theory, to the macro level where 
dominant forms of power become visible.  
 
Democratic deficit and new citizen politics 
A growing body of literature has chronicled the shifting dynamics of political 
participation by citizens, marked by a gradual decline in voting and political party 
membership, as well as increasing distrust and scepticism towards elite-
governed hierarchical institutions in Western democracies (Dalton, 2008; Kivisto 
and Faist, 2007; Leftwich, 2008; Marsh et al. 2007; Norris 2002, 2003, 2011;  
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Putnam, 2000; The Electoral Commission 2005; Youth Citizen Commission, 
2009)7KLVWUHQGKDVSUHFLSLWDWHGIHDUVRIDµGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLW¶(Norris, 2002) 
signalling a legitimacy crisis in politics (Dalton, 2008; Hay, 2007). Although 
electoral turnouts have gradually declined since the 1960s Norris (2011) has 
cautioned against drawing alarmist conclusions from such statistics as the 
decline is marked by fluctuations and is accompanied by an enduring aspiration 
for democratic ideals among citizens. Despite variations in patterns it is generally 
agreed that electoral politics is becoming less attractive to citizens in countries 
like the US and UKZKHUHPDQ\YRWHUVµVHHSROLWLFLDQVDVPRWLYDWHGSULPDULO\E\
self-interest, and government as serving a handful of corporate interests and 
ZDVWLQJDVLJQLILFDQWSURSRUWLRQRIWD[SD\HUVPRQH\¶+D\6XFK
attitudes also need to be examined carefully since the findings are mixed about 
how widespread disaffection is, with evidence of both negative and positive 
perceptions depending on the context and design of the research (Dalton, 2008; 
Hay, 2007; Norris, 2011). Nevertheless, the democratic deficit is keeping both 
political analysts and politicians animated in equal measure. Concerns about 
political apathy and disengagement are particularly acute in the case of younger 
members of society. As Norris (2003:2) states: 
Political disengagement is thought to affect all citizens but young people 
are believed to be particularly disillusioned about the major institutions of 
representative democracy, leaving them either apathetic (at best) or 
alienated (at worst).   
This raises questions about the future of democracy itself with cataclysmic 
YLVLRQVRIWKHµJURZWKRIDQWL-state movements and, at the most extreme, the 
EUHDNGRZQRIWKHUXOHRIODZ¶1RUULV7KHSROLWLFDOZLOOWRDGGUHVVWKH
issue of youth disengagement is evident in new initiatives like the introduction of 
citizenship to school curriculums since 2002, Millennium Volunteers, UK Youth 
Parliament, Young Mayor and Young Advisors and more recently the National 
Citizens Service, while improving participation has also been a strong remit of 
youth work in Britain (Shukra et al, 2012). However, these efforts often sit 
XQFRPIRUWDEO\ZLWKZKDWDUHVHHQDVµHIIRUWVWRPDQDJHDQGFRQWDLQWKH
VSRQWDQHRXVSROLWLFDODFWLYLW\RI\RXQJSHRSOH¶DVVHHQLQWKHKDUVKFUDFNGRZQ
on student demonstrators during the 2010 anti-fees and cuts demonstrations by 
the police and subsequent vilification of the protestors by politicians in the media 
(Shukra et al, 2012:38). This, combined with the perception that government 
LQLWLDWLYHVWRHQFRXUDJHHQJDJHPHQWDUHDµWRNHQRU D35H[HUFLVH¶ZKLFKDUH
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GHVLJQHGWRµUHVWULFWQRWHQDEOHWKHP¶<RXWK&LWL]HQVKLS&RPPLVVLRQ
GRQRWGRPXFKWRPLWLJDWH\RXQJSHRSOH¶VGLVWUXVWRISROLWLFV7KHVHHIIRUWV
reflect the tendency in policy and research to either present the category of youth 
as irresponsible and inexperienced (Mathews et al 1999; Valentine, 2000) or to 
pathologise it as deviant and delinquent (France, 2008; Herrera and Bayat, 
2010).  
When it comes to Muslim youth, in addition to generic concerns about 
young people, there are heightened anxieties due to the anticipated risks of 
UDGLFDOLVDWLRQDQGWHUURULVP+RPH2IILFH0\WKHQHWDO2¶7RROHDQG
Gale, 2013). This impression is reinforced when government efforts to foster 
better engagement with Muslim youth are rationalised by the need to tackle 
radicalisation rather than meeting their needs as marginalised citizens (Briggs, 
2010; Brown, 2010). For instance a government report on preventing violent 
H[WUHPLVPVWDWHVWKDWµ7KHUHLVHYLGHQFHWKDWDIHZ\RXQJMuslims are turning to 
extremism fuelled by anger, alienation and disaffection from mainstream British 
VRFLHW\¶DQGLWVXJJHVWVWKLVVKRXOGEHDGGUHVVHGE\SURYLGLQJµOpportunities for 
young British Muslims to be leaders and active citizens¶+RPH2IILFH2005:12).  
Concerns over the alienation of Muslim youth may be reasonable but 
actual evidence for their political disengagement is indeterminate at best since 
much research about electoral behaviour does not disaggregate voting and 
participation levels by ethnicity, DJHRUUHOLJLRQ2¶7RROHDQG*DOH7KH
findings are further complicated by differences in results depending on claimed or 
actual electoral turnout and the failure to take into account different levels of 
voter registration across and between ethnic PLQRULW\JURXSV2¶7RROHDQG*DOH
2013). Where more fine grained analysis does exist it can suggest a discernible 
difference in levels of participation by younger members of ethnic minority 
groups.  
While a failure to engage younger citizens is a problem for both white and 
EM groups, it is striking that second-generation black citizens and those of 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi background who have grown up in Britain are 
less engaged than immigrants. (Sanders et al, 2014:136)  
5HVHDUFKE\025,LQ2¶7RROHand Gale, 2013) also suggests that 
the alienation and disconnection of youth from mainstream politics is more 
pronounced among BMEs than whites although this has been challenged by the 
EMBES (Ethnic Minority British Election Surveys) following the 2010 elections 
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2¶7RROHDQG*DOH6DQGHUVHWDOThis suggests government fears 
regarding the disengagement of young Muslims may have some basis in reality, 
although a recent Runnymede Trust report (Heath and Khan, 2012) has 
highlighted that contrary to widely held views the minority group that is most 
disenfranchised and alienated is not Muslim but black. A cynical reading 
suggests government motives in addressing Muslim disengagement are linked to 
associations with radicalisation rather than genuine concerns for their 
marginalisation. When government efforts to address the disengagement of 
young Muslims are couched in terms of minimising the risk of terrorism this is 
RIWHQVHHQDVLQVWUXPHQWDOLVLQJWKHVWDWH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK0XVOLPVDV
highlighted by stakeholders in a report by the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion (2007). It also exposes exceptionalist attitudes towards Muslims.  
These exceptionalist claims about Muslim youth are made not simply 
because of their objective marginalisation, but especially because of their 
"Muslimness" ± an attribute often equated with religious fundamentalism, 
outdated notions about gender relations, insularity, and proclivities towards 
violence. (Bayat and Herrera, 2010:4-5)  
Besides the ambiguity of evidence around Muslim youth disengagement 
there are other reasons to be wary of misplaced anxieties over Muslim youth and 
their lack of political participation. This comes from arguments that the 
democratic deficit theory is based on a narrow and outdated definition of political 
participation, limited to voting and party membership (Dalton, 2008; Leftwich, 
+D\0DUVKHWDO1DVK2¶7RROHDQG*DOH
Growing evidence of a perceptible shift in citizen politics suggests a move away 
from passive participation through voting every few years to more active forms of 
HQJDJHPHQW7KLVµQHZstyle of FLWL]HQSROLWLFV¶VHHNVWRJDLQSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFH
through direct forms of action beyond elections involving protests, campaigning, 
communal activity and internet activism (Dalton, 2008:8-9). It is argued that post 
World War II social and political changes in Western democracies have given 
ULVHWRPRUHHGXFDWHGDQGGLVFHUQLQJµFULWLFDOFLWL]HQV¶1RUULV253) who 
vote less but are more knowledgeable about politics (Dalton, 2008; Della Porta, 
2013). Norris (2002:188; original emphasis) has linked changing political 
EHKDYLRXUVWRWKHDUULYDORIQHZVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVµWKDWKDYHDOWHUHGWKH
agencies (collective organizations), repertoires (the actions commonly used for 
political expression), and the targets (the political actors whom participants seek 
WRLQIOXHQFH¶RISROLWLFDODFWLRQ,WLVDOVRVXJJHVWHGWKDWQRQ-voters far from being 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  51 
politically apathetic are in fact engaging in a form of protest politics (Hay, 2007; 
Marsh et al, 2007). The optimism of these theorists is based on the view that 
FULWLFDOFLWL]HQVKLSLVDµZHOFRPHDQWLGRWHWRZKDWDUHVHHQDVWKHZRUU\LQJOHYHOV
of deference to political authority exhibited throughout much of the post-war 
SHULRG¶+D\5DWKHUWKDQEHLQJDWKUHDWVXFKQHZIRUPVRISROLWLFVPD\




The importance of bringing together the distinct literatures on Muslim 
political engagement and new citizen politics serves not only to challenge the 
damaging exceptionalism that has negative consequences for Muslim citizenship 
but also makes for a much more comprehensive understanding of each of the 




there are indications that young Muslims are not as apathetical as feared and are 
involved in a range of different forms of civic and political activism (Back et al, 
2¶/RXJKOLQDQG*LOOHVSLHO¶Toole and Gale, 2013; Solomos, 2005). 
According to %ULJJVµWKLVSROLWLFDOPRELOL]DWLRQLVGLIILFXOWWRFDSWXUH
quantitatively and is not always channelled through formal or traditional 
structures¶EXWGHVSLWHWKLVWKHUHDUHHQFRXUDJLQJVLJQVWKDWµ\RXQJ0XVOLPVDUH
more interested and engaged in current affairs and politics than ever before¶. 
Additionally citizenship surveys in Britain show that a third of Muslims report 
taking part in voluntary work which is an important indicator of civic and political 
engagement (Briggs, 2010). The importance and relative unfamiliarity of this 
topic necessitates an examination of how political participation among young 
Muslims citizens is being shaped by broader political and social shifts in society 
and what implications this has for their citizenship and belonging.  
 
The cultural turn in politics 
Diverting attention to alternative and non-conventional forms of politics 
requires theoretical and conceptual innovation as well as a shift in empirical 
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focus. Although politics has been defined in diverse ways by different disciplines 
DQGWKHRULVWVµSRZHU¶RIIHUVDQDEVWUDFWXQLI\LQJGLPHQVLRQwhich draws the 
various perspectives together. Accordingly, politics can be defined as a process 
involving the use and control of power in society (Nash, 2010) or as Colin Hay 
VXUPLVHVWKHSULPHFRQFHUQRIµWKHSROLWLFDO¶LVWKHGLVWULEXWLRQH[HUFLVH
and consequences of power. Also crucial to reappraising the notion of politics is 
the question of where power is located in society and how it is legitimised. In a 
traditional view of politics, which still persists in some social science approaches, 
the state is pivotal to the control and exercise of power (Faulks, 1999). This has 
OHGWRWKHGRPLQDQFHRIµWKHVWDWHDVWKHVLWHRIPRGHUQSROLWLFVDQGWKHODERXU
movement as thHGRPLQDQWSROLWLFDOIRUFH¶1DVK7KLVYLHZHQJHQGHUV
fears of a democratic deficit because political participation is predicated on voting 
and party political membership.  
As the previous section asserts, theorists are postulating new political 
subjectivities among citizens who are reshaping contemporary forms of 
engagement. Political activism through non-electoral channels has been made 
salient by the rise of social movements since the 1960s, precipitating an 
analytical and empirical shift from the µSROLWLFVRIOR\DOW\¶or class based politics to 
µSROLWLFVRIFKRLFH¶ (Norris, 2002:188) or identity politics. Giddens (1991:210-214; 
original emphasis) has elaborated a historical drift in Western liberal democracies 
IURPµemancipatory SROLWLFV¶ which dominated till the middle of the 20th century 
DQGZHUHFRQFHUQHGZLWKµOLEHUDWLQJKXPDQEHLQJVIURPWUDGLWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWV¶to 
DIRFXVRQµOLIHSROLWLFV¶ from the 1980s onwards ZKLFKµSUHVXPHVDFHUWDLQOHYHO
RIHPDQFLSDWLRQ¶. /LIHSROLWLFVLVSULPDULO\DERXWµOLIHVW\OH¶DQGLVDµSROLWLFVof 
FKRLFH¶*LGGHQVRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV7KLVSKHQRPHQRQKDVEHHQ
referred to by Beck (1997:98-DVWKHµSHWHULQJRXWRISROLWLFVZLWKWKHDFWLYDWLRQ
RIVXESROLWLFV¶and DµFDWHJRU\WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ¶LQSROLWLFVZKLFKHPHUJHVLQQHZ
areas of life formerly thought to be non-political. Sub-SROLWLFVµPHDQVVKDSLQJ
society from below¶E\µJURXSVKLWKHUWRXQLQYROYHGLQWKHVXEVWDQWLYH
technification and industrialization processes: citizens, the public sphere, social 
PRYHPHQWVH[SHUWJURXSVZRUNLQJSHRSOHRQVLWH¶DPRQJRWKHUV%HFN
1994:23; original emphasis). This has called into question traditional views of 
SROLWLFVDVµHTXDWLRQRISROLWLFVDQGVWDWHRISROLWLFVZLWKWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP¶
(Beck, 1997:98). While Beck draws attention to the expansion of politics into new 
and previously untouched areas of social life there is also a need to formulate 
new conceptual tools to account for these changes. The emerging significance of 
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new forms of political expression prompted Melucci (1985:139) to surmise that 
FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQLVLQFUHDVLQJO\PRYLQJIURPDµSROLWLFDO¶IRUP, commonly found in 
traditional opposition movements, to more cultural ground.   
Nash (2001; 2009; 2010) asserts that there has been a cultural turn in 
political sociology that calls for a rethinking of the traditional domain of politics as 
state-centred and requires an analysis of politics as a possibility in every domain 
of society, bringing to life the feminist claim thaWµWKHSHUVRQDOLVSROLWLFDO¶Nash 
(2010:37) states:  
«FRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFDOVRFLRORJ\FRQFHUQVFXOWXUDOSROLWLFVZKLFKLVWKH
interpretation of social meanings that support, challenge, or change the 
definitions, perspectives, and identities of social actors, to the advantage of 
some and the disadvantage of others, across state and society. 
Nash (2001) distinguishes two types of arguments to support the growing 
significance of cultural politics in contemporary social sciences. In the historical 
case cultural politics signifies a distinct shift in the way politics is conducted in 
contemporary democracies as some of the foregoing discussions have 
demonstrated. According to the historical argument culture plays an 
µXQSUHFHGHQWHGUROHLQFRQVWLWXWLQJVRFLDOUelations and identities in the 
FRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\¶1DVK, 2001:77). However, Nash (2001:77) has also 
highlighted the epistemological case for cultural politics which implies that politics 
is µuniversally FRQVWLWXWLYH¶RIVRFLDOUHODWLRQVDQGLGHQWLWLHVThe epistemological 
argument for cultural politics is based on a conceptually different view of politics 
which is indebted WR)RXFDXOW¶Vview of power as a productive force in all social 
relations, which has opened up the space to include conflicts and struggles of a 
more personal and symbolic nature (Nash, 2001; 2010). According to Foucault 
locating power in the state or ruling classes is to mistake the very nature of 
power and how it functions in contemporary societies. Although Foucault was not 
a cultural theorist, his understanding of power, as something that diffuses the 
entire body of the social world and operates through discourse and knowledge, 
brings culture to the forefront of political practice and analysis)RXFDXOW¶V
theorisation of power is returned to later in this chapter where its relevance as a 
theoretical framework to link the micro politics of Muslim activism to broader 
social structures of power and politics is elaborated in greater detail.  
A cultural politics perspective expands the horizon on which an analysis of 
political activism can extend its reach by taking into account much broader 
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processes beyond the state and electoral political systems. The concept of 
FXOWXUDOSROLWLFVGLUHFWVDQDO\VLVWRµ7KHSROLWLFVRIVLJQLI\LQJSUDFWLFHV through 
which identities, social relations, and rules are contested, subverted, and may be 
WUDQVIRUPHG¶1DVK7REHFOHDUFXOWXUDOSROLWLFVGRHVQRWPHDQ
neglecting issues of class and economic inequality but rather it focuses on how 
these issues are culturally framed and contested. Social movements have 
UHYHDOHGFXOWXUDOSROLWLFVWREHµVWUXJJOHVRYHUWKHGHILQLWLRQRIPHDQLQJVDQGWKH
construction of new identities and lifestyles, as well as addressing formal political 
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶1DVKHPSKDVLVPLQH7KHDVVRFLDWLRQRIFXOWXUDOSROLWLFV
to social movements should also not be taken to mean the state has become 
marginal to politics since it is one of the primary sites where cultural politics 
comes to life (Lentin, 2014; Nash, 2010; Pero, 2014). Castells (2012:4) has 




uses of force as well as the power to shape social meanings through cultural 
politics. However, this study attends to the exercise of what Castells (2012:5) 
FDOOVµFRXQWHUSRZHU¶ZKLFKLVµWKHFDSDFLW\RIVRFLDODFWRUVWRFKDOOHQJHWKHSRZHU
embedded in the institutions of society for the purposes of claiming 
representation for their own values DQGLQWHUHVWV¶ 
 
Social movement theory 
Social movements have been at the forefront of shaping and articulating 
the idea of cultural politics (Nash, 2010; Swidler, 1995) through a rich body of 
literature that has proliferated since the 1960s. Social movement theory is a 
diverse ensemble of ideas, concepts and approaches which highlights the 
various dimensions of collective action beyond the realm of mainstream electoral 
SROLWLFV0HOXFFLFRPSDUHVPRYHPHQWVWRSURSKHWVWKDWµDQQRXQFHZKDW
is taking VKDSHHYHQEHIRUHLWVGLUHFWLRQDQGFRQWHQWKDVEHFRPHFOHDU¶&URVVOH\
(2002) similarly refers to social movements as harbingers of social change, 
making them an important site in which to explore themes of youth participation 
and citizenship. The application of social movement theory to the progressive 
politics of young Muslims in the Britain represents a new and theoretically 
promising area against the paucity of such an understanding in existing literature. 
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Where social movement theory has been applied to Muslims it has tended to be 
with respect to conservative, fundamentalist and traditional politics like the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda (Castells, 2010; Munson, 2001; Sutton and 
Vertigans, 2006). In one such study Wiktorowicz (2005:4) applies social 
movement theory to Islamic activism in order to break a pattern of research 
ZKLFKKHFODLPVHVVHQWLDOLVHV0XVOLPSROLWLFVE\DVVXPLQJWKDWµDSDUWLFXODUVHWRI
grievances, translated into religious idioms and symbols, engenders 
PRELOL]DWLRQ¶+LVDSSURDFK GHFRQVWUXFWVµ,VODPLFH[FHSWLRQDOLVP¶E\KLJKOLJKWLQJ
the processes and strategies that Islamic activism shares with other social 
movements. This thesis goes beyond this by problematising the presumption that 
all Muslim activism is either deviant or in fact informed by faith. This is done by 
defining Muslims as sociological rather religious category as explained in detail in 
Chapter 4 on methodology.  
Locating the activism of young adult Muslims within social movement 
theory requires an explanation of what social movements are and what 
distinguishes them from other forms of collection action. Due to the vast range of 
literature on social movements it is impossible to offer a tidy and exhaustive 
definition, but as it is necessary to specify exactly what is being covered by this 
thesis, a working definition is devised through the distillation of ideas put forward 
by some of the most influential authors on the topic.  
$OEHUWR0HOXFFLGHILQHVDVRFLDOPRYHPHQWDVDµIRUPRI
collective action (a) based on solidarity, (b) carrying on a conflict, (c) breaking the 
limits of the system in which action occurs.¶ In this formulation conflict is defined 
DVµDUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQRSSRVHGDFWRUVILJKWLQJIRUWKHVDPHUHVRXUFHVWR
ZKLFKERWKJLYHYDOXH¶0HOXFFLZKLOHVROLGDULW\LVVSHFLILHGDVµWKH
capability of an actor to share a collective identity, that is, the capability of 
recognizing and being recognized as a part of the same system of social 
UHODWLRQVKLSV¶0HOXFFL-795). This has much common ground with the 
definition offered by Mario Diani who has tried to distinguish social movements 
from other political expressions like protests, pressure groups, political parties 
and religious organisations:  
A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality 
of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in political or cultural 
conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity. (Diani, 1992 in Nash, 
2010:120) 
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Della Porta and Diani (2006:20) further summarise the essential elements 
of a social movement by stating three defining elements: 
x Conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents 
x Linked by dense informal networks 
x Sharing of a distinct collective identity  
These definitionVHFKR0HOXFFL¶Vemphasis on collective identity and 
conflict but extend the definition to include organisational features of social 
movements as operating through networks rather than the hierarchical 
institutional structures characteristic of more traditional politics in trade unions or 
political parties. The seminal importance of networks to a social movement was 
not denied by Melucci but rather it is assumed by his definition since Melucci 
KDVDUJXHGWKDWFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQLVLWVHOIWKHRXWFRPHRIµQHWZRUNVLQ
WKHHYHU\GD\¶'HILQLWLRQVRIIHUHGE\'LDQL in Nash, 2010) and Della Porta 
and Diani (2006) also overcome the more narrow understanding of the role of 
VRFLDOPRYHPHQWVDVµEUHDNLQJWKHOLPLWVRIWKHV\VWHP¶LQWKHZD\WKDW0HOXFFL
VWDWHVE\VSHFLI\LQJDPRUHJHQHUDOFRQFHSWRIµFRQIOLFW¶ZKLFKSHUPLWVJUHDWHU
flexibility in what can be included in social movement analysis. However, Della 
Porta and Diani (2006:22) are reluctant to include forms of collective action that 
GRQRWKDYHµFOHDUO\LGHQWLILHGRSSRQHQWV¶DQGUHIHUWRWKHVHDVµFRQVHQVXV
PRYHPHQWV¶7KLVLVSUREOHPDWLFVLQFHLWH[FOXGHVPRYHPHQWVWKDWKDYHµPRUH
DEVWUDFWWDUJHWV¶OLNHµLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGUDFLVP¶RUµSDWULDUFK\¶ (Crossley, 2002:5) or, 
in the case of this research, Islamophobia. Addressing this critique a more useful 
and inclusive definition is offered by Snow et al (2007:321: original emphasis) 
who define social movements as: 
«collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity 
outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of 
challenging or defending extant authority.  
To synthesize the above definitions into a working model for this study, a 
summary of the above definitions suggests a social movement must contain 
elements of: 
x Collective identity/solidarity 
x Political or cultural conflict (with or without clearly identified 
opponents/challenge or defence of extant authority) 
x Informal (dense) networks/some degree of organisation 
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The three qualifications taken together suggest that social movements can 
include individuals or groups but a single individual or group cannot be a social 
movement. Similarly, while protests and riots may be part of social movements a 
single protest or eruption of a riot does not constitute a social movement since it 
ODFNVDµGHJUHHRIRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶RUSURFHVVHVRIµFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\¶SURGXFWLRQ 
Social movement theory is not a singular or fixed approach but rather 
comprises a number of different perspectives which incrementally contribute to a 
rich body of knowledge.  One of the earlier approaches called collective 
behaviour theory (CB) explained social movements as a response to grievances 
and anomie associated with structural strain (Beuchler, 2007; Crossley, 2002). 
These theories viewed social movements as one of the many forms of collective 
behaviour, including panics and riots, which were assumed to be an irrational 
reVSRQVHWRµSHULRGVRIVWUDLQDQGEUHDNGRZQ¶representing the weakening of 
µVRFLDOFRQWUROVDQGPRUDOLPSHUDWLYHV¶%HXFKOHU925). This approach 
eventually became discredited because grievances, deprivation and social crisis 
are widespread and do not necessarily lead to collective action (Diani and Della 
Porta, 2006; Nash, 2010). Furthermore, empirical evidence that social 
movements often emerge in times of social stability contradicts the collective 
behaviour perspective (Crossley, 2002).  
In contrast to CB Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) argues that the 
availability of resources to mount collective action is a much better indicator of 
mobilisation than grievances alone. RM theorists are interested in the way in 
which social movement organisations conduct and sustain mobilisation and this 
has contributed to knowledge of the organisational practices and strategies 
employed by social movements. However, a critique of this approach is that it 
ignores macro social structures like the political opportunities of particular 
societies and how they constrain or enable mobilisation (Crossley, 2002). 
Political Process (PP) theorists address this by relating social movements to the 
degree of openness or closure of a political system. Charles Tilly (1978 in Nash, 
2010) for instance has examined the way in which state agencies suppress or 
promote social movements to suit their own interests. A further advance in RMT 
FRPHVIURP%HQIRUGDQG6QRZ¶Vtheorisation of µIUDPLQJ¶DVDPRELOLVLQJ
strategy in social movements. Inspired by Goffman (1974 in Benford and Snow 
WKHFRQFHSWRIIUDPHVDOORZVVRFLDODFWRUVWRµGHILQHJULHYDQFHVIRUJH
collective identities, and create, interpret, and transform opportunities in order to 
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EULQJDERXWVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV¶ (Nash, 2010:100). Social movement organisations 
VWUDWHJLFDOO\XVHµIUDPHDOLJQPHQWSURFHVVHV¶WROLQNWKHLULQWHUHVWVDQG
interpretive frames with those of prospective members (Benford and Snow, 
2000:624).  
While RMT has contributed a great deal to social movement theory it fails 
to link individual values to collective action as well as relating social movements 
to broader sociological changes in society, particularly the rise of postmodernism 
and cultural politics (Nash, 2010). The approach known as New Social 
Movements (NSM) goes some way towards bridging this gap by linking the 
emergence of social movements to changes in social conditions from the 1960s 
onwards, including the availability of better jobs and mass education and the rise 
of post-material values (Inglehart, 2000). The newness of social movements, like 
the feminist and environmental movements, is characterised by a shift from the 
politics of class, explained by Marxist models of society, to new forms of politics 
which aim towards cultural, symbolic and sub-political changes (Crossley, 2002; 
Melucci, 1989; 1996; Nash, 2010). New social movements are marked by 
different modes of mobilisation compared to labour/class movements and they 
often prioritise different values and targets (Norris, 2002). They typically have 
participants from a cross-section of social categories rather than a single class or 
social background; the organisational structures are more decentralised with a 
more open membership criteria; and their efforts can be aimed at changing 
lifestyles and social values as well as government policy (Norris, 2002; Nash, 
2011). However, the distinction being drawn between old (class) and new 
(cultural) movements is a heuristic one to highlight relative but discernible 
differences between them. Empirically it would be implausible and historically 
suspect to assume that labour/class movements were devoid of cultural 
contestation or that new movements have little interest in material or class-based 
politics. As highlighted in the previous chapter the dividing line between identity 
and class politics or the politics of recognition and redistribution (Fraser, 2001) 
has been blurred by social movements (Isin and Wood, 1999; Young, 1990; 
2000).  It is also argued that these movements are not as new as it is assumed 
since movements prioritising identity or culture were either neglected by 
sociologists in the past or subsumed within the more dominant labour movement 
(Honneth, 2001; Nash, 2010).  
One of the limitations of RM and PP theories is that they are informed by 
rational actor theory drawn from economics which has no way of accounting for 
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agency or subjectivity within social movements. Attempting to bridge this gap, 
Melucci (1996) turned his focus to the processes involved in the production of 
collective identities as engines of social movement mobilisation. Prioritising 
agency in social movement theory Melucci (1996) argues that it is in negotiating 
identities in interaction with others in society that collective action is generated. 
However, collectLYHDFWLRQLVVXVWDLQHGE\µQHWZRUNVLQWKHHYHU\GD\¶RIODUJHO\
part-WLPHDQGIORDWLQJPHPEHUVKLSZKLFKµPDNHVLWH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWWRDFWXDOO\
VSHFLI\WKHFROOHFWLYHDFWRU¶0HOXFFL-114). Contrasting social 
movement politics to class based mobilisations Melucci (1996) argues that the 
production of collective identity in the information age involves the manipulation 
of symbols and signs, the hallmark of cultural politics, rather than solidarity built 
upon shared material conditions. 
Immanuel Castells (2010[YLLKDVEURXJKWLQWRIRFXVµWKHJURZLQJSRZHURI
LGHQWLW\¶DVDNH\IHDWXUHRIVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVLQWKHµQHWZRUNVRFLHW\¶&DVWHOOV
(2010:xxxii) view of power shares much common ground with the cultural politics 




(2010:xxxii; original emphasis) argues that this battle is now primarily being 
waged within media spaces. He proposes that the social world is witnessing a 
QHZNLQGRISROLWLFVWKDWKHUHIHUVWRDVµinformational politics¶RUµPHGLDSROLWLFV¶. 
With renewed interest in social movements sparked by a fresh wave of protests 
by young activists from the Arab Spring to the Occupy movement Castells 
(2012:4) has tentatively suggested a new form of power which he calls 
'communication power'. This power has come about as result of advancements in 
communication technologies which limit government control over political 
expression, offering social movements and political actors the opportunity to 
challenge and reshape the way that dominant social values and meanings are 
framed. This has given rise to a phenomenon that Castells (2012:5) refers to as 
µPDVVVHOI-FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ZKLFKDFWVDVDQHZDQGHPSRZHULQJUHVRXUFHIRU
grassroots activists. According to Castells (2012) the availability of such modes 
of communication partly explains the eruption of new and unexpected revolutions 
and mass mobilisations around the world.   
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As the above summary has tried to demonstrate, social movement theory 
offers a host of analytical tools to probe and elucidate the activities of young adult 
Muslim activists at a micro level of analysis. Most importantly a definition of social 
movements cited above helps to draw a distinct boundary around the area being 
studied which helps to differentiate it from other forms of politics or social 
activities. The next section focuses on Foucauldian theories of power and politics 
which provide a theoretical grounding to link these forms of engagement to the 
broader macro level view of society to highlight the structures that shape and 
define the possibilities within which these contemporary struggles evolve. 
 
Foucault, power and resistance 
As mentioned before, the work of Michel Foucault has been instrumental in 
redefining the notion of politics by elaborating a more socially diffused and 
abstract model of power in society. Nash (2010:21) argues that Foucault¶s 
analysis of power is significant in the development of cultural politics: 
His analyses are opposed to what he calls the ³juridico-discursive´ model in 
which power is seen as possessed by the state, especially the law, and is 
used to impose order on society. 
According to Foucault¶s µnominalist view of power¶ (Hindess, 2012:37) it 
must be seen as a productive force which circulates in all of society rather than 
being an entity that is located within particular sites (Foucault, 1994c). Power is 
never possessed or owned but rather it is exercised and becomes evident in the 
effects it produces. Instead of trying to understand what power is, Foucault is 
more interested in power relations and the productive conditions and practices 
which explain them. This renders definitions of politics premised on the workings 
of the state as offering a very limited view which obscures the multiple sites and 
devices through which power can be exercised. Foucault's understanding of 
power chimes with the assertion that politics should be seen as a process rather 
than a domain (Hay, 2007; Leftwich, 2008). This theory allows us to take 
seriously the potential to find political participation within a whole range of social 
activities from protests to poetry.  
An important dimension of Foucault's theorisation of power is his 
understanding that power in contemporary societies is exercised through 
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knowledge and discourse, both important concepts in his writings and vital 
aspects of political activism within the remit of cultural politics. Foucault (1994a; 
1995) identified the use of knowledge as a form of social control that emerged 
some time in the 18th century with the use of new technologies of power to 
manage the changing dynamics of population, economies and governance in 
Western capitalist nations. The use of specialised knowledge is integral to 
Foucault¶s (1994a) theory about the modern art of government which is 
dependent on understanding and gathering facts about society and its various 
domains of activity from the economy to civil society. Foucault¶s (1994a:207) 
notion of µthe art of government¶ contrasts this form of rule with past modes of 
governing society which were µconcerned primarily with the business of taking 
over the state, keeping it in one¶s possession or subordinating it to some external 
principle of legitimacy¶ (Hindess, 2012:39). Here Foucault (1994a) contrasts 
modern government with the Machiavellian model of government based on 
consolidating the prince's power over the principality as well as distinguishing it 
from the justification of authority with reference to a divine order of society 
oriented towards the pastoral guidance of souls and lives. In contrast to these 
modes of rule modern government is something quite different:   
«RQWKHFRQWUDU\ZLWKJRYHUQPHQWLWLVDTXHVWLRQQRWRILPSRVLQJODZRQ
men but of disposing things: that is, of employing tactics rather than laws, 
and even of using laws themselves as tactics ± to arrange things in such a 
way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-such ends may be 
achieved.(Foucault, 1994a:211) 
In this mode of government power is less concerned with µsovereignty¶ but 
with the µwelfare of the population¶ which it achieves by acting directly on the 
population itself µthrough techniques that will make possible, without the full 
awareness of the people¶ the fulfilment of these ends (Foucault, 1994a:217). This 
is what Foucault has referred to as µgovernmentality¶, a rationality of government 
which penetrates and multiplies through the capillaries of society and emerges in 
the actions of individuals. The production of knowledge was essential to this form 
of government in states established on principles of liberalism, since the people 
to be governed were µendowed with a capacity for autonomous, self-directing 
activity¶ and government was about µconducting the affairs of the population in 
what are thought to be the interests of the whole¶ (Hindess, 2012:39).  
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Foucault identifies a significant modification in the way knowledge was 
socially construed and applied at this time, from being an act of inquiry to 
becoming µorganized around the norm, in terms of what was normal or not, 
correct or not, in terms of what one must do or not do¶ (Foucault, 1994d:59). The 
ascendency of the sciences and the production of specialist knowledge went 
µKDQGLQKDQGZLWKWKHLQVWDOODWLRQRIQHZPHFKDQLVPVRISRZHU¶)RXFDXOW
1988:106) operating through strategies of monitoring, measuring and shaping 
social behaviours and needs. This allowed increasingly complex and 
unpredictable populations to be managed with far greater efficiency and at a 
much smaller cost through:  
«the proliferation of new devices for governing conduct that have their 
roots, in part at least, in the success of welfare in authorising expertise in 
relation to a range of social objectives, and in implanting in citizens the 
aspiration to pursue their own civility, well-being and advancement.  
(Rose, 2006:147) 
Foucault (1995:209) refers to this transformation in the way that power was 
exercised over people through knowledge as encompassing µthe formation of 
what might be called in general the disciplinary society¶ through µanonymous 
instruments of power, coextensive with the multiplicity that they regiment, such 
as hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration, perpetual assessment and 
classification¶. The production of such authoritative forms of knowledge, or 
regimes of truth, are seen by Foucault as one of the technologies of power which 
depend on the ability or tendency of power to inscribe desirable dispositions into 
citizens and produce certain subjectivities in what Foucault (1994b:341) referred 
to as the µconduct of conducts¶. By this Foucault meant: µTo govern, in this sense, 
is to structure the possible field of action of others.¶ This is how governmentality 
achieves the art of governing autonomous free individuals, central to liberalism, 
by conducting their conduct for the benefit of the whole. Knowledge is needed to 
create the conditions in which free individuals can act in ways that accord with 
the needs of governing. The complex workings of power encapsulated in the 
notion of governmentality is best explained by Nikolas Rose (2006) who states 
such technologies of power render µreality thinkable in such a way that it is 
amenable to political programming¶ (Rose, 2006:147).  
Knowledge that is produced through, within and in the presence of such 
technologies of power µnot only assumes the authority of the µtruth¶ but has the 
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power to make itself true¶ (Hall, 2010:76 original emphasis) through discourse 
that µtransmits and produces power¶ (Foucault, 1978:101). The concept of 
discourse is another important one described by Foucault (1995) since 
knowledge, produced through dominant discourses, is one of the key dimensions 
through which social control has been exercised in society. Discourse in the 
Foucauldian sense signifies the use of language as a social practice that 
produces meaning and in doing so constructs objects in the world (Foucault, 
1981; Hall, 2010). This model of power and politics brings into focus the 
importance of cultural politics since power is no longer exercised directly through 
violence or subjugation but through both material and symbolic techniques 
(Lemke, 2000) that act on the conduct of free agents.  
)RXFDXOW¶VWKHRULVDWLRQRISRZHULVRIWHQFULWLFLVHGIRULWVIDLOXUHWRDFFRXQW
for the subject, begging the question as to how it might be a useful theory for 
VWXG\LQJµFRXQWHUSRZHU¶. While in earlier works Foucault did indeed state that in 
order to understand power relations in society the subject must be removed from 
the analysis, this was due to his concern for the inflated importance of the subject 
in existing social theory. In his later works Foucault devoted much greater 
attention to developing a better understanding of the subject and how it was 
constituted by power rather than preceding it (Foucault 1994b,c). Foucault is also 
criticised for not allowing the subject to exercise agency since power that 
constitutes the subject bounds the scope of freedom to act, making his theory of 
power µincapable of distinguishing ontologically and analytically between human 
agency and social constraint¶$O-Amoudi, 2007:552). While it is true that agency 
is somewhat foreclosed, since the subject always acts within the limits produced 
by power relations in µthe possible field of action¶ (Foucault, 1994b:341), 
Foucault¶s analysis of power contains within it an explanation for how agency and 
resistance might be possible within power relations. Foucault (1997:299) stated: 
µThere three levels to my analysis of power: strategic relations, techniques of 
government, and the states of domination.¶ 
This distinction is important in understanding Foucault¶s (1997:298) 
conceptualisation of power as not necessarily an µevil¶ since he did not view the 
first nor the second of these distinctions as necessarily µbad¶ in themselves. 
Foucault (1997:299) conceives of some ways of exercising power as µstrategic 
games between liberties ± in which some try to control the conduct of others¶, 
which he also refers to as µgames of power¶. In contrast a µstate of domination¶ is 
defined as when µan individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of 
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power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement 
by economic, political, or military means¶ (Foucault, 1997:283). Between these 
two poles are located µtechnologies of government¶ which are defined broadly as 
referring to both government/state institutions, practices and discourses as well 
as the µthe way one governs one¶s wife and children¶ (Foucault, 1997:299), in 
other words the idea of µgovernmentality¶. However, Foucault also specified that 
while states of domination curtail or prohibit the exercise of freedom or agency, 
outside such states, power relations assume a free subject capable of exercising 
agency and choice.  
When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the 
actions of others, when one characterizes these actions by the government 
of men by other men ± in the broadest sense of the term ± one includes an 
important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects, 
and only insofar as they are free. (Foucault, 1994b: 341-342)   
It is this freedom that allows the possibility of resistance and for power to 
be challenged and appropriated by subordinates. Foucault¶s theories of power 
therefore can be appropriated to illuminate the mechanisms through which 
individual forms of action can be linked to prevalent technologies of power 
through the way in which power is resisted. The possibility of such social change 
to transpire constitutes an important aspect of conceptualising the strategic 
importance of cultural politics as defined by Nash (2009; 2010). Forms of power 
that operate through discourses and knowledge are hard to identify and 
challenge through conventional forms of politics because as Foucault argued 
their danger lies in their ability to function as invisible and neutral forces (Gordon, 
1994). However, these forms of power can be studied by the effects they 
produce. Foucault (1994b) suggests that one way of understanding how power is 
being exercised in society is to examine how it is resisted. To do so, Foucault 
EVXJJHVWVµDZD\WKDWLVPRUHHPSLULFDO¶ZKLFKµFRQVLVWVLQWDNLQJWKH
forms of resistance against different forms of power as DVWDUWLQJSRLQW¶7KLV
entails an examination of the forms of opposition prevalent at a certain time, so 
UDWKHUWKDQVWXG\LQJVDQLW\)RXFDXOWVXJJHVWVLQYHVWLJDWLQJWKHµILHOGRILQVDQLW\¶
RULQVWHDGRIµOHJDOLW\¶WKHµILHOGRILOOHJDOLW\Foucault (1994b:329) suggests that: 
µ5DWKHUWKDQDQDO\VLQJSRZHUIURPWKHSRLQWRIYiew of its internal rationality, it 
FRQVLVWVRIDQDO\VLQJSRZHUUHODWLRQVWKURXJKWKHDQWDJRQLVPRIVWUDWHJLHV¶Here 
)RXFDXOW¶VWKHRU\RISRZHUUHODWHVGLUHFWO\WRVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVZKLFKKHUHIHUV
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WRDVPRUHWKDQMXVWµDQWL-DXWKRULW\VWUXJJOHV¶LQWKDWWKey challenge 
governmentality itself: 
They are an opposition to the effects of power linked with knowledge, 
competence, and qualification ± struggles against the privileges of 
knowledge. But they are also an opposition against secrecy, deformation, 
and mystifying representations imposed on people. (Foucault, 1994b: 330).  
)RXFDXOWDEFGZDVDSSO\LQJKLVµDQDO\WLFVRISRZHU¶SULPDULO\
to the topics of sexuality and crime but his theories on the power/knowledge 
nexus and how it produces certain authoritative ways of defining and normalising 
social values, conduct and concepts can be applied to other areas of social life 
such as political participation and citizenship. Foucault¶s understanding of power 
and knowledge is well placed to explicate the plethora of literature around 
Muslims citizenship that has proliferated in the post 9/11 context which focuses 
on the pathologies associated with this minority religious group (Briggs and 
Birdwell, 2009; Choudhury, 2007; DCLG, 2007, 2010; Home Affairs Committee, 
2005; Quilliam, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2005). It may be argued that the 
disproportionate attention on radical, extreme and terrorist Muslims has 
discursively shaped public opinion to passively accept what constitutes an attack 
on hard-won civil liberties for all citizens (Buck-Morss, 2003; Dworkin, 2003; 
Vertigans, 2010). The concept of governmentality may be applied to 
understanding how certain political subjectivities have allowed a whole new 
range of security and immigration laws to be instituted in what is now referred to 
as the µsecurity state¶ or the µlaw and order state¶ in a post 9/11 context (Fekete, 
2009; Hyatt, 2011). Most importantly Foucauldian ideas of power and politics 
allow this study to not only extend the remit of political participation but also to 
appreciate the broader power relations in which day to day politics of citizenship 
takes place.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has articulated the conceptual and theoretical literature that 
sets the parameters for this study and informs the research design. New forms of 
political participation and new conceptual tools are explored to situate Muslim 
politics within wider understandings of changing citizen politics which directs 
attention to cultural politics and social movements as a promising and relatively 
uncharted site to study the politics of young Muslims. The chapter also draws on 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  66 
Foucauldian theorisation of power, knowledge and discourse to substantiate this 
VWXG\¶VIRFXVRQFXOWXUDOSROLWLFV)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNDOVRRIIHUVDVRXQGWKHRUHWLFDO
link between bottom up processes of political contestation and top-down 
structures that dominate prevalent power relations in society.  
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&KDSWHU7KHUHVHDUFKSURFHVV 
 
Epistemology and knowledge claims  
This study adopts a subtle realist ontological position drawing on the work 
of Murphy and Dingwall (2003), who in turn appropriate this concept from 
Hammersley 7KLVRQWRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQFODLPVWKDWµa world exists 
independently of its observers and constrains the observations that can be maGH¶ 
(Murphy and Dingwall, 2003:13). Although subtle realism, like critical realism 
(Sayer, 2000), is guided by the belief that social reality exists independently of 
human knowledge, this does not imply conversely that human knowledge is 
independent of the social world since 'reality has a way of resisting our 
constructions' (Murphy and Dingwall, 2003:12). Hence, even the most fervently 
held belief that racism does not exist fails to translate into its disappearance from 
society, which suggests that human knowledge is constrained by real, existing 
conditions. However, in contrast to objectivism, a subtle realist position 
approaches research from the perspective that µDOONQRZOHGJHLVEDVHGRQ
DVVXPSWLRQVDQGSXUSRVHVDQGLVDKXPDQFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶+DPPHUVOH\ 1992:74). 
This position avoids the determinist fallacy of objectivism as well as the extreme 
relativist impOLFDWLRQVRIFRQVWUXFWLYLVP&RPSDUHGWRUHDOLVPLWLVDµIDOOLELOLVW¶
DSSURDFKµUHJDUGLQJ³WUXWKV´DVSURYLVLRQDOXQWLOWKHUHLVJRRGUHDVRQIRU
coQWUDGLFWRU\YHUVLRQVWRJDLQVXSSRUW¶6HDOH-471). While subtle 
realism shares the relativist belief that reality can have several representations, 
from different perspectives, which may all be potentially true, it still allows 
judgements to be made about the relative plausibility and veracity of knowledge 
E\DVNLQJZKHWKHULWLVµDGHTXDWHO\VXSSRUWHGE\HYLGHQFHDQGDUJXPHQW¶
(Murphy and Dingwall, 2003:13).  
The subtle realist position, and interpretative epistemology, of this research 
compels it WRµEHUDWKHUPRUHYLJLODQWUHJDUGLQJWKHGDQJHUVRIHUURU¶
(Hammersley,1992:74) by carefully selecting methods that are likely to produce a 
more plausible view of social reality. Translating this into concrete terms it is 
asserted that an exclusive focus on the subjective perspectives of Muslim 
political activists provides only a partial view of political activism. Therefore, the 
research goes beyond probing the perspectives of participants to explicating the 
social structures and cultural settings in which activism is situated. In other words 
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while the primary focus of the research remains on individual participants and the 
ways in which they describe and narrate their social experiences, beliefs and 
aspirations it is recognised there may be differences between the participants¶ 
understanding, the interpretations of others and what actually exists in the world. 
This requires a study of both the participants meaning-making and the context in 
which this unfolds, necessitating mixed methods as explored below.  
 
Research Design and Methodology 
The study employs an ethnographic approach featuring mixed methods 
including semi-structured qualitative interviews, participant observation and 
documentary evidence. This is considered to be the most appropriate strategy for 
engaging with a marginalised group of citizens as it entails an µH[WHQGHG
LQYROYHPHQWRIWKHUHVHDUFKHULQWKHVRFLDOOLIHRIWKRVHKHRUVKHVWXGLHV¶
(Bryman, 2008:401). This is important in the light of previous research 
highlighting potential difficulties with gaining access to some Muslim subjects in a 
current µFOLPDWHRIIHDUDQGVXVSLFLRQ¶6DQJKHUDDQG7KDSDU-Björkert, 2008:544). 
It has also been pointed out that research fatigue and heightened sensitivities are 
becoming an issue in areas where residents are being over-researched 
(Sanghera and Thapar-Björkert, 2008). Ahead of fieldwork in the Midlands such 
tensions were anticipated in several areas that have experienced high levels of 
scrutiny in the war on terror due to their high Muslim concentration (Pentazis and 
Pemberton, 2009).  
 
Multi-sited ethnography  
An important consideration in adopting an ethnographic approach is to 
avoid a tendency in previous studies to take a majoritarian perspective in 
engaging with Muslims and neglecting to consider the perspectives of those who 
have been most deeply and inimically affected by the war on terror (Bectovic, 
2011; Brown, 2010; Garner and Selod, 2015; Mythen, 2012; Spalek and 
Lambert, 2008). It has been DUJXHGWKDWPDQ\FRQWHPSRUDU\VWXGLHVRQPLJUDQWV
DUHFRQGXFWHGµLQWKHDEVWUDFWDQGLQLVRODWLRQIURPWKHOLYHGH[SHULHQFHVDQG
SUDFWLFHVRIFLWL]HQVKLSRIWKHPLJUDQWVWKHPVHOYHV¶3HURRIIHULQJD
OLPLWHGSHUVSHFWLYHRIPLQRULW\OLYHV Ethnography offers a more inclusive and 
therefore ethical way, to conduct research with minorities as it attempts to 
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embrace complexity and recognises the agency and subjectivity of participants 
(Pero, 2008) which may help to avoid some of the reified and reductive views of 
Muslims that have contributed to their marginalisation. Ethnography is well 
placed to help the researcher study the lived experience of activism and civic 
engagement since it aims to minimise the social and cultural distance between 
WKHUHVHDUFKHUDQGWKHUHVHDUFKHG2¶/RXJKOLQDQG*LOOHVSLHTraditional 
ethnography has roots in the discipline of anthropology, which gained 
prominence in the work of Bronislaw K. Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown 
(Macdonald, 2001; Gobo, 2011) but it is also associated with the sociological 
tradition of the Chicago School (Delamont, 2007; Okely, 2012). Often 
ethnography is viewed as a method reliant on direct observation but in practice it 
has undergone many incarnations to become more than just a particular 
research tool, representing DµSDUWLFXODUSHUVSHFWLYH¶0LOOHUZKLFK
UHTXLUHVWKHUHVHDUFKHUµWREe in the presence of the people one is studying, not 
MXVWWKHWH[WVRUREMHFWVWKH\SURGXFH¶,WDOVRPHDQVHYDOXDWLQJZKDWSHRSOHGR
and not just what they say. Although ethnography has come to describe many 
diverse approaches Hammersley and Atkinson (2009:230) usefully summarise 






As ethnography covers such a diversity of practices and approaches it is 
necessary to specify exactly what kind of ethnography has been conducted. 
Traditionally ethnography is seen as an approach which focuses on a single site 
where intensive engagement is carried out for a long duration (Falzon, 2009; 
Marcus, 1995), although this view is contested by those who question whether 
the pioneering ethnographers were really fixed or isolated in that way (Hannerz, 
2003; Okely, 2012). In a seminal article on multi-sited ethnography Marcus 
(1995:100) points out that in a globalised world the field of research of even 
µVWDQGDUGHWKQRJUDSKLFSURMHFWVLQGHHGDOUHady crosses many potentially related 
VLWHVRIZRUN¶ZKHUHµSULQFLSOHVRIVHOHFWLRQRSHUDWHWRERXQGWKHHIIHFWLYHILHOG¶
'XHWRWKLVVWXG\¶VIRFXVRQLQGLYLGXDOVDQGGLYHUVLW\UDWKHUWKDQRUJDQLVDWLRQV
focusing on a single site would have posed serious limitations on generating 
sufficient relevant data, given the spontaneous, fluctuating and unpredictable 
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nature of unconventional, non-electoral politics that characterise social 
movements. Focusing on a single site, i.e. a single organisation or 
neighbourhood, would have severely limited how far the research could go into 
exploring the range of actions that young Muslims engage in. Focusing on one 
type of organisation might also run the risk of reinforcing essentialist views of 
Muslims by presenting a very narrow perspective. Although a representative 
sample is not sought by this study, it is hoped that including a wider range of 
activities, styles of mobilisation and recruiting Muslims from a range of 
backgrounds, might challenge some of the stereotypes of Muslims that dominate 
media and public perceptions. Including multiple sites increases the likelihood of 
gaining a broader and more comprehensive view of the diverse, unexpected and 
less visible ways in which Muslims conduct activism. For these reasons this 
study adopts a multi-sited ethnographic approach, which departs from the 
traditional view of anthropological practice as conducted by Malinowski and his 
SHHUVEXWUHPDLQVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHXVHRIHWKQRJUDSK\DVDµSDUWLFXODU
SHUVSHFWLYH¶(Miller, 1997:16))DO]RQ¶V-2) definition of multi-sited 
ethnography serves as an appropriate description of what this research aims for:  
The essence of multi-sited research is to follow people, connections, 
associations and relationships across space (because they are 
substantially continuous but spatially non-contiguous).  
Marcus (1995) provides a useful way of understanding how multi-sited 
ethnography constructs a research field:  
Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, 
conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer 
establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited 
logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the 
argument of the ethnography. (Marcus 1995:105)  
The tracing and following of some phenomenon of interest to the research 
is what characterises multi-sited ethnography. In this study the µORJLFRI
DVVRFLDWLRQ¶ that binds the various sites is the potential or real experience of 




relationships become established with a core group of activists. In the following 
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section, some arguments are presented to justify the use of multi-sited 
ethnography rather than singular methods.  
 
Limitations of single methods 
Singular methods, such as surveys or interviews, have limited scope to 
provide a more fine-grained understanding of political and civic activism, as they 
present some epistemological and practical limitations for this study. From an 
epistemological perspective Gilbert and Mulka\¶V (1984) research into scientific 
discourses highlights the limitations of interview data by demonstrating the less 
than perfect correspondence between what people say and what they do. Robert 
Dingwall (1997) sums up the status of the interview in social research as:  
The interview is an artefact, a joint accomplishment of interviewer and 
UHVSRQGHQW$VVXFKLWVUHODWLRQVKLSWRDQ\µUHDO¶H[SHULHQFHLVQRWPHUHO\
unknown but in some sense unknowable. (Dingwall, 1997:63)  
This suggests interview data as a co-production between the interviewee 
and interviewer, based on temporal interpretations and reflections, may not fully 
provide the information sought by the researcher. While SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ meaning-
making discourses are invaluable and of primary importance to the research, 
they also pose a practical challenge of how to obtain the relevant information and 
reaching what Scott (1990:14) refers to as the µKLGGHQWUDQVFULSWV¶RIsubordinate 
groups. Although Scott was analysing the relationship between masters and 
slaves in historical societies, his distinction EHWZHHQµSXEOLF¶DQGµKLGGHQ¶
transcripts is helpful in sensitising research to the ways in which discourses can 
delineate the hierarchies of power between dominant and subordinate groups in 
contemporary society. 6FRWWGHILQHVDSXEOLFWUDQVFULSWDVµDVKRUWKDQG
way of describing the open interaction between subordinates and those who 
GRPLQDWH¶,WLVWKHGLVFRXUVHRIWKHVXERUGLQDWHµLQWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHGRPLQDQW¶
whereas DKLGGHQWUDQVFULSWGHVFULEHVDGLVFRXUVHµWKDWWDNHVSODFH³RIIVWDJH´
EH\RQGREVHUYDWLRQRISRZHUKROGHUV¶ (Scott 1990:4). Accessing these hidden 
transcripts becomes more challenging in a political climate where Muslims have 
been under such intense pressure to demonstrate their loyalty to Britain after 
9/11 and 7/7, particularly by being coerced to avow liberal values and ideals 
(Brown, 2010; McGhee, 2008; Mythen, 2012; Thomas and Sanderson, 2011; 
Younge, 2005 ). In the context of securitisation it is distinctly possible that 
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interviews with unfamiliar researchers are likely to produce constrained 
UHVSRQVHVUHIOHFWLQJDµSXEOLFWUDQVFULSW¶GHVLJQHGWRDYHUWVXVSLFLRQDQGFHQVXUH
Indeed some studies with Muslims have indicated tendencies towards self-
censorship and identity management where Muslimness is downplayed due to of 
fears of persecution (Brown and Saeed, 2014; Gillespie, 2007; Mythen et al, 
2009). Recognising the challenges that a researcher faces in this context, there 
is a need to adopt an approach that can mitigate the limitations of single 
methods. Gillespie (2007:276) suggests that: 
Ethnography (as distinct from interview methods) lets us track differences 
between what people say and what they do, and gives clues as to why they 
might speak and act as they do.  
Participant observation, which is often used synonymously with 
ethnography (Bryman, 2008; Delamont, 2007) is traditionally the main mode of 
data generation for ethnographers, though rarely the only one. The considerable 
advantage of participant observation to make sense of the social world compels 
Dingwall (1997:60) to argue that µWKHZRUOGRIVRFLDOVFLHQFHSURIHVVHVDFRQFHUQ
for the integrity of its conclusions which sits uncomfortably with the neglect of 
REVHUYDWLRQDOUHVHDUFK¶ 
It is necessary to point out that while participant observation does allow the 
researcher to get closer to social actors and µVWULNHRXWLQWHUYLHZYDULDWLRQ¶
(Dingwall, 1997:67) to some degree, it would be a mistake to assume that this 
would grant direct access to reality. Observation as a method is also reliant on a 
filtering system which mediates what is recorded, how it is interpreted and what 
is selected for rHSRUWLQJ0D\7KHREVHUYHU¶VUROHLQSURGXFLQJWKHGDWDis 
XQDYRLGDEOHLQDQDSSURDFKZKLFKUHOLHVKHDYLO\RQWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VµKDQGKHDUW
PRYHPHQWDQGWKHVHQVHV¶ (Okely, 2012:1). One way in which the researcher 
can attempt to defend against charges of doing µILFWLRQDOZULWLQJ¶'DYLHV
DQGWKHFULWLTXHRIFUHDWLQJUDWKHUWKDQGLVFRYHULQJµREMHFWVRIVWXG\¶
(Davies, 1999:14) is through transparency and reflexivity to make explicit the 
influence the researcher has on the knowledge produced. A researcher can add 
rigour, credibility and reliability to ethnographic accounts by remaining reflexive at 
every stage of the research, from access and data generation to analysis and 
writing (Davies, 1999; Delamont, 2007; Silverman, 2006).  
However, no research strategy is without limitations and multi-sited 
HWKQRJUDSK\GRHVUDLVHFRQFHUQVDERXWµDWWHQXDWLQJ
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competencies that are expected from ILHOGZRUN¶0DUFXV7KLVLVWKH
practical problem of a single researcher trying to cover a wider area of study 
involving multiple sites. Due to this limitation, as well as the irregular and eratic 
nature of alternative forms of activism, interview data plays a much more central 
role in the analysis compared to participant observations as has been the case 
for other multi-sited researchers:  
Probably the time factor has a part in making many multi-site studies rather 
more dependent on interviews than single-site studies. (Hannerz, 
2003:211)  
A narrative style of interview is another strategy used by this research to 
facilitate access to marginalised voices. Also known as biographical interviews 
(Bryman, 2008), narrative interviews invite participants to give detailed accounts 
of their lives, allowing them to describe significant and meaningful events and 
relationships. Narrative interviews are commonly facilitated rather than directed 
so that the participant can tell their story in their own words (Coffey and Atkinson, 
1996; Mason, 2002)DQDSSURDFKWKDWLVPRUHUHVSHFWIXORIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
agency and intentionality which can be neglected in more µYDULDEOH-centred 
UHVHDUFK¶0LVKOHULQ5iessman, 2008:11).  
Finally documentary evidence from organisational literature, social media 
sites and blogs provides another dimension of understanding of the social and 
cultural world in which activism is located, as well providing an insight into the 
aFWLYLVWV¶µSXEOLFWUDQVFULSWV¶6FRWW:1). The use of the terms hidden and 
public transcripts is not intended to signify a definitive distinction between two 
discrete and stable types of expressions since these are ideal types which in 
social settings are harder to fix precisely. In particular it is difficult to draw this 
distinction on Facebook and social media, as the lines between private and 
public are much more fluid and complex in these virtual settings. However, these 
concepts help to draw attention to the context and audience involved in 
SURGXFLQJWH[WV7H[WKHUHUHIHUVWRµDQ\DFWXDOLQVWDQFHRIODQJXDJHLQXVH¶
(Fairclough, 2003:3). Given some of the limitations of interviews and 
observations described above, data from documentary sources, particularly 
social media sites, is an important source of data to capture the everyday 
practices of activism where collective action is said to be forged (Melucci, 1989; 
1996).  
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Research sample and location 
This section covers some of the practical aspects of the research as a way 
RIFRQVWUXFWLQJWKHµREMHFWVRIUHVHDUFK¶ZKLFKPHDQVUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\
RSHUDWLRQDOLVLQJNH\WHUPVWKHSURFHVVWKURXJKZKLFKWKH\DUHµJLYHQ
GHWHUPLQDWHDQGRUIXQFWLRQDOPHDQLQJ¶LVmade explicit (Fairclough, 2010:413-
414). A number of challenges and discoveries which called for responsive 
changes to the planned research design are also described. Fortunately the 
necessary changes did not pose any significant problems for the research driven 
by exploratory and open-ended aims and the promise of discovering the 
unexpected and the unfamiliar (Okely, 2012). However, they do require some 
degree of reflection to make the research process more transparent.  
Purposive samplingZKLFK%U\PDQGHILQHVDVµHVVHQWLDOO\
VWUDWHJLF¶ZKHUHµWKHUHVHDUFKHUVDPSOHVRQWKHEDVLVRIZDQWLQJWRLQWHUYLHZ
SHRSOHZKRDUHUHOHYDQWWRWKHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQV¶ was used as a recruitment 
strategy. Participants were chosen because their identities and modes of social 
engagement were relevant to the research questions aimed at exploring non-
electoral politics by young adult Muslims resident in Britain. Three criteria for 
recruitment are of primary importance:  
1. Must be actively engaged in non-electoral forms of activism 
2. Must be from a Muslim background 
3. Must be aged between 18 and 35 years  
Identifying and recruiting people who fit this description was quite 
challenging as there had been no previous engagement with the research 
setting. Additionally, due to the multi-sited nature of this study, as well as the 
patchy, peripatetic and unpredictable nature of activism in social movements, it 
was often not possible or practical to carry out extended engagements with 
participants prior to conducting interviews to determine if they precisely matched 
the recruitment criteria. In the following sections each of the recruitment criteria 
are discussed in detail, explaining the conceptual definitions developed to help 
make decisions about who would be included in the study and how these shifted 
in response to the emerging knowledge and demands of the research field.  
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Defining activists  
The terms µDFWLYLVP¶and µDFWLYLVW¶DSSHDU frequently within social movement 
theory to describe collective action and those who engage in it (Crossley, 2002; 
Della Porta and Diani, 2006). This definition was of limited use for a study which 
could not determine in advance of fieldwork whether young Muslims were part of 
a social movement since this proposition was itself under investigation. It is also 
remarkable that a great deal of literature on social movements does not set out a 
very clear definition of what activism is, which is why it is worth taking some time 
to do so here. From the vantage point of this research Portwood-6WDFHU¶V
(2013:238) comments are particularly helpful: 
,W¶VDOVRLPSRUWDQWWRUHFRJQL]HWKDWZKDWFRXQWV as activism is a discursive 
construction. I argue that whether a practice can be considered activism 
does not depend on the measurable effects of the action, but rather the 
meaning people attribute to it. 
This designation of activism is useful because it is broad enough to 
encompass a range of activities which can be construed as participation from a 
cultural politics perspective and is not reliant on selecting participants on the 
basis of a criterion that is itself indeterminate and being investigated. Portwood-
6WDFHU¶VTXDOLILFDWLRQUHODWHVWRDUJXPHQWVRYHUZKHWKHUOLIHVW\OHSROLWLFV
counts as activism by those who adopt a more conventional understanding of 
politics where visible and contentious modes of resistance against clearly-defined 
opponents are a requisite. Here this qualification serves a different purpose, it 
means the participants can be selected on the basis of their efforts to bring about 
social change without establishing in advance that these efforts are part of a 
social movement.  This definition of activism is consistent with the Foucauldian 
definition of politics as a struggle for power that occurs throughout society rather 
than being concentrated in particular sites (Nash, 2010). This allows the study to 
include those who act in a personal capacity through actions like blogging or 
graffiti art as well as those who adopt more conventional dissenting modes of 
DFWLYLVPWKURXJKSURWHVWVDQGFDPSDLJQLQJ*LYHQWKHVWXG\¶VUHPLWWRH[SORUH
subpolitical activities (Beck2¶7RROHDQG*DOH participants from 
mainstream political parties or trade unions were not recruited, although this did 
not exclude those who were active in mainstream politics, as long as non-
electoral politics was the mainstay of their activism.  
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Another helpful definition of activism is offered by Hands (2011:2) who 
HTXDWHVWKHFRQFHSWZLWKQRWLRQVRIµGLVVHQW¶µUHVLVWDQFH¶DQGµUHEHOOLRQ¶WR
FDSWXUHµWKHJHQHUDOVHQVHRIRSSRVLWLRQWRSUHYDLOLQJSRZHU¶$V+DQGV
further elaborates all three notions are able to signify opposition bXWµWKHPDQQHU
of opposition, its rationale, action and impact, may be very different in each 
FDVH¶+HWKHQJRHVRQWRGHVFULEHLPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQDOOWKUHH







focus on conflict or opposition to identifiable opponents is seen as a limiting the 
scope of activism to contentious politics. As discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to 
social movements, political projects of a consensual nature (Crossley, 2002) 
such as charity and community work also need to be included in this definition 
since resistance can take many different guises under conditions of domination 
6FRWWZKLFKPD\QRWDOZD\VLQFOXGHµGHILDQFH¶DV+DQGV
describes it.  
Participants for this study were chosen because of their involvement in 
activism in the sense defined above, although their levels of commitment remain 
varied. A total of 34 activists, 17 females and 17 males, participating in a variety 
of forms of activities are included in this study. A full description of the range and 
types of activism covered by this sample is indicated by Appendices 1 and 2. 
Some participants became involved in activism through chance and did not 
LGHQWLI\VWURQJO\ZLWKWKHµDFWLYLVW¶ODEHORWKHUVVDZDFWLYLVP as an opportunity to 
enhance career possibilities and a few considered themselves to be career 
activists. Levels of activity also varied from occasionally attending meetings to 
maintaining an active and visible presence, while a handful of participants acted, 
informally or officially, as leaders of campaigns or mobilisations.  
 
Who is a Muslim? 
7KHQHHGIRUDFOHDUGHILQLWLRQRIDµ0XVOLP¶ is necessitated by the sheer 
diversity of people in Britain who might, voluntarily or involuntarily, be associated 
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with this category. During a pilot study for this research (Mustafa, 2011) two out 
of six participants stated that they were not religious or practicing Muslims but 
upon analysing their interviews it was found that they had strong and personal 
concerns about Islamophobia and the post-9/11 securitisation of Muslims. This 
suggested that a self-defining Muslim category may be inadequate for capturing 
the experiences of those citizens who do not identify strongly with being a Muslim 
but nevertheless are socially categorised as being part of the group. Furthmore, it 
KDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWQHJOHFWLQJWKHµnon-religious elements of identity of 
Muslims and making them more religious than they are, has furthermore 
contributed to reducing thHFRPSOH[LW\RI0XVOLPLGHQWLW\¶ (Bectovic, 2011:1122). 
In other words existing research VXIIHUVIURPDµJURVVQHVVRIVRFLDODQDO\VLV¶
(Sen, 2007:61) due to the prioritisation of the voices of more religious Muslims 
and the marginalisation of secular, cultural or even non-believing Muslims who 
are included in the Muslim category due to their family name or ethnic 
background. I considered myself to be in this latter category of involuntary 
Muslims. 'XHWRWKLVVWXG\¶VLQWHUHVWLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJDFWLYLVPLQDVecuritised 
citizenship context in the aftermath of 9/11, it was vital to adopt a sociological 
rather religious definition of D0XVOLPVLQFHWKHµ0XVOLPH[SHULHQFH¶can and has 
visited anyone who is associated with Islam in the public imagination. Reference 
is being made here to reports of attacks on Sikh people in the US for looking like 
Muslims (Maira, 2009) as well as the shooting of the Brazilian youth Jean 
Charles de Menezes for suspected links to Islamic terrorism in the UK (BBC 
News, 2005). As Butler (2006:39) notes, IROORZLQJWKHUHKDVEHHQµD





theological' definition of a Muslim is adopted here to allow µopportunities for self-
definition¶ (Meer, 2010:63) thus capturing both voluntary and involuntary Muslim 
identities. This highlights the politicisation of Muslim citizenship in a post 9/11 
context where distinctions between practicing and non-practicing Muslims have 
become blurred with the rise Islamophobia and tough new measures on security 
and immigration (Briggs, 2010; Brown, 2010; Kundnani, 2014). 
Hence, throughout this study the term Muslim refers to participants who 
have a Muslim background either through family, country of origin or culture. The 
definition only serves as a recruitment strategy and not as any kind of description 
or normative statement. To reiterate, WKLVVWXG\¶Vinterest in Muslims stems not 
from a concern with religion but from their marginalised and demonised status in 






A young adult category of 18 to 35 years was set as a recruitment criterion 
even though it is more customary to define a youth category from 16 to 25 years 
in much of existing literature on young people and employment (Bradley and 
Devadason, 2008). There are two reasons why an extended age category was 
chosen for this research. Firstly, scholars like Bradley and Devadason (2008) 
have argued that the transitional phase between education and full time 
employment, which is often a marker for young adulthood, has expanded in the 
last few decades. Due to the fragmentation and vulnerability of employment in 
current times many young adults do not experience the kind of independence 
that previously established adulthood around the age of 25 years. As a result 
people as old as 34 have been included in the young adult age group by Bradley 
and Devadason (2008). Another argument for including people aged up to 35 
years is to gain a longer historical perspective by including the different 
generations of youth that have emerged within the last two decades, when the 
social and political context of securitisation and declining youth participation 
became more salient. People aged 35 at the time of conducting interviews 
between September 2012 and December 2013 were in the traditional youth 
category when 9/11 transpired and are in a good position to reflect on 
experiences and reactions to this major event and its immediate aftermath.  
Although it was not assumed activists would have a greater awareness and 
experience of post 9/11 politics, if their mobilisation had turned out to be 
completely devoid of any reference to 9/11 or security, as it did with some 
respondents, this has important implications for the securitisation of citizenship 
thesis. A strategy of including older participants allows the research to capture 
the experiences of people who are old enough to remember significant events 
like 9/11 and examine its political and civic impact on them. Having a sample with 
an extended age range encompasses a broader and more retrospective picture.  
The ages of participants ranged from 17 to 37 years at the time of 
interview. The ages of two participants fall outside the target age group of 18 to 
35 years which needs to be explained. Although the analysis presented in the 
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findings chapters that follow is based on 34 recorded and transcribed interviews, 
some supplementary interviews were conducted with 5 other activists who did 
not fully comply with the selection criteria for this study. This was done in the 
same spirit as observations were relied on to try and understand the social and 
political environment in which participants were located. Older activists who 
engage with young people on a regular basis are an important source of 
knowledge on the context in which activism takes place but they are also well 
placed to comment on what young people do and offer perspectives on what is 
novel or unusual about their actions in relation to other generations. With this in 
mind, an interview was conducted with a 61 year old veteran activist who had 
been involved in anti-war, pro-Palestine and trade union activism for several 
years in the West Midlands. He was able to give me an account of his experience 
of the changing local ODQGVFDSHRIµ$VLDQ¶UDWKHUWKDQµ0XVOLP¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWK
political and civic participation over the past 30 years as well as insights into how 
young people are doing activism at present. This kind of insight adds depth to the 
knowledge produced since younger people are less likely to have such a 
historical view of the field of activism. Talking to some of the older participants 
also confirmed the view that some of the issues emerging among the younger 
participants in this study, such as marginalisation, securitisation, Islamophobia 
and religiosity, pre-date 9/11 and 7/7. 
Another reason to solicit older participants was because they sometimes 
acted as gatekeepers to organisations that were otherwise difficult to access. An 
interview was conducted with a member of MPACUK, aged 43 years, as he was 
the first point of contact for the organisation. This interview was useful but 
unsuccessful in leading to further interviews with younger members as repeated 
attempts to contact individuals were met with silence. Similarly, 39-year-old 
Shazia was an important first point of contact for a social justice organisation in 
the East Midlands which provided a unique insight into community activism which 
was proving harder to access. Again there was a noticeable absence of young 
adults in this group, as well as difficulties in convincing them to do interviews with 
me. An interview was carried out with Aliya, aged 37, from a faith based 
community group for the same reasons and also because of the difficulties 
encountered in trying to recruit more participants involved in grassroots activism. 
This was harder to do in comparison to recruiting University students because I 
did not have any personal links to the areas of research prior to fieldwork. I met 
Aliya at a training course on politics, organised by one of the groups of interest, 
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and decided to interview her after discovering that she was key member of a 
national faith-based society. As it turned out I had to rethink my plans to recruit 
further participants from this Society because Aliya revealed that it was largely 
populated by older people and was in fact was struggling to attract younger 
members. However, her story of growing up in Britain had many common threads 
with some of the younger participants oIWKHVWXG\EXWKHUµUHSHUWRLUHV¶RIDFWLRQ
were different from the University students. This could be understood partly by 
the nature of the organisation she was involved with it. It was decided her 
account and her experience added an important dimension to the study and 
should not be excluded simply because she was two years older than the target 
sample. Finally, a 17 year old was recruited because of his involvement with an 
anti-war organisation but he also had an important story and perspective which 
was at odds with some of the other participants, allowing for a more diverse 
sample where interesting comparisons could be drawn.   
 
Citizenship status 
While a majority of participants were born and raised in Britain and had 
legal citizenship, two interviews were conducted with non-British nationals who 
had been resident in the country for over ten years. They were included in the 
study primarily because they fit the bill of someone who is vulnerable to having a 
µ0XVOLPH[SHULHQFH¶in the securitisation of citizenship context but also because 
they were important and committed members of the activism networks that were 
being studied. Most importantly as Isin (2012:KDVDUJXHGFLWL]HQVKLSLVµWKH
ULJKWWRFODLPULJKWV¶DQGWKHUHIRUHVKRXOGQRWEHVHHQDVWKHH[FOXVLYHSXUYLHZRI
those who enjoy legal status. Migrants who struggle for political rights can be 
viewed as carrying out active citizenship by virtue of their efforts within the nation 
state regardless of whether they have a passport or not. While the particular 
experiences of new migrants might present some analytical challenges, there 
was no reason to exclude more settled migrants from the study when their 
mobilisation constituted active citizenship in every sense of demanding change 
from the society in which they lived and made valuable contributions to. 
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Types of activism 
To achieve respondent variability it was intended to include diverse forms 
of activism, from as many different groups and settings as could be identified 
during fieldwork. However, the high representation of University students (21 out 
of 34) in this study is not merely a consequence of convenient access, there are 
some theoretical arguments to be made for this dominance. Access was no 
doubt much easier, even though the research was conducted across different 
Universities but more importantly students have been very prominent in the rise 
of social movements since the 1960s (Crossley, 2008; Crossley and Ibrahim, 
2012; Nash, 2010). It has also been argued that Universities UHSUHVHQWWKHµmost 
politically active spaces in the country¶Brown and Saeed, 2014:1) as well as 
having a strong role to play in politicising students:  
University campuses, I suggest, facilitate the formation of a critical and 
connected mass of previously politicised actors who then use their further 
networks to recruit political novices into activism. (Crossley, 2008:18)  
 
Indeed a number of participants reported becoming politicised during 
University life in this way. What also emerges as a positive consequence of 
interviewing students is the representation of variable experiences from across 
the country.  Although the research was located in the Midlands, the students 
interviewed came from all over including Essex, Yorkshire, Lancashire and 
London which added to the variety and depth of experiences and biographical 
narratives included in the study. However, gaining this advantage to some extent 
came at the cost of exploring more deeply the perspectives of activists located in 
grassroots and community networks. Despite efforts to recruit more grassroots 
and local activists, these sources were harder to identify as well as engage with 
without personal contacts and former involvement. It was also the case that 
student and community activists did not constitute discrete and unconnected 
arenas of activity as there were overlaps and common membership between 
University and non-University activism networks.  
 
Research location  
The term location is used here rather than site because it subsumes the 
multiple sites that were included in the study. The Midlands region was identified 
as an ideal location to conduct this study for a number of strategic advantages it 
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offered, not least of all because it happened to be where I lived. Birmingham 
itself has the second largest Muslim population in the UK after London as well as 
the highest percentage of Muslims (15%) in any UK city after Bradford (17%) 
(Ansari, 2009). The Midlands is also home to Muslims from diverse ethnic and 
national backgrounds providing an opportunity to engage with groups that have 
previously been marginalised in studies on Muslim citizens which tend to focus 
on people of South Asian origin (Ansari, 2009; Lewis, 2007). There are a number 
of features of the history and politics of the Midlands which make it relevant to 
the context of precarious citizenship (O'Loughlin and Gillespie 2012), including 
issues of security (BBC, 2011b), parallel lives (Karner and Parker, 2011:355) and 
rioting (Varma, 2010). Identifying a particular location in which to conduct the 
study was intended as a strategy to make it possible to capture the complexity of 
interactions within a quotidian context where political and civic activity is typically 
generated and mobilised (Melucci, 1989, 1996).  
Although originally the research hoped to focus on the West Midlands, a 
few months after the research commenced the field was expanded to include the 
East Midlands. A compelling reason to do so was because the number of 
activists identified in the first few months of fieldwork was not as large as 
anticipated and it was felt a wider area would need to be covered to get a critical 
mass of activists for the study. As already mentioned access to certain 
community groups proved more challenging than expected and this called on the 
research to be responsive to opportunities wherever they arose. Of all the 
participants whose interviews were transcribed 24 were located in the West 
Midlands while 10 were based in the East Midlands. However, following leads to 
other sites and expanding the research area were never precluded in the 
research strategy in the first place, as the intention had always been to stay 
responsive to knowledge emerging from the field.  
 
Fieldwork, challenges and resolutions 
This section will focus on how the fieldwork was approached and 
undertaken, describing how access was sought and what challenges surfaced, 
as well as reflecting on the strategies used to overcome these. This account is 
important for justifying some of the methodological choices made for the sake of 
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transparency of process, as well as for setting the context for the analysis that is 
presented in the following chapters.  
 
Entering the field  
Fieldwork commenced in June 2012 with groups like Stop the War 
Coalition, Unite Against Fascism and Palestine Solidarity Campaign being 
contacted to identify and recruit participants. Such groups appeared to be a good 
starting point since previous literature (Phillips, 2008; Werbner, 2005) and a pilot 
study (Mustafa, 2011) had indicated a good level of Muslim participation in such 
groups. On a more practical note, these groups had informative and up to date 
websites with information about local activities and named contacts, making 
access a lot easier. Another important starting point was University student 
unions and societies for which there does also tend to be information available 
online. Attending a planning meeting of a local Stop the War Coalition group 
early in the fieldwork revealed WKDWDOWKRXJKWKHUHZHUHIHZµ\RXQJ¶0XVOLPV
involved with the core organising committee, some executive members had good 
links with younger Muslims activists in the area. One of these individuals kindly 
invited me to connect with them on Facebook which opened up several doors 
into local networks from which participants were recruited. This launched my 
fieldwork as I was instantly connected to a number of key local figures in student 
activism, as well as some community-based actors. It was not only the 
oppoUWXQLW\WRµEHIULHQG¶, in Facebook lexicon, a number of key actors that was 
useful but also the information this network shared about local events and 
campaigns which was valuable. As one of the main channels through which 
collective action is being galvanised, Facebook and Twitter very quickly became 
vital resources in my research. However, Facebook connections were not 
enough to gain interviews, DVEHLQJDµIULHQG¶RQWKLVPHGLXPKDVGLIIHUHQW
implications to what the term implies in a non-virtual context. Being a Facebook 
contact meant I could email people and make arrangements to meet them at 
events they were planning to attend, where I would introduce myself in person 
and explain more about my research before seeking permission to conduct a 
recorded interview. Being a virtual friend did not automatically guarantee 
someone would make themselves available to be interviewed by a complete 
stranger.  
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Fieldwork progressed slowly but steadily but as the list of groups and 
individuals recruited to the study grew it became necessary to limit the number of 
sites engaged with as meetings and events started to overlap and conflict with 
each other. A full account of the groups that were observed and recruited from is 
available in Appendix 2. The fieldwork includes over 40 observations of meetings 
and demonstrations as well as countless visits to social media sites from which 
comments and content was observed and recorded.  
 
Access issues and approaches 
Based on a review of previous literature some challenges were anticipated 
in advance of conducting this research. Foremost was the possibility that 
PDUJLQDOLVHGFLWL]HQVZKRDUHFXUUHQWO\OLYLQJLQDµFOLPDWHRIIHDUDQGVXVSLFLRQ¶
(Sanghera and Thapar-Björkert, 2008:544) might be reluctant to engage with an 
unknown researcher. Existing literature also indicated that there may be 
GLIILFXOWLHVUHFUXLWLQJUHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDQWVGXHWRLVVXHVRIEHLQJµRYHU
UHVHDUFKHG¶LQDUHDVZLWKµFRQWURYHUVLDODQGFRQWHVWHG¶SROLWLFDOKLVWRULes 
(Sanghera and Thapar-Björkert 2008:544).  
The fieldwork has largely supported these concerns with access proving to 
be difficult. As access to participants was dependent on gaining entry into groups 
as a first step to identifying suitable candidates, it is worth mentioning perceptible 
differences between groups, some of whom were relatively open and public, 
while others were more closed and guarded in their operations. Although groups 
are not the unit of analysis in this study some understanding of how they operate 
was relevant to engaging with individual activists in the field and understanding 
the relationships within the activism networks. These themes will be explored 
further in the findings section but suffice it to say the difficulty encountered in 
attempting to access particular groups, like MPACUK, posed significant 
challenges to identifying and engaging with individuals working with them.  
Where access to groups was successful recruiting suitable subjects was 
also far from straight forward. This is not entirely unexpected as all research has 
its own set of issues relating to access, particularly where there is no previous 
relationship between the researcher and the research area (Bryman, 2008). 
Recruiting participants for interviews involved a process of holding one or two 
initial and informal meetings with participants during which they had an 
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opportunity to meet me in person, receive a verbal description of my research 
and ask questions. There were some exceptions but in those cases the 
participants knew me through friends who had already been interviewed and who 
were happy to vouch for me.  
Another challenge was the lack of visibility of many of the types of political 
and civic activism that young Muslims engaged in. While there have been studies 
examining the different forms of participation by young Muslims (Back et al, 
2009; Briggs, 2010; O'Toole and Gale, 2013)  these by no means provide an 
exhaustive list of activities, groups or organisations. This is because many such 
bodies operate at a grassroots level and often on a very voluntary and informal 
basis and are not visible or identifiable without a presence in these local 
networks. Such political formations also often arise during crisis periods and then 
disappear once the urgency has dissipated or the funding has dried up. 
Sometimes groups that are mentioned in previous literature disband and their 
websites become GHIXQFWIRUH[DPSOHµ-XVW3HDFH¶(Phillips, 2008) DQGµ<RXQJ
0XVOLPV$GYLVRU\*URXS¶(O'Toole and Gale, 2010). Circumstances also change 
and what once appeared to be a significant development, such as Muslim 
engagement with the Respect Party (Briggs, 2010), loses some of its relevance. 
This does not imply that support for Respect has dwindled in the Midlands, only 
that it was difficult for this research to find any evidence of it.  
Many of these challenges were resolved and several others averted 
through the use of an ethnographic approach, vindicating claims that this method 
was the most appropriate for this research. One of the advantages of doing 
ethnography was that gatekeepers were largely avoided as participants were 
identified and approached directly through participation in activities or surfing 
social media sites. This was particularly useful in identifying people that might not 
have otherwise been available through gatekeepers, such a photographer 
activism and a political poet, both of whom I met by chance at meetings. Being 
able to include such diverse and atypical examples of young Muslim activism 
was really important for this study, which seeks to challenge some of the reified 
judgements about young Muslims that have been dominant in media and policy 
representations. It should be noted that although a majority of the time 
gatekeepers were not used, some participants were identified through 
conversations and interviews with other participants but they were all contacted 
independently of the original source to maintain confidentiality. 
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During initial contact participants took the opportunity to determine my 
SROLWLFDOSRVLWLRQRUµDJHQGD¶LQDGYDQFHZKLFK sometimes involved me having to 
make my political views on issues related to Muslim citizenship quite explicit. 
This precaution was not solely related to fears of surveillance and spying but was 
also precipitated by concerns over being misrepresented in what participants 
viewed as an already toxic environment of relentless attacks on Muslims in the 
media. In this context it was important for participants to establish whether my 
views were sympathetic to their causes and beliefs before agreement to 
participate in the research ensued. In most cases I was able to demonstrate a 
supportive stance through my engagement as a participant observer where I 
conveyed my aims to avoid the kind of stereotypical and essentialist portrayals of 
Muslims that have dominated media headlines. This facilitated the recruitment of 
subjects for interviews which may have proved a lot harder, if not impossible, 
without developing some kind of understanding in advance.  
Apart from paving the way for interviews, an ethnographic approach 
enabled this research to map the field of activism itself. Participant observation 
helped to identify several previously unknown groups that young Muslims were 
engaging with or forming themselves, which were hard to locate without insider 
information. Being in the field also gave access to spontaneous initiatives in 
response to unexpected events like the series of demonstrations organised in 
November 2012 to protest against Israeli attacks on Gaza, and an anti-extradition 
meeting supporting Babar Ahmad and Talha Ahsan in December 2012 as well as 
a Muslim women-led counter protest on social media DJDLQVWWKHµ7RSOHVV-LKDG¶
organised by FEMEN in April 2013.  
Ethnographic methods also facilitated first hand observation of how 
DFWLYLVPLVFRQGXFWHGDQGZKDWQHZµJUDPPDUVRIDFWLRQ¶(O'Toole and Gale, 
2010:126) RUSROLWLFDOµUHSHUWRLUHV¶1RUULV:18) look like. This type of 
information was not easily available from interviews alone as many, though not 
all, activists were not very knowledgeable about political terminology or concepts. 
Their consciousness of mobilisation was that of an embodied and lived kind for 
which they did not have an available vocabulary or existing set of narratives. 
Categories employed by this study such as activism, politics, civil society, social 
movements and even citizenship did not automatically resound LQWKHDFWLYLVWV¶
DFFRXQWV'XULQJLQWHUYLHZVZKHQSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGµKRZ¶WKH\GLGSROLWLFs 
DQGZKDWWKHLUµDLPV¶ were, the answers never fully revealed what they actually 
did or wanted to achieve, which often emerged from observing them in the field 
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or changing the way in which the questions were asked to elicit this information. 
However, this was not the case with all the participants and some were highly 
knowledgeable about political theory and in these interviews it was harder to get 
information about biographical details and personal beliefs because the 
participants produced more abstract and theoretical responses to questions.  
Further appreciation of the distance between an academic perspective and 
the lived experience of activism came from discovering the inadequacy of the first 
set of publicity materials designed to help recruit participants. At the start of the 
study some leaflets and letters were designed to introduce the study to potential 
participants and these were used in emails and face to face meetings to give 
some background to the research. However, the stone wall of silence that 
greeted these materials led to revisions in order to make information about the 
study more amenable to a wider audience. Based on some of the conversations 
held early on in the fieldworkZKHUH,ZDVZDUQHGWKDWµ0XVOLPVGRQ¶WGRSROLWLFV¶ 
,IHOWWKDWODEHOOLQJWKHUHVHDUFKDVDVWXG\RIµSROLWLFDODFWLYLVP¶ was problematic. 
In response, the research was rebranded (see Appendix 3), so to speak, as a 
VWXG\DERXWµDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLS¶DQGHYHQWKRXJKWKLVled to only one person 
contacting me voluntarily to take part in the study, when I gave the new materials 
to potential participants the responses seemed to be more positive.  
 
Interviews, narratives and discourses  
All the interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. Apart from 2 
interviews conducted by Skype all the remaining were carried out in person in 
public locations.  Initially the research had intended to use narrative inquiry 
methods to privilege the voice of the marginalised participant. The interviews 
were conducted in an informal way, often as an extended conversation, allowing 
the participant to take the lead and trying to fit questions around the themes they 
were discussing. As a result the questions were not asked mechanically in any 
structured way as demanded by narrative interviews (Mason, 2002; Riessman, 
2008). While attempts were made to adhere to the guidelines of narrative inquiry, 
in practice this was difficult to achieve for two reasons; firstly it did not elicit the 
kind of data required by the study and secondly the data that was being 
generated did not fit the description of a narrative. This discrepancy between the 
research aims and practice in the field yielded an important methodological 
insight which is worth discussing briefly. Applying narrative interview techniques 
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involves open ended questions to allow participants to have more control over 
the interview and to tell a story about their lives (Mason, 2002). However, this 
approach became problematic because it did not necessarily lead to reflections 
on the concepts that this research aimed to explore, such as politics, activism 
and citizenship. This required multiple interventions during the interview to direct 
participants to reflect on views and experiences that might contain information 
regarding these concepts.  
In a further complication, not all participants responded to the open ended 
questions as hoped by providing extended stories about their lives and a large 
number of interview subjects simply gave brief and factual responses. These 
records of events or facts defeated the goal of narrative interviews to elicit 
µGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWVUDWKHUWKDQEULHIDQVZHUVRUDJHQHUDOVWDWHPHQW¶(Riessman, 
2008:23). As the interviews progressed it became obvious that the requisite 
storied accounts (Lawler, 2002; Riessman, 2008) were missing from some 
interviews and the features needed to conduct a narrative analysis were absent 
LQODUJHSDUWVRIWKHGDWDPDNLQJLWQHFHVVDU\WRUHIUDPHWKHLQWHUYLHZVDVµVHPL-
VWUXFWXUHG¶UDWKHUWKDQµQDUUDWLYH¶LQWHUYLHZV 
Reflecting on this experience raises questions about the relevance of a 
narrative framework for this study and suggests a distinctive characteristic of 
political topics to direct speakers to refer to collective action rather personal 
experience, making it less likely to feature the kind of stories that narrative inquiry 
seeks. What emerges are arguments, evaluations and normative ideas 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOZRUOGSROLWLFDOLVVXHVDQGWKHLUUROHLQ
activism.  An alternative way to describe the talk generated in the interviews is 
WKURXJKWKHQRWLRQRIµGLVFRXUVH¶ZKLFKVHHPVWREHDEHWWHUILWWRWKHGDWD
because LWZRUNVDWDPXFKEURDGHUFRQFHSWXDOOHYHOWKDQµQDUUDWLYH¶ZKLFKLVD
specific kind of discourse5HVHDUFKRQµGLVFRXUVH¶LVQRZDYHU\YDVWGLVFLSOLQH
with numerous methodologies and approaches employed with different intended 
research aims (Hammersley, 2005). In response to the question of how 
discourse plays a part in research Wetherell VWDWHVWKDWµWKHVWXG\RI
discourse is the study of human meaning-PDNLQJ¶7KLVLVDYHU\EURDGGHILQLWLRQ
RIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVDµGLVFRXUVH¶ZKLFKUHTXLUHVIXrther qualification to be 
formulated into a specific method of analysis, particularly if this is to be combined 
ZLWKHWKQRJUDSK\7KHQH[WVHFWLRQH[SODLQVKRZWKHFRQFHSWRIµGLVFRXUVH¶LV
employed as a framework for data analysis and how this relates to other sources 
of data gathered through observations and documentary evidence.  
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Analysing data and discourse 
Narrative inquiry appealed to this study because it not only involves a 
particular type of interview, it also offers a number of approaches for data 
analysis that try to be less reductive of the text and therefore avoid taking 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ZRUGVRXWRIFRQWH[W1DUUDWLYHDQDO\VLVKDVVRPHFRPPRQLQWHUHVWV
ZLWKRWKHUOLQJXLVWLFPHWKRGVWRXQFRYHUµLQWHQWLRQDQGODQJXDJH± how and why 
incidents are stoULHGQRWVLPSO\WKHFRQWHQWWRZKLFKODQJXDJHUHIHUV¶5LHVVPDQ
2008:11; original emphasis). This was considered an important device because 
RIWKLVVWXG\¶VWKHRUHWLFDODFFHQWRQFXOWXUDOSROLWLFVZKHUHWKHV\PEROLFDQGWKH
representational features of the social world assume greater prominence (Hall, 
2010: Melucci, 1996; Nash, 2010). Switching from narrative analysis to discourse 
analysis had the advantage of retaining a concern with the discursive and 
UKHWRULFDOIHDWXUHVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶WDONEXWUDLVHG some important questions about 
how this would impact on the ethnographic approach which underpins the study. 
While narrative interviews are well placed to complement the aims of 
traditional ethnography (Reissman, 2008) to gain a more bottom up perspective, 
the combination of ethnography with discourse analysis requires some 
qualification. This is because more radical approaches to discourse analysis can 
lead to a contradictory rather than complementary relationship between the two 
approaches (Hammersley, 2005). Some influential approaches to discourse 
analysis are not concerned with the wider context of talk unless the speakers 
refer to it in their interaction (Potter, 1996; Wetherell 2010) making them 
problematic in relation to ethnography, which is driven by more holistic research 
concerns (Okely, 2012). Many linguistic methods, like conversation analysis, are 
purely  interested in the interactional features of naturally occurring language in 
the social world (Heritage, 2010) rejecting interviews as unsuitable for analysis 
due to their staged character. Linguistic ethnography combines an interest in 
language with an ethnographic focus on social context but there remains a focus 
on the use and structure of language within interactions which does not serve the 
research aims of this study.  
Instead of focusing on language structures or social interactions, this study 
made use of the insights gained from a number of discourse theorists to 
illuminate the empirical themes under investigation. Foremost amongst these is 
0LFKHO)RXFDXOWZKRVKLIWHGWKHDWWHQWLRQIURPµODQJXDJH¶WRµGLVFRXUVHDVD
V\VWHPRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶(Hall, 2010:72). Foucault was less interested in the 
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internal structures of language itself and more concerned with the constitutive 
QDWXUHRIWDONRULQRWKHUZRUGVWKHµSURGXFWLRQRINQRZOHGJHWKURXJKODQJXDJH¶
(Hall, 2010:72). He argued that discourse was not a neutral system of 
VLJQLILFDWLRQEXWUDWKHULWµGHILQHVDQGSURGXFHVWKHREMHFWVRIRXUNQRZOHGJH¶
(Hall, 2010:72) and places limits on the ways in which objects and realities in the 
world can be constructed through talk.  
Foucault is often criticised for arguing that nothing can have any meaning 
outside of talk (Al-Amoudi, 2007), an epistemological claim that potentially 
undermines as contradictory any encounter with ethnography. This critique would 
add to the complication that many discourse analysts are social constructivists 
and lean towards a relativist position (Potter and Hepburn, 2008) which might be 
viewed as conflictual in relation to subtle realism as well as ethnography. In 
response to these positions critical discourse analysts like Norman Fairclough 
argue that discourses are socially constitutive but in a dialectical relationship with 
other non-discursive aspects of social life (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; 
Fairclough 2010))DLUFORXJKXVHVWKHWHUPµGLVFRXUVH¶LQWKUHHZD\V 
(a) meaning-making as an element of the social process, (b) the language 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDSDUWLFXODUVRFLDOILHOGRUSUDFWLFHHJµSROLWLFDO
GLVFRXUVH¶DQGFDZD\RIFRQVWUXLQJDVSHFWVRIWKHZRUOGDVVRFLDWHG
ZLWKDSDUWLFXODUVRFLDOSHUVSHFWLYHHJDµQHR-liberal discourse of 
JOREDOLVDWLRQ¶ 
These three conceptualisations of discourse point to different aspects of 
talk which are useful for interrogating the data from multiple angles. One of the 
most important advances that Fairclough and other critical discourse analysts 
KDYHPDGHRQ)RXFDXOW¶VWKLQNLQJLVWKDWWKH\GHILQHGLVFRXUVHVDVQRWRQO\
µFRQVWLWXWLYH¶EXWDOVRDVµFRQVWLWXWHG¶E\VRFLDOSUDFWLFH(Jorgensen and Phillips, 
2002:65). This position is more consistent with the subtle realist epistemology 
informing this ethnographic study. The conseTXHQFHVRIDFFHSWLQJ)RXFDXOW¶V
theories as implying radical constructivism would make an ethnographic 
approach redundant because if all social reality is constructed in talk there would 
be no need to observe anything other than the texts produced by activists. Such 
a reading of Foucault is highly questionable since his genealogical approach in 
his studies on sexuality (1978) and prisons (1995) moved his research beyond 
examing discourses to studying the conditions in which they become possible. In 
any case assessing whether Foucault was indeed in an extreme constructivist is 
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an aside here, since this thesis is not concerned with his work per se but rather 
deploys it strategically to make sense of the data gathered. )DLUFORXJK¶V
arguments against radical constructivism offer further justification for an 
ethnographic approach. The position taken by Fairclough (2003; 2010) is that 
discourses are a part of a social order which also contains non-discursive 
dimensions like economic power and inequalities that are structural in nature. 
These may be the product of previous discourses but an analysis of their effects 
cannot be fully captured in the discursive dimension (Jorgensen and Phillips, 
2002). This is perhaps why Fairclough (2003:15) states: 
To research meaning-making one needs to look at interpretations of texts 
as well as texts themselves, and more generally at how texts practically 
figure in particular areas of social life, which suggests that textual analysis 
is best framed within ethnography. 
Now there remains a need to articulate the relationship between the data 
that has been generated from interviews, observations and documentary 
evidence. As a number of discourse theorists rely on original texts or word-
perfect transcripts based on recorded interactions and content for analysis, the 
status and role of field notes based on observations is particularly in need of 
some clarity. Due to the focus on individual activists rather than the sites in which 
they are located, interview data assumed greater significance as the main unit of 
analysis. Observations played an important part in a number of ways, initially 
facilitating contact with potential interview participants and later helping to build 
up trust and understanding to progress to interview stage. However, notes taken 
during observations also played a role in the analysis by contextualising the 
interview data. All the data was imported into NVivo software for analysis where 
concepts and themes were isolated and progressively condensed as similarities 
and contrasts were drawn between different participants and groups of activists. 
While discourse analysis based on the work of Foucault and Fairclough is 
employed, there is no specific model or technique that has been applied. 
Foucault did not make such a technique available for text analysis but the same 
can hardly be said of Fairclough whose writings provide very detailed and 
specific methodologies for researchers. Rather than mechanistically trying to 
apply given techniques, the work of both theorists acts as a valuable resource in 
developing a heuristic sensibility that guides the reading and analysis of texts. 
Theoretical insights were used to conduct multiple critical and exploratory 
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readings of the data. This strategy is welcomed by Fairclough (2010:11) who 
VWDWHVWKDWWKHµWUDQVGLVFLSOLQDU\DSSURDFKWRUHVHDUFKZKLFK,KDYHVXJJHVWHG
entails a way of developing theory and methodology through re-contextualising 
FDWHJRULHVDQGUHODWLRQVIURPRWKHUWKHRULHVDQGIUDPHZRUNV¶:RUNLQJZLWKD
permeable and heuristic framework allows the study to appropriate and 
recontextualise relevant concepts from other discourse theorists without being 
restricted by some of the methodological and epistemological imperatives 
prescribed by the theories and approaches from which they are drawn.  
At a more abstract level applying the philosophy of Foucault involves 
reading the text with a view to understanding what is being represented as a truth 
or as the norm and what kind of evidence is being used in this construction. 
Other important questions that guide the analysis include looking out for what 
kinds of interests are being mobilised and what kind of identities or subject 
SRVLWLRQVDUHEHLQJIRUPHG)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRISRZHURSHQVXSWKHSRVVLELOLW\
of investigating KRZSDUWLFLSDQWV¶WDONORFDWHVDQGUHVLVWVSRZHUDQGWKHZD\VLQ
which their representations are constrained and enabled by dominant discourses 
(Thomson, 2011).   
Important discursive strategies to orient to in the data include devices like 
µUKHWRULF¶ZKLch Billig (2010:214) GHVFULEHVDVµdiscourse which is argumentative 
and which seeks to persuade.' Other important concepts are the related terms 
µLQWHUWH[WXDOLW\¶DQGµLQWHUGLVFXUVLYLW\¶ZKLFKKLJKOLJKWWKHZD\VLQZKLFKµWH[WV
draw upon, incorporate, recontextualise DQGGLDORJXHZLWKRWKHUWH[WV¶
(Fairclough, 2003:16; original emphasis). However, employing such devices can 
only be useful in drawing attention to their presence in the text as they do not 
automatically translate into interpretations. Drawing interpretations and 
LQIHUHQFHVIURPWKHGDWDUHOLHVRQWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VXQLTXHDQGVXEMHFWLYH
analytical work based on understandings and knowledge gained from within the 
field. Therefore, the data analysis framework outlined above describes the 
conceptual and theoretical ideas and orientations which inform the process of 
interrogating the data and does not constitute a specific step by step process.  
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Reflexivity, researcher role and ethics 
As the status and identity of a researcher plays a very important part in the 
research process and its outcomes, I want to briefly reflect on my own position in 
this research. Ethnography entails unavoidable tensions between being an 
insider and outsider, as well as the need to maintain a balance between being a 
participant and being an analyst (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2009). Knowing this 
in advance does little to prepare the researcher for the conflicts and pressures 
that can arise in the field and as a first time ethnographer approaching a highly 
politicised and sensitive research field such issues were not always easy or 
simple to manage. Consciousness of the political sensitivities around issues of 
security and Muslim citizenship constantly plagued my interactions with 
participants as I was eager to present myself as sympathetic and non-
threatening. I also felt a huge burden of responsibility not to add to the injustices 
they already faced in society or to misread their messages or interpret them out 
of context.  
Having a Muslim background gave me untold advantages in the research 
field, primarily with gaining access and additionally being able to relate to the 
cultural and religious habitus of the participants.  I had insider status with the 
participants by virtue of my name, my Pakistani roots and my understanding of 
Islamic principles and teachings, all of which allowed me to form an immediate 
bond with participants as someone from the same identity group. However, in 
many other ways I was painfully conscious of being an outsider because of 
important differences in life experiences and social position. While I was from 
Pakistan, some of the participants had migratory origins from other countries, 
including Algeria, Somalia, India and Morocco with different and unfamiliar 
cultural experiences and customs.  A majority of participants were brought up 
and educated in the UK which was also an alien experience to me since I arrived 
in the UK in my mid-twenties. While this did not have a perceptible impact on the 
research, the fact that I was considerably older than many of the participants was 
a visible and consequential difference that may have amplified any tendency 
among some participants to view me as a figure of authority representing the 
academy, an elite institution in society. If my gender played any role in shaping 
the research outcomes this was not in any way evident to me despite reflecting 
on the issue carefully. Where potential participants failed to respond to my 
requests for interviews it is my understanding this was related to issues of trust, 
as I was someone who was a stranger to them.  
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There are a number of ethical considerations within ethnography that apply 
across all research but there are also issues that are particular to this study. The 
ethical position of this research takes as a touchstone the six key principles of 
WKH(65&¶V)UDPHZRUNIRU5HVHDUFK(WKLFVZKLFKexpect µLQWHJULW\TXDOLW\
DQGWUDQVSDUHQF\¶(65&LQWKHXQGHUWDNLQJRIUHVHDUFKDQGLWV¶ILQDO
outcome. A researcher must also ensure informed consent (Appendix 5), 
confidentiality of information and anonymity of the participants, freedom from any 
kind of pressure or coercion and minimising any kind of harm. Lastly the ESRC 
principles state:  
The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest 
or partiality must be explicit. (ESRC, 2010:3) 
However, these principles represent a minimum standard for ethical 
conduct and careful consideration was given to the particularities of this research 
project. The work of Murphy and Dingwall (2003) has been particularly valuable 
in anticipating potential pitfalls and paying due care to the numerous possible 
ways in which research in the field can present a whole new set of unexpected 
challenges.  
This research deliberately set out to avoid any illegal or violent forms of 
politics. This was not only to protect my own self and my research, it was also to 
safeguard the other participants in this study by avoiding any links with people 
that might be deemed to be suspicious by security forces. Interview participants 
were given information about the aims and objectives of the research in advance, 
in written and verbal form, with assurances that anonymity and confidentiality 
would be of paramount concern to the research. Informed consent was given by 
all the participants whose interviews were recorded and where possible 
attendees of observed meetings were informed of the presence of a researcher. 
Clearly this was not practically possible at demonstrations and protests where 
behaviours were observed and photographs were taken without gaining consent 
from everyone present. Nevertheless I was aware that photographs might lead to 
my participants being identified and therefore I plan to be cautious in their 
dissemination in the outputs that follow from this research.  
The political implications of this work are of paramount importance due to 
the current attention on Muslim citizenship, which calls for a greater level of 
responsibility and due care to ensure anonymity and confidentiality without 
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FRPSURPLVLQJµWKLFNGHVFULSWLRQ¶*eertz, 1973). As Murphy and Dingwall (2003) 
point out there are a number of ways in which research participants can be 
wronged, even when actual harm is not done. The most pertinent concerns for 
this research are the disruption to the participants¶ assumptions about their own 
world and the risk of presenting their perspectives in a form that does not 
coincide with their expectations (Borofsky, 2005; Murphy and Dingwall, 2003). It 
is hoped that through open and honest discussions with participants during the 
fieldwork and sharing the knowledge produced some of these issues can be 
mitigated.  
Nevertheless in researching political topics there will always be a risk of 
unwittingly doing harm if the representation of issues is viewed as unjust or 
damaging by those who are researched (Borofsky, 2005). This also raises issues 
about WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VSROLWLFDOYDOXHV, a much contested area between seeing 
all research as inevitably moral and political in nature (Becker, 1967) and the 
belief that values should not over-determine research outcomes (Seale, 2004). 
This research follows Murphy and Dingwall (2003:192) in relation to what a 
researcher should do: 
...to make a clear distinction between their activities qua scientist and qua 
activist. To put it bluntly, while it is perfectly legitimate for their findings to 
inform their political activism, it is illegitimate for their political commitment 
to determine their findings.  
In accordance with this position while most of the activities and activists I 
engaged with fell within a broad spectrum of political and civic aims that I 
supported, the individual tactics and strategies employed by participants might 
not have resonated with my own normative position. For instance as a non-
religious person I could not relate to the efforts of one particular youth group who 
set out to coach young people from their community in how to be a better 
Muslim, with aims of challenging negative stereotypes about Islam. I viewed such 
projects to turn young Muslims into ambassadors of Islam as promoting the 
µFXOWXUDOLVW¶YLHZWKDW,VODPLVWKHSUREOHPZKLFKVHUYHVWKHLQWHUHVWVRIQHROLEHUDO
governance to push politics out of the civil domain by shifting responsibility for 
social problems to individuals and their actions (Brown, 2010; Hindess, 2012; 
Kundnani, 2014; Marinetto, 2003; Soysal, 2012a).  Despite this I would situate 
my political aims on a shared horizon with a majority of participants who were 
concerned with and motivated to act against the current pariah status of Muslims 
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in the West. In this I would draw support from Brown (2005:X) who states that 
µcritique is not equivalent to rejection or denunciation, that the call to rethink 
something is not inherently treasonous but can actually be a way of caring for 
and even rHQHZLQJWKHREMHFWLQTXHVWLRQ¶+RZHYHULWLVrecognised that a study 
dealing with an emotive and sensitive political topic may unavoidably generate 
outputs which may themselves become political objects and be further politicised 
by some readers, which brings with it a responsibility to consider possible 
consequences, not only for WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ but through implication Muslim 
citizens everywhere in general.  These considerations will be paramount in 
UHSRUWLQJWKHILQGLQJVLQDPDQQHUWKDWSURWHFWVWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LGHQWLWLHVEXWDOVR
tries to be accurate in representing their lives (Murphy and Dingwall, 2003).  
It is for this reason that in trying to achieve a balance between providing 
descriptive data for the purposes of transparency and maintaining the anonymity 
and confidentiality of the participants I have erred heavily in favour of the latter. 
Where there are risks of identifying participants this research has favoured 









This chapter explores the repertoires of political action of young adult 
Muslims, to map the range and nature of their activism and highlight some of its 
distinctive features. The modes of activism described in this chapter reveal 
typical features of social movements as identified in Chapter 3, highlighting the 
congruence between Muslim activists and other progressive struggles for social 
justice. This poses a distinct challenge to the moral panic engendered by Muslim 
youth disengagement, sometimes seen as a risk factor for radicalisation and 
terrorism.  
The analysis proceeds through four sections, each of which explore the 
distinctive and interrelated features of activism, explained with reference to 
insights drawn from social movement theory. This begins with an exploration of 
lived and ethical forms of action which are performed through lifestyle and 
embodied expressions of political agency. These lifestyle politics are linked to 
individualised and non-institutional modes of activism as discussed in the next 
section. This is followed by an exploration of the importance of informal networks 
which offer affective support and viable alternatives to the traditional role of 
institutions in producing and sustaining mobilisation. Finally the rise of digital 
technologies that enable and promote such forms of action in social movements 
are explored.  
 
Lifestyle politics and abstract objectives   
This section reveals how the repertoires of political action of young 
Muslims share many features described by other social movement studies where 
lifestyle and values are important sites for political contestation (Melucci, 1989, 
1996; Nash, 2010; Portwood-Stacer, 2¶7RROHDQG*DOH$
distinctive feature of activism in this study is the lived and embodied performance 
of normative ideas, where activists project their values and ideologies through 
discernible life choices and comportments. These are political repertoires without 
concrete aims or targets but rather exemplify the cultural reformation and value 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  98 
transformation activists seek to promote in society through their demeanours, 
SUDFWLFHVDQGFRQGXFW+HUHWKHWHUPµOLIHVW\OHSROLWLFV¶VHUYHVDVDVKRrthand to 
facilitate a discussion of this feature of activism which Portwood-Stacer 
(2013:156: original emphasis) defines as:  
When individuals who desire social or political change are compelled to 
shape their own personal behaviours and choices toward the ideals they 
envision, this is known as lifestyle politics. 
0RQD¶VVWRU\LVDJRRGH[DPSOHRIKRZVXFKSROLWLFVDUHHQDFWHGE\
participants in their everyday lives. A 27-year-old politically-motivated 
photographer and graphic artist, Mona aims to raise awareness of issues that are 
close to her heart, such as Islamophobia, Palestine, foreign policy and civil 
OLEHUWLHV,XQGHUVWRRG0RQD¶VHPSKDVLVRQDUWLVWLFPRGHVRISROLWLFDOH[SUHVVLRQ
by relating it to a particularly troubling event in her life where she was violently 
assaulted by a group of white people for wearing a hijab. The attack took place 
RQWKHVDPHGD\DVDQGGHHSO\LQIOXHQFHG0RQD¶VVXEVHTXHQWDFWLYLVPDV
she explains:  
Mona: You either let something stop you or you just carry on sort of, you 
know, dispelling all the ..«WKHPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVWKDWWKH\KDYHDERXWXV
DQGWKDW¶VWKHUHDVRQZK\,OLNHWRVRUWRI-  like attend these events is to 
make them see, ORRN,¶PQRWJRQQDEH«RQHRIWKRVHSHRSOHWKDWVRUWRI
hiding away from- ,PHDQ,¶YHDWWHQGHG,¶YHDWWHQGHGSROLWLFVOHFWXUHV here 
[University campus] and.. just about the UK economy or something or 
DQ\WKLQJVRUWRIFRPSOHWHO\UDQGRPDQG,¶YHZDONHGLQDQGOLNH\RX- the 




ZH¶UHNHSWRSSUessed and things like that but you know I think the morH«
especially amongst the women, integrated into society and sort of it gets 
involved in sort of you know all walks of life, I think that really helps and you 
really do change people¶VPLQGVOLNHVORZOy but surely.  
In this account Mona is describing actions that may not conform to a 
traditional definition of politics, but which clearly reflect a concerted political aim 
to challenge dominant stereotypes of Muslim women as helpless victims of 
oppression. Mona demonstrates through her presence and performance that 
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wearing a hijab is neither a sign of weakness nor of diminished intelligence and 
agency. These actions can also be interpreted as symbolic defiance against her 
attackers who not only assaulted her person but the idea of who she was. The 
act of trying to forcibly remove her hijab was not only a matter of bodily harm it 
DOVRUHSUHVHQWHGV\PEROLFYLROHQFHDJDLQVWKHULGHQWLW\0RQD¶VVXEVHTXHQW
engagement in political activism through forms of expression that rely primarily 
on visual and graphic signifiers, that is photographs as well as her own veiled 
appearance, may be related to the way in which her scarf made her a visible 
target of hate and violence.  While the vicious attack on Mona  is not a common 
theme among participants, the experience of symbolic violence produced by 
verbal attacks and cultural exclusion against Muslim identities is quite 
widespread. The fact that various forms of discrimination are often symbolic and 
psychological rather than physical makes it all the more explicable why 
mobilisation takes the form of lifestyle politics. Participants do not report many 
episodes of direct physical threats to their being but they often refer to prejudices 
operating in negative and pejorative assumptions about Muslim faith identities 
and cultures, particularly visible symbols like the hijab amongst women or beards 
among men. Similarly, certain social practices associated with Muslims are also 
seen as the target of public renunciation and contempt, such as gender 
segregation and arranged marriages, which leads to feelings of rejection and 
humiliation. In order to negate these stereotypes and false perceptions of 
Muslims participants are almost compelled to conduct activism through 
performing normative ideals to produce alternative representations of Muslims.   
Irum: I think I make the PRVWGLIIHUHQFHZKHQ,¶PVLWWLQJRQWKHWUDLQ\RX
know, travel, because I talk to - I talk to someone and I give them my time 
and they give me their time and I learn from them and they take things from 
me and .. I suppose this is QRWVRPHWKLQJ,¶YHRQO\MXVWEURXJKWLQWREXWRQH
of my driving forces for joining (government consultation group) was 
Islamophobia and being misunderstood as a Muslim and being 
misunderstood as a Muslim woman and terrorism and how that you know, 
KRZPLVJXLGHGSHRSOH¶VYLHZVDERXW,VODPDUHVR,OLWHUDOO\ZDVFDUU\LQJ
WKHIODJDQGWKDW¶VKRZ,ZDV,ZDVFDUU\LQJWKHIODJZKHUHYHU,ZHQW 
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NQRZ«\RXKave a role as well to act becausH\RX¶UHOHDYLQJDQ
impression.  
Irum and Khalid both describe strategies to combat Islamophobia through 
SROLWLFDOUHSHUWRLUHVPDUNHGE\HIIRUWVµLQZKLFKERWKWKHSROLWLFDOHQGDQGWKH
means, are the transformation of the VHOI¶1DVK7KH\DWWHPSWWR
confound negative perceptions of Muslims by providing living examples of 
positive, active citizenship and normalising the visible cultural symbols that are 
the object of stigmatisation. These discourses indicate types of political 
repertoires that are captured in previous literature through variant conceptual 
LWHUDWLRQVIURP*LGGHQVFRQFHSWRIµOLIHSROLWLFV¶WR%HFN¶V
WKHRULVDWLRQRIµVXESROLWLFV¶DQGPRUHUHFHQWGLVFXVVLRQVRIµOLIHVW\OHSROLWLFV¶LQ
sRFLDOPRYHPHQWV2¶7RROHDQG*DOH3RUWZRRG-Stacer, 2013).  
The role of lifestyle politics within social movements is a contentious one 
that has been linked to the encroachment of neoliberal rationalities into every 
area of life. In her study of self-esteem movements in the US Cruikshank (1999 
in Lemke, 2002) revealed how these politics of self-empowerment could be seen 
as reproducing neoliberal goals to shift politics from collective concerns to ways 
of governing the self. Similarly, Portwood-Stacer (2013:3185; original emphasis) 
DUJXHVWKDWOLIHVW\OHSROLWLFVZLWKLQUDGLFDOVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVµDUHVRSUREOHPDWLF
as a form of activism because they are a product of neoliberal conditions while at 
the same time representing resistance against many of the political projects of 
QHROLEHUDOLVP¶:KLOHOLIHVW\OHSROLWLFVUDLVHVFRQFHUQVWKDW\RXWKH[SUHVVLRQVRI
LQGLYLGXDOLW\DQGFKRLFHFDQEHµH[SORLWHGHFRQRPLFDOO\within a global 
marketplace¶%ODFNPDQDQG)UDQFHWKHDGRSWLRQRIVXFKJUDPPDUV
by young adult Muslims in this study can be better understood as a response to 
WKHµFXOWXUDOLVW¶IRUP,VODPRSKRELDWDNHVDWWKHFXUUHQWWLPHZKHUH0XVOLP
customs and values are being denigrated (Grillo, 2005; Kundnani, 2014; Lentin, 
2014). While these repertoires of action can be seen as reflecting neoliberal 
rationalities of individuality and choice they also resist its instrumental and 
PDWHULDOLPSHUDWLYHVWKURXJKWKHSXUVXLWRIµQRQ-LQVWUXPHQWDO¶REMHFWLYHV0DQ\
participants explain their actions as being motivated by moral beliefs and 
ideologies rather than driven by concrete goals and targets. 
Amna: I GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHZRUOG¶VJRLQJWRFKDQJHWKHZD\,ZDQWLWWRRU,
GRQ¶WHYHQNQRZKRZ,ZDQWLWWRFKDQJH,MXVWNQRZWKDWULJKWQRZZKDW¶V
happeninJLVDWHVWIRUPHIRUDOORIXVDQGZH¶YHJRWDFKRLFH, either we 
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ignore it and sit back and get on with our lives and do what we have to do 
or we get involved and do what we can, do our own bit. At least then when, 
you know, ZKHQZH¶UHRQRXUGHDWKEHGV ZHNQRZWKDWZH¶YHWULHGHYHQLI
QRWKLQJGRHVFKDQJHVR,¶PQRWJRLQJWREHGLVDSSRLQWed if you know come 







These arguments resonate typical social movement objectives described 
E\0HOXFFLZKLFKDUHPDUNHGE\µORZQHJRWLDELOLW\¶LQWKDWWKH\GRQRW
have an interest in seizing power, hence, are not fully reducible to political 
mediation through representative party political channels. This is reflected in 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXVWLILFDWLRQRIDFWLRQVDQGEHKDYLRXUVDVEHLQJLQVSLUHGE\DVHQVH
of personal duty and responsibility to act against injustices with little concern for 
personal profit or gain. The presence of such repertoires of political action in 
social movements have been explained with reference to changing social and 
economic conditions post World War 2 including wider access to education, civil 
rights and better jobs (Beck, 1997; Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Nash, 2010).  
Based on extensive survey research, Inglehart (2000:222) has argued that rising 




postmaterial values to the rise of new forms of politics through social movements, 
OHDGLQJWRFODLPVWKDWSHRSOHZLWKµSRVWPDWHULDOYDOXHVDUHVWURQJO\GLVSRVHGWR
VXSSRUWQHZIRUPVRIFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶'HOOD3RUWDDQG'LDQL7KLVLV
not to suggest that such values are exclusive to social movements, since 
members of trade unions, labour movements and political parties may also 
pursue non-instrumental and symbolic objectives. Similarly the dominance of 
postmaterial values in social movements should not be taken to mean they are 
oblivious to material concerns (Inglehart, 2000) as such demands continue to be 
UHIOHFWHGLQVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVWUXJJOHVHYHQLIWKH\FRQWLQXHWRSULRULWLVHµPRUH
µH[SUHVVLYH¶JRDOVRIµVHOIUHDOL]DWLRQ¶+RSNLQVDQG.DKDQL-Hopkins, 2004:341). 
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This point is echoed in this research, as participDQWV¶GLVFRXUVHVDOVRWRXFKRQ
class and material conditions but these are subsumed within political repertoires 
which prioritise a lived and embodied enactment of cultural politics aimed at 
challenging dominant social codes (Melucci, 1985; 1996). More importantly 
though these lifestyle politics are not simply an expression of choice and 
individualism but are part of a social movement that builds and serves collective 
identities and goals as the following chapter elaborates in more detail. In this 
respect this study agrees with Rheingans and Hollands (2013) contention that 
theories of individuation and life politics put forward by Beck, Giddens and 
Inglehart have limited purchase in anticipating the ability of youth politics to 
mobilise collectively. Based on a case study of the British student anti-fees and 
FXWVPRYHPHQWLQWKH\KLJKOLJKWWKHµcentrality of collective reflexivity in the 
student movement, the merging of so-FDOOHGµPDWHULDOLVW¶DQGµSRVW-PDWHULDOLVW¶
political values, and the importance of both virtual and physical spaces for youth 
activism¶5KHLQJDQVDQG+ROODQGV2013:546).  
 
Organisations, mistrust and autonomy 
Participants in this study manifest the typical social movement propensity 
for decentralised and non-institutional forms of organisation which contrast with 
traditional political party and trade union modus operandi (Castells, 2012; Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006; Downey and Fenton, 2003; Melucci, 1985, 1996; Nash, 
*LYHQWKHVWXG\¶VIRFXVRQVXESROLWLFDODQGQRQ-electoral forms of 
participation it is not surprising to find that membership of political parties and 
mainstream institutions is low, but it is striking how little regard participants have 
for any form of institutionalised political action, whether mainstream or led by 
minorities.  
A large number of participants, 23 out of 34, do not have formal 
membership of any organisation, even though they often participate in activities 
orchestrated by organisations with whom they have common goals, like Stop the 
War Coalition and Palestine Solidarity Campaign. This is despite these 
organisations having the ability to provide and pool expertise and resources that 
enable collective action and reduce the costs to individuals of mobilising (Della 
Porta et al, 2006). It has been argued that for individual activists multiple 
associations with different organisations affords a number of advantages 
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including expanding informal networks, facilitating the circulation of information 
DQGEXLOGLQJVROLGDULW\ZKLFKFDQH[WHQGWKHPRYHPHQW¶VUHach (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006). Participants in this study reflect such tendencies by rarely (though 
not universally) affiliating with a single organisation and this is often due to a 
ubiquitous distrust of institutions.  
Amna«OLNH7HOO0$0$LI\RXORok into the history of it or the people that 
DUHUXQQLQJLWLW¶VDOOYHU\GRGJ\OLNHWKHJX\WKDW¶VWKHKHDGRI7HOO0$0$
you know has got an MBE, I totally disagree with that anyway, I think that 
that just proves, you might as well be a sell-out.  
Haseena: [I] actually worked with some of the pretty you know 
controversial big NGOs like Oxfam and Christian Aid and stuff so like I, I 
kind of I guess I was a bit more naïve then so I thought I could exert 
change and influence through those kind of platforms and then I realised 
WKDWDFWXDOO\WKH\DUHSDUWRIWKHSUREOHPDQGWKDW\RXNQRZLW¶VDOODERXW
grassroots kind of work and grassroots movements.  
In these accounts established, mainstream institutions are described 
SHMRUDWLYHO\DVµGRGJ\¶DQGµFRQWURYHUVLDO¶RQWKHEDVLVRIXQGHUO\LQJDVVXPSWLRQV
and presupposiWLRQVRIWHQPDGHZKHQSHRSOHWDONZKHUHµZKDWLVPDGHH[SOLFLWLV
DOZD\VJURXQGHGLQZKDWLVOHIWLPSOLFLW¶ (Fairclough, 2003:17). Such assumptions 
are revealed by the way in which the social world is represented in a particular 
ZD\ZKHUHVRPHRQHZKRDFFHSWVDQ0%(KRQRXULVDµVHOO-RXW¶DQG1*2VDUH
µSDUWRIWKHSUREOHP¶7KHVHSDUWLFLSDQWVGRQRWRIIHUDQ\IXUWKHUqualification that 
explains why these institutions are framed so disparagingly but rather these are 
taken to be as self-evident truths in dismissing their credentials. The deployment 
of such assumptions suggests that such views may be quite common place 
ZLWKLQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOQHWZRUNVDQGGLVFXUVLYHILHOG7KLVLVVXJJHVWHGE\
the certainty inflected in the arguments which takes agreement from the listener 
for granted.  
Participants not only dismiss mainstream institutions as lacking credibility, 
they also express frustration with organisations and institutional structures 
because they view them as an impediment to action.  
Mona: 2NWREHKRQHVWZLWK\RX,GRQ¶WDVVRFLDWHP\VHOIZLWKDQ\SDUWLFXODU
JURXSWKHUHDVRQEHLQJLVEHFDXVHRQPDQ\VRUWRIHQJDJHPHQWVWKDW,¶YH
KDGZLWKWKHPDFWLYLWLHVWKDWZHKDYHGRQH,¶YHDOZD\VIHOWWKat.. it was a 
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bit of a hold back like you have to collectively make a decision whereas if 
\RX¶YHJRW\RXULQGLYLGXDOVRUWRIOLNH«KRZGR,SXWWKLV«OLNH\RX¶UHPRUH
gungho about something than somebody else is then you would want to do 
that rather than PDNLQJDFROOHFWLYHGHFLVLRQDERXWLW6R,¶YHDOZD\V
thought if I wanna do something in terms of my activism I am going to do it 
in future and I am going to do it on my own.  
Here Mona is describing the limits of organisations for mobilising in a more 
µJXQJKR¶ZD\GXHWRWKHQHFHVVLW\RIDFKLHYLQJFRQVHQVXVDPRQJPHPEHUV, 
which makes activism through institutionalised structures time-consuming and 
EXUHDXFUDWLF7KLVQRWRQO\UHIOHFWVWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GHVLUHIRUEHLQJPRUH
proactive but also implies that groups are seen as inhibiting rather than enabling 
action. While dialogue and compromise are essential and valued aspects of 
democracy, these arguments suggest they may pose challenges within a political 
project that is driven by individual choice and interests.   
To offer a more concrete example of the tension that arises between 
individuals and groups, a meeting of a Palestine Solidarity Campaign group is 
illustrative of the limitations of collective decision-making. This particular PSC 
event was an executive meeting where members managed the running of the 
group and planned events and campaigns. During the meeting two members of 
WKHJURXSDVNHGIRUDFRQWULEXWLRQIURPWKHORFDOJURXS¶VIXQGVWRYLVLW3DOHVWLQH
to assist on the Marmara Project, a non-profit NGO run by volunteers to help 
rebuild homes demolished by Israeli authorities. While a number of members 
agreed with funding the Marmara visit, other members felt that this was 
LQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKH36&¶VUHPLW2QHPHPEHULQSDUWLFXODUDUJXHGWKDWWKH
PS&¶VMREZDVWROHDGDµSROLWLFDO¶FDPSDLJQWRVXSSRUWWKH3DOHVWLQLDQFDXVH
through lobbying international governments, raising public awareness and 
FKDOOHQJLQJWKHPDVVPHGLD¶VELDVHGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKHFRQIOLFW$QRWKHU
member supported this view saying that Palestinians want the international 
community to do what they themselves struggle to achieve. However, after some 
debate it emerged that a majority of executive members were in favour of funding 
for the Marmara trip because they felt it not only constituted direct support to 
alleviate the suffering of Palestinians but also offered an opportunity to raise 
DZDUHQHVVWKURXJKORFDOSXEOLFLW\RI36&¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHSURMHFW7KLV
incident highlights how members of groups sometimes disagree over how to 
define and pursue their political interests, creating tensions between individuals 
and placing limits on actions due to the need for compromise. This highlights why 
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young activists often associate with such groups like the PSC on an ad hoc 
basis. While mistrust of institutions is pervasive, this does not apply to student 
societies since these are more likely to operate on a modest scale allowing 
individual members to exercise greater control over decision making and 
maintain autonomy. However, even within these societies tensions can arise 
around identity and belonging as explored in the next chapter. The following 
quotes reveal the importance of individual autonomy in maintaining fidelity to a 
set of values which can be compromised by affiliation to mainstream institutions.  
Yousaf: I sort of decided not to get involved in membership at all, in 
anything other than you know just like student societies, you know, which is 
QRWWKHVDPHWKLQJEXWSROLWLFDOO\,MXVWGLGQ¶WIHHOFRPIRUWDEOHFDXVH,WKLQN
when yRX¶UHa member one of the first thing you do is, you sort of, in a way 
give away your ULJKWWRMXVWEH«FKRRVH\RXURZQDFWLRQVEHFDXVHWKHQ
you have to stick to a party line - you have - \RXFDQ¶WDQG,ZDVWKLQNLQJ
that knowing myself I will.. I speak freely I speak my mind and whatever 
JURXS,¶OOEHSDUWRI,ZLOOEHFKXFNHG out within- within because I will say 
VRPHWKLQJWKDWSHRSOHVD\ZHGRQ¶WVD\WKLVWKLQJKHUHDQG,¶OOVD\ZHOO\RX
know, I do, so therefore.   
In this quote Yousaf equates institutional affiliation to loss of autonomy and 
diminished agency which justifies greater emphasis on individualised forms of 
activism or strategic and selective involvement with organisations. For Yousaf 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOPHPEHUVKLSLVSUREOHPDWLFEHFDXVHWKHµSDUW\OLQH¶SODFHVOLPLWVRQ
WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWLRQVDQGFRQVWUDLQVWKHLUDELOLW\WRH[SUHVVSROLWLFDOYLHZVLI
WKH\GRQRWFRQIRUPWRWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VLGHRORJ\These concerns reflect salient 
trends among contemporary social movements that favour leaderless and non-
hierarchical organisational structures with a greater emphasis on direct 
engagement and participation (Castells, 2012; Fenton, 2008; Maharawal, 2013; 
1DVK2¶7RROHDQG*DOH6RORPRVHWDO3DUWLFLSDQWVH[SODLQ
these in terms of not only being more effective but also less risky. 
Saif: I think ,¶P absolutely recruiting everyone to a leaderless cause .. 
because I genuinely believe that the way I think is, is .. the only sensible 
way to do it in a time when- ZKHQLW¶VVR«WURXEOHVRPe and so easy to get 
FDXJKWLW¶VDVDIHZD\LW¶VDUHVSHFWDEOHZD\DQGPRUHWKDQDQ\WKLQJLW¶VD
ZD\WKDW\RXFDQ¶WFKDOOHQJHDQ\RIXV.  
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Mona: ,¶YHIRXQGWKDW\RXNQRZ\RXFDQTXLFNO\VRUWRIPDQRHXYUH\RXUVHOI
rather than a lot of people together so in WHUPVRIOLNHWKHDFWLYLVP,¶YHGRQH
IRU*D]D,¶YHVRUWRIPDQDJHGWRJHWVRUWRIPHGLFDOVXSSOLHVDQGUHDOO\




In these extracts participants highlight a different kind of constraint that 
institutions place on activists by rendering them visible and easily identifiable 
when acting under the banner of established organisations. Since organisations 
aim to make a mark in the public sphere they often seek opportunities to 
publicise their activities, not only to spread their message but also to expand their 
membership and raise their profile, thus greater public visibility and prominence 
serves institutional interests. However, the above comments suggest that for 
individuals such publicity can be counterproductive as well as risky, suggesting 
this is one of the consequences of the rLVHRIWKHµODZDQGRUGHU¶DQGµVHFXULW\¶
state (Hyatt, 2011:105).  In the case of Saif, it is not made explicit how a 
OHDGHUOHVVFDXVHPLJKWPDNHDFWLYLVWVµVDIH¶RUµUHVSHFWDEOH¶EXWthe reference to 
µWURXEOHVRPH¶WLPHVDQGWKHGDQJHURIJHWWLQJµFDXJKW¶ is indicative of the 
repressive conditions of activism in which individuals face risks and need to keep 
a low profile. Mona explains that taking aid to Gaza under the fanfare of a public 
campaign is more likely to meet repression by Israeli forces, while as an 
individual she can mobilise before such plans can be detected and thwarted.   
While individualistic repertoires of action are dominant in the study a small 
number of participants do play a role in national organisations as executive 
members, with two being paid for their positions and a third participant working in 
a voluntary capacity. However, the two paid members of groups were selected 
for the study despite their formal roles because they were also active in their 
communities on a voluntary basis. In any case the organisations they belong to 
are important contributors to the social movement whose ontological status is 
being established in the present chapter.  
7KHIHDWXUHVRIDFWLYLVPUHYLHZHGLQWKLVVHFWLRQUHIOHFWZKDW2¶7RROHDQG
Gale (2013:76) GHVFULEHDVµPRUHKDQGV-on, loosely organised forms of action, 
where activists can engage directly in concrete action to make a difference, but 
ZLWKRXWVXEPHUJLQJWKHLULGHQWLW\LQWRDQ\RUJDQLVDWLRQRUPRYHPHQW¶:KLOH
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these individualistic repertoires of action and lifestyle politics may convey a rather 
DWRPLVWLFSLFWXUHRIDFWLYLVPDQH[SORUDWLRQRIWKHDFWLYLVWV¶UHODWLRQVKLSVZLWK
other social actors in the following section highlights the centrality of networks in 
instigating and sustaining collective action, particularly in the light of distrust of 
and indifference to institutions. 
 
Networks, solidarity and communication  
In Chapter 3 µGHQVHLQIRUPDOQHWZRUNV¶'HOOD3RUWDDQG'LDQLZHUH
identified as one of the classificatory features of social movements. This section 
demonstrates the presence of this dimension of activism by revealing the nature 
and importance of relationships between activists. Such a network is not only 
perceptible in the research setting but it proved essential for conducting this 
study, as it facilitated access to and recruitment of suitable participants. Due to 
the qualitative nature of this study, a formal network analysis (Crossley and 
Ibrahim, 2012) is not possible nor desired, however, in order to demonstrate the 
links between participants a diagram indicating relationships and associations 
has been produced. It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive picture since 
ethical necessities of upholding confidentiality prevented questioning participants 
on their relationships with other informants in the study and other extant means 
of determining links were limited. This model is based on ethnographic data 
which has a limited ability to fully grasp the network density. This model has been 
constructed from analysis of interviews, observations and an investigation of 
Facebook connections where such information was available. Not all the 
participants are members of Facebook or attended events that were observed. 
Yet, even this limited and partial picture reveals a fairly dense network of 
associations between diversely situated participants. The named discs and 
diamond shapes represent activists from different cities in the Midlands, 
revealing clear links between both sites as well as between different types of 
activists distinguished as community, community/past student and student 
activists. The model also shows two participants, Maz and Shoaib, as being 
external to the networks but this is because they were the first two interview 
candidates identified through an internet search before observations and direct 
recruitment in the field commenced. Further details of each participant are given 
in Appendix 1.  
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The presence of a fair level of networking within the participant sample 
clearly indicates the importance of building relationships and associations with 
other like-minded and supportive activists. Although averse to committing to 
formal membership of established organisations, most participants view solidarity 
with other activists as vital to initiating and sustaining activism. Participants 
describe the role of other activists in diverse ways but two dominant themes 
emerge which relate to their vital functions within mobilisation; firstly the 
emotional and psychological support derived from such relationships; and 
secondly the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge and skills. The affective 
dimension of relationships with other activists plays a decisive part in cultivating 
the confidence to act politically.  
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Beena: And it was all this like really supportive HQYLURQPHQW,¶YHQHYHU
experienced before and all of this was really overwhelming and kind of like 
really gave me the confidence to actually say you know what, like I can 
PDNHDFKDQJHDQG,ZDQWWRPDNHDFKDQJHDQGWKLVWLPH,¶PJRLQJWRGR
it and all these people will help me.  
Romana: IW¶VHPSRZHULQJLQDZD\EHFDXVHOLNH,¶YHQHYHUKDGWKDWYRLFH
before like as a young person and like, so like to be part of that and to be 
part of a movement to be like seven, eight people strong is like, it is 
empowering and in a sense like being able to talk about these issues out in 
the open with these people is like liberating which I know in ± LW¶VTXLWHVDG
because like you should be able to say that yeah I do experience racism on 
DGDLO\EDVLVEXWOLNH\RXFDQ¶WVROLNHEHLQJDPRQJVWWKDWLW¶VOLNHLWLV
liberating and like even like being involved in activism generally like sort of 
being involved - Palestine activism and things like that it is it is liberating, 
LW¶VOLNHJLYHQ\RXDYRLFHWKDW\RX¶YHQHYHUUHDOO\had before.  
Here the participants are describing solidarity with other like-minded 
activists as having a productive impact on their ability to mobilise, by inducing 
positive feelings and confidence to articulate and act upon their political 
motivations. These quotes draw attention to the role played by emotions in 
enabling activism but also suggest that the absence of such supportive and 
affective networks can inhibit political capacity. Both participants describe the 
motivational and empowering influence of others as something that marks 
HPDQFLSDWLRQIURPUHSUHVVHGGHVLUHVDQGDVSLUDWLRQVLQWKHSDVW,Q%HHQD¶V
case there is an implication that lack of self-belief prevented her from undertaking 
action for social change and Romana describes how she had buried her 
experiences of racism until VKHZDVDEOHWRVKDUHWKHPZLWKWKHµPRYHPHQW¶
ZKLFKZDVµOLEHUDWLQJ¶2WKHUDFWLYLVWVDUHSRUWUD\HGDVSOD\LQJDFDXVDOUROHLQ
instigating activism pathways and producing emotionally enabling conditions for 
sustained engagement. However, as with institutional associations, participants 
are selective about the people they include in their networks and their criteria for 
doing so are influenced by µIUDPHDOLJQPHQWSURFHVVHV¶%HQIRUGDQG6QRZ
2000:624) in terms of political ideals and aspirations.  
Salman: If you work with like-minded people then you know a committed 
group of ten people, hundred people, can do incredible things and it¶s 
about finding that because you all need to kind of drive each other and the 
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message has to be kind of really important as well and something worth 
your time and effort.  
Sara: I think it does come a lot of it does come down to who your friends 
DUHDQGZKDWWKHLULQWHUHVWVDUHLQDQGZKHWKHUWKH\¶UHDVDFWLYHDV\RX
EHFDXVH\RX¶UHNLQGRI«\RXIHHGoff HDFKRWKHU«NLQGRI«DFWivism.  
These quotes highlight the qualifications for inclusion in solidarity networks 
ZKLFKLVGHWHUPLQHGE\LGHRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQVµWKHPHVVDJH¶RUWKHLUZLOOLQJQHVV
WRFRPPLWLHWREHµDVDFWLYHDV\RX¶$V6DOPDQH[SODLQV, other activists can 
be a GULYLQJIRUFHEXWWKLVLVTXDOLILHGE\VWDWLQJWKDWWKH\KDYHWREHµOLNH-PLQGHG¶
VLQFHWKHµPHVVDJH¶RIWKHVRFLDODFWLRQLVDOVRLPSRUWDQW6LPLODUO\, Sara 
describes activism as emerging from friendships and similar interest groups who 
µIHHG¶HDFKRWKHU but there needs to be a shared ZLOOLQJQHVVWRPRELOLVH6DUD¶V
quote implies variation in levels of activity and commitment among friends, which 
is suggestive of the cost implications of mobilisation.  This highlights the 
importance of activism networks to shield members from some of the costs and 
risks associated with political action.  
Chohan: It was quite a sociable experience actually because we were 
quite a tightknit group of people working together also you could always 
VHH,¶GKRSH\RXNQRZFDXVHLW is quite a tension filled arena that whole 
being part of a certain group that has certain stigma attached to it.  
Sameera: You know a lot of the time it can be quite isolating when there is 
so much opposition to who you are or what you believe in, so in that 
respect it can be quite hard, but just knowing that there is a community out 
there indeed a global community that are all fighting towards equality and 
universality of human rights its really empowering and it just kind of gives 
you, it just kind of gives you that reminder that actually it's not just me, 
other people are going through the struggle, we're doing it together.  
In these accounts, participants are describing some of the adverse aspects 
RIPRELOLVDWLRQVXFKDVEHLQJLQDµWHQVLRQILOOHG¶HQYironment or facing 
µRSSRVLWLRQ¶ZKHUHEHLQJSDUWRIDFROOHFWLYHOLNHDµWLJKWNQLWJURXS¶RUµJOREDO
FRPPXQLW\¶RIIHUVVRPHpersonal insurance and security. For Chohan, working 
together and creating a sociable experience mitigates the tensions around 
belonging to a stigmatised group. Similarly, Sameera draws succour from the 
knowledge that other people share her convictions and hardships and this 
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minimises feelings of isolation resulting from membership of a demonised identity 
group.  
Relationships with other activists are a powerful emotional resource for 
mobilisation but they also act as a necessary vehicle to appropriate and 
manufacture another major activist asset, which is knowledge and information. 
Knowledge emerges as a salient theme in the participaQWV¶GLVFRXUVHVZKHUH
politics and participation is conceptualised as a discipline demanding a level of 
expertise on social issues. This is manifested in the way that participants make 
assumptions about the anticipated demands and prerequisites of political 
participation, for instance in the following extract Ameer gives credence to his 
role as a political activist by citing that he has the necessary expertise. 
Ameer: :HOO,DPDERUQDQGUDLVHG%ULWLVKFLWL]HQ«EXW,GRXQGHUVWDQG
VRPHDVSHFWVRIWKHODZ«Vo I am more.. like I said like you know I am a 
political activist. I mean many people if you see - if you look around you 
PRVWSHRSOHGRQ¶W - \RXNQRZGRQRWNQRZZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJ\RXNQRZ
\RXNQRZSROLWLFVWKH\GRQ¶WNQRZKRZSROLWLFVLVKRZSROLWLFVZRrks.   
Similarly other participants frame their identities as activists by describing a 
process of becoming more knowledgeable. 
Romana: Like my first real involvement in activism has been with the 
Palestine Society, FDXVH,¶YHEHHQLQWHUHVWHGLQDOORIWKDWNLQGRIVWXII
before, like before I got involved with it I just knew a bit about it and then I 
basically I went to Palestine with the students, this is like with the Palestine 
Society, which is a sort of unofficial trip, yeah, so I found out a little bit more 
about it through that. And then like I sort of learnt a bit about it and then I 
came back and I like felt like I could channel all that by becoming involved 
in the Palestine Society.  
Both participants talk about knowledge in a way that assumes it is a 
SUHFXUVRUWRDFWLYLVP$PHHUFRQWUDVWVKLVRZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµDVSHFWVRIWKH
ODZ¶WRRUGLQDU\SHRSOHZKRµGRQRWNQRZZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJ¶WRMXVWLI\DQG
legitimise his claim to a political activist identity. He also distinguishes between 
VRPHRQHZKRLVDµFLWL]HQ¶DQGVRPHRQHZKRLVDµSROLWLFDODFWLYLVW¶E\HPSOR\LQJ
WKHFRQMXQFWLRQµEXW¶LQWKHVHQWHQFHZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDWEHLQJDFLWL]HQLVQRW
enough to be an activist, something additional is needed and he qualifies on this 
VFRUHEHFDXVHRIKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµDVSHFWVRIWKHODZ¶7KLVSRLQWLVIXUWKHU
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DXJPHQWHGE\KLJKOLJKWLQJWKDWµPRVWSHRSOH¶RUFLWL]HQVGRQ¶WVKDUHKLV
NQRZOHGJHRIWKHZRUNLQJVRISROLWLFV5RPDQD¶VTXRWHLVLOOXPLQDWLQJLQKRZLW
describes the process of gaining more knowledge about the Palestinian issue 





LQWHUHVWHGGRHVQRWFRQVWLWXWHµUHDO¶LQYROYHPent but knowing more about the 
Palestinian issue does qualify for authentic engagement.  
Having knowledge is not only seen as a qualification for being engaged in 
activism but its absence is also seen as a deterrent to engagement.  
Chohan: «VR,WKLQNSHRSOH¶VOHYHOVRI,ZRXOGQ¶WVD\LJQRUDQFHEXWWKHLU
levels- WKDWWKH\GRQ¶WZDQQDDFWXDOO\JHWLQWRFRQYHUVDWLRQVLQWRGHHSHU
things that seems to be the problem.   
Irum: What it does it terms of activism is once you get your foot through 
the door, the hardest thing is knowing and getting your foot through the 
GRRUVREHIRUH,ZDVDQRERG\EHFDXVH,GLGQ¶WNQRZZKHUHWRJR, I 
GLGQ¶Wknow who to speak to, you know, ,GLGQ¶WNQRZZKDWZDVRXWWKHUH,
GLGQ¶WHYHQNQRZZKHUHWRJRRQOLQHWRVHDUFKIRUDQRrganisation that 
ZRXOGORRNDW\RXQJSHRSOH¶RUZRPHQ¶VLVVXHVI just did not know 
anything.   
+HUH&KRKDQLVDOOXGLQJWRWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶Vlack of willingness to 
acquire deeper knowledge as an obstacle to political participation. The cautious 
use of thHZRUGµLJQRUDQFH¶ZLWKWKHTXDOLILFDWLRQµ,ZRXOGQ¶WVD\¶VXJJHVWVWKDW
others would describe the public attitude as ignorance but the speaker would not 
go as far. However, this is one way to make an argument without being 
discredited for exaggeration and yet getting the message across that wilful 
LJQRUDQFHE\WKHSXEOLFLVDUHDVRQIRUORZSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ6LPLODUO\,UXP¶V
GHVFULSWLRQRIKHUVHOIDVDµQRERG\¶SULRUWR, when she became a member of 
a government advisory group, stresses the point that people who do not have 
knowledge about the issues they care about are inhibited in political participation.  
These discourses reverberate insights gained from previous studies that 
have highlighted the importance of knowledge and information as a vital 
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dimension of the cultural politics of social movements (Castells, 2010; Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006; Maharawal, 2011; Melucci, 1996; Nash, 2010).  Networks 
formed through supportive relationships with other activists play a formative part 
in opening up and promoting communication channels for the exchange of 
information and knowledge. In the following quotes participants discuss the 
importance of other activists in learning and gaining desired skills and expertise.   
Arya: I seem to somehow have chosen consistently people that would 
influence me in a way sometimes, not positively, but there are certain skills 
that I wanna gain and I see them in another person and so I latch on to 
them just for the sake of learning from them.  
Salman: It was a combinatioQ,PHDQ,ZDVUHDGLQJTXLWHDORW«DQGOLNH
\RXVDLGWKHUHZDV«\RXKDGDJURXSRISHRSOHZKRZHUHYHU\ZHOO
WXQHGWRZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJ, not in just their communities but also gen ± 
society in general you know, you had academics, you had doctors it was, 
just it was an incredible group of really talented people and you know we 
ZHUHWDONLQJDERXW«\RXNQRZDOOW\SHVRIWKLQJV«VR«VRLWZDVD
combination of reading and the people that I was kind of being exposed to.   
These participants are describing the ways in which other activists inspire 
and motivate mobilisation but the key attributes that are identified as the source 
of inspiration are the expertise and acumen of these social actors which can be 
appropriated by the participants to enhance their own abilities. Arya describes 
her choice of fellow activists in terms of their ability to teach her the skills that she 
aspires to gain. Salman describes his journey towards activism in terms of the 
learning that occurred tKURXJKERRNVDQGFRQYHUVDWLRQVZLWKµUHDOO\WDOHQWHG
SHRSOH¶ZKLFKLVUHYHDOLQJRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHDVFULEHGWRSHHUWRSHHUNQRZOHGJH
exchanges in the process of gaining the credentials for activism.  
As knowledge is seen as a vital resource in politics and activism, its 
acquisition through networks is strategic and targeted at others who share the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQZRUOGYLHZV RUµIUDPHV¶GHILQHGE\ Snow and Benford 
DVµVLJQLI\LQJZRUNRUPHDQLQJFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶LQVRFLDOPRYHPHQWV
This section has revealed that relationships and connections between 
SDUWLFLSDQWVDUHRUJDQLVHGWKURXJKµGHQVHLQIRUPDOQHWZRUNV¶'HOOD3RUWDDQG
Diani, 2006:20) and described the role they play in providing affective support for 
initiating and sustaining activism as well as promoting the acquisition of requisite 
knowledge and skills for mobilisation. The presence and importance of such 
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informal networks also partly explains the shift to more individualised forms of 
activism discussed earlier, since the networks can act as an organising medium 
for collective action (Diani, 2007; Portwood-Stacer, 2013). However, this raises 
an important question as to how these networks operate without formal 
organisations to coordinate their activities in time and space. This propels the 
discussion into an exploration of the important role played by digital 
communications, particularly social media, in connecting network actors as well 
as producing and circulating knowledge.  
 
Circulation of knowledge and digital media 
In this section the role of the internet and social media is explicated to 
uncover how digital communications facilitate the circulation of knowledge 
through networks that activists view as authentic and reliable in opposition to 
untrustworthy mainstream media sources. The analysis also reveals how digital 
networks are integral to enabling and promoting the production of µalternative 
cultural forms¶DQGµthe construction of new learning possibilities¶6WHYHQVRQ
2010:209) which are deemed to be essential to the democratisation of the public 
sphere.  
High levels of distrust and dismissal of elite-controlled institutions is even 
more pronounced when it comes to seeking authentic and reliable sources of 
knowledge on issues and causes of interest to activists. Distrust of mass media 
and reliance on alternative, independent and local sources of information is an 
almost universal theme in the data. Therefore, it is worth reviewing some of the 
reasons why participants do not trust mass media sources before exploring how 
they seek and promote alternative forms of knowledge through digital networks.  
Arya: I realise that you said 600 Egyptians died in the protest 
(demonstration in Cairo on 14 August 2013)«ZKHQLQIDFWKhalid (not real 
name), who had people in the protest in Egypt, had told us that it was 
actually 2000 and that the media is lying, that kind of thing. A lot of my 
information actually does come from friends and social media but I do take 
the time out to watch the news as well.  
Chohan: I find myself being a lot more sceptical µcause I wrote my 
GLVVHUWDWLRQRQWKHPHGLD¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH:DURQ,UDTDQGVLQFH
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WKHQDOO,¶YHORRNHGDWLVOLNHPHGLDDQGWKHZD\KRZDXWKHQWLFWKH\UHDOO\
are so always like second guessing, questioning everything.  
Shoaib: I think obviously there is an agenda by the media whether people 
like to believe or not it definitely, definitely exists.   
In these narratives participants are describing mass media in dismissive 
terms, expressing mistrust and doubt about its integrity and intentions by citing 
alternative versions of events where participants have direct links to the 
protagonists of related news stories. Participants express scepticism about the 
motives of the media in presenting certain versions of events according to a 
partiFXODUµDJHQGD¶ZKLFKFOHDUO\FRQIOLFWVZLWKWKHLURZQreadings. Such mistrust 
means participants are heavily reliant on alternative sources of information, 
particularly other activists as described previously. In the following extracts 
participants describe their reasons for trusting sources in their networks rather 
than mainstream media.  
Tehmina: I heard so much about Sudan so, so much is happening in 
6XGDQ,¶YHUHDGORDGVRIDUWLFOHVWU\LQJWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHVLWXDWLon in Darfur 
,MXVWGRQ¶WJHWLW,GRQ¶WJHWLW, you have the Zionist lobby really involved in 
campaigning for these poor Darfuris but Zionist lobby rings alarm bells in 
P\KHDGIRURWKHUUHDVRQVDQGVR,ZDVWU\LQJWRXQGHUVWDQGWKLVOLNHLW¶V
just such a strange like mix of confusing mish mash so then I knew there 
ZHUHVRPH6XGDQHVHSHRSOHDW8QLYHUVLW\DQGWKHUH¶V\RXNQRZa 
particular individual who I really respected and thought you know what, I 
WKLQNKH¶OONQRZZKDWKH¶VWDONLQJDERXWVR,JRWLQWRXFKZLWKKLPDQGYHU\
random but essentially asked him, can I have your perspective on this 
cause I thought it was really important tR«WRXQGHUVWDQGIURPDSudani 
SHUVSHFWLYH«\RXNQRZLQVWHDGRIWKHRXWVLGHU\RXNQRZVRPH(QJOLVK
American person writing a book or article about it to understand from their 
own perspective.   
Sameera: You know in this country ...the people who have a monopoly on 
the media - I say people but actually its really you know Rupert Murdoch 
and his empire and Murdoch is a white, very wealthy, very middle class 
very able bodied somewhat extremist person almost in his - actually not 
almost but definitely in terms of his politics and that's going to affect his 
news stance and that's something that I have a problem with, I don't have a 
problem with him having a voice, of course I don't, but it's just not a voice 
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that I particularly agree or will listen to if you like, that's not what interests 
me. What interests me is hearing news of communities, by those 
communities, rather than outsiders kind of looking in and making their 
judgement on it but actually hearing the news from the people whom it's 
affecting.    
These quotes suggest that the social position of informants is key to 
evaluating the authenticity and reliability of the news and information being 
conveyed. Both participants prioritise knowledge that comes directly from the 
source rather than its depiction through second hand reporting. The sources that 
are trusted are the people on the ground, the people who are directly involved in 
the situations and their credibility is portrayed as stemming from their direct 
access to the events. Participants frame these sources as authentic, suggesting 
WKDWWKH\GRQRWKDYHDQµDJHQGD¶7KLVLVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWWKHSUR[Lmity of the 
sources to the events could be seen as undermining their credibility since they 
are more likely to be affected by events and therefore have a stake in their 
reporting. Most participants do not consider that the viewpoints of these 
alternative sources may also be influenced by their social experiences and 
positions in ways that may produce a biased view. One of the participants 
explains why alternatives to mass media should still be given credence as more 
reliable.   
Yasir: People say oh but if you have news on a website which is an anti-
ZDUZHEVLWHLW¶VJRLQJWREHELDVHG«to a point yes and the point of the 
news is to be  you know journalists who are qualified, journalists who have 
NUJ cards and things like that, neutral unbiased news but the fact is we 
NQRZWKHQHZVLVQ¶WWKDWZHNQRZWKDWnews is - news stations, 
newspapers, news websites are all owned by corporations. RHFHQWO\ZH¶YH
found since News of the World before and all kinds of investigations that 
newspapers are biased, newspapers are not really neutral, newspapers 
have vested interests in politicians and corporations, they are run by 
people, therefore there is no real news.  
What is being argued here is that representations of the world are always 
coloured by the social and economic position and interests of the person or 
group producing the knowledge. While the previous two quotes highlight ethnic, 
national and racial identities as determining viewpoints, Yasir emphasises 
differences on ideological grounds between the mass media and alternative 
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media outputs by activists. Here the separation is between those who have a 
vested financial interest in the information being presented and those who seek 
SROLWLFDOJDLQV<DVLU¶VDFFRXQWDVVXPHVWKDWFRPPHUFLDOLVPWDLQWVWKHSURGXFWLRQ
of knowledge while its absence lends credibility to the informant even if it is 
influenced by particular political interests.  
While the social position is important in determining the credibility of 
information, identities also matter, as participants gauge the credibility of 
information on the basis of the ethnic, national or class identities. The way in 
which participants frame sources closer to their social identity as authentic and 
unbiased also suggests that information and knowledge is never seen as a 
neutral commodity that is produced and consumed impartially. Evaluations are 
influenced by activists own identity and social positions which are linked to the 
ways in which they view the world and the political values they hold and promote. 
,QRWKHUZRUGVLW¶VQRWWKDWDOWHUQDWLYHVRXUFHVRINQRZOHGJHGRQ¶WKDYHDQ
agenda, what matters is that they have the same agenda as the participants.  
Salman: %XWOLNH,VDLG,KDYH«DSRLQWRIYLHZ- VRIRUPH«3DOHVWLQHLV
never the oppressor yeah, LW¶VQHYHUthe oppressor and so I would look for 
WKHQHZVWKDWZRXOG«NLQGRIPDWFKWKDW«\RXNQRZDQGIRUPHWKHLU
resistance, not terrorism, their resistance is sound and just and 
proportionate to a degree so anyone who says that - Israel what - any news 
source which kind of favours Israel it completely turns me off (AM: yeah) 
\HDKDQG,JXHVVWKDW¶VMXVW«,JXHVVP\ELDVSOD\LQJLW± playing as well 
EXWWKDW¶VMXVW-  WKDW¶VKRZ,DP  
This quote reveals the personal investments that shape how media 
representations are read as coded to reflect the interests of power in framing of 
issues which stand in need of recoding by participants. Salman subverts the 
dominant framing of Palestinian VWUXJJOHVDVµWHUURULVP¶ by asserting that these 
DUHIRUPVRIµUHVLVWDQFH¶. The personal stakes involved in evaluating the 
authenticity of information and media representations become more apparent 
ZKHUHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶link biased and inflammatory news coverage to Islamophobia.  
Khayam: So in terms of journalistic integrity I mean you have Nick 
Robinson right ..who straight after what happened in Woolwich is saying 
µWKHVHSHRSOH«WKDWDWWDFNHG/HH5LJE\ZHUHRI0XVOLPDSSHDUDQFH¶
«ZKDWLV0XVOLPDSSHDUDQFH"«,KDYHJRW0XVOLPDSSHDUDQFHKDYH,",
could be Hindu right to anybody onlooking or 6RXWK$PHULFDQRU,GRQ¶W
Active citizenship, dissent and power  118 
NQRZZKDWHYHU«DQGHYHQLI\RXORRNDWWKHDWWDFNHUV«WKH\FRXOGEH\RX
know from Kingston Jamaica as much as they could be from Nigeria right 
and even if they look like Nigerian they could well be - have a Christian 
appearance so what is Muslim appearance? He subsequently apologised 
but by then the horse had bolted. 
Rabia: <RXNQRZWKH\¶YHGRQHVXFKDJUHDWMRERIKLJKOLJKWLQJLW¶V0XVOLPV
Muslims, Muslims and then they expect us to be able to get on with it, we 
want to get on with them but QRWHYHU\RQH¶VJRLQJWRZDQWWRJHWRQZLWKXV




difference?   
In these accounts participants express outrage over media messages 
which are perceived as prejudiced and hostile towards Muslim identities, 
inevitably making the appraisal of their content deeply personal. As following 
chapters discuss in more detail activism by young adult Muslims in this thesis is 




offers a productive and cost-efficient medium to realise these aims. These 
channels are used to consume and diffuse alternative images and ideas to 
challenge dominant representations and frames.  
Irum: I tend to identify the mood of people through Facebook, Facebook is 
a really good indicator of how people are feeling what their views are and 
because they are kind of like my crowd of people that I know and work with 
and engage with, VRIRUPHLW¶VLPSRUWDQWWRXQGHUVWDQGZKHUHWKH\¶UH
coming from.  
Salman: I guess Facebook actually is quite, and social media generally is 
quite empowering in that sense because you can get - and Twitter as well 
you can get access to information from these sources, from people on the 
ground level quite quickly and quite accurately more importantly, so I think 
WKHUH¶V - WKHUH¶VQRORQJHUDVRXUFe because the individual affected directly 
by the issue becomes the source I guess yeah and it becomes available 
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very quickly and people catch on to it very quickly as well so iW¶VQRWDFDVH
of BBC giving its spin any more «>@«LW¶VDOORZHGSHRSOHWRNLQGRIJHW
access to real time information . .the truth more importantly not just 
LQIRUPDWLRQFDXVHWKDWFRXOG«HDVLO\be misinformation but the truth.   
As these quotes highlight participants use social media applications like 
Facebook and Twitter to connect with other like-PLQGHGDFWLYLVWVWKURXJKµIUDPH
DOLJQPHQWSURFHVVHV¶WKDWOLQNDFWLYLVWV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGLQWHUSUHWLYHIUDPHVWR
generate collective action in social movements (Benford and Snow, 2000:624). 
These are not only reframing efforts but are also the sites where participants can 
µUHDOLVHtheir identities as cultural producers of meaning rather than being merely 
consumers¶6WHYHQVRQWhile social media is central to sharing 
information and building networks of solidarity this does not undermine the 
importance of meetings, events and gatherings in real, local settings which are 
often publicised and promoted through online sites.  
Zahir: You can have a thousand friends, a million friends online but LW¶VQRW
the same as having five friends that you can see on a regular basis and I 
think that regular connection with society is important, hence, the events 
that I do, I try to encourage people to come along because I spend extreme 
amount of time online, on social media as you probably know (AM: yeah) 
that you know for one purpose for people to get away from that and to 
come and meet people on a face to face level.  
However, comparison of social media and local events during fieldwork 
suggests that online activism can sometimes exaggerate the level of real support 
on the ground, giving rise to concerns about the internet encouraging an 
XQKHOSIXOIRUPRIµFOLFNWLYLVP¶*ODGZHOO)ODLP7KLVLVWKH
phenomenon of activism being reduced to clicking a few buttons online but not 
promoting any meaningful participation in events that require co-presence such 
as protests and demonstrations. The role of social media in activism is an 
emerging and exciting area of study which has generated new debates about the 
democratising potential of digital communications (Castells, 2012; Della Porta et 
al, 2006; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Hands, 2011; Fenton, 2008; Stevenson, 2010). 
One view is that social media and digital communications play a constitutive and 
productive role in facilitating political participation (Hands, 2011), by enhancing 
and extending the ability to form networks and generate collective identity 
(Castells, 2010) and reducing the costs incurred by individuals in mobilisation 
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(Della Porta et al, 2006; Earl and Kimport, 2011). In a tentative analysis of the 
recent wave of social movements around the world, like the Arab Spring, Castells 
(2012:1) argues that many of these protests and mobilisations were enabled by 
social networks on the internet which cUHDWHGµVSDFHVRIDXWRQRP\ODUJHO\
EH\RQGWKHFRQWURORIJRYHUQPHQWVDQGFRUSRUDWLRQV¶7KLVRIIHUHGRSSRUWXQLWLHV
to counterbalance the disproportionate control of mass media by the state and 
capital that effectively reduces the participatory potential of the public sphere 
(Habermas, 1989 in Downey and Fenton, 2003).  Castells (2012:4) has 
suggested that these movements may be indicative of a new form of power 
available in the network society which he describes as 'communication power'. 
This power has come about as result of advancements in communication 
technologies which offer social movements and political actors the opportunity to 
challenge and reshape the way that dominant social values and meanings are 
framed.   
Fenton (2008:237) has been more cautious in appraising the role of social 
media in promoting greater political participation and promoting democratisation 
because new media generate new challenges:  
Non-hierarchical forms of disorganization that make decisions on the basis 
of collective consensus become harder to achieve the larger and more 
disparate the collective is. Furthermore, the internet may contribute to the 
fragmentation of civil society, as well as political mobilization and 
participation.  
While acknowledging the potential of the intHUQHWWRDOORZµcitizens to alter 
their relationship to the public sphere, to become creators and primary subjects¶
of political participation, Fenton (2008:236) is less optimistic about the 
democratising potential of internet activism.  Given the reversal of the Egyptian 
revolution in 2012 and the failure of protestors in Europe to undermine 
neoliberalism and austerity measures there is a ring of truth to )HQWRQ¶V
FRQFHUQVWKDWµOnline activism runs the risk of raising our hopes 
withouWWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIGHOLYHUDQFH¶ 
Nevertheless, )HQWRQ¶VFULWLTXHLVEDVHGRQWKHYLHZWKDWLQWHUQHW
activism has limits due to its individualism and particularism which inspires hope 
but cannot move beyond utopia to forge a political project capable of changing 
the power balance in society. However, it may be argued that despite the 
reversal of the Egyptian revolution the events of the Arab Spring demonstrated 
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that internet activism can move beyond symbolic gains to capture real political 
power with material outcomes, even if the gains were temporary. As Stevenson 
(2010:215) cautions there is a need for further investigation to determine 
µwhether these new forms of communication actually enhance the capacity of the 
civil sphere for dialogue and learning or whether they simply commodify the 
realm of everyday life.¶7KXVIDUhe concludes, there are reasons for optimism 
but without losing sight of the continuing dominance of neoliberalism in shaping 
commodified societies.  
While the democratising potential of social media is an interesting and 
important question it remains marginal to the aims of this chapter and the thesis. 
The relevance of digital communications in the context of this chapter is to 
KLJKOLJKWLWV¶FHQWUDOSODFHLQDOORZLQJWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVWREHFRPHµFXOWXUDO
SURGXFHUV¶6WHYHQVRQRIVHOI-authored corpuses of knowledge in 
alternative media.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented findings on the nature and range of activism 
young adult Muslims engage in, which reveal distinctive features shared with 
other progressive social justice social movements. Repertoires of political action 
marked by individualised forms of engagement, lifestyle politics and a reliance on 
networks operating through digital media rather than formal organisations, 
resonate the model of cultural politics described in the literature review. Lifestyle 
politics and individualised modes of activism are closely related to misgivings 
about the constraints and credibility of institutions, while the reliance on dense 
informal networks is compelled by mistrust of mainstream mass media. These 
interlinked characteristics of activism foreground the importance of digital and 
online networks of like-minded activists in sustaining collective action by 
providing emotional and security benefits but also as the essential vehicle 
through which knowledge is produced and promoted as the mainstay of cultural 
politics. These findings demonstrate that social media plays a vital and enabling 
role in the activism of participants in this study by allowing them to become 
cultural producers+RZHYHUWKH\DOVRVXSSRUWWKHFODLPWKDWµYLUWXDOQHWZRUNV
operate at their best when they are backed by real social linkages in specifically 
ORFDOL]HGFRPPXQLWLHV¶'HOOD3RUWDDQG'LDQL  
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The presence of informal and somewhat dense networks which provide the 
level of organisation required to mount and sustain collective action fulfils one of 
the qualifying dimensions of social movements as defined in Chapter 3. The 











This chapter focuses on collective identity and the conflictual relations that 
shape it through complex but concerted processes of production, signifying that 
the activism of participants in this study constitutes a social movement with 
conscious and shared aims and objectives. This is done by revealing the 
intentional efforts of participants to produce a collective Muslim identity which is a 
defining and constitutive feature of social movements (Crossley, 2002; Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006; Melucci, 1996). Melucci (1995:44, 47) describes collective 
LGHQWLW\DVDµSURFHVVRI³FRQVWUXFWLQJ´DQDFWLRQV\VWHP¶PHDQLQJLGHQWLW\LVQRW
RQO\WKHPRELOLVLQJIRUFHRIVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVEXWDOVRWKDWLW¶VDSSDUHQWVWDELOLty 
FRQFHDOVµDQDFWLYHSURFHVVWKDWLVQRWLPPHGLDWHO\YLVLEOH¶He goes so far as to 
argue that the breakdown of collective identity PDNHVµDFWLRQLPSRVVLEOH¶
Drawing on these insights this chapter focuses on how participants recognise 
themselves as being part of a collective group worth struggling for, despite the 
complexities and tensions of producing such a unified entity.  
This chapter also reflects on how these findings relate to existing literature 
on British Muslim identities (Ameli 2002, 2004; Cesari, 2007; Choudhury, 2007; 
Hussain and Bagguley, 2005; Lewis, 2007; Modood 2010b; 2¶7RROHDQG*DOH
2013), which highlights the growing importance of faith, particularly less cultural 
and more reflexive and personal interpretations, among younger Muslims. The 
findings discussed below add to this body of knowledge by highlighting the 
political dimensions of a collective Muslim identity and challenging some of the 
essentialist conclusions drawn from the role of faith in Muslim politics. 
Participants in this study, who come from different social backgrounds, 
national origins, ethnicities and migratory pathways, reveal divergent 
understandings of the meaning of being a Muslim in Britain today. A multiplicity of 
beliefs and practices prevail in the participant sample, making activism as a 
single group challenging due to conflicts and tensions between members. Some 
participants state that Islam plays a definitive and all-encompassing role in their 
life while others profess atheism with a cultural attachment to Islam¶V familiar and 
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comforting rituals and customs. Despite these fissures and divisions identification 
with the social and faith FDWHJRU\µ0XVOLP¶is strong for nearly all but one 
participant. In this one contradictory case, while Muslim identity is not denied it is 
not experienced as an important or primary DVSHFWRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VVRFLDO
profile. 1RWRQO\LVLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKHODEHOµ0XVOLP¶VWURQJSDUWLFLSDQWVDOVR
defend this identity in what is perceived to be a climate of pervasive and 
normalised hostility towards Muslims which is attributed to the war on terror.  
The analysis is divided into three sections, the first of which looks at the 
active production of collective identity through processes shaped by the agency 
of participants. The next section focuses on the complexities of faith identification 
which confound essential and reductive ideas about Muslim faith identities and 
finally the role of faith as a political resource is explored.  
 
Unities and fissures in collective identity 
The complexities underpinning the production of a collective identity are 
UHYHDOHGE\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶HIIRUWVWRUHVROYHcontradictory and multiple aspects of 
personal identity in ways that do not undermine the coherence of a valued 
primary identity. Such tensions are conveyed by the contingent ways in which 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶LGHQWLI\ with other Muslims but also how they differentiate 
themselves in some contexts. This is exemplified by Romana¶VFDVHZKLFK
appositely represents the tensions and paradoxes participants had to negotiate in 
constructing a collective identity. Romana describes growing up in a 
predominantly white area and struggling with feelings of exclusion and 
marginalisation from an early age, which were amplified after 9/11. Feeling 
persecuted for being associated with Islam, Romana initially sought to deny her 
0XVOLPLGHQWLW\EHFDXVHµHYHU\ERG\KDWHVXV¶+RZHYHUDW University Romana 
discovered a network of Muslim friends and societies, like the Palestine and 
Kashmir Societies, through which she formed friendship bonds as well as an 
activist profile. 7KHVHµHPSRZHULQJ¶DQGµOLEHUDWLQJ¶relationships enabled 
Romana to articulate earlier experiences of racism, as well as to find the 
language and means to challenge it. Through these networks Romana gained 
confidence in her faith identity.  
Romana6LQFH,¶YHFRPHWR8QLYHUVLW\HVSHFLDOO\RYHUWKHODVWWZR\HDUV
,¶YHVRUWRIIHOWOLNH - ,IHHODELWVDGWKDW,¶YHORVWWKDW, like, ,¶YHIRUJRWWHQKRZ
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WRSUD\DQG,¶YHIRUJRWWHQOLNH,¶Ye forgotten surahs (holy verses) and things 
DQGOLNH,¶GUHDOO\OLNHWROHDUQLWDJDLQDQG,IHHOOLNHVRUWRIEHLQJLQYROYHG
in all these Muslims - like all these sort of projects and all these things that 
like involve Muslims I feel like I can sort of engage with it and like slowly 








For Romana a sense of belonging with other Muslims restores and affirms an 
important part of her identity as a Muslim that has been lost or denied due to 
troubling experiences of racism and prejudice. This awakening through shared 
identification reflects insights from social movement studies that collective 
identities are not a precondition of collective action but rather they are built up 
and produced within it, through interaction with other activists (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006; Haenfler et al, 2012; Hunt and Benford, 2007; Melucci, 1995;1996; 
Portwood-Stacer, 2013)5RPDQD¶VDFFRXQWUHVRQDWHVWKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
collective identity as a process of active production through edifying and 
nourishing engagements with others in the identity group. However, in the next 
extract Romana goes on to describe how this network can also produce a 
contradictory sense of marginalisation inside the group.    
Romana: Yeah I mean like there¶VSHRSOHOLNHPHZKROLNHOLNHWKHSHRSOH
WKDWGLGOLNHORVHWKHLUZD\DOLWWOHELWOLNH\RX¶UH\RXIHHOVRUWRILVRODWHG
from the like sort of main Muslim group like ISocs (Islamic Societies) and 





RIOLNH«OLNHWKHZD\,EHKDYHLVGLIIHUHQW, my mannerisms and things just 
EHFDXVH,¶PQRWXVHGWREHLQJLQWKDW0XVOLPVHWWLQJ««DQGOLNHWKH\¶UH
sort of like they see you as the other, like, they see me how I feel a lot of 
the time, they see people like me as how I see people like.. like the Other, 
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ZKR,¶PWDONLQJDERXWOLNHWKHSHRSOHWKDW,ZHQWWRVFKRROZLWKDQGWKLQJV
like that.   
Although, the contrasting ways in which Romana describes her relationship 
with other Muslim students appears to be contradictory, this tension can be 
understood through a relational concept of identity, as a process that involves 
moments of unity and stillness but at other times entails fluidity and change, 
invoking different registers of context-dependent subjectivity (Sen, 2007). Clearly 
belonging to the group is important for Romana as the earlier quote reveals and 
which is further evidenced by the way in which she refers to herself as a Muslim 
who has lost their way, suggesting her natural place is within the group. 
However, this quote also suggests that belonging to the identity group can also 
be contingent and unstable.  
7KHFRQWUDGLFWLRQVLQ5RPDQD¶VDFFRXQWGLVUXSWWKHUHLILHGYLHZRILGHQWLW\
based on the QRWLRQRIµFRQWLQXLW\RIVXEMHFWRYHUDQGEH\RQGYDULDWLRQVLQWLPH
and its aGDSWDWLRQVWRWKHHQYLURQPHQW¶0HOXFFL$OWKRXJKLQHYHU\GD\
parlance the FRQFHSWµUHPDLQVVHPDQWLFDOO\LQVHSDUDEOHIURPWKHLGHDRI
permanHQFH¶0HOXFFL1996:76) this is contradicted by theorists of identity who 
HPSKDVLVHLWV¶IOXLGLW\FUHDWLYLW\ and plurality (Castells, 2010; Hall, 1993, 2005a; 
Modood, 2007; Sen, 2007). ,WLVDUJXHGWKDWSHRSOHFDQµVLPXOWDQHRXVO\EHORQJ¶ 
WRPDQ\GLIIHUHQWFDWHJRULHVZKLFKFDOOIRUFKRLFHVWREHPDGHDERXWWKHµUHODWLYH
importance to attach, in a particular context, to the divergent loyalties and 
priorities thDWPD\FRPSHWHIRUSUHFHGHQFH¶(Sen, 2007:19). Another layer of 
complexity is addHGE\0RGRRG¶VUHIHUHQFHWRµLQGLYLGXDO YDULDELOLW\¶in 
collectivities where µnot all group members, even in the case of any one group, 
DUHDOOPHPEHUVLQWKHVDPHZD\¶ 
$V5RPDQD¶VFDVHH[HPSOLILHVindividuals relate to collective identities in 
different ways, depending on which aspects of their selves, their biographies and 
experiences are shared or divergent in a particular context. This contextual 
sensitivity plays out as shifting identity positions responding to differentiated 
levels of belonging, in ways that do not negate other aspects of identity but rather 
brackets WKHPRXWWHPSRUDULO\DQGVWUDWHJLFDOO\7KLVUHIOHFWV0HOXFFL¶V
LQVLJKWRQFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\DVDµILHOGFRQWDLQLQJDV\VWHPRIYHFWRUVLQWHQVLRQ¶
ZKHUHµXQLW\and equilibrium are re-established over and over again in reaction to 
VKLIWVDQGFKDQJHVLQWKHHOHPHQWVLQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOWRWKHILHOG¶5HLWHUDWLQJ
'HOOD3RUWDDQG'LDQL¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLWLHVFDQEHEDVHGRQ
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different shared dLPHQVLRQV5RPDQD¶VYDULDEOHVHQVHRIEHORQJLQJFDQEH
understood as representing two different subjectivities shaped by shifting 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. In the first passage Romana identifies 
strongly with a collective Muslim identity because this allows her to articulate a 
shared experience of racism and Islamophobia. However, as the second extract 
reveals differences in religious interpretation and practice constitutes a different 
vector of inclusion which creates disparities of belonging within the social group. 
In the latter extract the sense of belonging becomes more contingent since the 
discursive field has now been rescaled from referencing society at large to the 
G\QDPLFVZLWKLQWKHJURXS7KLVUHSUHVHQWVFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\DVµDILHOd which 
expands and contracts and whose borders alter with the varying intensity and 
GLUHFWLRQRIWKHYDULRXVIRUFHVWKDWFRQVWLWXWHLW¶0HOXFFL 
5RPDQD¶VH[SHULHQFHDOVRUHIOHFWVWHQVLRQVZLWKLQDFWLYLVWFLUFOHVto do with 
µpoliticking over liIHVW\OH¶ ZKHUHSHUVRQDOEHOLHIVDQGSUDFWLFHVµEHFRPHWDUJHWVRI
self-righteous moralizing and other forms of social poliFLQJ¶3RUWZRRG-Stacer, 
2013:335), creating hierarchies of status. Such conflicts can turn the negotiation 
of group boundaries and its terms of inclusion into a political struggle in itself. 
This is evident in the following extract where Basma talks about her tense 
relationship with members of the Islamic Society over the issue of wearing head 
scarves. 
Basma: 3ROLWLFDOO\,¶PDZDUHWKDW«like for example this, these issues I will 
not speak about externally to kind of BME or mainly Muslim circles anyway 
but I know the importance of maintaining a solidarity and a community 
EHFDXVHKLVWRULFDOO\,XQGHUVWDQGWKDW«FHUWDLQDVSHFWV«,MXVW«OLNH
w- like to a certain extent each member is like a victim of a history and for 
example issues with gender can be traced back to so many other kind of 
historical- KLVWRULFDOO\FRORQLDOLQFLGHQWVDQ\ZD\DQG«\HDKVROLNHLQD
VHQVH,¶PQRWDJJUHVVLYHbut I try to understand and I know that I have to 
EHWKHUHLQWKRVHVSDFHVUHJDUGOHVVRIKRZXQFRPIRUWDEOHDVSHDNHU¶V
making me feel by saying I have to- not looking at me in the eye but saying 
\RXNQRZµVLVWHUDWWKHHQGRIWKHGD\LI\RX¶UHQRWZHDULQJthe head scarf 
\RX¶UHQRWJRLQJWRWKLQNWKDWLVDUHVSHFWDEOHSUDFWLVLQJ0XVOLPZRPDQ¶VR
you know, you know having to deal with that I know I have to be there even 
if I am the only like one of five for example in order to open that space up 
for others beFDXVH,GRQ¶WZDQWWKHPWRIHHOERWKWKHLQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDO
marginalisation.  
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This reveals how collective identity has to be negotiated, fought for and 
maintained through constant effort and struggle. Groupness is asserted by 
drawing a line between what FDQEHVSRNHQDERXWLQWHUQDOO\ZLWKLQµ0XVOLP
FLUFOHV¶DQGZKDWPXVWQRWEHVDLGH[WHUQDOO\Here Basma is referring to difficult 
experiences of attending Islamic Society events and facing difficult questions 
about her identity as a Muslim woman, because she chooses not to wear a hijab. 
The qualification that this issue can only be discussed within the BME community 
conveys an implicit knowledge of the public sensitivities and controversies 
surrounding the role of women in Muslim communities and veiling (Meer and 
Modood, 2010). Basma even attempts to mitigate the damage her critique may 
GRWRWKH0XVOLPFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\E\VXJJHVWLQJµLVVXHVZLWKJHQGHU¶KDYHWKHLU
roots in colonialism. The presence of such defensive and qualifying statements 
prior to the revelation that some aspects of being in Muslim spaces are 
uncomfortable and marginalising suggests the importance of the collective 
identity despite the conflict between a faith identity and gender identity. The fact 
that this tension is resolved in favour of maintaining solidarity within the collective 
Muslim identity is revealing of the priority given to the faith identity in the specific 
context of external pressures of marginalisation.  
Other participants similarly reveal internal divisions and conflicts that 
remain concealed behind the efforts of a social group to project permanence and 
stability. .DVLP¶VFDVHLVVRPHZKDWXQLTXHDVKHLVRQO\RQHRIWZRILUVW
generation migrants included in the study, which largely comprised second or 
third generation migrants. Kasim has lived in the Midlands for the last ten years 
where he has played a productive role in activism through trade unions and anti-
racism/anti-Islamophobia campaigns. .DVLP¶Vreflexive engagement with his 
identity and its¶ relation to other Muslims conveys some of the complexities and 
intersectionality inherent in the production of collective identities. 
Kasim,PHDQP\SHUVRQDOFKDOOHQJHLVWKDWEHFDXVH,¶PDILUVWJHQHUDWLRQ
migrant .... connecting with people here, Asians, bODFNV«$IULFDn 
Caribbeans I mean there is - there is an experiential gap so they - what 
they have experienced is much more dire much more severe and they 
KDYHLQVRPHZD\VWKH\KDYHPDGHFRPSURPLVHVZLWKLW,¶PVWLOO
VWUXJJOLQJZLWKLWVRLW¶VMXVWLWGRHVFUHDWHVRPHNLQGRIDJDSDQGWKH
I mean the effort needs to be made to fill that gap across that boundary.  
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Here Kasim is describing the difficulty of building solidarity with other British 
Muslims because his experience of racism as a first generation migrant is 
qualitatively different from settled second and third generation migrants. His 
LVRODWLRQLVVLJQDOOHGE\DµERXQGDU\¶EHWZHHQKLPDQGRWKHUVEXWKLVFRPPLWPHQW
WRWKHFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\LVLQGLFDWHGE\WKHQHHGWRPDNHWKHµHIIRUW¶WR cross it. As 
with Romana the experience of Islamophobia plays a strong role in shaping his 
identification with a collective Muslim identity.  
Kasim: Yeah this is absolutely right that being Muslim you are going to be 
discriminated... .. yeah he (second or third generation Muslim) ZRQ¶WFDOO
himself Bangladeshi or even  I mean even his family comes from 
Bangladesh or Pakistani or Indian or anything like that or black or Asian 
HYHQVRPHWLPHVKHDVVHUWVWKDWKH¶VD0XVOLP«AM: What do you call 
\RXUVHOI"«««,¶PEODFNLnternationalist (laughs) yeah I mean I would use 
being ± I would say WKDW,¶PD0XVOLPIRUVSHFLILFSXUSRVHVEXWWKDW¶VRQO\
for those purposes yeah.  
Kasim reveals that he identifies much more strongly with the identity label 
RIµEODFN¶EXWWKDWWKH0XVOLPLGHQWLW\ODEHODOVRRFFXSLHVDVWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRQLQ
his politics which is determined by the ubiquitous threat of Islamophobia. Being 
from a Muslim background Kasim is unable to escape the inevitability of 
Islamophobia, even though he neither shares the strong connection to a faith 
identity nor does he experience marginalisation in the same way that his peers 
do. He identifies instead ZLWKWKHODEHORIµEODFNLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVW¶which is not 
widely shared by others in his group. Yet it is difficult for Kasim to disassociate 
IURPWKH0XVOLPODEHOEHFDXVHRIWKHIDFWWKDWµEHLng a Muslim you are going to 
EHGLVFULPLQDWHG¶7KHIROORZLQJTXRWHUHYHDOVKRZGHVSLWHWKHVHWHQVLRQVKHLV
able to summon a collective Muslim identity.   
Kasim: I mean this - this is one of the issue which affects Muslim and 
migrant communities most I mean their primary identity is connected with 
migration and even if they are born here the stamp of being a migrant is 
WKHUHLWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHUKRZPDQ\KRZPDQ\JHQHUDWLRQVWKH\KDYHEHHQ
here.  
In this extract Kasim dissolves the µERXQGDU\¶EHWZHHQKLP from other 
Muslims E\XQLWLQJWKHPXQGHUWKHµSULPDU\LGHQWLW\¶RIµPLJUDWLRQ¶These efforts 
reveal the importance of in-group solidarity within a perceived climate of hostility 
towards Muslims, designating the external pressures that structure collective 
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identity. While positive identifications with members of the identity group are 




(Hunt and Benford, 2007:7533).  The production of collective identity usually 
requires differentiation from other actors (Melucci, 1995, 1996).   
Romana: I find that like with young Muslim people getting involved with like 
DFWLYLVPOLNHVRUWRIWKLQJVWRGRZLWK3DOHVWLQHDQGWKLQJVOLNHWKDWLW¶VOLNH
LW¶VEHFDXVHWKH\¶UHOLNH, WKH\¶UHRXUSHRSOHOLNHWKH\¶UHRXUEURWKHUVDQGRXU









mean (AM: yeah) sort of getting like Muslims out of the hole, like building 
ourselves up like getting rid of this whole title of like.. sort of a terrorists and 
like things like that I mean.  
Kasim: I used to I mean.. like was very close to a lot of leftist groups... but 
... just \RX¶UHDQRWKHUZKDWHYHUWKH\FDOOEURZQIDFH$05HDOO\"\HDKWR
MXVWLI\WKHLUSROLWLFV«WKH\KDYHFLYLOLVHG\RXDQG«AM: the left?) yeah I 
mean the left has civilised these Pakis and whatever.. others so yeah I ± 
DQG,GRQ¶W- I would rather be uncivilised barbaric err  whatever Pakistani 
,QGLDQ%DQJODGHVKLPDQWKDW¶VILQHZLWKPH 
Here both participants are not only constructing a collective identity through 
differentiation with a left identity but also highlighting the importance of identity to 
mobilisation. A collective Muslim identity is constructed by Romana through 
DUWLFXODWLQJWKHVKDUHGFRQFHUQVDQGLVVXHVRIµRXUEURWKHUVDQGVLVWHUV¶ZKLFKLV
differentiated from people on the lHIWZKRDUHPHUHO\LQYROYHGDVDµWRNHQ¶
gesture. Romana brings a Muslim identity category into being by bringing various 
different political conflicts like Palestine, Kashmir, Syria into a single liberation 
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struggle which joins seamlessly with the stigmatisation of Muslims as potential 
terrorists in Britain. This creates DQµHTXLYDOHQFH¶)DLUFORXJKEHWZHHQ
conflicts faced by people in Muslim countries and the issue of Islamophobia and 
prejudice endured by Muslims in the UK, forming a unified global project to 
defend Muslim identities. This connection is reinforced by citing affective ties to 
µRXUSHRSOH¶ZKLFKLVFRQWUDVWHGZLWKWKHH[SORLWDWLYHPRWLYHVRIWKHµOefties¶who 
merely want to promote their own agenda. This presumes that a shared identity 
translates into a more authentic form of engagement in a political cause and 
since people from the lHIWGRQ¶WLGHQWLI\ZLWKWKHSHRSOHLQYROYHGLQWKHQDPHG
struggles their involvement is not as genuine. Kasim further signifies how identity 
GLIIHUHQFHVXQGHUPLQHVROLGDULW\E\GLVWLQJXLVKLQJµOHIWLVWJURXSV¶DQGµDQRWher 
EURZQIDFH¶RIµXQFLYLOLVHGEDUEDULFZKDWHYHU3DNLVWDQL,QGLDQ%DQJODGHVKL¶
origin suggesting dividing lines based on colour and ethnicity. More importantly 
these quotes highlight how a collective identity is drawn by accentuating 
similarities inside the group and emphasising differences with others outside the 
group. Struggles in Kashmir, Palestine and Syria are equated with Islamophobia 
in Britain while Kasim brings people from different South Asian countries into a 
XQLILHGµEURZQIDFH¶FODVVRIPLQorities. Also common is the way in which the 
singular category is connected to the attack on Muslim identities in Britain which 
are demonised as µWHUURULVWV¶ DQGµXQFLYLOLVHGEDUEDULF¶.  
These experiences highlight the complexities and tensions as well as the 
emotional and discursive investments made by participants that are masked by 
the apparent stability of a collective identity. The different ways in which 
participants UHODWHWRWKHLGHQWLW\ODEHORIµ0XVOLP¶UHYHDOVWKDWWKLVLVQRWDJLYHQ
or uncontested unity but rather has to be achieved through the participants¶ 
efforts to µGHOLPLWDQGVWDELOL]HDGHILQLWLRQRIWKHPVHOYHV¶ (Melucci, 1995:45). 
These extracts reveal that collective identity has to be understood through a 
µUHODWLRQDO¶UDWKHUWKDQµVXEVWDQWLDOLVWORJLF¶<Rung, 2000:1059) meaning it is not 
automatically and unconsciously generated from a single marker of group identity 
but rather, as the above discourses suggest, is constantly negotiated and 
activated in relation to different internal and external forces. Producing collective 
identity involves boundary work where the parameters between inside and 
outside can shift depending on the temporal and contextual configuration of 
different dimensions or vectors along which collective identity is being 
constructed. This is evident in the way participants describe divisions within the 
group which contracts the boundary of inclusion but which gets expanded to a 
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wider circle when describing relationships with the rest of society. While a 
collective Muslim identity is produced with an implied homogeneity this is not 
always experienced personally.  
It is argued that studies on Islam and Muslims often reduce the complexity 
of Muslim identities by paying an inordinate amount of attention to Muslim 
organisations that accentuate the religious dimension of their collective identity,  
µwhile neglecting the other, often non-religious elements of identity of Muslims 
and making them more religious than WKH\DUH¶%HFWRYLF7KLV
section has tried to address this by revealing the complex and conflicted ways in 
which young Muslim activists themselves construct a collective Muslim identity. 
This is not to say that such contradictions are present or obvious among all the 
participants as some do present faith identities in a more much more primordial 
and uncontested way as discussed in the next section. However, this also 
involves a great deal of work to build a relationship with faith which involves 
agency and choice rather than reversion to tradition.  
 
The role of faith in identity politics 
This section focuses on the relationship between faith and activism in the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶SROLWLFDODQGFLYLFPRWLYDWLRQVZKLFKWDNHVWKHGLVFXVVLRQEH\RQG
the production of collective identity to its core contents. This is important for 
demystifying the salience of faith in Muslim identities which is viewed as being in 
conflict with national identity and evidence of Muslim disloyalty to Britain (Brown 
and Saeed, 2014; Grillo, 2005; Lynch, 2013, Werbner, 2000). The following 
quote demonstrates an uncontested faith identity that subsumes all other aspects 
of  the SDUWLFLSDQW¶V social life.  
Shoaib: I mean for me personally being a Muslim and you know for some 
SHRSOHLW¶VQRWVXFKDELJLVVXHWKH\GRQ¶WUHDOO\FDUHEXWVRme others do 
DQG«\HDKVRIRUPHLW¶VOLNHDZKROHHQWLUHZD\RIOLIHDQG,VHHOLWHUDOO\,
mean even the way in which the first question I recall was you were talking 
about social, political and civil activities, these are all part of in itself Islam. 
So you could just write about that, you know, instead of saying can you talk 
about the different social, political and civil activities you could just 
rephrase it and say talk about the Islamic activities that you are involved 
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with, µcause I see all these paUWDQGSDUFHOZLWK,VODPVR«\HDKWKDW¶VSUHWW\
PXFKLWUHDOO\LW¶VMXVWP\PRWLYDWLRQUHJDUGLQJP\IDLWK 
In this quote the role of faith is presented as being the primary identity 
through which all over forms of life are refracted. Similar sentiments are 
expressed by other participants confirming given understandings of the 
heightened significance of Islam in the lives of young Muslims (Lewis, 2007; Roy, 
2004; Parekh, 2008). However, like many other participants Shoaib also 
experienced a journey towards faith that was reflexively self-determined through 
independent knowledge-seeking rather than adherence to parental cultural 
practices.  
Aliya: I wouldn't call myself a Muslim growing up because I had no idea 
what Islam was about. When I was at college I happened to be surrounded 
by some ...people who...were practising you know and they would talk to 
me about religion and I became interested and wanted to know more ... so 
I would say it's my peers really who influenced me to explore religion and 
try and understand you know what I was born into. 
$OL\D¶VTXRWHDIILUPV5R\¶V (2004:40) assertion that faith identities among 
Muslims in the West are linked to processes of modernisation rather than a 
retreat to tradition, indicating particular forms of religiosity ZKLFKDUHµEDVHGRQ
LQGLYLGXDOSUDFWLFHVRQHWKLFVDQGQRWRQFXOWXUH¶The contemporary positioning 
of faith comes to light when examining one of the most contested notions in the 
citizenship of Muslims in the West. This is the concept of the ummah, which 
literally describes a global Muslim community but signifies a collective Muslim 
LGHQWLW\WKDWIXQFWLRQVOLNHDVWDWHOHVVQDWLRQRUWRXVH$QGHUVRQ¶V
frequently cited and apt phraseDQµLPDJLQHGFRPPXQLW\¶0XVOLPOR\DOW\WRWKH
ummah sends anxiety levels soaring over IHDUVWKDW0XVOLPVµFRXOGQRWEH
WUXVWHGWREHJRRGFLWL]HQV¶3DUHNK,WLVXVHIXOWKHQWRH[DPine how 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQYRNH this global unity in describing their motivations to act.   
Amna: I think what drives me is like the grassroots people, the people that 
\RXGRQ¶WVHHRXWLQWKHRSHQWKHSHRSOHWKDW\RXGRQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\FRPH
across.... you know people that are going to be out in the snow and rain 
QRZSURWHVWLQJDJDLQVWZKDWLWLVEXWZKDWUHDOO\GULYHVPHLVWKLV«NLQd of, 
for me Islam really the history of Islam, the Prophet and the way he kind of 
IRXJKWDJDLQVWLQMXVWLFHDQGWKHZD\WKDW¶VWROGXVWRGRWKDWIRUWKHUHVWRI
our lives for, as long as the ummah is alive we have a duty to do this to 
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VWDQGXSIRUZKDW¶VULJKWDQGZKDW¶VZURQJDQG,WKLQNWKDWPRWLYDWHVPH
the most.  
Basma: :HOOIRUPHREYLRXVO\,WKLQNLW¶VMXVWXOWLPDWHO\WKHNLQGRIZLWKLQ
the ummah that understanding that those who are persecuted, oppressed 
and so on, you will always like fight by their side and personally my ethnic 
EDFNJURXQG«KDVODUJHO\GULYHQPHWRNLQGRIEHTXLWHXQFRPSURPLVLQJO\
anti-FRORQLDOLVWDQGLPSHULDOLVW««>@«WKHRYHUDOOVRXUFHRIP\GULYH
aside from my faith is then the people, the collective people because I think 
iIVRPHWKLQJ¶VQRWFROOHFWLYHWKDWLQGLYLGXDOZRXOGQ¶WEHSUHVHQWLQWKDW
position anyway what - 0DOFROP;ZDVQ¶WRQKLVRZQ\RXNQRZ.  
Here the ummah is cited as an ageless and universal agent of Muslim 
solidarity but it also invokes a more local and embodied collectivity. The ummah 
is being deployed in these accounts as a timeless global community through 
UHIHUHQFHWR0XVOLPGXWLHVWKDWIORZIURPLWDVORQJDVLWLVµDOLYH¶but it is also 
pointing to people closer to home, µWKHJUDVVURRWVSHRSOH¶DQGWKHµFROOHFWLYH
SHRSOH¶. Rather than a kickback to ancient traditions this merging of the local and 
JOREDOUHIOHFWVWKHHPHUJHQFHRIµnew politics that can be less accurately 
described as localisation but as a form of globalisation from below¶, stimulated by 
digital communications that have created new possibilities for identity creation 
according to Stevenson (2010:214)3DUWLFLSDQWV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKVXFKGLJLWDO
technologies was explored in the previous chapter.  
The above quotes also suggest a highly politicised reading of the notion of 
ummah since it is being positioned as a threatened object in need of defence, as 
revealed by references to fighting injustice and being persecuted and oppressed. 
It is important to point out that the term itself is not widely referenced in the 
interviews, with only six of the 34 participants mentioning it. Even where 
participants cite the ummah in what appears to be a yearning for a return to the 
past glories of Islam, a careful reading reveals immediate and personal stakes.  
Arya: Really what I am aiming for is to..to do what I can for the ummah to 
become what it was, that is the PRWLYDWLRQ,UHDOO\ZDQWXV« I want to 
show the world because, I mean once upon a time Islam was great 
because everyone knew Islam was great but now Muslims say Islam is 
JUHDWEXWQRRQHFDQVHHWKDWDQGWKDW¶VZKDW,ZDQWWREULQJEDFNWKDW
SHRSOHFDQVHHWKDWLW¶VWUXH,VODPGRHVFKDQJHVRFLHW\LWPDNHVSHRSOH
KDSSLHU«\HDKEULQJ - it takes away corruption because now when you look 
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at Muslim countries really when you go down and check out what - where 
WKHFRUUXSWFRXQWULHVDUH\RX¶GILQGWKDWPRVWRIWKHPDUHSUHWW\PXFK
Muslim countries.  
+HUH$U\D¶VUHYHUHQFHIRUWKHummah is based on its historical importance 
but it is also being linked to aspirations to change the negative perceptions of 
Islam in the political context in which Muslims are currently situated. The way in 
which Arya describes her mission to project a positive image of Islam, in contrast 
to the negative image portrayed by corrupt Muslim countries, reflects her 
symbolic and emotional investment in a collective Muslim identity. The 
significance of this identity is evident by the weight it carries in motivating her to 
mobilise in its defence by demonstrating practically that Islam is a great religion 
that contributes positively to society. This approach suggests a desire for 
inclusion in society without losing valued aspects of identity.   
The way in which references to ummah appear in this research do not 
indicate the kind of atavistic regression that is often ascribed to it in mainstream 
discourses (Cesari, 2007, 2009; Roy, 2004; Parekh, 2008) but rather reflect 
concerns for the present politicisation of Muslim identities. The diverse 
identifications with faith through individualised and ethical idioms rather than 
traditional interpretations of Islam, revealed by young Muslim activists in this 
study HSLWRPLVH&HVDUL¶V(2007:113) profile of new Muslims who µH[HUFLVHQHZ
levels of individual choice in the course of religious observancH¶. Religiosity is 
framed through agency and choice rather than conformity to community norms, 
invoking processes RIµUHIOH[LYLW\¶in which identities are shaped by choice rather 
than tradition (Giddens 1991:214). Indeed it is argued that the breakdown of 
traditional identities by rapid social change has created a void in which µSHRSOH
turn to religion for moral certainty, meaning, stability and principles of individual 
DQGFROOHFWLYHOLIH¶ (Parekh, 2008:1). 
Hanif: ,WKLQNWKDW¶VEHFDXVHUHOLJLRQ¶VPRUHRIDFRQVWDQWEHFDXVHWKHUH¶V
like \RX¶UHEHFRPLQJ PRUH«LW¶VOLNHJHWWLQJPRUHRIDPL[RIFXOWXUHVWKDW
people are getting confused about what culture they belong to, like some 
people they can identify more with being British, some people more like 
ZKHUHYHUWKHLU«WKHLUHWKQLFLW\, Pakistani or Arab, some people have like a 
PL[RIHWKQLFLWLHVVRWKH\GRQ¶WUHDOO\IHHOOLNHWKHHWKQLFLW\LV- WKH\GRQ¶W
EHORQJWRLW,WKLQNEHFDXVHUHOLJLRQLVPRUHRIFRQVWDQW,¶YHVHHQWKDWDORW
more people they focus on religion because it is that constant.  
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Haseena: In University like for example like when I came to University here 
WKHUH¶VQRWOLNHPXFKWRGROLNHLQWHUPVRIOLNH«VR - like social life if you 
GRQ¶WMXVWZDQQDJRFOXEELQJDOOWKHWLPH, so like I kind of found that having 
like a kind of religious activLVWFLUFOHDURXQGPHWKH\¶UHQRWQHFHVVDULO\
UHOLJLRXVSHRSOHOLNHEXWSHRSOHRIWKH,VODPLFIDLWKLW¶VUHDOO\KHOSIXODQG,
WKLQNLW¶VQRWMXVW«P\IDLWKIRUPHSHUVRQDOO\EXWLW¶VOLNHP\IDLWKDVDNLQG
of as a kind of way of networking with other people and you know just 
DJDLQLWPDNHV\RXIHHOOLNH\RX¶UHSDUWRIDFRPPXQLW\VR,WKLQNLW¶VYHU\
important in that respect.  
These discourses underline the role of religion as a unifying force where 
other forms of identification lack intensity or are H[FOXVLRQDU\,Q+DQLI¶VDFFRXQW
religion has the power to be a constant source of identification where ethnic and 
cultural ties have become diluted and disempowering for many young Muslims in 
Britain. Where ethnicity, nationality and cultures can have variable resonance in 
\RXQJSHRSOH¶VOLYHVUHOLJLRQSURYLGHVDXQLYHUVDOSHUPLWRIHQWLWOHPHQW. For 
Haseena social marginalisation from the typical youth or student category can be 
mitigated by fostering a sense of belonging and community through religious 
identification. Haseena describes her relationship with other Muslim students 
XVLQJWKHVSDWLDOFRQFHSWRIµFLUFOH¶ZKLFKLVVXJJHVWLYHRIDERXQGDU\Parking the 
group within which community spirit prevails. This boundary is not drawn with 
religious markers since she specifies that group members are not particularly 
religious but rather inclusion in µDFRPPXQLW\¶represents a more welcoming 
alternative to the clubbing scene which is alienating and exclusionary.  
The diversity of ways in which these participants relate to Islam challenges 
essentialist and reified views of Muslim religious identities as being fixed in an 
antiquated and culturally backward tradition. The dominance of faith in the 
political motivations described here suggests that it is central to constituting a 
µSURMHFWLGHQWLW\¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDW&DVWHOOV[[YLKDVGHILQHGLW: 
«when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are 
available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society 
and, in so doing, seek the transformation of overall structure.  
In this respect the role of faith can be seen as a powerful cultural and 
ideological resource to construct a collective identity capable of unifying diverse 
individual interests and subject positions as well mitigating against negative 
experiences of exclusion and marginalisation. These findings support earlier 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  137 
studies on ethnic minority mobilisations which establish µKRZFRPPLWPHQWWR
Islam provides not only a normative and ethical basis for the construction of a 
µ%ULWLVK0XVOLP¶SROLWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVEXWDOVRDJURXS-based framework and 
set of symbolic resources to be drawn on in the course of mobilisation and 
engagement itseOI¶2¶7RROHDQG*DOH2950). The cultural politics of 
marginalised groups to reclaim and revive identities WKURXJKµindividual and 
FROOHFWLYHH[SORUDWLRQRIWKHPHDQLQJRIDFXOWXUDOJURXS¶VKLVWRULHVSUDFWLFHVDQG
PHDQLQJV¶ (Young, 2000:1329) can result in fortifying and ossifying the 
boundaries between groups. For this reason feminists like Fraser (2001) have 
argued against identity politics which can result in undue pressure on group 
members to conform to this identity and inhibit the complexity and diversity. 
+RZHYHULWLVZRUWKUHLWHUDWLQJ<RXQJ¶VFRQWHQWLRQthat such efforts do not 
intrinsically carry political significance and that such differentiated identities 
become politicised when cultural expressions are thwarted or threatened in some 
way. The ways in which participants in this study construct a collective faith 
identity is not only suggestive of such cultural and social conflicts but participants 
have also stated as much in describing the pressures of Islamophobia and social 
exclusion. The next section focuses attention on the conflictual relations that 
have a structuring impact on collective identity for Muslims.  
 
Demonisation, difference and defence 
Despite a high level of respondent variability in ethnic, national and socio-
economic backgrounds and different religious and ideological intensities, a strong 
sense of collective identity emerges from the ways in which participants defend 
Islam and Muslims in a perceived climate of heightened Islamophobia in the post 
9/11 context. The following extracts represent a cross-section of views from 
participants who have very divergent religious practices and beliefs. For instance 
Dania is unsure about the existence of God but takes comfort in Islamic customs 
and rituals, while Beena has very strong convictions about God and Islam. The 
diversity in the levels of participants¶ religiosity, defined by Roy (2004) as the 
relationship with faith, is indicative of an externally shaped collective subjectivity. 
Unsurprisingly 9/11 and the war on terror are seen as redefining the status of 
Muslim citizenship in Britain.  
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Dania: I think there is a strong sense of resistance in Muslim identity to 
«WRNLQGRIWRZKDWWKH- WKHRSSUHVVLYHNLQGRISHUVSHFWLYHWKDW¶VWKURZQ
on us and I think most Muslims would - are very kind of anti-government, 
anti-establishment and they realise that this is all like, for want of a better 
ZRUGEXOOVKLWWKDWWKH\DUHMXVW,WKLQNLW¶VQRWWUXHWRVD\WKDWWKH\¶UHQRW
WKDW0XVOLPVDUHQ¶WSROLWLFDOEHFDXVH,IHHOOLNHLQKHUHQWO\LIVRPHRQH¶VOLNH
... ( ) ... especiaOO\,WKLQN\RXQJSHRSOHFRPLQJXSSRVW«HYHU\RQH- 
we all - HYHU\RQHKDVYHU\PXFK«GHYHORSHGWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGNLQG
RIEHHQDEOHWR«VRUHVLVWWKDWNLQGRIRSSUHVVLRQLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VDQGZH





kind of a resistive identity I think.   
In this account Dania is talking about a collective identity that is formed 
through resistance to the µoppressive¶ perspective that frames all Muslims as 
terrorists. She is also claiming that this experience of oppression µinherently¶ 
politicises young Muslims who have no choice but to resist. This argument is 
made by challenging the view that Muslims µaren¶t political¶, refuting an implicit 
argument in dominant discourses that Muslims reject Britain's democratic 
institutions. However, Dania is also revealing the nature of Muslim resistance 
which presents itself as a refusal to engage in the political debate on the terms 
dictated by the hegemonic majority, because even denying terrorism would be to 
µbow down¶. This is designed to justify why the political mobilisation of young 
Muslims has taken the form of a µresistive identity¶. Dania¶s views are 
exceptionally candid and bold in criticising the securitisation of Muslim citizens 
and stands in contrast to most other participants who are cautious and guardedly 
contentious in their vocabularies. However, resistive identities in Muslim activism 
can take many different forms and by the logic of Scott's (1990) distinction 
between hidden and public transcripts these may not always be overtly 
manifested. This topic is revisited in Chapter 8 where different models of activism 
are compared in explicit and implicit forms of resistance.  
In the following extract Yasir reinforces Dania's view that Muslim collective 
identity has been structured by a post 9/11 context.   
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Yasir: I think after the Rushdie affair and all the stuff that was happening in 
the 70s and 80s I think Muslims were maybe to a point ostracised as much 
as any other community cause we were living at a time before 9/11 where 
although the 90s were ± KDGWKLVLOOXVLRQRIHYHU\RQH«OLYLQJDJUHDWOLIH
DQGVRFLHW\EHLQJZRQGHUIXO«SROLWLFDOO\,WKLQN«WKHSUHMXGLFHVDJDLQVW
Muslims were equal to the prejudice against black people, gypsies, Irish 
DQGVRRQ6R,WKLQNWKDWZDVMXVWNLQGRIIROORZRQIURPMXVW«WKHDQWL-
immigration of general society from the 70s, 80s onwards but I think after 
9/11 it kind of just singled out Muslims. Muslims became the prime target 
for everyone and you know before 9/11 you had the sense of community 
where at least everyone who was a minority, everyone your kind was just 
like oh well, we all get it at some point but after 9/11 it was like Muslims, 
including Muslims, who FRXOGQ¶WUHPHPEHUDWLPHZKHQElacks and Irish 
and ..sort of Asians were treated differently were suddenly the target and 
LW¶V - it got to a point where for a time you had other communities also 
turning on Muslims, who should have known better.   
Here Yasir is giving a historical perspective on how exclusionary processes 
have produced collective categories based on shared experiences of racism and 
marginalisation. However, Yasir contends that after 9/11 Muslims have been 
µsingled out¶ as the µprime target¶ for discrimination by both whites and non-
Muslim minorities. This understanding of collective identity as structured by social 
arrangements echoes Bourdieu¶s (in Sen, 2007:27) view that µsocial magic can 
transform people by telling them that they are different¶. The presence of such 
exclusionary forces in the everyday lives of the young activists is exemplified by 
Sara and Beena who narrate personal experiences of Islamophobia.  
Sara: Like once I was in London and I was at a train station and there was 
erm erm ..what happened with Anders Brevik in Norway and one girl 
DFWXDOO\VDLGµRKRK0XVOLPV\HDK,GRQ¶WUHDOO\OLNHWKHP¶REYLRXVO\
XQDZDUHRIWKHIDFWWKDW,DP0XVOLPDQGEHFDXVH,¶PQRWTXLWHREYLRXVO\
OLNHYLVLEO\0XVOLPDQG,¶PMXVWOLNHTXLWe thrown back because the way 
SHRSOHFDQFDVXDOO\VD\WKDWDQGLW¶VOLNHQRWDELJGHDODQGWKDW,WKLQN,¶YH
become more aware of those kind of comments growing up and stuff and I 
think it ultimately comes down to the stereotypes and the kind of image of 
the kind of backwards kind of terrorism kind of Muslim that goes all the way 
EDFNWREHFDXVH,WKLQNWKDW¶VZKHQLWDOOUHDOO\VWDUWHG 
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Zahir: A society which has so many other social problems and then when 
you label a community as the demons or the differeQWRUWKHµ2WKHU¶,WKLQN
the word is then that can cause a lot of problems and it has done with hate 
crime, especially against Muslim women who either would be dressed in 
KLMDEVEHFDXVHWKHUH¶VEHHQORWVDQGORWVDQGORWVRIKHDGOLQHVDJDLQVWWKDW 
6R\RX¶UHVHHQDVWKHRWKHUDQGDVGLIIHUHQWDQGVRPHERG\FRPPHQWHGRQ
VRFLDOPHGLDµLIWKH\GRQ¶WOLNHWKHZD\WKH\OLYHin Britain then they can go 
KRPH¶DQG,GLGUHVSRQGEDFNWRRQHSHUVRQ,VDLGµLIWKH\DUHERUQKHUH
ZKHUHDUHWKH\PHDQWWRJR"¶Eecause they would classify themselves as 
you know the place of where they were born is their origin and therefore 
they are British legally.  
 As these accounts reveal many participants experience Islamophobia first 
hand and their efforts to comprehend this level of prejudice in society leads them 
directly to 9/11 which they believe planted the seeds of fear and suspicion 
towards all Muslims. The µmoral panic¶ (Parekh, 2008:11) generated by the 
presence of Muslims in Europe has been mounting over the last few decades in 
response to a series of crisis events, of which the Rushdie Affair and 9/11 are 
particularly momentous. However, it is also postulated that a paradigm shift has 
occurred in a µpost 9/11 crisis in which the integration and loyalty of Muslims are 
the greatest challenge¶ (Modood, 2007:20). While few of the participants describe 
stigmatisation and marginalisation of Muslims after 9/11 as the sole reason for 
their activism, the recurrence of the theme and its association with the 
demonisation of Muslims indicates that it plays a decisive role in mobilising these 
participants.  
The foregoing discussions have presented an overview of how participants¶ 
constructions of collective identity are linked to shared experiences of 
Islamophobia which transcend the divisive impact of internal diversity and 
intersectionality. The perception of an external threat helps to explain the highly 
politicised role of faith in solidifying the boundaries of collective identity as found 
in Tinker and Smart¶s (2012:644) research on Muslim mobilisation around faith 
schools which stated that: µthe expression or mobilization of identifications that 
emphasize intra-group unity is not evidence of essential group characteristics, 
but rather the convergence of identities and interests in particular social 
conditions.¶ This invokes Spivak¶s (1988 in Phillips, 2010:2) concept of µstrategic 
essentialism¶ when a group under threat or in pursuit of political gains has an 
interest in asserting a reified category, or as Melucci (1989:46) explains these 
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are DWWHPSWVWRµDIILUPZKDWRWKHUVGHQ\¶ The issue of essentialism re-emerges 
later in this chapter.  
The political role of faith is further evidenced by the strategic and tactical 
interpretations of Islam which correspond with the parWLFLSDQWV¶FKRVHQPRGHVRI
activism. In other words, the types of activism that participants engage in 
appears to influence how they understand and deploy particular aspects of faith 
in their political discourses. At face value these discourses suggest a form of 
identity politics that is guided by the demands of faith but a closer reading reveals 
that there is a great deal of agency and choice operating in participants' 
engagement with their faith.  
Khayam)RUPHLW¶VDERXWVHUYLFHOLNHWKH3URSKHW6DODWXl Asalam he said 
*.....* (Arabic verse) that the one who leads a community is the one who 
VHUYHVWKHPVR,WKLQNWKHUH¶VFHUWDLQUHOLJLRXVUHZDUGV,WKLQNPRUHWKDQ
anything so religion is a motivating factor in contributing to civil society 
WKDW¶VIRUVXUH«HVVHQWLDOO\OLIHRIVHUYLFHWKDW¶VDUHZDUGLQLWVHOIWRPHEH
KRQHVWZLWK\RX««>@«,PHDQLW¶VRQO\QRZWKDWZH¶YHUHDOLVHGWKDW
Muslims voluntarily give up so much of their income a year just on 
FKDULWDEOHFDXVHVULJKWVR«WKHVHDUHWKHVDPHSHRSle that are being 
castigated in the media for being extreme and violent and everything and 
WKH\¶UHJLYLQJPRQH\WRRUSKDQVDQGWKH\¶UHJLYLQJPRQH\WRSHRSOHWKDW
FDQ¶WIHHGWKHPVHOYHVDQGWKH\¶UHJLYLQJPRQH\WRSHRSOHWKDW\RXNQRZ«
to educate themselveVDQGVWXIIOLNHWKDWVR\HDKSHRSOHGRQ¶WUHDOLVHWKLV 
This participant is justifying his community activism in terms of religious 
compulsion, which not only establishes and reinforces his faith identity but also 
promotes an image of Islam as a religion that encourages charity, social 
engagement and community service. Such discourses can be seen as 
challenging the negative stereotypes of Muslims as citizens who µdo not wish to 
and cannot integrate¶ (Parekh, 2008:11) and make little contribution to the 
communities in which they live. Within Khayam's arguments there is a mutually 
constitutive relationship between religious beliefs and the aims of activism. 
Similarly other participants¶ interpretations of their faith play a role in reinforcing 
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first sign of a believer, I believe is questioning or doubting and then you 
realise that if any.. any ideology which says to you first off, go and read 
PXVWEHSUHWW\FRQILGHQWZLWKLQLWVHOIWKDW\RXNQRZZKDWLW¶VWUXH&RPHRQ




know, Sufi side of you, the Salafi side of you, the Tableeghi side of you, the 
political side of you, the active side of you because that was the Prophet 
Mohammad Salalahu Wasalam yeah and - DQGVRWKDW¶VZK\,¶PNLQGRI
UHDOO\LQWHUHVWHGLQSURMHFWLQJWKDWPHVVDJHIRUZDUGDQGLW¶V- DQG,WKLQNLW¶V
VHOODEOHLW¶VHDV\WRVHOOWRSHRSOHWKDWNLQGRIFRQFHSWWKDW,VODPLVQ¶WMXVW
about sitting under the tree and reading the Quran. IW¶VQRWDERXWVKRXWLQJ
RQWKHSXOSLWLW¶VQRWDERXWMXVW\RXNQRZKDYLQJDdawa (proselytizing) 
stall, LW¶VDERXWSLFNLQJXSWKHOLWWHULW¶VDERXWWHDFKLQJ\RXUNLGV, LW¶VDERXW
you know running for public office, LW¶VDERXWDOOWKHVHNLQGVRIWKLQJV 
For these participants faith provides a sound reasoning and justification for 
their respective forms of activism. Saif, who is politically active through academia 
and public speaking, emphasises learning and reading as one of the most basic 
tenets of Islam. Salman is describing the activities of the national organisation 
through which he is supporting an education programme for young Muslims. 
Here Salman is conveying the importance of uniting different sectional interests 
within Muslim groups (Sufi, Salafi, Tableeghi) to project a unified Muslim image 
based on the identity of the Prophet himself. By naming the Prophet as the 
source of his authority Salman can make a claim about how Islam should be 
practiced in the world, not by µsitting under the tree and reading the Quran¶ but by 
being actively engaged in society as useful citizens. This represents a view of 
Islam as a religion that inspires civic engagement and not only does this 
politically challenge those Muslims who contribute to the negative image of 
Muslims but also resists allegations of self-segregation as a tendency within 
Islam itself. Most importantly these interpretations of Islam promote Muslim 
integration in British society by projecting forms of religiosity that are socially 
acceptable.  
The above discourses can be seen to bring both faith and civic or political 
activism into a mutually reinforcing encounter that also coincides with defending 
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those aspects of Muslim identity that are currently the basis of stigmatisation. Put 
more bluntly these arguments defy the view that µthere is something inherent and 
essentialised about µIslam¶ and µMuslims¶ that leads to a particular form of politics¶ 
(Adamson, 2011:903). The accounts presented above suggest that the politics of 
these participants are directed towards contesting forms of Islamophobia through 
defensive strategies which are informed by strategic readings and deployment of 
faith as a valuable ideological and political resource. As Roy (2004:10) has 
argued the most important question regarding Muslims in the West is not µwhat 
the Koran says but what Muslims say the Koran says¶.  
Such strategic interpretations of faith are also evident in participants¶ 
challenges to religious authorities in their own community to defend agency and 
choice by younger or female group members. For example, Beena has 
experienced community and parental pressures to get married at an early age at 
the cost of her education, which can be linked to the way that Islam is invoked in 
her activism on gender rights. 
Beena: Oh the role of faith, faith has a lot to do with it I think, especially 
0XVOLPZRPHQHPSRZHUPHQW«DV,ZDVVD\LQJEHIRUHOLNHWKH3URSKHW
VDODODKRZDVODP¶V ZLIH.KDGLMDVKH«\RXNQRZZDVDEXVLQHVVZRPDQ
she had an education she proposed to her husband, she was very really, 
UHDOO\IRUZDUGIRUKHUWLPHDQG\RXNQRZ«LI\RXWKLQNDERXWLW\RXNQRZ
(College)WKHFROOHJHWKDW,¶PDWWKH\KDYHWR - WKH\ZHUHQ¶WDOORZLQJ
women in to their college till 1979, they started to accept women and at 
(College) it used to be all, all men.  
Here Beena¶s arguments are serving a dual purpose. Firstly citing the 
example of the Prophet's wife as an emancipated working woman allows her to 
defend her decision to delay marriage and go to University and secondly it 
projects an image of Islam that contradicts the widely held view of Islam as the 
religion that suppresses women. This is done by highlighting that Muslim women 
were active in education and business in the time of the Prophet while revered 
Western institutions excluded women as recently as 1979. A similar strategic role 
is played by faith in the case of Irum, who is a former member of a government 
advisory group on Muslims:  
Irum: Faith is the reason I got involved because I felt it was part of my duty 
to do so and faith is the reason I got involved because I feel like I need to 
SURWHFWLWIURPWKHGDPDJHDQGWKHSXQFKHVDQGWKHNLFNVWKDWLW¶VJHWWLQJ





know Rabia al Basri was one of the most famous mystics and writers and 
you know the first two universities that were opened were by Muslim 
women so all these things.  
Both these participants are describing faith as a means to resisting 
endogenous and exogenous pressures to conform to subjugated identities. 
Beena is active in work in the community to bring about awareness and changes 
to marital and educational restrictions on young women while Irum¶s activism is 
also aimed at empowering Muslim women and youth against domination from 
male community leaders. As such the collective identity to which both 
participants appeal is an intersectional one crossing gender and faith. What 
unites these different discourses is the strategic interpretation and projection of 
Islamic values and traditions to resist the denigration of valued aspects of faith 
based identities.  
So far this section has explored how collective identity is shaped as a 
political project to defend stigmatised identities. These strategies speak to 
Solomos¶(2001:201) assertion that when cultural racism manifests itself in 
demands for minority assimilation into the nation, subordinate groups use 
GLIIHUHQFHWRµDXWKRUL]HWKHLURZQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV¶DQGµVHL]HWKHFDWHJRU\¶and 
invert it by attaching positive instead of negative value to it. An appreciation of 
the reOHYDQFHRIµGLIIHUHQFH¶in the above political discourses is really important. 
This is because the concept of difference, rather than any other identity marker 
like religion, ethnicity or gender, much more appositely represents the empirically 
informed analysis of Muslim collective identity presented above. The term 
difference is used in the sense specified by Modood (2007:37) to describe the 
significance of multiculturalism as a political ideal in Muslim identity politics:  
A better normative starting point is the politics of recognition of difference 
or respect for identities that are important to people, as identified in minority 
assertiveness.  
Understanding the nature of the political struggles described above in 
these terms, as the politics of pursuing positive difference, also helps to resolve 
the tensions inherent in group identities which are always marked by the paradox 
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of both challenging essentialist ideas about the group and reinforcing them by 
asserting and amplifying their differences. This points to the danger of identity 
politics creating a µstrange convergence in the language of the racist right and the 
black or ethnic nationalists, as both infuse categories such as race or ethnicity 
with essentialist, and supposedly naturally inherited, characteristics¶ (Solomos, 
2001:201). Modood (2007:132) describes this as a dilemma:  
when one identifies some people as a group one inevitably pulls out one 
feature of a complex set of features and gives it a primacy. In arguing that 
Muslims deserve some recognition and representation one is almost 
inevitably prioritizing religious over other features (such as occupation or 
locality, for example) and promoting religious Muslims as the 
representatives of Muslims as a whole. 
This problem can be resolved through Modood¶s (2007:39) insistence that 
the concept of µdifference¶ rather than culture or religion should be prioritised in 
understanding the demands of marginalised groups engaged in identity politics 
as this is µto recognize that the difference in question is not just constituted from 
the µinside¶, from the side of the minority culture, but also from the outside, from 
the representations and treatment of the minorities in question.¶  
Understanding identity politics as µthe SROLWLFVRIGLIIHUHQFH¶(Young, 1990) 
enables a better understanding of the way in which collective identity is a 
response to situated and historical conditions of inequality and disadvantage. 
The willingness of ethnic minorities, including Muslims, to identify strongly with 
the identity labHORIµEODFN¶LQWKHVDQGVVLJQDOVWKHVDOLHQFHRIFRORXU-
racism as the main form of discrimination at the time which produced a collective 
identity that included all non-whites (Ramamurthy, 2006; 2013). The growing 
significance of faith as a marker of identity in Muslim identity politics from the 
1990s onwards is an indication of the rise of cultural forms of racism that have 
become encoded in Islamophobia (Lentin and Titley, 2011; Kundnani, 2014; 
Modood, 2007; 2010; The Runnymede Trust, 1997).  
The use of the term difference as the primary concern of identity politics 
also avoids the reification of groups by allowing space for internal diversity to 
flourish within collective identities. Accordingly, where the shifting sense of 
identity and belonging conveyed by some participants in different contexts is 
discussed above, this can be better understood as politics mounted in defence of 
difference that does not obscure the activists¶ multiple identities. This echoes Isin 
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and Wood (1999:15; original emphasis) who argue that such efforts represent 
cultural politics that µacknowledge a simultaneous and ambivalent desire both to 
affirm identities and to transcend them.¶  
The role played by faith in such politics by young adult Muslims in this 
study can be understood as having a primary but not determining place in the 
identities that are the subject of their contestations. Such an understanding 
connects with the framework of multicultural citizenship described by Modood 
(2007:43) which draws attention to 'the political uses of non-European origin 
ethnic and related identities, especially in turning their negative and stigmatic 
status into a positive feature of the societies that they are now part of.' It should 
be noted that this chapter has been focusing on faith identities in the context of 
activism and this should not be confused with the entirely separate matter of the 
participants¶ relationship to their faith in a spiritual sense, which is not the subject 
of investigation in this study.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how collective identity is consciously and 
actively constructed through the agency and choice of participants from within 
the identity-group as well as its conditioning by external factors of Islamophobia 
and the war on terror. The complexity and ambiguity of collective identity 
processes signifies the multiple and relational nature of social identities where 
Muslim identities can shift with different frames of reference for belonging and 
shared experience. The internal fissures which contradict and complicate the 
production of a unified and stable collective identity demonstrate how unity and 
coherence is laboured for by the participants. The role of faith in Muslim identities 
discussed in this chapter defies charges of dogmatic conformity to tradition by 
foregrounding the personal and reflexive as well as strategic and political ways of 
in which Islam underscores a primary identity. It is also revealed how collective 
identity underwrites a political project to turn negative difference into positive 
difference as described in theories of multicultural citizenship (Modood, 2007) in 
response to threatening levels of stigma and marginalisation in the post 9/11 
context. These findings attempt to avoid a fatal fault line in literature on identity 
politics µunderpinned by the presumption that one¶s identity necessarily defines 
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one¶s politics¶ by highlighting how µidentity grows out of and is transformed by 
action and struggle¶ (Solomos, 2001:202).  
In demonstrating the complexity and agency involved in producing a 
collective identity this chapter has built on the arguments presented in the 
previous chapter to establish the presence of social movement that is concerned 
with contesting Islamophobia in the post 9/11 context. Viewed through a lens 
framed by social movement theory, the activism of young adult Muslims 
represents a political struggle that seeks inclusion and belonging to British 
society rather than a withdrawal from it. This dialectic between difference and 
unity is better explained by Melucci (1995:48) who states that:  
The autonomous ability to produce and to recognize the collective reality as 
a "we" is a paradoxical situation: in affirming its difference from the rest of 
the society, a movement also states its belonging to the shared culture of a 
society and its need to be recognized as a social actor. The paradox of 
identity is always that difference, to be affirmed and lived as such, 
presupposes a certain equality and a certain reciprocity.  
As this research focuses on individuals and their motivations rather than 
organisational structures it may be difficult to see how the various forms of 
activism constitute a µsocial movement¶. This is not helped by the fact that many 
grassroots movements µtypically go unnoticed beyond the local context because 
they operate beneath the radar of national and international media¶ which makes 
them less visible than µlarge scale protests events¶ (Snow et al, 2007:198). 
Despite these challenges this thesis argues that young adult Muslims 
represented in this study are part of a wider social movement that is populated by 
diverse, but networked, individuals, small groups, societies as well as national 
organisations, lobbies and campaigns that converge around common goals to 
defend Muslim identities against the threat of Islamophobia that has reached 
crisis point in the post-9/11 context.  
  





The two preceding chapters have established that the activism of young 
adult Muslims in this study is part of a British Muslim social movement seeking to 
counter heightened Islamophobia in the wake of the war on terror. Thus far the 
thesis has largely focused on elaborating the distinctive features and drivers of 
Muslim civic and political activism. If the state has largely been absent from this 
SLFWXUHWKLVLVEHFDXVHE\QDWXUHWKHVHPRGHVRISROLWLFVDUHGHVLJQDWHGDVµnon-
VWDWHFHQWUHGDFWLYLWLHV¶ (Norris, 2002:193; original emphasis). Participants 
confirm this tendency by largely ignoring the state in their reflections on the social 
ZRUOG,QRUGHUWRH[SORUHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SROLWLFVDQG
the state, during interviews they were asked to reflect on what they thought about 
politics and politicians and how these served the interests of citizens in general. 
The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on responses to that question to 
explore how participants understand their relationship with the state and to make 
sense of their chosen modes of activism through subpolitical activities.  
This chapter also demonstrates the strategic importance of cultural politics 
in response to participants¶ belief that the main arena of political struggle at the 
current time is the battle of ideas in the hearts and minds of other citizens. This is 
not unexpected given the elevated levels of hostility and alienation expressed 
towards mainstream political institutions which are deemed to be inadequate 
channels for desired social change. The emphasis on cultural contestation is also 
linked to the high costs associated with participating in more contentious forms of 
politics, like protests and demonstrations, which is indicative of the operations of 
a security state.  
The chapter is divided into five sections the first of which sets the scene by 
delineating different attitudes towards conventional politics and politicians 
through non-discrete and overlapping but distinguishable approaches. In the next 
two sections participants¶ rejection of mainstream politics is explored through 
their normative views on the concept of political representation. The next section 
discusses the perceived limitations of engaging in protest politics in the wake of 
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Islamophobia and securitisation, followed by arguments about widespread public 
apathy and passivity which are seen as being central to the failure of politics in 
contemporary society.  
 
Politics and activist attitudes 
Participants¶ attitudes to mainstream politics and politicians can be 
demarcated into four discernible approaches: 'hopeful'; 'disillusioned'; 
'disengaged' and 'dismissive'. Derived from the arguments participants put 
forward these approaches are not mutually exclusive but overlapping, therefore 
they do not represent rigid positions but suggest some flexibility in participants¶ 
YLHZVRQPDLQVWUHDPSROLWLFV7KHDSSURDFKGHILQHGDVµKRSHIXO¶LQFOXGHVD
handful of participants who are largely satisfied with the political system but see 
scope for improvement.  
Imran: I mean loads of people say that the politicians are now more out of 
WRXFKWKDQWKH\¶YHHYHUEHHQEHIRUH,GLVDJUHHZLWKWKDW«\HDKEHFDXVHLI
\RXORRNDW«LI\RXORRNDWWKHSROLWLFVVRPHGHFDGHVDJRZKDW\RXUHDOO\
had was very un-transparent governmHQW«DQGIRUDOO1HZ/DERXU¶VNLQG
of shortcomings they did bring about the Human Rights Act, Freedom of 
,QIRUPDWLRQ«DQGVXFFHVVLYHO\,WKLQNJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHEHFRPHPRUH
transparent.  
,QFRQWUDVWWRWKLVSRVLWLRQLVWKHµGLVLOOXVLRQHG¶VWDQFHmarked by intense 
negative feelings towards politics and a refusal to engage with what is 
considered to be a corrupt and self-interested system.   
Rabia,GRQ¶WUHDOO\OLNHSROLWLFVDVVXFKOLNH«,FRXOGQ¶WFDUHOHVVDERXW
politics, the only time that politics mattHUVLVZKHQLWDIIHFWV«SHRSOHRUOLNH
\RXNQRZLW¶VEHFDXVHRIWKHSROLWLFVWKDWWKHUH¶VVRPHKDUPEHLQJGRQH
VRPHZKHUHEDVLFDOO\WKDW¶VWKHRQO\WLPHEXWRWKHUZLVH,FRXOGQ¶WFDUHOHVV
about the Labour or Conservatives or anything like that. 
A very small number of participants express DµGLVHQJDJHG¶SRVLWLRQ
denoting appreciation of the importance of politics but a lack of knowledge to 
engage with it.  
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Arya: Of course we need that, we need people that are higher up and 
people that can- that understand politics whereas me I¶m completely 
clueless, so I know my strengths and I know my weaknesses and I know 
that we¶re a team as Muslims so what I can¶t do someone else can do. 
And finally the position representing the largest number of participants is 
summarised DVµGLVPLVVLYH¶, where engagement with conventional politics is seen 
as futile and ineffective compared to subpolitical forms of activism.  
Yousaf: My particular position is« it¶s sort of like what people say, you 
know Tony Benn when he left parliament he said so he can«do - spend 
more time in politics that was his reason for taking - which was obviously 
extremely witty he wasn¶t just sort of flippant it was actually very, very true 
and you see exactly what he means because - and I think that¶s part of my 
philosophy for not joining parties, it¶s not because I think they have no role 
to play it¶s because I think it allows me - I can do a lot more from without 
than from within.  
0DQ\SDUWLFLSDQWVH[SUHVVRSLQLRQVWKDWPLUURU<RXVDI¶VORJLFZKLFKLV
central to understanding the salience of cultural politics in this study. This 
argument can be summarised as the belief that the kind of social change sought 
by participants is more likely to come through channels outside parliamentary 
politics.  It is therefore worth focusing greater attention on critical views which are 
QRWRQO\GRPLQDQWLQWKHVWXG\EXWDOVRKHOSWRH[SOLFDWHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SUHIHUHQFH
for politics that are µnon-state oriented¶.  
 
Political failure and representation  
A primary concern for participants is the issue of political representation by 
elected members of government, a concept that is vital to the legitimacy of 
politics but is also a contentious and elusive one (Dovi, 2002; Leftwich, 2008; 
Pitkin, 1967; Plotke,1997; Phillips, 1995,1998, 2000; Young, 2000). Participants 
express high levels of distrust and disillusionment with politicians, explaining their 
failure as political representatives in terms of their existential estrangement from 
voters owing to their privileged position in society. This existential gap is defined 
by differences between voters and politicians on the grounds of class, gender, 
ethnicity and religious belief, as well as life experiences and residential locality.  
Active citizenship, dissent and power  151 
Haseena: The main issue is that you know parliament is very elitist, very 
white, very male, very middle class so yeah naturally I just feel alienated 
from it.  
Sameera: Under no illusion do I think we¶re in a democracy because if we 
were, where are the working class voices, where are the female voices, 
where are ethnic voices, we look at our cabinet and it¶s, well, it¶s all white 
for a start, they even got rid of the token ethnic person which was Baroness 
Warsi.  
Such trenchant criticism suggests a deep schism between the lifeworld of 
the participants and politicians, based on differences which converge on identity. 
These extracts explain alienation from mainstream politics with reference to the 
µwhite¶, µmale¶ and µclass¶ identities of the people in power which makes them ill-
placed to reflect other µvoices¶. The way participants here link identity to 
experience and perspective resonates the arguments of multicultural theorists 
like Anne Phillips (1995, 1998, 2000, 2007) and Modood (2003; 2007) who 
support group representation on grounds that a collective response is needed to 
address the multiple and enduring inequalities and disadvantages faced by 
minorities. This argument is implied in participants¶ reference to differences in 
identity as being essentially linked to differences in political ideals, capacities and 
agency. The failure of mainstream politicians to meet the needs of marginalised 
citizens is also attributed to the fact that political representatives do not share the 
participants¶ perspectives and interests because of the chasm that lies between 
their different social positions.  
Abid: Ideally we need to start looking at people that actually represent us, 
JHWWLQJWKHPLQWRSRZHUUDWKHUWKDQSHRSOHZKRGRQ¶WFDXVHVRPHRQH
ZKR¶VJRQHWRDSRVKPLGGOHFODVVVFKRROZRQ¶WKDYHDQ\LGHDZKDWLW¶VOLNH
growing up in inner city (CityDQGWKH\ZRQ¶WKDYHKDGWKHVDPH
experiences and same you know hardships as someone from a privileged 
background.  
Laila$OWKRXJKSROLWLFLDQVKDYHWREH\RXNQRZWKH\FDQ¶WEHQDUURZ
minded and they have to think about different kinds of people in society, I 
GRQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\WKLQNWKDWWKH\GR ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKH\QHFHVVDULO\- they 
FDQYLHZWKHZRUOGIURPDGLIIHUHQWSHUVRQ¶VH\HVIURPDUHIXJHH¶s eyes or 
you know someone from an ethnic minority or someone from a working 
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class background and so their policies can sometimes be hindered by that 
E\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH\FDQ¶WVHHWKHZRUOGLQGLIIHUHQWH\HV 
These participants are expressing the normative belief that lived 
experience is a requisite for politicians to comprehend and address marginalised 
SHRSOHV¶ needs. Here the emphasis on differences between representative and 
those who are represented is located in lived experience because it is the basis 
on which political µconcerns¶, µneeds¶, µhardships¶ and viewpoints are constituted. 
For these participants, there is a fundamental dissonance between their political 
ideals and imaginaries and the politicians who do not live in their local areas or 
experience their hardships. Participants¶ pessimistic view on the ability of 
politicians to reflect their needs, interests and perspectives on the basis of their 
different identities expresses similar reasoning to Phillips¶ (1995; 1998; 2000) 
FDVHIRUµWKHSROLWLFVRISUHVHQFH¶DOVRFDOOHGµGHVFULSWLYH¶RUµPLUURU¶
representation, which argues that the underrepresentation of minority groups can 
only be addressed if members of the group represent themselves. Participants 
passionately seek descriptive representation by arguing that the identity of the 
representative has both symbolic as well as practical value for the political 
inclusion of minorities.  
Amna$QRWKHUWKLQJWKDW,KDYHOLNHLW¶VQRWDEXJEHDULW¶VPRUHRIDNLQG
RIREVHUYDWLRQLVWKDWZHGRKDYH«0XVOLPZRPHQUHSUHVHQWLQJXVLQWKH
media such as like Myriam Francois-Cerrah, we have Lauren Booth, we 
KDYH«ZKDW¶VLWFDOOHG<YRQQH5LGOH\WKHUH¶VRQHWKLQJLQFRPPRQZLWK
DOOWKRVHWKUHHSHRSOHWKH\¶UHDOOZKLWH«DQGZKDWGRHVWKDWNLQGRIVD\WR










but when we have groups like Muslims ... migrant Muslims or in general 
Muslims or blacks- by black I mean political black in the sense that people 
who are non-white.. who are historically at least in the last 500 hundred 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  153 
years who have been marginalised by brutal force then you cannot talk 
about like sitting on the same sort of playing ground, being on the same 
SOD\LQJJURXQGVLW¶VMXVWQRWWKHUH,mean peop- like if you go to a leftist 
PHHWLQJULJKWWKHSHRSOHZKRVSHDNDUHZKLWHSHRSOHZHGRQ¶WKDYHD
ODQJXDJHZHGRQ¶WKDYHWKHZRUGVZHGRQ¶WKDYHZHGRQ¶WKDYHDYRLFH 
In these accounts participants are strongly advocating the need for ethnic 
minorities to develop the resources and capacity to politically represent 
themselves. Both participants are highlighting the reinforcement and reproduction 
of political exclusion by non-Muslims who dominate Muslim struggles. Being 
µVSRNHQIRU¶LVVHHQDVSHUSHWXDWLQJUDWKHUWKDQDGGUHVsing the absence of 
minorities from positions of power, giving weight to both Phillips (1998; 2000; 
2007) and Young¶s (1990; 2000) contention that equality of representation and 
justice requires appreciation of and curtailment of the hegemony of dominant 
gURXSV5HIOHFWLQJWKLVORJLFSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DUJXPHQWVLQIDYRXURIGHVFULSWLYH
representation also point to differential experiences of inequality and 
disadvantage between Muslims and other minorities.  
Basma: You engage with the left more within educational spaces, those 
that are part of it are middle class, quite comfortable you know white young 
people that are completely disconnected like they're just ... the same as the 
rest of the people in their universities or college, they're just in different kind 
of clothing. So for them we're still completely not on the same page, you 
come from very different ... you know ideas and so it's difficult as well 
EHFDXVHVRPHWLPHVLW¶VOLNHWKH\WDONDERXWDVSHFWVRISULYLOHJHVRFODVV
class, class but actually I'm like, are you aware of your own privilege?  
This quote indicates that the exclusion of Muslims is not only attributed to 
the state but is also seen as being reproduced by other members of the majority 
population who fail to grasp the exceptional level of Muslim disadvantage. 
%DVPD¶VTXRWHFDQEHUHDGDVDFODLPIRUUHFRJQLWLRQRI,VODPRSKRELDDVDIRUP
of discrimination against Muslims that cannot be subsumed by the categories of 
race disadvantage or class inequalities. It also resounds grievances raised by 
other oppressed groups that lHIWRUJDQLVDWLRQVRIWHQVHHNWRµWDNHRYHU
SURJUHVVLYHJURXSVDQGWRUHGHILQHWKHJURXSV¶DJHQGDVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLU
pDUWLFXODUSURJUDPV¶6PLWK:38). This is why among Muslim activists there 
is a strong impetus to resist attempts to µhijack¶ minority causes by those who 
speak on their behalf.  
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Haseena:  I don¶t really like the term internationalism because I feel like« I 
feel like it allows a lot of people to kind of claim other people¶s struggles or 
get too involved and kind of take away from .. their self-determination like 
for example a lot of white middle class« internationalists you know 
passionate about the cause of Palestine and when Palestinians are free 
they¶ll say it was us, it was the BDS it was you know- they won¶t ever talk 
about you know the, you know, the woman who¶s you know who¶s had to 
look after her sons who¶ve been in and out of prison you know for throwing 
stones at - they won¶t think about people who¶ve been martyred you know 
for their freedom, freedom of their children and their children but will think 
µoh it was our pickets¶.  
7KHVHDUJXPHQWVHFKRWHQVLRQVDURXQGµZKRFDQEHVWVSHDNIRURURQ
EHKDOIRIDQRWKHU¶UDLVHGE\IHPLQLVWDQGFLYLOULJKWVVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVLQWKHSDVW
that fought for recognition of modes of social oppression that class politics fails to 
address (Phillips, 1995:9). Although Young (2000:1556) supports positive action 
WRHQKDQFHPLQRULW\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVKHUHMHFWVµWKHORJLFRILGHQWLW\¶LQGHVFULSWLYH
representation and allows for cases where people with the same life experiences 
PD\UHSUHVHQWWKHDVVRFLDWHGµSHUVSHFWLYHV¶+RZHYHUDVWhe participants in this 
study reveal this would not suffice, since political resolution of issues is not the 
sole purpose of representation, there is also at stake the symbolic issue of whose 
voice is heard and who is credited with political victory. Descriptive 
representation is sought not simply to bring certain perspectives and interests 
into play in political negotiation, but to develop the capabilities and resources to 
act as brokers with commensurate power in these debates. This also relates to 
arguments supporting descriptive representation which appeal to the importance 
of role models in breaking symbolic barriers to inclusion. Participants believe the 
visible presence of Muslims in political institutions would diminish feelings of 
disenfranchisement and encourage participation.  
Romana,W¶VPRUHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGWKLQJVOLNHPRUHVRUWRIPDNHLWPRUH
DFFHVVLEOHWRSHRSOHOLNHP\VHOI«EXW,PHDQ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDW¶VJRQQD
KDSSHQLQSROLWLFV,PHDQUHFHQWO\OLNH,GRQ¶WNQRZLI\RXKDYHD- do you 
know the Tower Hamlets MP BushaQDUD$OLVKH¶VOLNHD\RXQJ%HQJDOL
ZRPDQOLNHWKH7RZHU+DPOHWV03««DQGVKHJRWHOHFWHGOLNHODVW
WLPHVKH¶V\RXQJDQGVKH¶V%HQJDOLDQGOLNHSHRSOHOLNHWKDWUROHPRGHOV
like that, like more people like that involved in politics is really going to help 
like inspire people like me to get involved.  
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In this extract Romana is suggesting that mainstream politics would be 
more appealing to ethnic minorities if they could see those who share their 
identities in politically influential positions. The aspects of identity that are marked 
out as important are Bushanara Ali¶s ethnicity and gender, as well as her age 
which allows Romana to imagine someone like herself having a place in 
parliament. The presence of role models has an important symbolic function in 
empowering minorities to participate in politics by addressing their imagined and 
anticipated barriers which are as forceful as real obstacles. This reveals the 
psychological constraints that hamper ethnic minority participation in politics.  
Amna: There¶s so many people in my area that have got University 
degrees, that are not political, that are not - they don¶t - I think it¶s again 
about a sense of entitlement or a sense of feeling as if they belong in those 
circles or belong at that position and I don¶t think that they do.. I think 
people think µlook you know let¶s just leave them to it. I can¶t do anything 
there¶ µcause there¶s nobody there to empower µem into that position. 
While higher education levels are typically linked to greater political 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ+D\1RUULV$PQD¶VTXRWHsuggests that for Muslims 
the psychological barriers are so deep-seated that even enhanced social capital 
does not mitigate against them. This explains the importance of role models who 
can populate the imaginaries of Muslims with positive images of political 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQE\HPERG\LQJWKHµVHHLWWREHOLHYHLW¶SRVVLELOLW\+RZHYHUGXHWR
the symbolic importance of descriptive representation it is that much more crucial 
that the role models own and promote the identities that are currently devalued 
by the political system.  
Sara: ,VHHDORWRISROLWLFLDQVZKHWKHUWKH\¶UH$VLDQ0XVOLPDQG,IHHOOLNH
WKH\¶YHVROGWKHLUVRXOOLNHWKH\¶YHEHHQOLNHSROLVKHGDQGEUXVKHGDQG





say that yeah I do look up to her.  
In this extract Sara draws a revealing contrast between ethnic minority 
politicians whom she disparages for having µsold their soul¶ and a politician that 
she admires for being µinspirational¶. The distinction is being made on the basis of 
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the visible and figurative dimension of their politics as well as their µviews¶. The 
inspirational politician is the one who is noticeably Muslim while the ones who are 
viewed as objectionable are µpolished and brushed¶ which renders their Muslim 
identity less visible. Despite being one of the most influential and staunch 




discourses reveal that the role model argument also has great traction amongst 
these participants, for whom seeing Muslims in positions of power is imperative 
for breaking down barriers to participation.  
Sara¶s quote also raises the important and related concern of co-optation of 
ethnic minority politicians, whose interests and identities are perceived as being 
subsumed by dominant political structures as explored further in the next section.  
 
Co-optation and systemic failure 
Much of the above critique of mainstream politics coalesces around the 
identity of politicians, implying that descriptive representation would better serve 
the needs of marginalised citizens. However, this is only part of the picture as 
few participants place all the blame on the shoulders of politicians, as the political 
system itself is seen as flawed.  
Sara: $VORQJDVZHKDYHDSROLWLFDOV\VWHPWKDWGRHVQ¶WNLQGRIUHSUHVHQW- 
LVQRWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRUGRHVQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGPDLQVWUHDPVRFLHW\ZH¶UH
gonna always have kind of disenfranchised and disillusioned and 
disengaged - ,WKLQN\HDKZH¶UHDOZD\VJRLQJWRKDYHWKRVHSHRSOH 
Sara is arguing that the failure of politicians to meet the needs of citizens is 
part of a wider systematic fault which makes political institutions inherently 
exclusionary and elitist. Here Sara places Muslims within the µmainstream¶ that is 
being failed by politics although elsewhere she viewed Muslims as facing 
exceptional levels of disenfranchisement. Arguments about systematic failure are 
premised on the view that politicians are powerless to exercise agency against a 
monolithic political structure that imposes its own agenda.  
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Yasir: After 9/11 a lot of people got involved into politics, a lot of Muslims 
got involved into politics hoping to make that change and they did it through 
the Peace and Progress Party, they did it by joining the Lib Dems, they did 
it through the Respect Party they set up new parties, individuals in the 
Labour Party took a heavy VWDQFH\RXNQRZ\RX¶YHJRW0XVOLP)ULHQGVRI
Labour and all the rest of it but the simple fact is, as time went on they got 
swallowed up, not all of them but a lot of them got swallowed up, the 
smaller parties dismantled, had issues, the politicians who had become 
politicians on the back of things that were happening around 9/11, Muslim 
politicians, they got swallowed up in the whole party political thing, the 
stances changed, views changed and as far as public is concerned and as 
far as young people are concerned they look at that and they think well you 
NQRZZKDW,GRQ¶WUHDOO\KDYHPXFKIDLWKLQWKHSROLWLFLDQVEHFDXVHDOO
those that went on wanting to fight the Muslim corner seem to have given 
XSRUWKH\¶YHJRWRWKHULQWHUHVWV 
Yasir is reflecting a common perception among participants of political 
parties as being authoritarian, demanding submission to centralised rules and 
policies. This represents a critical stance towards the established norms of 
representative democracy that demands impartiality from political representatives 
and expects them to relinquish sectional interests for the common good. Within 
OLEHUDOGHPRFUDFLHVWKLVKDVEHHQDµORQJ-standing feature of political (i.e. 
JRYHUQPHQWDOUHDVRQ¶+LQGHVVLQWHQGHGWRVDIHJXDUGSROLWics from 
partisanship and sectarian bias (Phillips, 2000; Dobbernack et al, 2012). This 
view is taken for granted in the following quote. 
Parveen: And it is hard for Muslim MPs to actually you know say 
something about Muslims cause they don't wanna have that - that link 
between Muslims and, and themselves and they're trying to further their 
political career.  
3DUYHHQ¶VDVVXPSWLRQVDUHVXSSRUWHGE\UHVHDUFKUHYHDOLQJWKDW0XVOLP
MPs do take pains to distance themselves from Muslim communities to establish 
thHLUSROLWLFDOFUHGHQWLDOV$QVDUL2¶7RROHHWDO6XFKDUJXPHQWV
draw attention to the µdouble imperative in party politics¶ (Phillips, 2000:33) which 
places representatives of minority groups in a paradox where their selection is 
often predicated on their ability to represent marginalised citizens but once in 
parliament they are expected to suspend their particular interests to vote 
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according to the party line. Such a view is clearly articulated by Yasir who states 
that many politicians who got into power µon the back of things that were 
happening around 9/11¶ failed to fulfil their mandate to address the issues 
affecting Muslims as a result of the war on terror. This undermines the principles 
on which descriptive representation is sought as it fosters a dangerous 
complacency, where minority presence in parliament is seen as fulfilling the need 
for representation (Phillips, 2000; Dovi, 2002). For this reason critics argue that 
µpresence¶ by itself is not sufficient to address the issue of inequalities in minority 
representation (Dovi, 2002; Phillips, 2000). Phillips (2000) argues that political 
party processes must make allowances for minority members to vote in their 
FRQVWLWXHQWV¶LQWHUHVWVWRGHOLYHUUHDOMXVWLFH6XFKFRQFHUQVDUHERUQHRXWby 
participants¶ reservations.  
Sara: I know the ones who are openly Muslim, you have (MP) for example 
who voted for - against an inquiry into the Iraq War and then he I think - I 
probably stand to be corrected - EXW,¶PVXUHKHDSSURYHGIRU&&79
cameras to be implemented in (AreaDQGWKRVHNLQGRIWKLQJV,¶PMXVWOLNH
ZKHUHDUH\RXULQWHUHVWVUHDOO\\RX¶UHVXSSRVHGWRUHSUHVHQWDFHUWDLQ
group of people but your actions state otherwise. 
Tamara: The SU full time officers for example I think like you said WKDW¶V
gonna make a huge difference having maybe more BME people there 




minorities to get more involved which would be amazing or to feel 
UHSUHVHQWHGEXWGRHVKHDFWXDOO\UHSUHVHQW«WKHP,GRQ¶WWKLQNVR 
These quotes demonstrate the limitations of descriptive representation to 
µrevitalize democratic institutions¶ (Dovi, 2002:735) as presence in political 
LQVWLWXWLRQVFDQEHµWRNHQLVWLF¶DQGDJDLQVWRULQGLIIHUHQWWRPLQRULW\µLQWHUHVWV¶)RU
Sara the Muslim MP fails as a Muslim representative because his actions 
undermine Muslim citizenship. Similarly, Tamara draws attention to the fact that 
an ethnic minority, in an influential position, who does not act differently from a 
µZKLWH¶candidate, fails to represent minorities in any practical way, although this 
has motivational value.  
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To prevent descriptive representation from becoming an empty signifier 
Dovi (2002) suggests that descriptive representation must be based on some 
criterion for evaluating who is a preferable candidate for the job and that this 
VKRXOGEHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHFDQGLGDWH¶Vµstrong mutual relationships with 
dispossessed subgroups¶ within the minority group (Dovi, 2002:735, original 
emphasis). By this Dovi (2002:735) means that the µrepresentatives and 
members of historically disadvantaged groups must mutually recognize each 
other¶. Clearly the participants in this study fail to demonstrate such mutual 
recognition as they highlight the failure of Muslim MPs to reflect their 
perspectives and interests. Dovi¶s qualification for descriptive representation is 
particularly sensitive to the issue of µsecondary marginalization¶ as identified by 
Cohen (1999 in Dovi, 2002:738) whereby some members of the group 
subordinate others by regulating and policing the group boundary and 
membership rules. This references the issue of µminority within a minority¶ and 
the associated problem of denying diversity within groups (Dovi, 2002; Fraser, 
2001; Philips, 2007). Such diversity along intersecting lines of division in class, 
ethnicity, age and gender and the tensions it produces is considered in Chapter 
6. That these tensions betray hierarchies of power within the identity-group is 




of critical of them or says someWKLQJWKDWWKH\GRQ¶WOLNHRUWKH\VHHDVD
WKUHDWVWUDLJKWDZD\WKH\¶OOFRPHWRJHWKHUDQGVXSSRUWHDFK other. Most of 
WKHPDUHPLGGOHFODVV0XVOLPVWKDWOLNHFRPHIURP«WKDWDUHMXVWQRW
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH\¶UHQRW- WKH\¶UHRXWRIWRXFKWKDW¶VP\main bug bear 
with them.  






white man than sit and have a meeting with me. 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  160 
Here participants are describing the ways in which class and gender place 
certain members of the Muslim identity group within a marginalised space of 
µminority within a minority¶ which limits who might be seen as an authentic 
representative. For this reason Dovi (2002) insists that descriptive representation 
can only be effective if subgroups are included in drawing group boundaries. This 
FULWLFLVPUHVRQDWHVZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DOLHQDWLRQIURPMuslim leaders and 
organisations that are seen DVµVHOORXWV¶for becoming co-opted into mainstream 
agendas, confirming previous research on kinship or biraderi politics which 
highlights the marginalisation of younger Muslims and women (Akhtar, 2012; 
DeHanas et al, 2010; Michael, 2004). A recent report on the role of Muslims in 
British governance by 2¶7RROHHWDOargues that Muslim leaders can be 
vindicated on grounds that they do also VSHDNRQEHKDOIRIWKHµFRPPRQ
LQWHUHVWV¶WKDWXQLWH0XVOLPVDQGWKHUHIRUHreinforce WKHQHHGWRµIRFXVRQWKH
representativeness of claims, not of claims-PDNHUV¶However, the discontents 
and grievances articulated by participants in this study suggest existing 
arrangements are inadequate to meet the representative needs of women and 
young Muslims. More descriptive representation is sought that does not simply 
focus on the nature of the claims but also respects the identity of the claims-
makers.  
If citizens¶ µVWUHQJWKRILGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV¶2SHQ6RFLHW\
Institute, 2010:187) is a measure of political inclusion then clearly these 
reflections paint a bleak picture. Participants clearly view conventional politics as 
antagonistic and plagued by issues of co-optation and tokenism. The normative 
concept of political representation demanded by participants requires descriptive 
representation to ensure minority principles, values and interests are recognised 
and given an audible voice in corridors of power. Participants see existing 
political institutions as a failure and offering a poor means to register political 
agency or seek social and political change. Viewed in this light disengagement 
from electoral politics looks like a pragmatic choice rather than signifying a purely 
reactive form of identity politics as sometimes dismissed by detractors 
(Dobbernack et al, 2012). However, rejection of conventional politics does not 
mean participants are automatically pushed into the politics of dissent and 
protest as the next section examines.  
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High costs of protest politics   
Protests and demonstrations have been on a sharp incline in recent years 
(Castells, 2012; Della Porta, 2014; Gamson and Sifry, 2013; Maharawal, 2013), 
transfixing global attention on mass mobilisations erupting around the world. Yet 
many participants in this study dismiss protest politics as outdated and 
ineffective, as well as risky and subject to new forms of security and control in 
Britain. A majority of participants have taken part in activities such as petitions, 
demonstrations, rallies, occupations and marches but these are not their 
preferred mode of action. Participants¶ reservations are based on perceived risks 
associated with such dissent-based politics, both in exposing participants to 
criminalisation in the wake of securitisation, as well as exacerbating existing 
negative stereotypes about Muslims. This significantly increases the costs 
associated with contentious politics for young Muslims, as formerly predicted by 
a number of academics (Briggs, 2010; Buck-Morss, 2003; Mythen et al., 2009; 
O¶/RXJKOLQ and Gillespie, 2012).  
Amongst many participants who view protests as ineffective repertoires of 
action, the failure of mass demonstrations against the Iraq War in 2003 to 
change the political will of politicians has assumed iconic status in symbolising 






Here Khalid is highlighting the costs associated with activism which is 
µKDUG¶DQGUHTXLUHVµGHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶QHFessitating strategic allocation of resources 
WRDFKLHYHµDQRXWFRPH¶$V.KDOLGVXUPLVHVSDUWLFLSDQWVGLGQRWYLHZSURWHVWVDV
a productive means to achieving political ends. This is explained as a result of 
FKDQJHVLQ%ULWDLQ¶VSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHZKLFKKDs made protesting less feasible due 
to increased restrictions and regulations. A number of participants cite stifling 
conditions which restrict marches, rallies and demonstrations to certain locations 
and times, requiring prior consent from relevant authorities.  
Shoaib<RXVD\WKDWWKHUH¶VQROLPLWDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJSURWHVWLQJKHUH
actually there is because when you want to protest in a particular space 
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WKHUH¶VZKDW\RXFDOOWKHIUHHVSHHFK]RQHEDVLFDOO\ZKHUHLW¶VPLOHVDZD\
from any particular government establishment where you are not able to 
speak upon any particular political matter - you are so far away that literally 
no political in you know.. individual or.. person worthy of any importance 
regarding these particular matters can ever hear your message, this is 
ZKDW\RXFDOOIUHHVSHHFK]RQHVVRWKDW¶VTXLWHLURQLFEHFDXVHZH¶UH
supposedly in a democracy and you know, freedom of speech and so and 
VREXW\HW\RXZDQWWROLPLWRXUVSHHFKVRWKDWZKHUH\RXFDQ¶WKHDUXV 
These arguments substantiate warnings from other studies that the space 
in which young people can demonstrate and express political agency is 
becoming very narrow at the current time, due to the security state infringing 
upon civil liberties in surreptitious ways (Brown and Saeed, 2014; Buck-Morss, 
2003; Hyatt, 2012; O¶Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012; Shukra and Ball, 2012; 
Vertigans, 2010). Participants are also acutely aware of the disproportionate 
impact that the restrictions on political expression have on Muslims (Brown, 
2010; Kundnani, 2007; Hickman et al, 2011).  
Sara: For the average Muslim they will probably.. might join in on a protest 
but they will not actively be involved with like campaigns against cuts and 
fees against redundancies against the privatisation of ± on  local facilities 





and not get ourselves into trouble and three I think Muslims are just so 
stigmatised in general that if they do get involveGZLWKSROLWLFVLW¶V«LW¶OOMXVW
be kind of counter-productive. 
Amna: ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWNLGVWKHVHGD\VHVSHFLDOO\0XVOLPNLGVKDYHWKH
WRROVRUWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRDFWXDOO\«WRVKRZZKDWWKH\IHHOEHFDXVH
WKH\¶YHEHHQVWLIOHGE\3UHYHQWWKH\¶YHEHHQVtifled by all of these 
stereotypes and things that have been kind of fed into µem and they get 
VWRSSHGE\WKHLUSDUHQWVDQGWKDWNLQGRIWKLQJDVZHOODQGWKHUH¶VWKLV
DWPRVSKHUHRIIHDUWRJHWLQYROYHGLQSROLWLFVDQG,WKLQNWKDWWKDW¶V
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These participants are describing the serious and unsettling restraints 
imposed by the presence of security forces, both real and imagined, on young 
SHRSOH¶V political behaviours. Participants, particularly students, fear being spied 
upon and ending up on a national database of risky citizens or being labelled a 
terrorist for attending demonstrations or public meetings. As Amna explains this 
VWLIOHV\RXQJSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQSROLWLFVVXSSRUWLQJWKHILQGLQJVRID
recent study UHYHDOLQJKRZ0XVOLPVWXGHQWV¶SROLWLFDOFKRLFHVDUHVHYHUHO\limited 
EHFDXVHµ0uslim students in particular have to tread with caution, lest they are 
DFFXVHGRIEHLQJDµUDGLFDO¶¶%URZQDQG6DHHG,QGHHGVRPH
participants recount the risks of religious societies being targeted or closed down 
if they dabble in political issues.  
Basma: And then when my fellow brothers, like Muslim brothers and 
sisters are involved like sadly the Islamic Society and mainly they¶re - their 
main involvement for various reasons including the fear of being smeared, 
Islamophobia and being de-recognised and therefore eradicating yet 
another minor, minor space for BME and Muslim students, they¶ll just get 
involved on the fundraising aspect or for the bake sale and even then it¶s 
very little.  
Hanif: So if like something bad happens to our society (Palestine Society) 
obviously we won¶t be able to continue so we need to make sure that we 
can continue first of all, continue raising awareness so that¶s been the 
priority over doing something that big. 
In these accounts participants explain why Muslim student societies 
abstain from RYHUWRIµELJ¶political actions on campus for fear of being shut down, 
refocusing their efforts on innocuous µbake sale¶ type of events. This resonates 
%URZQDQG6DHHG¶VVWXG\ZKLFKIRXQGWKDWIRU0XVOLPVWXGHQWV
µDFWLYLVPLVIUDPHGDVDQµHYHU\GD\¶ experience rather than a distinct subset of 
activities PRUHW\SLFDORIVWXGHQWSURWHVW¶EHFDXVHRIWKHULVNRIEHLQJEUDQGHGWRR
radical and being associated with terrorism.   
What is also significant about these discourses is that apart from a handful 
of participants who have been targeted by security forces, the majority are not 
relating personal encounters but rather reference the very real prospect of this 
happening. Securitisation does not pose any immediate threat but has a 
pervasive and ubiquitous presence in the background of daily life. While this 
does not dissuade these participants from becoming engaged in civil society, nor 
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prevent them from expressing dissent, they are very conscious that fear and 
trepidation deters others from doing so and admit that these concerns play a part 





criminal record so there are certain things even though I know they should 
definitely- DUHQ¶WOLNH«DUHQ¶WDFWXDOO\WKH\VKRXOGQ¶WEHLOOHJDOFHUWDLQ
WKLQJVWKDW,ZRXOGQ¶WHQJDJHLQFHUWDLQGHPRQVWUDWLRQV,¶GVWD\DZD\IURP 
Hanif6RPHSHRSOHWKH\WKLQNLIWKH\¶UHSart of like the even like Islamic 
Society or Palestinian Society they might be put on a watch list or 
something and that might jeopardise .. what they can do or even if like on 
applications if you put that the treasurer of one these support societies 
WKDW¶ll look a lot better than if you had the treasurer of the Palestinian 
Society. 
These admissions constitute the strongest evidence of the limits 
securitisation of citizenship places on the types of actions that are possible in the 
current political environment, since participants not only fear for their current 
safety but also apprehend future repercussions. Securitisation is not simply a 
passing threat it renders insecure the identities of activists in the long term by 
PDUNLQJWKHPRXWSHUPDQHQWO\DVµVXVSHFW¶FLWL]HQV7KHSHUYDVLYHQHVVRI
security in this uncertain and surreptitious manner makes it highly likely to have 
constrained the expression of critical views by participants in this study. This is 
certainly a plausible suggestion in the light of existing research revealing that 
experiences and fear of victimisation have led to many Muslims adopting 
µstrategies of identity management¶ such as presenting themselves as µsafe¶ and 
minimising their µMuslimness¶ in public (Mythen et al, 2009:749). Hence, the 
silence and cautionary stance adopted by participants on the topic of security is a 
possible sign of self-censorship. At times the awkwardness generated by 
discussing the subject with a relatively unfamiliar researcher is betrayed by the 
effort made to normalise and minimise the issue of security.  
Shoaib: I mean there is some issues regarding the Student Union, they are 
quite hesitant regarding obtaining- errr «allowing us to obtain speakers in- 
which I¶ve noticed is quite unfair due to the fact that yeah usually other 
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societies of a similar nature, whether they be faith based or otherwise, 
they¶re not usually subject to the same protocols of security as the Islamic 
Society are involved but we always nevertheless get confirmation by 
security and Student Union but it¶s just through a more tedious procedure 
which other societies I don¶t believe really encounter.  
This extract reveals the difficulty of trying to articulate a reasonable 
description of the exceptional measures being taken against Muslim societies 
DQGFOXEV:KLOH6KRDLEUHIHUVWRWKH6WXGHQW8QLRQ¶VSROLF\RIYHWWLQJ,6RF
speakers DVµXQIDLU¶DQG µWHGLRXV¶KHdownplays its magnitude by saying Union 
RIILFHUVDUHµKHVLWDQW¶LQJUDQWLQJSHUPLVVLRQUDWKHUWKDQUHIHUULQJWRLWDV
Islamophobic. Although this practice is clearly discriminatory, since it is specified 
that non-0XVOLPVRFLHWLHVµRIDVLPLODUQDWXUH¶DUHQRWµVXEMHFW¶WRLW, the injustice is 
UDWKHUSDVVLYHO\GHVFULEHGDVµjust WKURXJKDPRUHWHGLRXVSURFHGXUH¶VXJJHVWLQJ 
that caution is being exercised in how this information is communicated. 6KRDLE¶V
subdued response stands in stark contrast to the anger and indignation 
expressed by other participants who resent such restrictions on their activities. 
The exercise of caution in relation to security concerns may also explain the 
absence of any concerted campaigns or initiatives to challenge the exceptional 
burdens being placed on Muslim citizenship. During 18 months of fieldwork there 
were only two events where security issues were the focal point, one was a film 
screening about surveillance of Muslim students at universities and another a 
meeting to discuss a campaign against the extradition of two British Muslims to 
the US under terrorism charges.  At both events attendees commented on the 
lack of support from Muslim communities on tackling these issues which is 
indicative of securitisation resulting in Muslims being compelled to µvalidate the 
self as µsafe¶ and thus reduce the potential for victimization¶ (Mythen et al, 
2009:749).  
While for many participants security constraints place direct limits on 
action, for others protest politics are seen as unproductive because of the risk of 
further fuelling negative images and stereotypes about Muslims in the current 
climate of heightened Islamophobia. Some participants feel that unless a positive 
message can be conveyed demonstrations do more harm than good to their 
causes. An example of this during fieldwork was the absence in the UK of any 
visible or vociferous opposition to the circulation on the internet of a film called 
µThe Innocence of Muslims¶ in 2012 which depicted the Prophet Mohammad in a 
derogatory and degrading manner. While violent riots took place in many Muslim 
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countries, British Muslims adopted a low-key and appeasing tone in denouncing 
the film and avoided venting their frustrations in a publicly clamorous manner. 
Possibly in an effort to distance themselves from the unrest witnessed in various 
other Muslim countries, many British Muslims organised peaceful 
demonstrations, such as one event where they handed out roses tagged with 
statements highlighting the virtues of Islam and the Prophet to members of the 
public in a busy shopping centre. Although the offensive film fuelled anger at the 
µVODSLQWKHIDFHIRU0XVOLPV¶one participant explains the need to demonstrate a 
peaceful Muslim response.  
Ameer: Yeah but personally I did not riot against it, I organised a protest 
against it, a peaceful protest where I spoke - where I spoke to a small 
crowd you know and I actually calmed them down. 
7KHVHUHVSRQVHVFDQEHUHDGDVWKHHPHUJHQFHRIPRUHµSUDJPDWLF
Muslims politics¶(Modood, 2011:online) but also indicate fears of stoking further 
Islamophobia by replaying the scenes from the Rushdie riots which resulted in 
Muslims being widely condemned as enemies of  free speech. The fact that the 
same slur, fanning new levels of Islamophobia, was quick to resurface across 
Europe after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January 2015 testifies to the 
need for Muslims to demonstrate inordinate levels of constraint and resilience at 
the current time.  Such an attitude of caution is evident in participants¶ reflections 
on the way in which the public perceives Muslim protests.  
Parveen: There's no point in burning flags and the burning of city centre, 
there's no point like.. chanting like all this Arabic takbeers (shouting Allah 
hu Akbar) and all that kind of stuff like, are you getting anything out of it? I 
mean you're not even creating awareness because you're making people 
look down on you, like I remember there was one (demonstration) 
Palestinian one in (City) a couple- when.. it was on Egypt, I think it was the 
Egyptian.. when they - happening in Cairo, there was one to«.just I think 
stand in solidarity with them or something and I remember these - this 
group of guys were just chanting all this stuff in Arabic and the (City) 
security guard was just like..ehhh this is so annoying like what are you 
doing like« I think if you wanna create awareness there's other ways to do 
it.  
For Parveen protests are counter-productive because clearly the aims to 
convey a certain message and persuade others to support the cause are 
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redundant due to the negative perceptions of Muslims in society. This is 
suggestive of the absence of a receptive and sympathetic audience for Muslim 
protests and politics. Parveen is projecting the expected public contempt in 
response to Muslim protestors chanting Arabic slogans in city centres, rather 
WKDQUHIOHFWLQJKHURZQGLVDSSURYDO7KLVUHIOHFWVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIµUHVRQDQce¶
for social movement activists who have to work within existing cultural 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVIRUWKHLUSROLWLFDOPHVVDJHVWRKDYHµFUHGLELOLW\¶%HQIRUGDQG
6QRZ$V:LOOLDPVVWDWHVµ0RYHPHQWGLVFRXUVH
ideologies, and actions must be culturally resonant ± coherent within some 
shared cultural repertoire ± if they hope to strike bystander publics as legitimate, 
RUQHXWUDOL]HRSSRVLWLRQDOSRVLWLRQVE\HOLWHVDQGFRXQWHUPRYHPHQWV¶ 
 This reveals that Muslim participants perceive protests and 
GHPRQVWUDWLRQVWRFDUU\OHVVµUHVRQDQFH¶ZLWKµWDUJHWVRIPRELOL]DWLRQ¶%HQIRUG
and Snow, 2000:621) which requires alternative and more creative modes of 
DFWLRQWKDWKDYHµFXOWXUDOSRZHU¶:LOOLDPV1925). Not only are protest 
politics risky and dangerous in the current conditions of the securitisation (Brown, 
2010; O¶Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012; Mythen et al, 2009; Mythen, 2012; Shukra 
and Ball, 2012) but they are also counterproductive due to the negative 
perceptions of protestors which diminishes the resonance of their message. 
These findings reveal the importance of the symbolic dimension of politics where 
the message and image conveyed by the activists is a central aspect of activism.  
 
The power of people and ideas 
As the above discussion implies the symbolic and cultural dimension of 
politics is significant for participants, evidenced by critiques of mainstream 
politics for lacking Muslim role models as well as the rejection of more 
confrontational politics due to their likelihood of inflaming existing negative 
stereotypes about Muslims. The power invested in the cultural domain of ideas 
and codes resonates 0HOXFFL¶V(1985:147) understanding that new social 
movements are primarily concerned with the µfight for symbolic and cultural 
stakes, for a different meaning anGRULHQWDWLRQRIVRFLDODFWLRQ¶7KLVLVVXSSRUWHG
E\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHDVRQVIRUconducting alternative and non-electoral forms of 
participation.  
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Laila: I think I view grassroots organisations as an alternative now to party 
politics because grassroots organisations manage to have.. you know they 
FDQPDQDJHWRGHOLYHUFKDQJHRQVRPHOHYHODQGDOVRWKH\¶UHDEOHWR
LQIOXHQFHSHRSOHDVZHOOVRWKDW¶VZK\,¶PNLQGRI,¶PQRWLQWHUHVWHGE\
party politics as much.  
Salman: This is how it works across the board about making policy and 
making politics work for you, either one, you make your argument 
convincing enough to affect the masses, whatever that is, the argument is. 
OUWZR\RXIXQGSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDQGJHWOREE\LQJWKDW¶VWKHRQOy way, two 
way street, either you make the country you know care about something 
enough to make the political class absolutely quake in their boots to 
change the situation or you donate to parties that make them you know go 
down certain avenues and take ceUWDLQSRVLWLRQV««,¶YHQHYHUNLQG
RIUHDOO\VSRNHQWRP\ORFDOFRXQFLOORURUDQ\WKLQJOLNHWKLVSHUVRQDOO\VRLW¶V
about really just making people aware that they have the civic role to play 
and that for me to play that role for them to say listen you ± LW¶VLPSRUWDQW
WKDW\RXGRWKLVLW¶VLPSRUWDQWWKDW\RXJHWLQYROYHGDQG«WKDW¶VGHILQLWHO\
where my activism lies. 
These participants¶ qualifications for eschewing mainstream politics are 
based on the rationale that their political aims can be better achieved through 
engagement outside the arena of electoral politics. However, these arguments 
also betray the participants¶ underlying desire to affect political change through 
addressing society directly, as revealed in Laila¶s comment that µgrassroots 
organisations¶ have greater influence on public opinion and Salman¶s admission 
that his efforts as an activist are oriented towards convincing the public to 
engage rather than doing politics himself. These political goals that are targeted 
towards influencing public consciousness are informed by the belief that 
widespread apathy and political illiteracy among the general citizenry is a causal 
factor in the failure of politics.  
Basma,WKLQNWKLVLVWKHSUREOHPZLWKWKLVFRXQWU\LVWKDWWKH\¶UHso 
DSDWKHWLFLW¶VLW¶VSDWKHWLFLW¶VVRLQFUHGLEOH\RXNQRZOLNHP\0XPZRUNVLQ
a secondary school and I work with the youth like across the country, they 
KDYHQRLGHDWKDW$LW¶V3ULPH0LQLVWHUQRW3UHVLGHQWZKRWKHKHOOLWLV
WKH\VWLOOWKLQNZH¶UH LQ7RQ\%ODLU¶VSHULRGDQGZKR¶V7KDWFKHUDQGZKHUH
did she- because the film came out and then finally Thatcher was 
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understood and then, and then it was ZLWKDQDGPLULQJOLNH«SHUFHSWLRQRI
KHUµRKWKHRQO\ZRPDQDKK¶VRDOOWKLVMXVWso .. depoliticised on you know 
± and then so much so that when things are presented to them, you should 
KDWHWKHVHSHRSOH««VRWKH\GRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGWKH\¶UHEHLQJUDFLVW
VH[LVW\RXNQRZKRPRSKRELFEHFDXVHWKH\¶YHEHHQSUHVHQWHGZLWKWKLVDV
a mainstream point of vieZDQGWKH\FDQ¶WPDNHXSWKHLU-  WKH\FDQ¶W
possibly (AM: think for themselves?) yeah think for themselves in order to, 
to reach that conclusion to begin with.  
In this impassioned statement Basma reveals more than just her frustration 
towards a politically docile public, she is also suggesting that this passivity is 
partly to blame for racism, sexism and homophobia because the failure to 
understand and challenge the political causes of these forms of discrimination 
contributes to their normalisation. In this extract the attributions are complex 
because even though the issues of racism, sexism and homophobia are not 
directly attributed to public apathy, the problem is framed as an issue related to 
µDSDWKHWLF¶people who can¶WµWKLQNIRUWKHPVHOYHV¶which is telling of the way in 
which activists focus on the complicity of other citizens in legitimising inequalities 
and injustices. While Basma is talking about a wider general population Parveen 
and Saif are more critical of Muslim communities. 
Parveen: I think it's Muslim communities, I think there needs to be a 
change in mind set on how they look at things, I think they just ± they just 
VLWEDFNDQGGRQRWKLQJWKH\GRQ¶WWKLQNLW
VLPSRUWDQWWRGR\RXNQRZWR
get involved in activism and I think that needs to change, like with the 
extradition thing they need to realise it can happen to them.. they just don't 
care, they'd just rather, just you know come home and sit in front of the 
WHOHYLVLRQGRWKHLURZQOLWWOHWKLQJDQG\RXNQRZWKH\GRQ¶WJHWLQYROYHG 
Saif: Because you see violence is the easy way, using- smashing 
VRPHRQH¶VIDFHLQRQWKHVWUHHWLVWKHHDV\ZD\EXWVLWWLQJGRZQDQG
intellectually challenging them is a lot harder, it takes patience, it takes 
WLPHLWWDNHVNQRZOHGJHLW¶VORWVDQGORWVRIOong hours in the library and 
SHRSOHGRQ¶WZDQQDGRLWEHFDXVHSHRSOHDUHOD]\.  
Although Parveen had described Islamophobia and foreign policy as 
motivations for activism, here she blames the failure of Muslim communities to 
get involved as one of the major obstacles to tackling social injustices. Saif 
UHODWHV0XVOLPSDVVLYLW\WREHLQJµOD]\¶since mounting a challenge to the 
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dominant power structures requires gaining cultural capital which demands 
commitment and effort. While in these examples the general public is being cited 
as apathetic and culpable, participants also renounce other activists for wasting 
time and energy on counter-productive tactics.  
Haseena: What we need to do is spontaneously mobilise, many people, so 
many that you know we can¶t be controlled and that¶s you know, that¶s the 
only way we can make an impact, not by like you know - NUS 
demonstration - what the route was very « that out of the way and it 
wasn¶t, it wasn¶t anywhere near parliament so it¶s just things like that, that if 
you¶re going to ask you know.. you know your MP whether or not you can 
demonstrate and they give you a poxy route you don¶t, you shouldn¶t settle 
for that even just makes us look even weaker and I think .. I think it¶s better 
not to demonstrate than have a really small turnout but then I think some 
demonstrations are you know for the sake of solidarity.  
Khalid: PURWHVWV,WKLQNWKH«IRUPHWKHUHDVRQWKDWLW¶VWKHUHLVWRHPSRZHU
WKHSHRSOHDURXQG\RX«LW± ,GRQ¶WWKLQNLQDQ\ZD\GRHVLWDIIHFW
«SROLWLFLDQVDOVRZULWLQJWR\RXU03V,GRQ¶WWhink it does affect politicians.  
These participants raise similar points about the inefficacy of 
demonstrations, citing the lack of spontaneity as a basis for failure but justifying 
their participation in terms of expressing solidarity and empowerment of fellow 
activists. This suggests that protests and demonstrations have a symbolic role in 
generating solidarity between activists rather than addressing political power 
structures that were typically the target of such actions in the past. Protest 
politics is seen as being ineffective due to repressive social conditions as well as 
non-responsive politicians but criticisms are aimed primarily at other activists who 
are complicit in this state of affairs through the absence of resistance. This is 
intimated by the derogatory way in which those who participate in the action are 
described as settling for a 'poxy route'. The underlying rationale in these 
discourses is that changing the mindset of other activists and the public can have 
a transformative effect in society. 
Ameer: I believe people should be doing more because their future is at 
VWDNHWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VIXWXUHDWVWDNHDQGVRPHSHRSOH¶VJUDQGFKLOGUHQ¶V
IXWXUHDWVWDNH,PHDQ,GRQ¶WPHDQWRVRXQGOLNHH[WUHPHRUDQ\WKLQJor 
rude but I believe people should be more willing to do things that will 
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actually pressure the government you know or possibly bring down the 
government, like what they did in the Arab world.  
Dania,WKLQNFKDQJHSUREDEO\WKDW¶VJRQQDFRPHLW¶VQRWJRing to come 
top-GRZQLW¶VJRQQDFRPHERWWRP-up like the people probably will create a 
PDVVPRYHPHQWDQGWKDW¶VWKHRQO\ZD\ZH¶OOUHFUHDWHHTXDOFKDQJHV
about for everybody.  
These views resonate the concerns of a major body of literature discussed 
in Chapter 3 charting the withdrawal of citizens from politics (Hay, 2007; Kivisto 
and Faist, 2007; Leftwich, 2008; Putnam, 2000) in what is commonly referred to 
as the µdemocratic deficit¶ (Norris, 2002; 2011). Embodying new forms of citizen 
politics that challenge alarmist views of a democratic deficit in politics (Dalton, 
2008; Marsh et al, 2007; Norris, 2002, 2003; Nash, 2010) these participants also 
reveal that public apathy hampers subpolitical forms of activism as much as it 
imperils democracy.     
The power of public opinion and consciousness is also a significant factor 
in comprehending the dynamics of the securitisation of citizenship. The 
restraining impact of security, despite the relative absence of more direct 
experiences of its consequences by participants, is central to understanding why 
politics is targeted at raising social awareness rather than challenging the state 
directly.   
Kasim: And this again goes back to the... people are too much paranoid 
and being paranoid the powers are successful, the more we keep our head 
down the more they will be successful. 
Amna: My Mum¶s quite worried, she¶s - every time I order a book online 
like it comes through the post she¶ll read it, you know if it¶s a political book, 
talk about politics, even when I¶m watching the news you know or go to a 
demo, when I went to Palestine, the first thing she says is µlook anti-terror 
are gonna come and knock through the door¶ and I think that¶s why they¶ve 
won because that¶s the ultimate aim was to kind of shut people up and 
VFDUHµHPLQWRQRWJHWWLQJLQYROYHGLQWKLVNLQGRIWKLQJDQGWKH\¶ve won 
because every single parent that I know has those kind of worries towards 
their children.  
These discourses suggest that activists view the main battlefield in their 
struggles to be located in the domain of the hearts and minds of other citizens. In 
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these discourses paranoia and fear acts as a subjugating and repressive force 
that quells dissent and political agency, evident in the reference to keeping heads 
down (Kasim) and shutting people up (Amna). While the effects of power are 
wielded on the body, through preventing people from speaking about certain 
political topics and avoiding certain spaces, the nature of the force being 




This chapter has explored the attitudes of young adult Muslim activists 
towards mainstream politics to understand how they perceive the relationship 
between citizens and the state. A majority of participaQWVKDYHDµGLVPLVVLYH¶
approach to electoral politics which is viewed pejoratively due to deep-seated 
discontent and distrust of politicians as well as the perception that the institutions 
of power co-opt and stifle alternative perspectives and interests. The issue of 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQORRPVODUJHLQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UDWLRQDOHIRUGLVHQJDJHPHQWIURP
politics, as politicians are seen as being incapable and unwilling to bring minority 
perspectives and interests into mainstream political debates and decision-
making. Reflections on politics suggests participants seek the kind of descriptive 
representation that has been argued for by feminist and multicultural theorists 
(Modood, 2007; Phillips, 2007; Young, 1990; 2000) bringing the cultural and 
identity politics of young Muslims in closer proximity to other movements for 
social inclusion and justice. As Taylor and Van Dyke (2007: 4536) have asserted 
it is characteristic of social movement activists to pursue unconventional and 
DOWHUQDWLYHPRGHVRIDFWLRQGXHWRµODFNRf access to political institutions and 
other conventional means of influence or because they feel that their voices are 
QRWEHLQJKHDUG¶ 
It is also significant that young Muslims not only eschew mainstream 
political channels but are almost equally dismissive of more contentious and 
dissent-based forms of activism. This is partly due to fears of criminalisation and 
Islamophobia which make the costs of expressing dissent much higher at the 
current time for young Muslims, but it is also related to participants¶ 
understanding that apathy, political passivity and illiteracy among other citizens is 
a major contributory factor in the failure of politics. Based on these limitations 
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within contemporary political opportunity structures to express political agency, 
cultural politics can be seen as a more viable political strategy to challenge the 
dominant codes and norms of society. The political struggles in which 
SDUWLFLSDQWVDUHHQJDJHGDUHFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHµSRZHUWRQDPHFRQVWUXFW
meaning and exert control over WKHIORZRILQIRUPDWLRQ¶ZKLFKLVµRQHRIWRGD\¶V
FHQWUDOVWUXFWXUDOGLYLVLRQV¶6WHYHQVRQ3XEOLFDSDWK\LVOLQNHGWRODFNRI
accountability of corrupt politicians and political structures that are failing citizens, 
as well as the power of the state to dominate and control both physical and 
mental aspects of citizen¶s lives. It is fear and paranoia that paralyses and 
SURGXFHVµGRFLOLW\¶DQGµVXEPLVVLRQ¶LQVXEMHFWV)RXFDXOWZKLFKGLUHFWV
activists to seek political tactics to counter their effects. This provides a strong 
drive to engage in cultural politics oriented towards changing the dominant codes 
in society by persuading passive citizens to engage with politics. The next 
chapter discusses the main concerns of the cultural politics of young adult 











This chapter seeks to shed more light on the demands of Muslim cultural 
politics and explore the scope for active citizenship within such forms of political 
and civic participation. This follows from the SUHYLRXVFKDSWHU¶VUHYHODWLRQVRQ
alienation from mainstream politics and concerns about securitisation of 
citizenship which foregrounds cultural politics as a strategic and salient mode of 
activism for Muslim activists. The present chapter elucidates the participants¶ 
normative vision of society and their terms for inclusion within it, by focusing on 
the concept of citizenship which has traditionally been a key site of symbolic 
contestation within social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Nash, 2010; 
Stevenson, 200<RXQJ$QDO\VLVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLVFRXUVHV
uncovers efforts to redefine citizenship in universal, post-national and inclusive 
terms WKURXJKDVHWRIGHPDQGVZKRVHORJLFµPLUURUVWKRVHRIRWKHUHTXDOLW\
seeking groups¶ (Modood, 2010:39).  
While a number of previous studies have attempted to understand how 
0XVOLPFLWL]HQVUHODWHWRµ%ULWLVK¶FLWL]HQVKLSLQWKLVUHVHDUFKthe approach 
deviated by posing the question from a more generic perspective. This strategy 
of delinking citizenship from Britishness was adopted from an interest in 
discovering how activists understand political concepts that carry a weight of 
analytical and theoretical baggage but it was also conscious of the potentially 
distorting and highly politicised connotation of µ%ULWLVKQHVV¶IRU0XVOLPVLQDSRVW
9/11 context. )RFXVLQJRQµFLWL]HQVKLS¶UDWKHUWKDQ%ULWLVKQHVVRIIHUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV
more space to express their understandings of the concept without being 
weighed down by expectations to prove affinity to Britain (Mythen, 2012; 
McGhee, 2008; Parekh, 2008). This approach did not preclude some participants 
assuming the question was about Britishness but it did facilitate the expression of 
a range of responses which disturb the nationalist framework of citizenship and 
convey civic consciousness in defiance of dominant discourses about the 
unwillingness of Muslims to fit into Britain. 
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Participants¶ conceptions of citizenship discursively resist the hegemony of 
dominant models of citizenship, particularly the resurgence of nationalism and 
neoliberal notions promoted by the state in recent decades. Two distinct forms of 
civic consciousness or models of activism present themselves, one marked by 
overt and explicit resistance and the other reflecting greater compliance through 
implicit resistance to hegemonic conceptions of citizenship. The apparent tension 
between both approaches is resolved by highlighting the agency and choice that 
participants demonstrate through active citizenship. To qualify the meaning of 
µKHJHPRQLF¶FRQFHSWV,ERUURZ1DVK¶VUHIHUHQFHWRWKHWHUPZKLFK
VLJQLILHVµWDNHQ-for-JUDQWHGDVLIWKH\VLPSO\UHIOHFWKRZWKLQJVDUHDQGPXVWEH¶ 
The chapter is organised in four sections beginning with an exploration of 
the sense of alienation and marginalisation that underscores negative 
associations with Britishness. These pejorative ideas of citizenship and belonging 
are structured by post 9/11 policies and discourses that have framed Muslims as 
disloyal, suspect and risky citizens (Brown, 2010, Hickman et al, 2011; McGhee, 
2008; Mythen et al, 2009; Pentazis and Pemberton, 2009) and dominate 
explicitly resistant forms of activism. In the next section sensitivity to context in 
participants¶ reflections reveals that while Britishness poses serious challenges to 
Muslim identities, the generic concept of µcitizenship¶ evokes a sense of civic duty 
and commitment to social, civic and political participation based on religious and 
humanitarian ethics which conceptually and existentially subvert the ideals of 
both nHROLEHUDOLVPDQGQDWLRQDOLVP,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶YDU\LQJ
responses to Prevent, a counter-terrorism strategy targeted at Muslim µhearts 
and minds¶, are explored to underscore the different models of active citizenship, 
FRQWUDVWHGDVµH[SOLFLW UHVLVWDQFH¶DQGµLPSOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶,WLVDUJXHGWKDWWKHVH
are different political strategies of resistance rather than oppositional modes of 
action. Finally it is revealed how activism is conducted through empowerment 
strategies which demonstrate how these cultural politics constitute active 
citizenship in a post-national framework of belonging and political subjectivity. 
 
Counter-hegemony and explicit resistance 
This section reveals counter-hegemonic discourses, distinguishable by 
explicit resistance that is more common among participants who are currently 
based in Universities. Given prevailing literature on Muslim alienation and 
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disengagement from µBritishness¶ (Ameli, 2002, 2004; Ansari, 2009; Choudhury, 
2007; Joppke, 2009) and the constrained relationship with the state, 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is hardly surprising to find that nationalist 
formulations of citizenship are highly problematic for some participants. Dominant 
and hegemonic notions of citizenship are challenged on normative grounds by 
reflecting on contemporary experiences and realities that defy given meanings 
and reimagining citizenship along fluid temporal and spatial dimensions.  
Kasim: Their starting point is basically these are standard values which we 
have to abide by, these are certain political structures so for example the 
conception of nation is basically if you create a state boundary you - a lot of 
men killing, ready to kill themselves or kill other men then it becomes a 
nation state ...whereas for Muslims ummah is a different thing, similarly for 
DORWRI$IULFDQV$VKDQWLWULEH«WKHWULEHWKHQDWLRQH[WHQGVWRZKHUHYHU
even a single person is, so if a person is living in (City) or living in north 
pole they would say this is their nation.  
Shoaib: So regarding citizenship it literally means nothing to me. Me being 
%ULWLVKKDVOLWHUDOO\QR«LWKDVQRHIIHFWRQPH\HVLWKDVDQHIIHFWRQPH
in terms of the language I speak and the way in which I dress and the way 
maybe in which I condXFWP\VHOIµFDXVHFHUWDLQSXEOLFHWLTXHWWHVDQGQRUPV
and values and traditions that exist within the British culture and therefore 
you have to conform to but.. really if I live in another country all these 
things would probably just go immediately so that¶VDWHPSRUDU\WKLQJ 
These participants are contesting the dominant idea of citizenship by 
stripping it of primordial essence and affective investments produced by enduring 
historical and traditional ties (Chernilo, 2006; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1998). This 
formulation not only questions the established idea that citizenship should be 
aligned with a national identity and engender emotional attachment, but also the 
form of the contestation suggests that such a notion is seen to be the norm in 
society, evidenced by the way in which the arguments are framed in response to 
this unspoken and taken for granted understanding. As Kasim argues this notion 
is so pervasive and sanctified by convention that it has the power to compel men 
to µkill WKHPVHOYHV¶UHIOHFWLQJwhat Yuval-Davis (2006:208) refers to as one of the 
µXOWLPDWH¶DQGµJHQGHUHG¶duties RIFLWL]HQVKLSWKDWLVµWKHUHDGLQHVVWRVDFULILFH
RQH¶VOLIH± DQGWRNLOORWKHUV¶. For these participants such associations are 
redundant in the context of contemporary lived experience, as well as alternative 
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ideologies of nationhood found in non-Western cultures. Kasim directly 
FKDOOHQJHVDµPRGHORIQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSDQFKRUHGLQWHUULWRULDOL]HGQRWLRQVRI
FXOWXUDOEHORQJLQJ¶6R\VDOEE\FRQWUDVWLQJLWWR forms of nationhood 
which are defined by personhood and common identity instead of borders. 
Shoaib¶s challenge to the permanence and deep emotional resonance of 
nationalism implies tacit knowledge of a dominant narrative in which Muslim 
dissonance with Britishness is seen as a sign of disloyalty. Shoaib frames his 
disagreement in response to such an argument by stating that it is incongruous in 
a globalised world where increased mobility makes ties to any particular territory 
a passing arrangement. These contestations respond to a persistent and 
recriminatory discourse about the failure of Muslims to place their national 
identity above other forms of identification such as ethnicity and faith (McGhee, 
2008; Parekh, 2008). One way of challenging the statist discourse but 
maintaining the affective dimension  of µcitizenship¶ is to position it as a universal 
obligation making µhumanity¶ or µcommunity¶ rather than µnationality¶ as the 
significant frame of reference in defining the concept.  




having a social responsibility for the whole of the world, like a global citizen.   
Chohan<RXNQRZJHWWLQJWKLVLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\JRLQJOLNHWKDW¶V
the whole thing that you hear about when \RX¶UHLQ3DOHVWLQLDQ6RFLHW\RU
part of any solidarity society, is that you hear about the international 
community who all come together because they all feel the same - same 
feelings and they all have these same ideas and beliefs.  
Both participants are redrawing the boundaries of citizenship to bring 
µmultiple actors, groups and communities¶ (Sassen, 2002:277) into the fold which 
loosens national claims on personal identification. The concept of community is a 
contested one, which can refer to either a common geographical space or shared 
identity features and ideals (Lister, 2010). The way in which community is 
referred to by participants in this study invokes both these senses of the term, 
intimating a more universal form of belonging that appeals to the concept of 
global rather than national citizenship. This echoes a growing tendency to 
problematise the nation-state template of citizenship by those who posit the 
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increasing relevance of transnationalism (Kivisto and Faist, 2007; Samad and 
Sen, 2007) post-nationalism (Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 2012), cosmopolitanism 
(Beck, 2005; Stevenson, 2003), µglobally oriented citizenship¶ (Parekh, 2008:248) 
and µcitizens without frontiers¶ (Isin, 2012). As Back et al (2009:4) have reported 
LQSUHYLRXVUHVHDUFKWKHµSOXUDOSROLWLFDOLPDJLQDULHV¶RIFRQWHPSRUDU\DFWLYLVWV
SDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHEDVHGRQUHOLJLRXVIDLWKµdo not square easily with appeals to 
participate in the unitary world of the nation state¶+RZHYHUWKLVXQLYHUVDOYLHZ
of citizenship is not based on a zero sum game where a post-national sensibility 
negates the significance of national obligations. Rather, it is a more inclusive 
notion of citizenship that dissolves boundaries and disperses obligations to 
different levels of belonging including local, national as well as global, 
demarcated by affinities to people and ideas rather than territories.   
Yasir: For PHEHLQJDFLWL]HQLV«LW¶VQRWDQDWLRQDOLVWLFWKLQJ, LW¶VQRWD
political thing, ,GRQ¶WFDUHDERXWQDWLRQDOLVPDQGSROLWLFVDQGSDWULRWLVP, 
that stufIGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\LQWHUHVWPHDWDOODQG,WKLQNSHRSOHZKRJHWKRRNHG
on to that misunderstand citizenship, I think being a citizen is like what I 
VDLGHDUOLHUDERXWSD\LQJ\RXUUHQWRQWKLVHDUWKLW¶VMXVWWKHFRUHWKLQJVDQG
IRUPHLW¶VQRWDERXWEHLQJin this country, LW¶VDERXWEHLQJDQ\ZKHUHWKH
core things are looking after where you live, the environment, looking after 
the earth and therefore if you live in Britain also looking after the country, 
looking after the people around you and creating understanding and 
tolerance and if that all leads to peace, that is citizenship.  
Yasir¶s interpretation is a counter-discourse to the dominant view of 
citizenship which emerged traditionally through a grand narrative of the µpotency 
of the sovereign nation-state in control of its borders¶ (Isin, 2012: 863). Such 
challenges have been a core function of social movements that have 
'significantly blurred the conventional dichotomy between national citizens and 
DOLHQV¶6R\VDOEVRPHWLPHVgiving way to human rights as the basis 
for equality and inclusion. Such universal obligations resonate in the accounts of 
FLWL]HQVKLSRIIHUHGE\SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKLVVWXG\DV<DVLU¶VTXRWHLOOXVWUDWHVby 
citing a universal human obligation to pay µUHQWRQHDUWK¶ 
Rather than being hostile to Britishness per se the accounts examined thus 
far reflect the kind of affective disinterest conveyed by young adults in Fenton¶s 
(2007:335) research in Bristol, which found µa significant element of indifference 
or disregard for national identity¶. While the results from this single study should 
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not be generalised to the wider population it is a significant reminder that lack of 
regard for national identity is not unique among Muslims, a consideration that is 
often overlooked in framing them as exceptionally disloyal citizens for prioritising 
their faith over Britain (Parekh, 2008). However, indifference or disregard 
represents only one aspect of the diverse perspectives on British citizenship. 
More profound objections to Britishness could be found among participants who 
viewed hegemonic constructions of citizenship as politically harmful to Muslim 
interests.  
Haseena,MXVWIHHOOLNH,¶PQRWD%ULWLVKFLWL]HQFDXVH,NQRZZKDWWKDW
stands for, I know what that symbolises, WKDW¶V\RXNQRZDOOWKHEDGWKLQJV
DERXWFDSLWDOLVPZKLWHVXSUHPDF\SDWULDUFK\VR,GRQ¶WZDQWDQ\WKLQJWR
do with that.   
Amna<RXNQRZWKHUH¶VQRFOHDUFXWLGHDRIZKDWEHLQJ%ULWLVKLVDERXW,V





history, the current culture, the current foreign policy all of this, no I 
ZRXOGQ¶WQR,¶PQRWFRPIRUWDEOHZLWKWKDW 
These accounts highlight the problematic nature of Britishness for some 
participants, particularly its symbolic articulations, which are equated with policies 
and ideologies that are in tension with the activists¶beliefs and identities. For 
Haseena British citizenship is so integrally tied up with the ideologies that she is 
actively opposing, like capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy, that it is 
impossible for her to reconcile her politics and activism with ownership of national 
citizenship. For Amna the entire British system, including its history, culture and 
foreign policy is antagonistic to Muslim identities. Such misgivings about 
Britishness bear out a number of previous studies on the elevated levels of 
alienation from Britain experienced by young Muslims (Ameli, 2002, 2004; 
Ansari, 2009; Choudhury, 2007; Joppke, 2009). However, it is significant that 
underlying these arguments there is an assumed correspondence between 
British citizenship and the state, since being British is equated with a compulsion 
to support foreign, economic and domestic policies, rather than representing 
feelings of a common bond with other fellow nationals. This suggests rejection of 
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the current conditions imposed on British citizenship rather than alienation from a 
nation of citizens. The associations being made between citizenship and 
government policy in these statements bear out a number of academic warnings 
that recent anti-terror laws and foreign policy are likely to further fuel existing 
feelings of estrangement and marginalisation among young Muslims (Briggs, 
2010; Brighton, 2007; Brown, 2010; Kundnani, 2009; Spalek and Lambert, 2008). 
However, even where citizenship is framed in terms of relationships with other 
citizens, many participants struggle to reconcile endemic racism with a demand 
to avow Britishness. 
Amna: When you see your mother walking down the road getting spat at or 
\RXNQRZJRWFDOOHGD3DNLE\OLWWOHNLGVEHFDXVHWKDW¶VWKHFXOWXUHWKDWWKH\
have where they treat us as different, as outsiders, stuck us into our little 
DUHDV«WKHQKRZFDQ\RXLGHQWLI\ZLWKWKDWKRZFDQ\RXVD\WKDW,¶P
%ULWLVKLWZRXOGEHDELWRID«DFRSRXWWREHKRQHVW,¶GIHHOXQWUXHWR





VRUWRI«\RXOLNHPurder their parents or whatever. 
These discourses are symptomatic of the impact of counter-terrorism and 
community cohesion policies through which Britishness has come to signify an 
ultimatum for Muslims to prove their loyalty to Britain (Alexander, 2007; Brown, 
2010). They also stress its incongruence as a positive source of identity in the 
face of persistent exclusions produced by experiences of racism and 
Islamophobia. While above citizenship is framed in more abstract and universal 
terms here the focus is on the everyday life which is where Skey (2013:87) 
argues tKHQDWLRQLVSURGXFHGDVDQREMHFWLYHUHDOLW\IRUFLWL]HQVZKRµWLHWKHLU
RZQXQFHUWDLQIXWXUHVWRDPRUHVWDEOHDQGSRZHUIXOVRFLDOJURXS¶&OHDUO\IRU
these participants the challenges of citizenship are not just accounted for by top-
down institutions of power but are located in the quotidian experiences of being 
marginalisHGDQGH[FOXGHGIURPWKHµSRZHUIXOVRFLDOJURXS¶7KLVUHIOHFWVWKH
QRWLRQRIµQDWLRQDO FXOWXUDOFDSLWDO¶FRQFHSWXDOLVed by Hage (1998 in Skey 
2013:89) which creates a hierarchy of belonging where some are seen as more 
GHVHUYLQJRILQFOXVLRQWKDQRWKHUVRQWKHEDVLVRIµQDWLRQDOO\VDQFWLRQHGDQG
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YDOXHGVRFLDODQGSK\VLFDOFXOWXUDOVW\OHVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQV¶7KLVFDSLWDOSRLQWVWR
cultural rather than material dimensions of exclusion (Skey, 2013:91) 
HQJHQGHUHGE\EHLQJµSRVLWLRQHGE\DPRUHGRPLQDQWJURXSDVDQµRXWVLGHU¶$V
FLWL]HQVKLSLQYROYHVDQDFWRIµLPDJLQDWLRQ¶$QGHUVRQ6WHYHQVRQ
Yuval-Davis, 2006) these feelings of exclusion have a negative bearing on 
participanWV¶DELOLW\WRLGHQWLI\ZLWKWKHQDWLRQ 
These views on citizenship are marked by the sense of contingency and 
precariousness highlighted in previous studies where membership and belonging 
is undermined by perceptions of stigma and persecution (Brown, 2010; Mythen et 
al, 2009; O¶Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012; O¶Toole and Gale, 2013). As evident in 
these accounts, feelings of alienation from Britishness are often explained as a 









These discourses indicate that the unfair and discriminatory attitudes of 
both the state and the general public limit the ability of Muslims to identify with 
the nationVXJJHVWLQJDUHDFWLRQWRµ%ULWLVKQHVV XQIXOILOOHG¶$OH[DQGHU
2007:2502) rather than outright rejection. The desire and will to be included is 
signaled by participants¶ description of attempts to be good citizens (Mona) and 
making an extra effort (Rabia). Within the reflections on citizenship described 
thus far there is an orientation towards global and post-national sensibilities but 
the concept is also embedded in the everyday and the local, reflecting ,VLQ¶V
QRWLRQRIµWUDYHUVDOFLWL]HQVKLS¶WKDWVHHNVWRFURVVERUGHUVEXWLV
constrained in action and concrete expression within national parameters. 
The above discussion conveys that participants¶ alienation from British 
citizenship is influenced by the current conditions placed on citizenship, 
particularly its disproportionate impact on Muslims. These pejorative 
commentaries on Britishness also reflect forms of activism or active citizenship 
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PDUNHGE\µH[SOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\YHKHPHQWFRQWHVWDWLRQRI
hegemonic notions RIFLWL]HQVKLSUHIOHFWLQJ+DQGVQRWLRQRIµUHEHOOLRQ¶ 
discussed in Chapter 3, which includes both dissent and resistance but is clearly 
PDUNHGE\WKHµQHFHVVLW\RIDFWLRQ¶7KHVHH[SOLFLWO\UHVLVWDQWGLVFRXUVHVVWDQGLQ
contrast to other ways of describing citizenship which are more compliant with 
hegemonic notions, as explored in the next section.  
 
Hegemony and implicit resistance 
:KLOHµH[SOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶UHSUHVHQWVDVLJQLILFDQWIDFHWRIGLVFRXUVHVRQ
citizenship this does not completely foreclose positive evaluations of aspects of 
national association even among those who hold critical and alienated views on 
Britishness. In some cases participants express views that verge on affirmation 
of hegemonic discourses in relation to Muslims, while the individualism and 
responsible self-reliance promoted by neoliberal citizenship (Brown, 2005; 
Marinetto, 2003; Soysal, 2012a) also resonates in some interviews. These 
discourses are largely associated with participants whose activism is interpreted 
DVEHLQJPRUHFRPSOLDQWRUDFTXLHVFHQWGHVFULEHGKHUHDVµLPSOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶
This form of active citizenship is conducted through non-confrontational forms of 
engagement in community work or cultural education in religious organisations or 
societies. Even in such circles the affirmation of Britishness is circumspect. 
Arya: My identity itself is D%ULWLVK0XVOLP,¶PQRW%ULWLVK,¶PQRWMXVWD
0XVOLP,¶PQRWMXVW<HPHQL,¶PD%ULWLVK0XVOLPWKDW¶VKRZ,WKLQNRILW«
because I feel like that in itself is a culture.  
Maz: I obviously I'm British Asian ... just purely cause it just ...it's the right 
term I feel cause obviously I was born in Britain and I'm Asian at the same 
time. 
An important aspect of these expressions is that they are appended with 
other markers of selfhood to signify a hybridised British identity, suggesting the 
importance of multiple rather than singular identities as discussed in Chapter 6. 
)RU$U\DEHLQJDµ%ULWLVK¶0XVOLPLVDQLPSRUWDQWTXDOLILFDWLRQRIKHULGHQWLW\VLQFH
she is able to distinguish this from other ways of being a Muslim, particularly to 
being one in Muslim countries like Yemen. The ownership of Britishness reflects 
her role as an activist involved in a University based Islamic Society and 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  183 
community based youth projects to promote a better understanding of Islam and 
to normalise religious identities in the public sphere. On the other hand Maz¶s 
reference to his µAsian¶ identity reflects the relatively inconsequential role of Islam 
in his life, particularly to his role as an elected Student Union officer. The primary 
importance of Britishness in both these accounts is not only evident but taken for 
granted. Despite being critical of the state and its foreign policy other participants 
are able to acknowledge the freedoms and opportunities that citizenship grants, 
particularly in contrast to the countries from where their parents originate.  
Laila: I felt at that point I was extremely privileged to have what I had and 
«,NQHZWKDWLIP\JUDQG - DWWKDWSRLQW,UHDOLVHGP\JUDQGSDUHQWVKDGQ¶W
moved to the UK, like they did after partition, ,ZRXOGQ¶WKDYHWKHOLIHthat I 
have now you know.  
Sameera: Well actually no matter what struggles I am going through or no 
matter how hard I might perceive it to be, the fact of the matter is that I was 
born in the UK and not Pakistan you know there's more rights that I have 
here than I would do in Pakistan... you know this country isn't by no means 
perfect but I have more of a voice here, my rights are more respected in 
the UK than they would be in many other parts of the world actually, so it 
was that realisation that I actually thought well.... it's almost whether I want 
to or not it's almost an obligation because of who I am and where I am that 
I do need to make a stand because there's other peop - counterparts in the 
world that just can't because ...their lives are on the line you know.  
These discourses reveal some of the aspects of British citizenship valued 
by participants, including the freedom to practice their faith and free speech. 
Here British citizenship as a legal status and entitlement to freedoms and rights 
is seen as being a privilege that is valued but also, as Sameera reveals, this is 
sought for others beyond British borders to whom participants feel a duty of 
citizenship. This reveals not only appreciation of British traditions of freedom and 
equality but a confidence to make political claims on the basis of entitlement. 
It is also significant that discourses on citizenship, rather than Britishness, 
tell a different story to the one emphasising alienation in the last section. What 
emerges from the redirection of attention to a generic notion of citizenship is the 
appreciation of Muslim civic consciousness and public spiritedness that compels 
participants to actively and visibly engage in British civil society. It is also 
important to consider that many participants had not previously given the 
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question of citizenship a great deal of thought or attention. This suggests these 
discourses constitute unrehearsed and instinctive narratives, with a greater 
likelihood of reflecting given and commonplace understandings or in Foucauldian 
WHUPVWKHµQRUPDOL]LQJMXGJHPHQW¶$OWKRXJKWKHVHWKHPHVDUHSLFNHG
XSDJDLQLQWKHQH[WFKDSWHUZKHUH)RXFDXOW¶VWKHRU\RIJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\LV
applied to these discourses, the task at hand is to contrast these to the 
previously discussed explicitly resistant forms of citizenship. The following 
examples reveal how some participants¶ views converge with neoliberal notions 
of citizenship underpinned by µresponsible self-help¶ (Marinetto, 2003:109) as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
Abid: For me citizenship is about taking that more active role in your area 
because ultimately what we all want is actually is a safer area for our own 
NLGVWROLYHLQDQGRXUIDPLO\WREHLQ«>@,¶PYHU\DOOIRULPSURYLQJ\RXU
own local area of where you live cause I do believe you know no one else 
is going to come from outside.  
Irum&LWL]HQVKLSIRUPHPHDQVWKDW«\RXOLYH\RXUOLIH\RXJRWR
ZRUN«\RX¶UHFRQWHQWEXWZKHUH\RX¶UHQRWFRQWHQW\RXKDYHWKHDELOLW\DQG
the capacity to address it so you know for example the bare minimum 
would be to go to vote.  
These normative accounts reveal congruence with the dominant 
GLVFRXUVHVRIµDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLS¶WKDWKDYHHPHUJHGLQWKHODVWIHZGHFDGHV
where the balance has shifted from the rights and entitlements of citizenship in 
favour of the obligations and responsibilities of individuals (Brown, 2005; 
Fitzpatrick, 2005; Marinetto, 2003; Soysal, 2012a). Here participants¶ views 
coincide with neoliberal ideals to promote the role of individuals in taking 
responsibility for social order, as citizenship is constituted by the abilities and 
effoUWVRIFLWL]HQVZKRDUHµDFWLYH¶DQGµFRQWHQW¶. These accounts suggest that the 
GRPLQDQWGLVFRXUVHVRQµDFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLS¶ZKLFKVHHNWRSURGXFHSDUWLFXODU
subjectivities and embodiments of citizenship have become so internalised by 
citizens that their roots in state mechanisms of power have become obscured. 
This is particularly evident where participants convey undertones of internalised 
blame and guilt, bearing traces of dominant policy and public discourses which 
blame Muslims for failing to integrate into Britain.   
Tamara,W¶VDORWHDVLHUWREH\RXNQRZ0XVOLPLQWKLVFRXQWU\WKDQLWLVWR
be a Christian back in another country and even though we kick and 




Beena: I think they have so much to be grateful for in this country, imagine 
if the white people were in Pakistan and if they had done half the things 
that Muslims are doing in this country, you know, how tolerating would 
Pakistan be of that.  
Here both participants are stating the limits of what British citizenship can 
accommodate by suggesting that Muslims expect too much from the nation, a 
view that is sometimes expressed by liberals and those on the right who consider 
the demands of Muslim identity politics to stretch the limits of a secular state too 
far (Meer, 2010; Modood, 2010c; Parekh, 2008). These responses may be read 
as submission to extraordinary pressure on Muslims to conform to a nationalist 
model of citizenship but on the other hand it may also be significant that both 
these participants feel more integrated into British society than many other 
participants. Tamara reports that she has never personally experienced racism 
and exclusion from mainstream society and Beena feels the obstacles she has 
experienced in her life have come from conservative Muslim family and 
community members. While these views represent a minority perspective in this 
research they are important in highlighting the absence of unanimity when it 
comes to views on Britishness.   
While some aspects of these participants¶ talk may be accounted for as the 
internalisation of dominant discourses, this does not imply co-optation or lack of 
agency since these accounts also signify critical and resistant stances towards 
the values and priorities of neoliberal citizenship and nationalist pressures. This 
is evident in the radically divergent motivations that underpin the participants¶ 
normative ideas of citizenship.  
Salman: I think citizenship is about ownership I think..it¶VDERXW
«PDNLQJ«DVRFLHW\WKDW\RXOLYHLQDQGDUHLQYROYHGLQ«DSDUWRI\RXU
own «I guess an extension RI\RXURZQH[LVWHQFHEHFDXVH«society, the 
EXLOGLQJEORFNRIVRFLHW\«\RXNQRZLVWKHLQGLYLGXDORUWKH you know the 
family unit and if you want a better society then obviously you have to kind 
of rectify yourself first and make VXUHWKDWWKDW¶VWDNHQIRUZDUG&itizenship I 
WKLQNLVDERXW«ZLVKLQJIRURWKHUVZKDW\RX¶GZLVKIRU\RXUVHOI«LW
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doesn¶WQHFHVVDULO\PHDQBritishness or anything like or whatever that 
means (laughs) I mean these are vague terms.  
In this articulation of citizenship Salman places the emphasis on the 
individual who has become a recognisable emblem of neoliberal ideology (van 
Houdt et al, 2011) as well as foregrounding it¶s most central precept of 
µresponsibility¶ by equating a µbetter society¶ with the ability of the citizen to 
µrectify¶ themselves. However, he then dislocates this concept of citizenship from 
the national body of µBritishness¶ suggesting a different value system is being 
invoked in his understanding. A closer examination of such normative ideas and 
logics brings into view a departure from hegemonic discourses. Participants¶ 
underlying motivations for being civically engaged draw from an entirely different 
moral register compared to neoliberal or nationalist imperatives of citizenship. 
Respondents talk about the responsibilities associated with being a good citizen 
as emanating from a value system that subverts the neoliberal market rationality 
and resurgent nationalism promoted by politicians in recent years by prioritising 
alternative values of faith, humanity and universality.  
Salman)RUPHLW¶VOLNH,VDLGLW¶VXOWLPDWHO\,ZRXOG,GRZKDW,GREHFDXVH
I seek the pleasure of God first and foremost and I know that you know 
Islam places more of an honour on someone who goes out of his way to 
help his brother than someone who you know, or helps society, than 
someone who prays five times a day.  
Zahir: Sincerity is something which is very fundamental - is very basic, 
IXQGDPHQWDOEHOLHIRI0XVOLPV<RXGRWKLQJVQRWIRUDQ\ERG\HOVH\RX¶UH
GRLQJLWWRSOHDVH\RXU/RUGDQG*RG«VRLQDVHQVHRIFLWL]HQVKLSLW
should be why you do things, how sincere are you in what you do, it could 




These accounts reference a different set of ideals and aspirations which 
depart substantially from the ways in which politicians pursuing neoliberal 
governance link good citizenship to gaining economic and social capital (Brown, 
2010; Soysal, 2012a; van Houdt et al, 2011) or promote stronger notions of 
British national identity (McGhee, 2008). These discourses also reflect forms of 
resistance to dominant power structures that can be better understood through 
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repertoires of action based on spirituality, faith and humanitarian concerns reflect 
a very different vision of society from the one promoted by neoliberal self-serving 
rationalities of consumerism as well as the obligations of nationhood. These 
discourses represent the particular moral imperatives of followers of Islam which 
µLPSOLFDWHVDTXDOLWDWLYHO\GLIIHUHQWVHWRIFRQFerns from those implicated in the 
ODQJXDJHRIµLQWHUHVWV¶¶(XEHQLQ+RSNLQVDQG.DKDQL-Hopkins, 2004:341). 
5HIOHFWLQJ(XEHQ¶VLQ+RSNLQVDQG.DKDQL-Hopkins, 2004) observation that 
for Muslims the relevant unit of social analysis is not the individual but the 
community, these participants reveal a strong commitment to serving the 
common good rather than promoting their own personal gains, a theme that is 
related to the dominance of post-material values in activism discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 5. It is worth emphasising that while service to the community is 
of prime importance this does not mean that participants unreflexively submit to 
community pressures and demands since the social norms and priorities of these 
participants are framed through personal and individualized political 
subjectivities. The spiritual, religious and universal concerns expressed by these 
SDUWLFLSDQWVUHIOHFW6R\VDO¶VEFRQWHQWLRQWKDWFRQWHPSRUDU\IRUPVRI
FRQWHVWDWLRQRYHUFLWL]HQVKLSDQGEHORQJLQJPDUNµDGHYLation from the earlier 
forms of claims-PDNLQJ¶ZKLFKµZHUHDWWHPSWVWRUHGHILQHLQGLYLGXDOVDVSDUWRI
WKHQDWLRQDOFROOHFWLYLW\¶,QFRQWUDVWVKHDUJXHVWKDWµWKHHPHUJLQJIRUPVRI
collective participation and claims-making in Europe are less and less nationally 
defined citizenship projects. Individuals and collective groups set their agenda for 
realization of rights through particularistic identities that are embedded in, and 
GULYHQE\XQLYHUVDOLVWLFGLVFRXUVHVRIKXPDQULJKWV¶6R\VDOE 
Despite these qualifications these discourses of citizenship can also be 
read as internalisDWLRQRIµZKDWDSSHDUWREH³LQVWUXPHQWVRIWKHLURZQ
RSSUHVVLRQ´¶WRGHSOR\DQH[SUHVVLRQXVHGE\VRPHIHPLQLVWFULWLFVWRGHVFULEH
Muslim women who voluntarily subjecWWKHPVHOYHVWRµWKHKHJHPRQLFPDOH
FXOWXUDOQRUPV¶0DKPRRG$OWKRXJKVXFKDYLHZLVFRQWHVWHGLQWKH
following discussion, these modes of activism do reflect a more compliant model 
of civil society activism where the modes of resistance are implicit, non-
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confrontational and based on value divergence rather than direct conflict with the 
state. This is explored in more detail in the following section where the nuances 
of different modes of mobilisation are explored.   
 
Securitisation, agency and resistance 
The discourses on citizenship discussed above cannot be understood in 
isolation from the context of the µVHFXULWLVDWLRQRI0XVOLPVXEMHFWV¶0DYHOOL
2013:159) in a post 9/11 political climate. The restraining impact of security on 
activism is covered in the last chapter where it is revealed that fears of 
surveillance and criminalisation are likely to place limits on the way in which 
participants mobilise and the issues that they act on. Securitised citizenship 
necessitates a more careful reading oISDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLVFRXUVHVRQFLWL]HQVKLS
since this concept is reflective of the relationship between participants and the 
state (Yuval-Davis, 2006). To offer a concrete example of the complexity of this 
relationship this section elucidates different responses to securitisation which 
vary by the types oIDFWLYLVPSDUWLFLSDQWV¶HQJDJH in. The policy of Prevent is a 
good measure of how much the issue of security divides opinion, making it 
harder to categorisHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶YLHZVRQFLWL]HQVKLSDQGEHORQJLQJin any 
simple and categorical way as either integrated or alienated or hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic. Some participants vehemently oppose initiatives like Prevent 
which they see as a policy to quash dissent.   
Sara: Like the MI5 kind of Prevent kind of spying database I think that if we 
LI«,WKLQNIHDULVNLQGRI«LW¶VXVHGWRNLQGRIVXSSUHVV«OLNHWKHSXEOLF
and stuff so if you have people who are completely scared of doing 
anything then you know that you can do anything and no one will speak up.  
Saif: Prevent is the manipulative programme that exists - the manipulation 
LVJLYHQDYHU\FDWFKDOOWHUPFDOOHGµKHDUWVDQGPLQGV¶EXWZKDWLVKHDUWV
DQGPLQGV",QRUGHUWRZLQVRPHRQH¶VKHDUWVDQGPLQGVRYHU\RXKDYHWR
alter the basis of their ability to XVHUHDVRQVRGRQ¶WORRNDWWKLVSLHFHRI
information look at this piece of information and that piece of information. 
In these quotes both participants are expressing a common unease among 
more explicitly resistant activists that the main motivation of Prevent is to 
depoliticisHDQGVLOHQFH0XVOLPV7KHVHDQ[LHWLHVUHYHUEHUDWH6DOPD<DTRRE¶V
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ZDUQLQJLQ.XQGQDQLWKDWµ7KHGDQJHURIWKLVDSSURDFKLVWKDWLW
serves to squeeze the democratic space for dissent within the Muslim 
FRPPXQLW\¶However, this view is not unequivocal and some participants 
approach Prevent more ambiguously, with a few even welcoming the injection of 
much-needed resources into Muslim communities.  
Parveen: I don't really see a problem because my opinion was at that 
timH«MXVWEHIRUH0XVOLPFRPPXQLWLHVZHUHQ
WUHFHLYLQJDQ\PRQH\«
at all, so then came Prevent and councils had all this money and they didn't 
know what to do with it so if ± LIFRXQFLO¶VJRLQJWRRIIHU\RXPRQH\WRGRD
SURMHFWWKDW¶VJRQQDEHQHILW0XVOLP\RXWKWKHQ«ZK\QRWWDNHLW" 
Although views and experiences are mixed even those who do work with 
Prevent are aware of its controversial status.  
Sameera: Yes I have worked with Prevent in (City,¶GEHGXELRXVDERXW




constabularies and areas you know around the UK are like you know, I 
mentioned (Hometown) as an example that's closer to home but I think with 
(University town)...in particular because they were so straight up about it 
and because they - when they talk about Prevent it wasn't just Muslim 
extremism that they're looking at, they're looking at all forms of extremism.  
This reveals how counter-terror measures like Prevent, which have been 
widely criticised in academia (Briggs, 2010; Kundnani, 2007; McGhee, 2008; 
Pentazis and Pemberton, 2009) are not uniformly rejected by participants in this 
research. This reflects the diverse experiences of the policy across the country 
KLJKOLJKWHGE\2¶7RROHHWDOin a report arguing that although Prevent is 
VHHQDVDµKLJKO\WRS-down, securitised and disciplinary model of state 
HQJDJHPHQWZLWK0XVOLPV¶WKLVSUHVHQWVDSDUWLDOSLFWXUHDQGWKDWµ0XVOLPFLYLO
society actors were not merely subject to the Prevent agenda, but were actively 
LQYROYHGLQUHVKDSLQJDQGFRQWHVWLQJWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI3UHYHQW¶2¶7RROH
et al 2013:53). Certainly the views of some participants reverberate such an 
ambiguous view of Prevent with some even welcoming the financial assistance 
and opportunities given to marginalised Muslim communities through the 
strategy. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind, as Kundnani (2009:6) has 
pointed out, that Prevent has created a climate where µto make radical criticisms 
of the government is to risk losing funding and facing isolation as an µextremist¶, 
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while those organisations which support the government are rewarded¶. This is 
why as Chapter 2 discussed Prevent is largely viewed as a policy that has 
criminalised all Muslims by bundling welfare programmes together with counter-
terrorism measures which has strained the relationship between Muslims and the 
state (Brown, 2010; Spalek and Lambert, 2008).  
Attitudes to Prevent acts as one of the markers, albeit a blunt one due to 
the relative silence on the subject, of whether someone falls within the explicit 
resistance or implicit resistance camp, although these are not hard and fixed 
categories and sometimes views can be overlapping and ambivalent. However, 
the distinction is real enough to create palpable tensions between those who are 
more confrontational and critical of the state and those who prefer to work with 
the state or accede to its terms. Such divisions and conflicts were observed 
during fieldwork between dissenting activists who are likely to accuse those who 
UHFHLYHJRYHUQPHQWIXQGLQJDVµVHOORXWV¶DQGµDSRORJLVWV¶ZKLOHWKHFRmmunity 
based activists criticise the former for wasting time on protests and 
demonstrations. Such tensions were visibly heightened with the Woolwich 
murders in London where two Muslim men brutally killed a British soldier Lee 
Rigby on 22 May 2013. A rift opened up between activists who sought to 
publically condemn the murders and those who viewed such efforts as apologist. 
7KHVHSRVLWLRQVFDQEHFRQWUDVWHGE\VRPHRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SRVWVRQ
Facebook on 23 May 2013. 
Abid,¶PRUJDQL]LQJD3($&()8/'(021675$7,21RQ0RQGD\DJDLQVW
the killings in Woolwich.  
Amna: There is a simple explanation as to why the middle class Muslim 
elites that run these organisations that supposedly represent us all are 
perpetually subservient, apologetic and Uncle Tom in their approach. 
Those who benefit most from empire, benefit most from keeping up the 
status quo.  
These two social media posts capture the divergent positions of the two 
models of active citizenship that are delineated by the research and contrasted 
DVµH[SOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶DQGµLPSOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶$ELG¶VTXRWHUHSUHVHQWVHIIRUWVE\
the latter to reassure the public that Muslims are equally repulsed by the 
atrocities in Woolwich as the rest of society, while Amna captures the concerns 
of more dissenting activists who view such strategies as inflaming anti-Muslim 
prejudice. Those who are more implicit in their resistance sometimes express 
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their opposition to confrontational tactics by mocking the dissenting activists as 
µ)DQRQW\SHV¶UHIHUULQJWRWKHLUWHQGHQF\WRFLWHDQWL-colonialist and anti-
imSHULDOLVWOLWHUDWXUHDV$PQDGRHVLQWKHTXRWHDERYHE\FLWLQJWKHµHPSLUH¶
However, as Chapter 6 on the processes and production of collective identity has 
discussed in more detail these different social movement actors are closely 
networked and publically their differences dissolve when confronting the forces of 
Islamophobia.  
It should be noted that the issue of Prevent and securitisation is a highly 
sensitive one that is often skirted around or elided by a number of participants 
which is itself revealing. It would be disingenuous, if not epistemologically 
suspect, to assume that such silences are simply a result of internalising 
KHJHPRQLFGLVFRXUVHVUHIOHFWLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRISRZHU3DUWLFLSDQWV¶IDLOXUHWR
confront or challenge the issue of securitisation should not be conflated with lack 
of agency. This is because the two different approaches to active citizenship 
distinguished above represent two different strategies for tackling challenges to 
Muslim citizenship at the current time. In other words it is a case of different 
strategies of resistance rather than a distinction between resistance and 
complicity. 7KHPRGHVRIDFWLYLVPWKDWDUHGHVFULEHGLQWKLV&KDSWHUDVµLPSOLFW
UHVLVWDQFH¶FRQWUDGLFW+DQGVunderstanding of the term µUHVLVWDQFH¶ 
ZKLFKKHGHILQHVDVDIRUPRIDFWLYLVPZKHUHµDFWVUHDGLO\FURVVWKHERXQGDU\
LQWRGHILDQFHRIDXWKRULW\¶:KLOHPDQ\RIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVZKRFRQYH\PRUH
explicit resistance would certainly agree with Hands (2011) in discrediting 
µLPSOLFLW¶IRUPVRIUHVLVWance as posing no real challenges to Islamophobia or the 
forces that produce it, the different value system that is promoted by these 
politics stands in opposition to the dominant values of neoliberalism and 
nationalism which should not be dismissed. Care must also be taken in using the 
WHUPVµUHVLVWDQFH¶DQGµDJHQF\¶WRDYRLGUHDGLQJLQWRWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DFWLRQV
political motives that are irrelevant to their projects in the first place. As Mahmood 
(2005:9) has warned there is a danger of assuming that acWVOLNHµUHVLVWDQFH¶
KDYHDXQLYHUVDOPHDQLQJµRXWVLGHRIWKHHWKLFDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQGLWLRQVZLWKLQ
ZKLFKVXFKDFWVDFTXLUHWKHLUSDUWLFXODUPHDQLQJ¶%HDULQJWKLVPLQGLWLV
acknowledged that the participants in question might not concur with the 
interpretation of their actions and views as resistant. +HUH0DKPRRG¶V
LQVLVWHQFHRQVHQVLWLYLW\WRµKLVWRULFDOO\FRQWLQJHQWDUUDQJHPHQWVRISRZHU¶
warrants consideration of the disproportionate impact of securitisation on Muslim 
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citizenship which complicates the ways in which their reflections on the social 
world can be interpreted.   
 
Cultural politics and active citizenship 
So far the chapter has focused on distinguishing and contrasting the 
different models of activism presented by participants in this study by 
differentiating their conceptions of citizenship and degrees of resistance to 
domination. This section focuses on common strategies and political projects that 
unite the diverse social movement actors in efforts to negotiate citizenship on 
their own terms, through cultural politics to defy dominant codes of neoliberalism 
and nationalism. This is evident by the way in which the pejorative views of 
Britishness and nationalism can be reframed as the need to create a space for 
Muslims within the nation. Basma demonstrates this reasoning by contrasting the 
aims of Muslim and non-Muslim activists.  
Basma: I see a lot of the white leftie like comrades do focus on that like 
µ2KWKH8QLYHUVLW\JRQQDEHV-h-i-t-ing themselves with this and that and 
like WKH\¶UHUHDOO\OLNHODXJKLQJDW- having a dig at the man but I understand 
just as you know a slave would happily see the death of his master but 
WKDW¶VQRWRXUIRFXVJHQXLQHO\LWGRHVQ¶WHYHQFRQFHUQPH >@«,¶PJRLQJ
to work on this because of all these positive aspects and because of my 
SHRSOHWKDW¶VLWVR,GRQ¶WFDUHZKDW«DERXWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RUDQ\WKLQJ
DQGWRDFHUWDLQH[WHQW,GRQ¶WZDQWWKH8QLYHUVLW\¶VUHSXWDWLRQWREH
WDUQLVKHG,¶YHJRWDQXQGHUJUDGDQGKRSH- soon to be postgrad degree 
from here (laughsOLNH,QHHGLW,ZRXOGQ¶WKDYHFRPHKHUHLI,JHQXLQHO\
GLGQ¶WEHOLHYHWKDWthe UniversityKDGDORWWRRIIHUWREHJLQZLWK,W¶VQRW
DERXWWKDWLW¶VQRWDERXWWDNLQJLWGRZQLW¶VDERXWUH-shifting and making 
WKLVHYHU\ERG\¶VXQLYHUVity and space. 
Here Basma is qualifying Muslim dissent as a demand for greater inclusion 
and concessions for Muslims which stands in contrast to the left politics of total 
transformation through seizing power. While this sentiment about the University 
cannot be extended to Basma¶s views on British citizenship, of which she is 
wholly dismissive, it does reveal that the impetus for her politics comes from a 
civic concern to make university spaces inclusive of BME students. Williams 
(2007:1868) has described some of the cultural pressures for social movements 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  193 
to adjust their demands to fit within established norms which PHDQVµXVXDOO\WKH\
do not ask publics for radical revisions of their conceptions of societal 
DUUDQJHPHQWV¶%DVPD¶VDWWHPSWWRPDNHDQDSSHDOIRUFKDQJHµLQDUHDGLO\
accessible, and hence broadly legitimatHODQJXDJH¶:LOOLDPV1868), 
particularly by contrasting reasonable Muslim demands with more radical left 
ones, is broadly suggestive of the cultural limits on Muslim political agency. It 
also reverberates a sense of entitlement to inclusion that was touched upon 
earlier by other participants (Sameera) implying an integral logic of belonging that 
contradicts the expression of alienation found in others contexts. Such 
expressions reveal a basic level of confidence in citizenship status, particularly 
compared to previous generations.   
Khayam:LWKWKHROGHUSHRSOHEHFDXVHWKH\¶UHDELWPRUHGHPXUH«DQG
WKH\ZRUU\DORWRNHVSHFLDOO\LIWKH\¶UHIURPLPPLJUDQWEDFNJURXQGV
WKH\¶YHMXVWFRPH here from a different country and the reality is the 
IUHHGRPVLQWKH0XVOLPFRXQWULHVDUHQ¶WJUHDWDQ\ZD\\HDKDQGWKHUXOHRI
ODZLVQ¶WJUHDWDQ\ZD\VRWKH\¶YHJRWDPRUHSXWXSDQGVKXWXSDWWLWXGHWR
WKLVNLQGRIWKLQJZKHUHDVWKH\RXQJSHRSOHGRQ¶W«Fause we recognise 
ZH¶UHFLWL]HQVULJKWZHKDYHWKDWEDVLFULJKWWRQRWEHVSLHGRQ«WRQRWEH




not, whether- LWGRHVQ¶WPDNHRQHELWRIGLIIHUHQFH 
These discourses cast the dissent of young Muslims in a different light, 
demonstrating participants¶ sense of entitlement to demand that the concept of 
citizenship and nationhood be broadened to include Muslim identities. The citizen 
rights asserted in these accounts also indicate a degree of empowerment and 
the political capacity to articulate such demands despite the securitisation of 
politics and citizenship. However, the presence of inordinate burdens and 
pressures means participants still have to express political agency through 
LQQRYDWLYHDQGFUHDWLYHµWDFWLFVRISURWHVW¶ (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2007:4536), 
that is the strategLHVGHSOR\HGWRµWU\WRVKDSHSXEOLFRSLQLRQDQGSXWSUHVVXUHRQ
WKRVHLQSRVLWLRQVRIDXWKRULW\¶7KHVHWDFWLFDOUHSHUWRLUHVFDQEHUHIHUUHGWRDV
empowerment and enablement struggles.  
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Amna*HWWLQJ\RXQJSHRSOHLQYROYHGDQGWKDW¶VP\PDLQDLPUHDOO\MXVt to 
get young people in my area, especially more involved in politics.  
Abid: A lot of people that get into arts be it drama, be it acting, poetry 
whatever but not many people get into those spheres to make a difference 
WRSHRSOH¶VOLYHV7KHUH¶VP\VHOI,¶PWKHULJKW- ,¶PJRLQJWRXVHSRHWU\DVa 
means for social change, as a tool for social change. 
Ameer: :HOOOLNH,VDLG«Whey - that these people they need leadership 
DQGLW¶VXSWRWKHP,FDQ¶WIRUFHSHRSOH\RXNQRZWRMRLQWKHUHYROXWLRQEXW,
could educate them and I could possibly, I could try and make them see 
the world differently you know.  
These forms of mobilisation reflect the quintessential concerns of cultural 
politics made salient by social movements which engage in µorganised struggles 
over symbols¶ and µpublic contests over how society is imagined¶ (Nash, 
2009:141).  While disengagement from mainstream politics and negative 
associations with Britishness have often been portrayed as evidence of the fact 
that Muslims are unfit and unworthy of  British citizenship (Parekh, 2008), these 
tactics challenge such reasoning by revealing struggles aimed at inclusion and 
belongiQJZLWKRXWµ³QRUPDOL]LQJ´GLVWRUWLRQ¶3DNXOVNLLQ6WHYHQVRQ
2001:3). 3DUWLFLSDQWV¶WDFWLFDOUHSHUWRLUHVIRFXVHGRQLQIRUPLQJHGXFDWLQJDQG
motivating the public have a specific aim to reshape society from its grassroots.  
Saif: So basically what I¶PVD\LQJLVWKLVLVDQHZIRUPRIDFWLYLVPWKDW
SHRSOHKDYHWRWDNHRQ«DQGLWFRPHV«IURPWKHLQWHOOLJHQWVLDVLPSOHDV
LW¶VWKHDFDGHPLFVWKDWKDYHJRWWRWDNHWKLVRQDQGDFDGHPLFVDUHDQ




talk to us. 
Parveen,¶YHWDNHQDVWHSEDFNZLWKJRLQJRQDOOWKHVHSURWHVWVDQGWKDW
sort of stuff because I feel I can make more of a change if I write stuff 
ZKHUHLI,¶PPRUHRI- ,¶YHJRWDYRLFHLQPDLQVWUHDPPHGLDEHFDXVH\HDK
I've been to loads of protests and.. nothing has come out of it.   
These chosen modes of activism through academic debate and 
dissemination of knowledge (Saif), community awareness raising and blogging, 
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journalism and contributing to mass media (Parveen) represent strategic choices 
in response to purposeful aims. Abjuring more conventional forms of politics, 
these participants direct their energies towards revolutionising social norms and 
YDOXHVZKLFK5RFKRQLQ:LOOLDPVDUJXHVLVDµFRQWHQWLRXVVWUXJJOH¶
IRUµFXOWXUDOFKDQJH¶,QWKe case of Saif the aims are to promote learning among 
members of the Muslim community, while Parveen¶s efforts seek to address 
mainstream audiences to dispel misconceptions about Muslims. These quotes 
highlight two different tactics for shaping opinion, one targeted inwards to 




should be kind of, they should be engaging more in this kind of activism 
EHFDXVHWKH\VKRXOGEHUHVLVWLQJ«\RXNQRZDQGWKHRQO\ZD\WKDW«WKH
RQO\ZD\WKDWZH¶OOEHDEOHWRJHWDQ\ZKHUHLVLIZHNHHSUHVLVWLQJ 
Hanif: If you can educate people aboXWZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJWKHQ\RXNQRZ
obviously they would feel some sympathy because obviously I feel like you 
KDYHWRVRHYHQLI\RXGRWKDWWKHQWKDWFDQKHOSOLNHLQHYHQWKURXJKLILW¶V
like elections, electing MEPs, electing MPS, writing letters towards them, 
getting it through the governmental stages so that it actually gets to the top 
stages where the government can do something about it. If the government 
know that this is what the people want to do then the government will have 
WRGRWKDWFDXVHLW¶V representative that way. 
Haseena is expressing a rationale common to the more explicitly resistant 
mode of activism that social change can only be achieved by convincing Muslims 
to directly resist oppressive conditions while Hanif, whose activism oscillates 
between explicit and implicit modes of resistance, argues that gaining the support 
of majority citizens would compel those in power to address issues important to 
marginal groups. Both participants have a very different view of the state¶s 
culpability for social anomie, while Haseena¶s stance suggests the state is 
willfully creating conditions that necessitate resistance, Hanif¶s argument 
indicates public indifference is responsible for state failure. Yet both participants 
consider it incumbent upon activists to shift public perceptions and opinions to 
achieve social change. The pressure of trying to balance the divergent tangents 
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of internal and external goals sometimes calls for skillful maneuvering by 
participants.  
Arya: If you look at all the leaders and the ISoc and the leaders in (youth 
group) and the leaders in anything really they would always choose people 
that they feel like can - that have enough knowledge to pass on, that can 
be good role models and inshallah I  hope to be and then again at the 
same time we are challenging the outside world because of the things that 
we do and with (youth groupHVSHFLDOO\WKHFRPPXQLW\SURMHFWVWKDWZH¶UH
GRLQJWKDW¶VFRQVWDQWO\WU\LQJWRVKRZSHRSOHWKDWLWLVSDUWRIRXUUHligion to 
SDUWLFLSDWHLQVRFLHW\DQGFRPPXQLWLHV« .... again another aspect of 
(youth groupDQGWKH,6RFLVWR«LVIRUWKH\RXWKWRFRPHLQ«OHDUQZKDW
they can, change them as much as we can, get them to educate 
themselves, get the, you know, the whole thing that happened to me where 
\RXUSULRULWLHVFKDQJHDQGHYHU\WKLQJWKDW¶VWKHZKROHSRLQWWKDWZH¶UH
WU\LQJWRFKDQJHSHRSOHWRPDNHWKHPEHWWHUSHRSOHVRZH¶UHZRUNLQJRQ
the inside and the outside. 
Here Arya is describing the work of the Islamic Society and the youth group 
in which she has a leadership role which are both aiming to shape the identities 
of young Muslims in accordance with the correct form of Islam to be good roles 
models to the µoutside world¶ in order to demonstrate that Muslims are good 
citizens. What Arya refers to as a strategy of µworking on the inside and the 
outside¶ is indicative of the twofold pressures on young Muslims who face the 
challenges of Islamophobia from the rest of society but also struggle with the 
need for reform within their own communities. In the context of post-9/11, the 
exceptional demands and challenges that render Muslim citizenship contingent 
and precarious means battling on multiple fronts, within a limited civic space and 
with narrow margins of success.  
Mona: You know even if it takes just one person to sort of... be enlightened 
by it I think that will be enough for me I don't want- I don't want I mean  am 
I really in a position where I can awaken a whole load of masses, am I 
leader in that sort of sense, probably not but if it can - if it's one picture that 
maybe some, maybe somebody visiting my (photography) exhibition can 
see oh you know what's the message behind that like .....if that can make 
them more politically aware then I think that's great that's like - that's my 
outcome achieved.  
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Khayam: LLNH,VD\ZH¶UHODWHWRFLYLOVRFLHW\«WKHROGHUFRPPXQLW\ZHUH
concerned about establishing themselves in the market, concerned about 
establishing themselves in government and they saw that as sufficient «
the reality is that civil society was lagging, now people of my generation, 
DOWKRXJKWKHFKDOOHQJHLVWKHUH«HVSHFLDOO\organising people and 
resources«««DPRQJVWWKRVHFKDOOHQJHV\HVWKHVS\LQJWKLQJLV«LW¶V -  it 
hinders you, it makes you hesitate buWZH¶OOGRLWDQ\ZD\, it just has to be 
GRQH«LIZHGRQ¶WGRWKDW\RXNQRZZH¶UHJRLQJWREHFRPSOHWHly 
disenfranchised from this society. 
The above quotes suggest that participants deploy agency and choice in 
prioritising modes of activism that are viewed as important despite being 
challenging and indeterminate in their outcomes. These positive strategies of 
self-empowerment and capacity-building in British civil society defy allegations of 
apathy and withdrawal. If anything, as discussed earlier these politics personify 
the type of µresponsible self-help¶ that contemporary governments are seeking to 
cultivate in citizens as discussed in Chapter 2. These educational and 
empowering ventures are motivated by values, norms and aspirations for society 
which diametrically oppose some of the neoliberal discourses focused on profit, 
marketisation and consumption, as well as the resurgent demand for nationalist 
sentiment being foisted upon citizens by politicians. These efforts can be seen as 
incarnating active citizenship by participants who are renegotiating the notion of 
citizenship as µactivist citizens¶ (Isin, 2009; 2012). This term is suggested by Isin 
(2009:383) as representing the actions of those members of a polity who 
challenge the status quo in contrast to µactive¶ citizens who follow µa script for 
already existing citizens to follow already existing paths¶. Isin¶s (2009; 2012) 
definition of µactivist citizen¶ is useful for exploring the ways in which participants 
redefine citizenship on terms that disrupt dominant nationalist and neoliberal 
narratives but even where participants enact active citizenship by complying with 
hegemonic discourses this can be interpreted as a strategic pursuit of implicit 
forms of challenge to power. Participants are µactivist citizens¶ who demand 
citizenship on their own terms through dissent and rejection of hegemonic terms 
but they are also µactive citizens¶ through normative beliefs on civic duty that 
converge with some aspects of dominant narratives.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has conveyed the efforts of young British Muslim activists to 
negotiate some of the multiple challenges posed by new demands and 
contingencies being placed on citizenship through the war on terror, neoliberal 
rationalities of governance and resurgent nationalism elaborated in Chapter 2. 
7KHDQDO\VLVIRFXVHVRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶QRUPDWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJVDQGSUDFWLFHVRI
citizenship which reveal constrained and conflicted ways in which citizenship is 
imagined and enacted, engendering alternative forms of civic consciousness. For 
many young Muslims their relationship with the British nation is fraught with 
tension due to their feelings of exclusion, victimisation and a fear of securitisation 
which contributes to the experience and perception of citizenship and belonging 
DVSUHFDULRXVDQGFRQGLWLRQDO7KLVVXJJHVWVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHMHFWWKH
contingencies to which their membership of Britain is being subjected rather 
membership itself.  
Dominant discourses that frame Muslims as suspect citizens due to their 
lack of affinity to µBritishness¶ are challenged by the presence of positive 
associations with British freedoms and opportunities as well as participants¶ 
understandings of citizenship as a generic concept which reflects notions of 
individual duty and obligations signifying the type of µresponsible self-help¶ 
contemporary governments have been seeking to cultivate. These cultural 
politics evoke two models of civic and political activism or active citizenship, 
distinguished by differentiated intensities of resistance to hegemonic concepts of 
FLWL]HQVKLSDQGQDWLRQKRRG7KHGLIIHUHQWPRGHOVDUHFRQWUDVWHGDVµH[SOLFLW
UHVLVWDQFH¶RQWKHRQHKDQGDQGµLPSOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶RQWKHRWKHU+RZHYHULWLV
also argued that both these forms of activism indicate different strategies of 
resistance rather than being antagonistic to each other in their aims as their 
differences often dissolve in public.   
The findings demonstrate that young adult Muslims incarnate active 
FLWL]HQVKLSWKURXJKHQJDJHPHQWLQµWDFWLFDOUHSHUWRLUHV¶RI empowerment and 
capacity-building within their own localities and communities, often demonstrating 
convergence with the hegemonic demand for µindividual responsibility¶ promoted 
by recent government regimes on citizenship. However, invoking a very different 
set of values and priorities to hegemonic notions of active citizenship predicated 
on personal and material profit or narrow nationalist priorities the participants 
affirm a strong commitment to civic responsibility and participation on the basis of 
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faith, humanity and universal ethics. The embodied forms of active citizenship 
demonstrated by these young activists defy fears that negative associations with 
Britishness weaken the value and relevance of citizenship. As Soysal 
(2012b:388) has argued: 
This shift in focus from national collectivity to particularistic claims does not 
necessarily imply disengagement from public spheres. Neither does it 
mean the disintegration of civic arenas. On the contrary, it evinces new 
forms of mobilization through which individuals enact and practise their 
citizenship.  
This research suggests young Muslims are taking up the discursive 
possibilities and potential offered by WKHµLQWHUVWLWLDO¶VSDFHEHWZHHQWKHQDWLRQ
and post-national spaces but their actions are still embedded in the nation. As 
seen in previous chapters, like other movements for social justice, Muslims 
traverse frontiers in political repertoires through theLUµFUHDWLYHLQYHQWLYHDQG
auWRQRPRXVDFWV¶,VLQ5034). Isin¶s (2009, 2012) insistence on focusing on 
citizenship acts and practices to understand the changing meaning and forms of 
citizenship is important here. He states that µthinking about citizenship through 
acts means to implicitly accept that to be a citizen is to make claims to justice: to 
break habitus and act in a way that disrupts already defined orders, practices and 
statuses¶ (Isin, 2009: 384, original emphasis). Seen in this way the dissent and 
resistance offered to hegemonic notions of British citizenship in this chapter 
represent citizen politics that confirm the participants¶ stake in British society.  
This chapter therefore uncovers how the cultural politics of young adult 
Muslims has scope for British citizenship but also highlights the continuing 
presence of structural constraints that impede the better integration of Muslims 
into British society. The next chapter relates the forms of politics discussed thus 
far to the macro and abstract level of society by applying Foucauldian analytics of 
power to the data.  
  





This chapter brings the cultural politics discussed in the previous chapters 
into dialectical contact with broader configurations of power in society. If the 
previous chapters engaged in analysis at the micro and meso levels of society 
then the present chapter takes a much more ambitious leap into the orbit of 
macro theories of social power. In this chapter I argue that the cultural politics of 
young adult Muslims responds to two distinct forms of power, delineated for 
heuristic purposes as imperceptible forms of power that operate through 
)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRIJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\DQGSHUFHSWLEOHIRUPVRISRZHURSHUDWLQJ
through securitisation processes. As the following discussion argues these forms 
of power are difficult to separate from each other and their combined 
achievement can be discovered in the effects and responses they produce in 
subjects of power. The argument proceeds by firstly highlighting what the two 
modes of power constitute, followed by an examination of how they are reflected 
in participant discourses. This is divided into two parts, where first imperceptible 
power is discussed and then securitised citizenship, as a direct kind of power, is 
analysed.  
 
Two faces of power 
In this thesis I argue that the cultural politics of young adult Muslims can be 
understood as a historical and situated response to particular relations of power 
in society within which marginalised identities and politics must be understood. 
This argument GUDZVRQ)RXFDXOW¶VWKHRULVDWLRQRISRZHUNQRZOHGJHDQG
governmentality, as well as theories of securitisation of citizenship in the wake of 
9/11. It is argued that the participants in this study respond to the presence of 
historically specific relations of power made perceptible by Foucault (1978; 1980; 
1990; 1994; 1995), which render cultural politics an inescapable but also a 
strategic mode of resistance to multiple forms of stigmatisation and exclusion, 
broadly encapsulated in the notion of Islamophobia. The political discourses and 
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grammars of action demonstrated by activists in this study not only presuppose 
such a model of power but also evidence it by deploying appropriate forms of 
µcounterpower¶ (Castells, 2012:5) WRVXEYHUWLWV¶UDWLRQDOLWLHVDQG operations.  
Here it is necessary to reiterate that Foucault (1997:299) conceived of 
power as a productive force diffused throughout the social body. As discussed in 
the literature review chapter Foucault (1997:299) did not view power as 
QHFHVVDULO\µHYLO¶EHFDXVHVRPHZD\VRIH[HUFLVLQJSRZHUDUHµVWUDWHJLFJDPHV
between liberties ± LQZKLFKVRPHWU\WRFRQWUROWKHFRQGXFWRIRWKHUV¶ZKLFKKH
DOVRUHIHUVWRDVµJDPHVRISRZHU¶7KHVHGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\LQYROYHGRPLQDWLRQ
and repression and can be seen as productive forces. The competitive and 
adversarial tensions between different actors within activism networks, as they 
negotiate collective identities and political strategies can be seen as such games 
RISRZHU7KLVFRQWUDVWVZLWKDµVWDWHRIGRPLQDWLRQ¶ ZKHQµDQLQGLYLGXDORUVRFLDO
group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and 
preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military 
PHDQV¶)RXFDXOW%HWZHHQWKHVHWZROLPLWVDUHµWHFKQRORJLHV of 
JRYHUQPHQW¶)RXFDXOWRULQRWKHUZRUGVWKHLGHDRIµJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶
described more expansively in Chapter 3.  
A central claim of this thesis is that the cultural politics of young Muslims in 
this study highlight two distinct dimensions of power in Britain today, captured by 
the notion of domination on the one hand and governmentality on the other, that 
become apparent in the forms of resistance mounted by participants. The 
manifestation of power through perceptible or concrete forms of domination 
refers to the securitisation of citizenship in a post 9/11 context while the idea of 
µJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶XQGHUOLQHVLPSHUFHSWLEOHDQGGLIIXVHGIRUPVRISRZHUWKDW
emerge in the subjectivity of citizens. However, it is argued that both these forms 
of power are imbricated in reinforcing the relations of power in society as 
DUWLFXODWHGLQ)RXFDXOW¶VH[SRVLWLRQRIWKHPXOWLSOHDQGFRPSOH[WHFKQRORJLHVRI
control that characterise contemporary governance. Before applying these 
theories to the findings it is useful to illustrate how these two forms of power 
SUHVHQWWKHPVHOYHVLQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLVFRXUVHV7RH[HPSOLI\WKLVSRLQWWZR
quotes are apposite as they epitomise some of the political aims of the social 
movement that is being enunciated in this thesis.  
Basma:KDW,¶PGRLQJWKHJURXQGZRUN for «ERWKRQZKHWKHULW¶V
regarding Palestine, BME communities against racism, oppression so on, 
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or Islamophobic activity whatever - it focuses on the empowerment of those 
SHRSOHWKDW,¶PDGGUHVVLQJWKDWLVZKDt - it - what took me a few years to 
understand, like, there is no point in trying to make your oppressor grow a 
heart, what the hell is the point on that and what is the point of focusing 
your energy and your intelligence and your knowledge, everything, money 
even on WKHRSSRVLWLRQRURQWKHRQHZKR¶GUDWKHUKDYH\RXNLOOHGWKDQ
KDYHDFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWK\RX\HDKVRWKDWLVZKDW,HVVHQWLDOO\GRLW¶V
about education, educating and empowering your own.  




relation of domination with citizens making a direct challenge counter-productive 
as well threatening VLQFH\RXFDQEHµNLOOHG¶$GLIIHUHQWNLQGRISRZHULV
conceptualised by Kasim.   
Kasim: [The aim is] to try to bring communities... into... in open and say 
that look we have the power we« delegitimize the power of the powerful 
and the most important bit I think Steve Beko was absolutely right that the 
mind of the oppressed is the most powerful weapon in the hand of the 
oppressor. It is our own conceptions, it is our own understanding of 
ourselves that we have to reinvent «and this is the aim if we start creating 
these platforms in which we can say that look we don¶t recognise this 
government, we just simply don¶t recognise these people, whoever these 
are, we want to organise our community in different ways.  
This reveals a strategy of deconstructing and unsettling given 
understandings of a social order that is conceived as oppressive, by creating 
public spaces where state hegemony can be exposed and undermined. In this 
TXRWH.DVLPVLWXDWHVSRZHUZLWKLQWKHVWDWH¶VDELOLW\DQGFDSDFLW\WRVKDSHDQG
manage the political subjectivities of other citizens. Rather than acting on their 
bodies through concrete forms of violence this is a more diffused and 
surreptitious form of control that acts on the consciousness of the µsubjectivated¶
(Foucault, 1995) FLWL]HQ:KLOH%DVPD¶VTXRWHUHIHUVWRWKHIXWLOLW\RIGLUHFWO\
appealing to power, her redirection of political efforts towards educating the 
people reflects a simiODUORJLFWR.DVLP¶VYLHZWKDWDFWLYLVPPXVWEHWDUJHWHGDW
the point at which power produces its most potent effects. This invokes 
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)RXFDXOW¶VDLGHDRIJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\WKDWGRHVQRWLPSRVHSRZHUEXW
rather employs tactics to create dispositions, tendencies, subjectivities and ways 
of thinking that produce the outcomes necessary for power to be exercised 
µZLWKRXWWKHIXOODZDUHQHVVRIWKHSHRSOH¶ 
These diVFRXUVHVVXJJHVWWKDWWKHVWDWH¶VSRZHULVLPDJLQHGWRUHVWRQtwo 
distinct strategies; through its monopoly of violence manifested in the ability to 
KDYHGLVVLGHQWVµNLOOHG¶DQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHSRZHURIFRQWUROOLQJµWKHPLQG
RIWKHRSSUHVVHG¶7KHVHIRUPVRISRZHUVLJQLI\WKHµSRVVLEOHILHOGRIDFWLRQ¶
(Foucault, 1994b:341) in which participants mount resistance through cultural 
politics.  
 
Technologies of government  
7KLVVHFWLRQH[SOLFDWHVKRZ)RXFDXOW¶VDQDO\WLFVRISRZHUH[SODLQWKH
cultural politics of young adult Muslims by re-H[DPLQLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLVFRXUVHV
on themes raised in previous chapters. The existence of certain technologies of 
power which operate through cultural mechanisms are demonstrated by the way 
in which activism is oriented towards challenging them but also how they are 
appropriated and exercised by activists themselves. So firstly it is established 
that knowledge is central to power, secondly that it is diffused and nominal rather 
than originating in a particular location and finally it is revealed how power is 
exercised through particular technologies which can be resisted as well as 
appropriated and redeployed.  
 
Knowledge as power 
The salience of knowledge as a central concern of activism suggests that 
this is seen as a critical mode of power that must be addressed and reversed. In 
Chapter 5 it is revealed that pDUWLFLSDQWVFRQVWUXFWµSROLWLFV¶DVDYRFDWLRQWKDW
demands certain capabilities and expertise about the social world. Having 
knowledge is not only seen as a qualification for activism but its absence is 
viewed as an obstacle to engagement. 
Irum: Most people are conformists you know the majority of the readership 
LVWKH'DLO\0DLODQG6XQUHDGHUVKLSWKH\¶UHDOOFRQIRUPLVWVWKH\OLWHUDOO\DUH
VSRRQIHGDQGWKH\MXVWDEVRUEZKDWWKH\¶UHJLYHQDQGWKH\GRQ¶WWKLQN
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DERXWLWDQGIRUPHWKDW¶VYHU\GHWULPHQWDOWRVRFLHW\«[  ]..«SHRSOHGRQ¶W
HYHQNQRZVRPHSHRSOHGRQ¶WHYHQNQRZZKRWKHSROLWLFLDQVDUHZKRWKH
Prime Minister is - ,UHPHPEHUZKHQSHRSOHGLGQ¶WHYHQNQRZ*RUGRQ
%URZQZDV3ULPH0LQLVWHULWZDVOLNH«WKLVLVUHDOO\DSSDOOLQJUHDOO\UHDOly 
appalling. 
Sameera: I think a lot of it [social injustice] is to do with being uninformed.. 
EHFDXVHOHW¶VEHKRQHVWHGXFDWLRQLVWKHJUHDWOLEHUDWRU. YRXNQRZLW¶VUHDOO\
VLPSOLVWLFEXWLW¶VNLQGRI, LISHRSOHDUHQ¶WHGXFDWHG«GRWKH\UHDOO\NQRZ
any better, you know. 
These quotes reveal the importance of knowledge, particularly about 




their parents, indicative of the unrestrained power of the state. This is seen as 
damaging to society since this creates a chasm between citizens and political 
structures of power but the blame is being attributed to citizens who are 
µFRQIRUPLVWV¶. Sameera links the pursuit of social justice to the ability to gain 
knowledge because of the belief that education has the ability to liberate people 
from the clutches of power. The focus on knowledge as an object of political 
intervention suggests that participants view it as a dimension within which power 
is anchored and can be dislodged. The inherent logic is that knowledge can 
empower the powerless but also that it is the basis of power itself.  
The importance of knowledge as a resource in activism is explored in 
Chapter 5 where it is revealed how participants build and maintain networks of 
like-minded activists and supporters to produce and disseminate alternative 
bodies of knowledge to contest what is seen as mainstreDPPDVVPHGLD¶V
untrustworthy and biased representation of the social world. Rejection of public 
institutions and mainstream media is closely related to the need to expose 
DXWKHQWLFYHUVLRQVRIUHDOLW\DQGEULQJWKHVHWRWKHSXEOLF¶VDWWHQWLRQ7HKPLQD¶V
plans to set up a new organisation to support Indian Kashmiri activists is 
revealing of this.  
Tehmina: But having that space where we can put information about 
Kashmir because we have a lot of books, we have a lot of reports that have 
been written by people there, UHDOO\ZHOOGRFXPHQWHGUHSRUWV«EXWWKH\
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MXVWKDYHQ¶WKDGH[SRVXUHSHRSOHKDYHQ¶WKDGDFFHVVWRWKHPWKHUH¶VVXFK
little .. facts and figures RQ.DVKPLULW¶VXQUHDO«>@«I had a couple of 
events at University in 2010 and 2011 and you know, lot of people attended 
WKRVHHYHQWVEXW«,ZDVWU\LQJWRRUJDQLVHDOHDIOHW\RXNQRZSULQWHGRII
loads of leaflets for those events but it was so difficult to get the facts and 
ILJXUHVWKDWZHUHQ¶WFRQWURYHUVLDO, FDXVH,QGLDQJRYHUQPHQWGRHVQ¶WDFFHSW
WKLVRQHGXKGXKGXK\RXNQRZLW¶VMXVW«DKKKSDLQVWDNLQJ.  
In this quote knowledge about the issue of Kashmir is assumed to be 
central to the mobilisation of support for the issue but also what is being 
prioritised is the knowledge that comes from the people, directly from the sources 
LQ.DVKPLUµZULWWHQE\SHRSOHWKHUH¶ZKLFKDUHQRWWDLQWHGE\WKH,QGLDQ
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLWLcal manipulations or censorship efforts. Here Tehmina is not 
only suggesting that the real facts about Kashmir are being suppressed but that 
making them available is the main aim of activism in this project, reflecting the 
argument in Chapter 5 that challenging false knowledge and promoting the 
correct version of events is itself an objective of activism.  
The prioritisation of education, learning and dissemination of knowledge in 
political and civic struggles resonates Foucault¶V (1995) argument that 
knowledge, produced through dominant discourses, is one of the key 
technologies of power in contemporary societies. However, this does not mean 
participants acquire knowledge in an intentional way to consciously counter such 
power, since such concepts and theories are of greater concern to academics 
than activists. In these discourses participants are prioritising education, learning 
and knowledge as a means of achieving political or social capital but they do not 
refer to the nature of power in society, rather it is implied. This is because such 
forms of power, operating through discourses and knowledge, are successful 
because of their ability to function as invisible and neutral forces through 
established norms of society. This accounts for the strategic importance of 
cultural politics whereby power can be challenged by resisting and subverting 
dominant discourses in which knowledge and power join forces as Foucault 
(1978:101) explained:  
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to 
thwart it.  
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By this Foucault means that discourse is not just representative of social 
UHDOLW\EXWLWLVDOVRSURGXFWLYHRIVRFLDOREMHFWVVRDGLVFRXUVHµQRWRQO\DVVXPHV
WKHDXWKRULW\RIWKHµWUXWK¶EXWKDVWhe power to make itself true¶+DOO:76, 
original emphasis). Therefore, the discursive production of knowledge is a 
domain in which participants can strategically locate their struggles, which is 
evident in the unequivocal rejection of mainstream mass media and the 
cultivation of alternative sites for the production, dissemination and deployment 
of knowledge. By doing so they subvert the truth claims of the powerful and try to 
overturn hegemonic discourses on Muslim citizenship.  
Haseena: I think that the most important thing is.. like empowering our 
FRPPXQLWLHVDQGPDNLQJVXUHWKDWZHGRQ¶WIHHOOLNHZHKDYHWR«ZHKDYH







apologise for like one terrorist out of how many, billion Muslims you know. 
In this extract Haseena iVUHIHUULQJWRWKHµFXOWXUDOLVW¶DSSURDFKWR0XVOLP
citizenship which essentially views Islam as incompatible with the West and 
seeks to control its influence by sanctioning acceptable forms of religiosity 
(Adamson, 2011; Lentin, 2014; Mamdani, 2002; Kundnani, 2014; Roy, 2004). 
7KLVSURGXFHVWKHµGLFKRWRP\¶RIDµPRGHUDWHDQGH[WUHPLVW¶0XVOLPGHILQHGE\
the level of complicity Muslims demonstrate towards government policy and its 
principles+DVHHQD¶VFULWLTXHLQYRNHVDFRPPRQPDLQVWUHDPGLVFRXUVHWKDWµKDs 
turned religious experience into a political category, differentiatinJ³JRRG
Muslims" from "bad Muslims, rather than terrorists from civilians¶0DPGDQL
2002:766). Haseena conveys the implicit understanding that in order to qualify as 
DJRRGµPRGHUDWH¶Muslim, she has to apologise for the terrorist acts committed 
by other members of her faith. As this would entail accepting that Islam is a 
religion of violence, and thus undermining her own identity, Haseena claims the 
RQO\ZD\WRµJHWDQ\ZKHUH¶LVWRUHVist this hegemonic dichotomy which she views 
as a form of racism in the way it discriminates against non-ZKLWHV+DVHHQD¶V
activism is directed at educating and empowering the Muslim community to resist 
repressive social discourses promoting Islamophobia.  
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$QRWKHULOOXVWUDWLYHDVSHFWRI+DVHHQD¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWLWLVQRWFOHDU
where community resistance might be directed and who would the empowered 
community members resist? What agent or institution is it that produces the 
dichotomy that Haseena refers to, what form of power is it that can bring to bear 
this oppressive binary of moderate and extreme?  These indeterminate 
DWWULEXWLRQVLQ+DVHHQD¶VVWDWHPHQWLQYRNHWKH)RXFDXOGLDQDQDO\VLVRISRZHUDV
a force that permeates different levels of society and which pose as accepted 
truths about the world through the authority of knowledge. These forms of power 
are difficult to locate due to their diffused and invisible quality, as discussed in the 
next section.  
 
Power as diffused and nominalist 
FoucauOW¶VQRPLQDlist theory of power asserts that it cannot be reduced to a 
particular site or agent because one its mechanisms is to produce dominant 
societal norms and meanings. This is brought into sharp relief by post 9/11 
politics on Muslims citizenship which has generated volumes of new literature 
emphasising the pathologies associated with this minority religious group, not 
least of all research led by national security agendas concerned with extremism, 
radicalisation and cohesion (Briggs and Birdwell, 2009; Choudhury, 2007; 
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007; Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2010; Home Affairs Committee, 2005;  
Quilliam, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2005). The exercise of power through such regimes 
of truth which encompass multiple sites of production in the power-knowledge 
nexus, including the state, media and academia, H[SOLFDWHVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLVWUXVW
of all established and elite-controlled institutions in society3DUWLFLSDQWV¶
pejorative constructions of politics and politicians explored Chapter 7 need to be 
revisited to pinpoint the way in which a diffused and nominalist conception of 
SRZHUDVµas a productive network that runs through the whole VRFLDOERG\¶
(Foucault, 1994:120) appears in the data.   
Basma,QHYHUWKLQNWKHLULQWHQWLRQVZLOOHYHUEHSXUHDQGWKH\FDQ¶WEH
even if they do start out wanting to become a politician with this and this 
ideal once they get into those seats, those which surround them will drive 
them away from iW7KH\ZRXOGQ¶WEHLQWKRVHVHDWVWREHJLQZLWKXQOHVV
WKH\KDGWRFRPSURPLVHRQFHUWDLQWKLQJVVR,WKLQNWKHRQO\WKLQJ\RX¶YH
got to focus on is the people and those who are kind of hopefully driving 
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WKHPWRGRZKDWWKH\QHHGWRGREXW,GRQ¶WWKLQNZH should put any faith (in 
politicians)LW¶VMXVWDQRWKHUZKLWHVDYLRXUOLNH,VDLGlaughs) regardless 
even if they're black or brown.. the white mask is on (laughs) at all times. 
Kasim: (Sarcastic laugh) PolitLFLDQVDUHSDUWRIWKHSRZHU« HOLWHVVR«
there might be some people, JRRGSHRSOHZKDWHYHU«WKH\PLJKWOLVWHQWR
the similar sort of music I listen to and they might like kids and so on and 
might be nice when you go to their house, they offer you a cup of tea and 
so on but that is all apart from what they do as when they are in the.... 
when they are within the institution, so the power of institution takes 
over...and we have to challenge their power - their power as institutional 
broker. 
As elaborated in Chapter 7, while participants sometimes attribute the 
failure of politics to individual politicians, largely, as these extracts reveal, political 
power is conceived of in terms of systemic and structural domination which lies 
beyond the influence of inGLYLGXDODJHQF\,Q%DVPD¶VTXRWHSRZHULVXQGHUVWRRG
DVDFRHUFLYHIRUFHWKDWLQGXFHVµFRPSURPLVH¶RQprinciples and imposes DµZKLWH
PDVN¶DVGHVFULEHGLQ)DQRQ¶VDQWL-colonial and anti-LPSHULDOERRNµ%ODFN
6NLQ:KLWH0DVNV¶+HUHWKH reference to )DQRQ¶VSV\FKRDQDO\WLFDOLQVLJKWVRQ
the dependency of the racialised subject to white domination has echoes of 
)RXFDXOW¶VQRWLRQRIµsubjectivation¶ (Gros, 2014:344) by power. Similarly, Kasim, 
who referenced Fanon elsewhere in his interview, makes the point that power 
OLHVLQWKHµLQVWLWXWLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQZLWKVRFLDODJHQWV$OWKRXJKSRZHULVEHLQJ
specifically located in a site, it is being nominalised as a force that acts without 
an intentional agent. These ways of understanding power illuminate the acWLYLVWV¶
need to strive for political and social change from outside the system but they 
also make cultural politics more comprehensible since power diffused in society 
works through cultural modes and objects where it produces its effects in 
perceptible and accessible discourses and norms.  
$QLPSRUWDQWDQGVHPLQDODVSHFWRI)RXFDXOW¶VWKHRU\RISRZHULVWKDWWKH
use of knowledge as a technology of power is not important from the perspective 
of evaluating its truth claims. According to Foucault the significance of knowledge 
as a form of power is that its status as true or false is independent of its political 
deployment. Indeed, the role of knowledge as a useful and necessary feature of 
VRFLDOOLIHLVZKDWUHQGHUVLWµSUDFWLFDOO\VHUYLFHDEOH¶IRUSROLWLFDOends.  As Gordon 
(1994:xviii) argues:  
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The reason the combining of power and knowledge in society is a 
redoubtable thing is not that power is apt to promote and exploit spurious 
knowledges (as the Marxist theory of ideology has argued) but, rather that 
the rational exercise of power tends to make the fullest use of knowledges 
capable of the maximum instrumental efficacy. 
This perspective resonates with the way participants frame their own 
alternative sources of knowledge as authentic and closer to the truth, in contrast 
to mainstream sources that are seen as dishonest and misleading. An important 
DQGGLVWLQFWLYHDVSHFWRI)RXFDXOW¶VSROLWLFDOWKRXJKWLVWKHLGHDWKDWWHFKQRORJLHV
of power are not the exclusive purview of a certain class of actors, as often 
argued by Marxists, but that they operate in a way that makes them available to 
all social actors even though the state and elites continue to have a greater 
monopoly over them (Foucault, 1994b). This suggests power can be used to 
dominate and control actions but it can also be deployed as a productive force for 
resistance.  
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to 
say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes 
power hold good, what makes it acceptHGLVVLPSO\WKHIDFWWKDWLWGRHVQ¶W
only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces 
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. 
(Foucault, 1994c:120)  
Such a productive and transformative use of knowledge as power is 
HYLGHQWLQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶HIIRUWVWRFRQVWUXFWDOWHUQDWLYHUHJLPHVRIWUXWKWR
challenge hegemonic concepts, policies and practices. To further illustrate the 
point that technologies of power are available to be appropriated anywhere in the 
social formation I want to highlight a passage from an interview with Irum, a 27 
year old community activist and former member of a government advisory group. 
It is important to bear in mind that while Islamophobia is a driving force for Irum, 
another motivation for activism is the marginalisation and oppression of young 
people and women within Muslim communities. In this extract Irum describes the 
importance of learning about Islam to shift power relations inside the community.  
Irum: ,¶PJRLQJWRIRFXVQH[WWZo years hopefully on studying Islam in 
depth ... so basic knowledge and so that one thing I noticed if you want 
credibility you need to have that knowledge you know - people will take you 
a lot more - so instantly you know a lot of men have access to Islamic 
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knowledge, they go to the mosque, they learn with Sheikh, they have that 
time to learn so you know instantly they get that credibility and if they - if 
they are able talk and speak with an - for example if they can quote line 
from Quran, \RX¶UHMXVt like µoh this person is knowledgeable¶ that's how it 
is - ,GRQ¶WKDYHWKHFRQILGHQFHWRGRWKDWVR,¶PJRLQJWRJRGRZQWKDW
route, so that I feel you know I have the knowledge and the ability to stand 
my ground and be able to talk about a topic and give my viewpoint with the 
backing of Islam.  
Here Irum argues she must gain expertise in Islam to challenge influential 
elders and leaders who wield religious knowledge in order to maintain their 
power and position among other FRPPXQLW\PHPEHUV,UXP¶VTXRWH suggests 
that knowledge is used as a technology of power by religious and community 
leaders to regulate and control the identities and conduct of other members 
within the group, usually young people and women. In order to counter this 
power Irum has to acquire proficiency in religious matters so that she can 
exercise this kind of authority herself. This quote reveals the diffused nature of 
power, that operates in soFLHW\WKURXJKµWKHVWUDWHJLHVWKHQHWZRUNVWKH
mechanisms, all those techniques by which a GHFLVLRQLVDFFHSWHG¶)RXFDXOW
1990:104) and it also points to the availability of these technologies for 
resistance. According to Irum community leaders deploy the technologies of 
power available to be used as productive forces anywhere in the fibre of society. 
7KLVDOVRUHVRXQGV)RXFDXOW¶VEDUJXPHQWWKDWUHVLVWDQFHWRSRZHU
usually responds to its most immediate and local effects as: µ,QVXFKVWUXJJOHV




Power, governmentality and subjectivity  
Finally the two different models of active citizenship compared in Chapter 8  
are recounted to demonstrate how governmenWDOLW\IXQFWLRQVE\µimplanting in 
citizens the aspiration to pursue their own civility, well-being and advancement¶
(Rose, 2006:147). The said chapter reveals that participants enact two variant 
forms of active citizenship in response to forces of Islamophobia, contrasted as 
µH[SOLFLWUHVLVWDQFH¶where power is challenged more overtly DQGµLPSOLFLW
UHVLVWDQFH¶ where convergences are found with neoliberal conceptions of 
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citizenship predicated on individual responsibility. However, both forms of 
activism represent different strategies of resistance when the underlying moral 
and ethical values, oriented towards community and humanity, are contrasted 
with neoliberal aspirations of individual success and profit. The following quotes 
demonstrate this point more clearly.  
Changez,JXHVVLQ,VODPWKHUH¶VDELJHPSKDVLVRQFKDULW\DQGzakat 




Khayam: For me it¶s about service like the Prophet Salat ul Asalam he said 
[Arabic verses] that the one who leads a community is the one who serves 
them, VR,WKLQNWKHUH¶VFHUWDLQUHOLJLRXVUHZDUGV,WKLQNPRUHWKDQDQ\WKLQJ




Although these discourses evoke the neoliberaOGULYHWRSURPRWHµVHOI-
VXIILFLHQF\¶DQGµUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶WKH\DOVRUHYHDOWKHSRVW-material values 
(Inglehart, 2000) commonplace in social movements, as the motivations for 
activism are clearly linked to religious obligation to achieve the common good. 
Although these discourses reproduce the dominant notion of active citizenship 
projected as DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VFLYLFGXW\WRFDUHIRUWKHPVHOYHV (Davies, 2012; 
Marinetto, 2003; McGhee, 2008; Soysal, 2012a), the authority to which they 
appeal is not the nation and neither is the benefit personal gain but rather it is 
oriented towards universal human and social welfare. Nevertheless, the 
presence of hegemonic notions of active citizenship can be understood through 
WKH)RXFDXOGLDQQRWLRQRIµJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶DUDWionality of government that can 
be found reflected in the subjectivities of individuals who conduct their lives in 
ways which reproduce the prevailing power relations in society. This is a form of 
JRYHUQPHQWLQZKLFKµWKHVWDWH¶VSRZHUDQGWKDW¶VRQHRIWhe reasons for its 
VWUHQJWKLVERWKDQLQGLYLGXDOL]LQJDQGDWRWDOL]LQJIRUPRISRZHU¶)RXFDXOW
1994b:332). By this Foucault means that power, working through multiple 
technologies, apparatuses and agents, acts upon the conduct of individual 
citizens, directing them towards choices which extend to the total body of the 
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SRSXODWLRQLQDµNLQGRISROLWLFDO³GRXEOHELQG´¶)RXFDXOWE,QWKLVPRGH
RISRZHUZKLFKKDVWREHVWXGLHGµZKHUHLWLQVWDOOVLWVHOIDQGSURGXFHVLWVUHDO
HIIHFWV¶)RXFDXOW980:97), the individual becomes the object of control, 
representing its individualising function. Governmentality induces within the 
individual the capacity or disposition to fulfil the aims of the state to effect the 
common good which is its totalizing function. This is achieved through forms of 
SRZHUZKHUHLWLVDTXHVWLRQµQRWRILPSRVLQJODZRQPHQEXWRIGLVSRVLQJWKLQJV¶
(Foucault, 1994a:211). Through such forms of power citizens can be induced to 
accept and actively reproduce social norms and conditions that serve the 
interests of power, even if they may be contrary to personal interests and needs. 
An example of this is the increasing tenor of discourses on welfare dependency, 
since the 1970s, that have legitimised state reductions in benefits (Fitzpatrick, 
2005; Marinetto, 2003). Such moves further imperil minorities who are already 
structurally disadvantaged (Soysal, 2012a), yet despite being critical citizens who 
engage in activism to change the social order, many participants echo the 
narratives of self-sufficiency that legitimates such reduction of welfare provision.  
Khayam: $QG,WKLQNLW¶VDOVRUHDOO\LPSRUWDQWWKDWZHZHQWWKURXJKVRPH
WLPHDVDFRPPXQLW\«ZKHUHSRVW«SRVW«WKDWZHOLYHGRIIWKH
government WHDWVRWRVSHDN«DQG,¶PKRSLQJWKDWHUD¶VFRPHto an end to 
be honest with you, EHFDXVHUHDOO\\RX¶UHFRQVWUDLQHGUHDOO\\RX¶UHQRW
self-DXWRQRPRXVLQWKDWVLWXDWLRQ«DQG«LWFDQEHGHVWUXFWLYHDFWXDOO\. 
Here Khayam is suggesting that Muslims have to stop depending on the 
state and start taking care of themselves as a community, which suggests that 
the challenges facing Muslims are located in their inability to do precisely this. 
While developing autonomy and self-dependency is a positive aspiration for 
citizenship, what is problematic in this context is the legitimation and reproduction 
of a growing rhetoric by politicians that blames social inequalities and 
disadvantages on those who suffer its consequences the most (Kundnani, 2007; 
Fitzpatrick, 2005; Soysal, 2012a7KLVUHIOHFWV)RXFDXOW¶VDFRQWHQWLRQ
that governmentality creates a continuity between the rationality of the state and 





in their interests to do so. Similarly, hegemonic discourses that blame Muslims 
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for their disadvantaged position in society due to self-segregation (Kundnani, 
2007) can be detected in the following quote.  
Abid,W¶VPDLQO\KRZZHSRUWUD\RXUVHOYHVDVZHOOZHGRQ¶WJHWLQYROYHGLQ
community work, I mean, a lot of people, what we  - the doubts made about 
Islam being a secretive community have come true. If we throw ourselves 
out and get involved in all the community work that is out there, it could be 
something simple as coffee mornings or a street clean-ups or going to visit 
VLFNLQKRVSLWDORUZKDWHYHUDQGWKDWZLOOFKDQJHSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQRI
Islam, µcause at the moment wH¶UHVHHQDVDYHU\UHVWULFWHG, very closed 
community, GRQ¶WOLNHWRJHWLQYROYHGZLWKRWKHUSHRSOHEXWWKHPRUHZH
step out of our comfort zone involved in politics and community 
organisation and how we all can learn from that, is the more we can 
change pHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIZKDWZHDVD0XVOLPFRPPXQLW\DUHGRLQJ 
$ELG¶Vsuggestion that Muslims are to blame for their negative image in 
society because they are secretive and closed as a community resounds a 
number of developments in public policy and discourses which have shifted the 
focus from the structural causes of social inequality and disadvantage to the 
character, actions and dispositions of citizens (Kundnani, 2007, Lentin, 2014; 
Marinetto, 2003; McGhee, 2008). While the reproduction of neoliberal values of 
citizenship are more recognisable in such compliant modes of activism (implicit 
resistance), the choice of cultural politics in more dissenting and confrontational 
forms of activism can also be viewed as being inscribed by neoliberal 
governmentality. This is because even among participants whose activism is 
interpreted as being counter-hegemonic (explicit resistance), the expression of 
dissent through lifestyle, cultural production and struggles for education and 
empowerment can be seen as reproducing neoliberal agendas to shift 
responsibility for social welfare from the state to citizens. Thus political 
subjectivities and conduct oriented towards self-development, public awareness-
raising and capacity building can be seen as doing little to shift the existing power 
relations in society. The implication is that struggles over culture have limited 
scope to bring about any measurable change in the way power operates. As 
revealed in &UXLNVKDQN¶VLQ/HPNHFoucauldian inspired study of 
self-esteem movements in California, politics of enablement and sufficiency can 
VHUYHWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWVWRcompel citizens to take charge of their own welfare.  
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However, WKLVLVQRWWRVXJJHVWWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DUHPHUHGXSHVRI
neoliberal rationality since governmentality does not simply inscribe certain 
subjectivities, it also acts by limiting the scope of action. While power through 
knowledge and discourse allows resistance this LVDOZD\VOLPLWHGE\µWKHILHOGRI
SRVVLELOLWLHV¶DYDLODEOHWRµDFWLYHVXEMHFWV¶)RXFDXOWE/HQWLQ¶V
(2014:1276FULWLFLVPRIWKHµFXOWXUDOL]DWLRQ¶RISROLWLFVE\WKHVWDte is important to 
consider in this respect. Appropriating the ideas of 6ODYRM=LåHNLentin 
DUJXHVWKDWµculture has become the dominant framework for 





in culturaOL]HGWHUPV¶$FFRUGLQJWR/HQWLQWKHµFulturalization of 
politics¶UHQGHUVLVVXHVOLNHUDFLVPµpostpolitical, both reducing the socio-
economic to the cultural, and constraining the terms of the debate within a 
FXOWXUDOLVWUHJLVWHU¶This restricts the terms of the debate on issues of citizenship, 
security and terrorism within a cultural register that becomes difficult to escape, 
limiting the scope for contestation on other grounds.  
If the operation of power through governmentality constrains the field of 
DFWLRQE\SURGXFLQJGRFLOLW\DQGFRPSOLDQFHZLWKLQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQ
subjectivities, its effects on other citizens produces additional barriers to political 
expression at the current time. Some of these limits of activism are described in 
CKDSWHUZKHUHDFWLYLVWV¶IUDPHSXEOLFDSDWK\, citizen passivity and political 
illiteracy as key causes of the failure of politics and the depoliticisation of society. 
Due to the cultural modes through which solutions to the problems of cohesion 
and security have been framed in the war on terror Muslim citizenship had 
become associated with threats to the nation and social harmony. This has 
rendered public support for Muslims contingent upon their willingness to 
assimilate to a recognisable British culture and desist from expressing dissent or 
discontent. This shuts off the possibility of adopting more conventional forms of 
activism like demonstrations and petitions. This poses a serious challenge to 
Muslim activism.  
Chohan: I think the source of the tensioQVZRXOGEHSHRSOHDUHQ¶WOLVWHQLQJ
WRZKDWZH¶UHDFWXDOO\VD\LQJRUSHRSOHGRQRWZDQQDOLVWHQWRZKDWZH¶UH
VD\LQJ««,WKLQNWKH\QHHGWROHDUQWKHPVHOYHV, maybe open up 
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slightly more and not be afraid to listen to the other side, rather than just 
EORFNLWRXWDQGKDYHVXFKDRQHWUDFNPLQGDERXWWKLQJV«DERXWZKDW
WKH\¶UHJRLQJWROLVWHQWR 
This extract suggests that the inability to find a public audience that is 
willing to even listen is one of the largest obstacles to traditional forms of political 
participation. This quote also demonstrates the real and concrete barriers young 
Muslims believe they face in trying to put forward their perspectives and 
viewpoints. This invokes Foucault's (1981:52) argument that power operates 
through processes of 'prohibition' on what can and cannot be said within the 
discursive field of possibilities, in addition to inscribing certain ways of thinking 
about social reality (Rose, 2006). Stereotypes and misconceptions about 
Muslims and related issues are seen as so intransigent that they present 
WKHPVHOYHVDVDµEORFN¶WKDWTXDVKHVDFWLYLVWYRLFHV,ISRZHUFDQEHGHFLSKHUHG
IURPµZKHUHLWLQVWDOOVLWVHOIDQGSURGXFHVLWVUHDOHIIHFWV¶)RXFDXOW
then public apathy and passivity in response to politics can be seen as the work 
of governmentality that produces such subjectivities within citizens. Cultural 
explanations for Muslim deviance resonate in public opinion and engender an 
unwillingness to entertain the alternative knowledges and truths offered by 
Muslim activists. This makes cultural politics an adaptation to a µILeld of 
SRVVLELOLWLHV¶WKDWDUHVWDNHGRXW by the depoliticisation of the public sphere.  
 
Power as domination in the security state 
Finally this section focuses on direct forms of power that threaten, prohibit 
and coerce subjects in a condition of domination which invokes the securitisation 
of citizenship thesis. It is argued that despite the real threat of securitisation, the 
symbolic and ideational aspects of such forms of power are equally compelling 
and that the theory of governmentality is well placed to elucidate the conditions 
that make them conceivable and possible at the current time. 
Chapter 2 elaborates the disproportionate impact of counter-terrorism 
legislation and intensified surveillance on Muslim citizenship to set the context in 
which activism transpires. As discussed in the same chapter, security has 
become a central theme within citizenship in the war on terror, with a host of new 
laws and controls on freedom which pose a distinct threat to civil liberties for all 
citizens LQWKHµVHFXULW\VWDWH¶)HNHWH+\DWW0F*KHH6HPDWL
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2010; Vertigans, 2010). The impact of securitisation on Muslim activists is 
broached in Chapter 7 where participants reveal its constraining effects on their 
political vocabularies and choices. Despite an obsessive focus on issues of 
radicalisation and security around Muslim citizenship in the West, many 
participants elide the topic in the interviews and any significant critique of the 
securitisation of citizenship was unexpectedly muted in the research. The relative 
silence on this topic during nearly 18 months of fieldwork is suggestive of the 
prohibitive impact of security. This impression is supported by the weight given to 
the issue by those who are willing to speak on the subject more openly to reveal 
its chilling effect on communities.   
Rabia: M\'DG¶VDFWXDOO\VDLGWRPH, he goes µRQHGD\ZH¶UHMXVWJRLQJWR
have these officers.. at the door knocking, looking for you and stuff trying to 
arrest you for terrorism, \HDKEXWLW¶VEHFDXVHZKHUH,OLYHZH¶YHKDGWKDW
happen to people around us. 
Here Rabia is describing an experience cited by a number of other 
participants whose parents discourage them from involvement in student activism 
for fear of attracting the attention of security forces. By conveying that this has 
DOUHDG\KDSSHQHGWRRWKHUVLQKHUIDPLO\¶s residential area Rabia is also 
highlighting that such fears are not exaggerated or baseless. However, as it is 
revealed in Chapter 7 despite the very real threat of being targeted by security 
forces, few participants have personally suffered such encounters. The effects of 
security are more pernicious in prohibitions acting upon the imagination rather 
than the body of the subject.  
Yousaf: I think one of the major aims clearly has been to depoliticise the 
0XVOLPFRPPXQLW\E\VLPSO\VD\LQJ«EXLOGLQJWKLVQRWLRQDQG
VWUHQJWKHQLQJDQGFRQVROLGDWLQJWKLVQRWLRQEHLQJ«SROLWLcal is being radical 
«WKDW\RX¶YHJRWYHU\YHU\WLQ\URRPIRUmanoeuvre EH\RQGZKLFK«\RX
are a radical, so if you go to attend a talk, if you do anything .. the likelihood 
LVWKDW\RX¶UHJRLQJWREHSDUWLFLSDWLQJRUWDNLQJSDUWRUHUULQJRQWKHVLGHRI
radicalism whether you like it or not and the best way to be safe is to simply 
to just not go there.  
This quote demonstrates how securitisation influences political choices by 
producing fear and anticipating danger. The possibility of being branded a 
radical, and by common association a terrorist, carries real and imminent risks 
ZKLFKOHDGVWRWKHXOWLPDWHDFWRIQHJDWLRQE\µVLPSO\¶QRWHQJDJLQJ+RZHYHU
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the operation of power does not directly forbid activism, rather it acts by defining 
the discursive field through the creation of an equivalence between being 
µSROLWLFDO¶DQGµUDGLFDO¶which shuts off certain choices and actions. This symbolic 
DQGSV\FKRORJLFDOGLPHQVLRQRIVHFXULW\HOXFLGDWHVWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SROLWLFDO
grammars of action and imaginaries focused on cultural contestation, although 
this is not to deny the very corporeal dangers inherent in counter-terrorism 
legislation through the possibility of arrests, stop and search and extradition.  
The presence of security in this research field approximates what Foucault 
FDOOVDµUHODWLRQVKLSRIYLROHQFH¶ZKLFKµDFWVXSRQa body or upon 
things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door 
on all SRVVLELOLWLHV¶+RZHYHUWKLVGRHVQRWDPRXQWWRDµVWDWHRIGRPLQDWLRQ¶
where resistance and agency have become inconceivable or impossible. Rather 
it is argued that direct forms of threat can also be seen as functioning through 
technologies of power associated with governmentality, whereby, certain 
knowledges, discourses and subjectivities, cultivated through technologies of 
VHOIOLPLWWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUDFWLYLVP,WLVZRUWKUHLWHUDWLQJ)RXFDXOW¶V1997:299) 
conceptualisation of the three ways in which power relations are configured 




The operation of governmentality can be deciphered in the cultural 
imperatives through which securitisation is made conceivable and defensible with 
the consent of the public. $VZLWKWKHµFXOWXUDOL]DWLRQ¶RISROLWLFVLQWKHEDFNODVK
against multiculturalism (Lentin, 2014:1276), securitisation has also been 
established on cultural grounds. To reiterate Buzan, Waever and de Wilde¶V
(1998 in McGhee, 2010:42) definition of securitisation from Chapter 2: 
If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential 
threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or 
rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of 
securitization. 
This suggests that securitisation is not a warranted or proportionate 
response to danger EXWLVEDVHGRQDQµDUJXPHQW¶WKDWMXVWLILHVE\SDVVLQJWKH
normal rules governing democratic societies. As elaborated in Chapter 2 
securitisation in Britain, as in the USA, has become normalised through the 
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discursive framing of security concerns as a matter of paramount importance to 
maintain public security (Buck-Morss, 2003; Dworkin, 2003; McGhee, 2010). 
Even though they have been inimical to the freedoms of ordinary citizens, the 
extraordinary measures introduced in the war on terror have been legitimised 
WKURXJKWKHµDcquiescence and willingness to accept restraints¶E\WKH%ULWLVK
SXEOLFµin order WRVDIHJXDUGWKHLURZQVHFXULW\¶9HUWLJDQVSuch a 




(2013:166) argues that the securitisation of Islam is predicated on DµFRQVROLGDWHG
GLVFXUVLYHUHDOP¶ZKLFKDOORZVQRWLRQVRIVHFXULW\WREHFRPHHDVLO\OLQNHGWR
0XVOLPV+HQFHDIWHU7RQ\%ODLU¶VGHIHQFHRIWKH%ULWLVKZD\RIOLIHE\
condemning certain forms of Islam reinforce the association between terror and 
,VODPE\GUDZLQJRQDQH[LVWLQJµGLVFXUVLYHUHDOP¶SRSXODWHGE\PHPRULHVRIWKH
2001 riots, Rushdie book burnings, Danish cartoons and various other examples 
of Muslim aberration. Securitisation occurs through the stated need for 
µH[FHSWLRQDOPHDVXUHV¶LQUHVSRQVHWRWKHH[WUDRUGLQDU\WKUHDWWRQRWMXVW to the 
life and limb of citizens EXW:HVWHUQµFLYLOL]DWLRQ¶LWVHOI9HUWLJDQV 
This is the cultural dimension of security which is encoded in the numerous 
public expressions and displays of fear and suspicion towards Islam and Muslims 
(Brown, 2010; Morey and Yaqin, 2011; Semati, 2010). One outcome of such 
securitised readings of Muslim culture is that visible symbols of Islam like veiling 
become marked with deviance, as Modood et al (2010:105; original emphasis) 
illustrate in a study on the representation of the niqab (full veil) in British media 
which linked veiling to separatism and terrorism. Summarising the mood of the 
time Modood et al (2010:105) conclude WKDWµremoving the niqab was, for many 
commentators, an integral part of counter-WHUURULVP¶  Since securitisation is 
framed and legitimised through cultural codes, challenging it becomes impossible 
without undermining its cultural codes and assumptions. This is why activism is 
aimed at contesting dominant rationalities which have negative political 
consequences for Muslims.   
Yasir,¶YHDFWXDOO\EHHQFDOOHGE\\RXQJSHRSOH,ZRUNZLWKQRZDQ
µH[WUHPLVW¶ZKLFKLVTXLWHKDUVKFDXVH,¶YHQHYer been called an extremist 
by anyone and it was ± it is because ..you forget that a lot of people now 
WKH<RX7XEHJHQHUDWLRQKDYHEHHQEURXJKWXSZKHUHWKHZDU¶VDOZD\V
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EHHQJRLQJRQVLQFHWKH\ZHUH\RXQJWKH\GRQ¶WUHDOO\NQRZPXFKDERXWLW
but to talk DERXWSROLWLFDOWKLQJVPDNHV\RXH[WUHPHEHFDXVH\RX¶YHJRWD
viewpoint and I do work with a lot of young people now and a lot of them 
VNLUWDURXQGLVVXHVDQGWKH\¶UHQRWYHU\SROLWLFDOO\DZDUHRUSROLWLFDOO\
involved. 
Here Yasir is describing a whole generation of people who have come to 
view politics as a dangerous and risky activity which inhibits political expression 
EHFDXVHWKLVFDQEHVHHQDVµH[WUHPLVW¶,QWKHVLWXDWLRQGHVFULEHGE\<DVLURWKHU
citizens are the agents whose pejorative views of pROLWLFV\LHOGWKHµUHODWLRQVKLSRI
YLROHQFH¶ZKLFKSURVFULEHVFHUWDLQH[SUHVVLRQVRUGLVFRXUVHVZKLFKFDQQRWEH
voiced. As such, WKHVH\RXQJSHRSOHDFWDVWKHDJHQWVRIDµVHOI-SROLFLQJ¶VRFLHW\
which Hyatt (2011) argues has emerged in the wake of 9/11 in a transitional 
phase where neoliberalism gives way to the security state. As a consequence 
µWKHLGHDOLVHGVXEMHFWRIWKHODZ-and-order state is now the citizen who both 
polices anGDJUHHVWREHSROLFHG¶+\DWW2011:107). In the empirical context this 
can be observed as functioning on the ground through the Prevent programme 
where local community organisations and individuals are expected to carry out 
the task of surveillance of fellow Muslims in what Wacquant (2001:407; original 
HPSKDVLVFDOOVµsocial panRSWLFLVP¶. The emphasis on public hearts and minds in 
government strategies for countering terrorism (DCLG, 2007) can be explained 
E\)RXFDXOW¶VLGHDRIJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\ZKLFKSXWPRUHVXFFLQFWO\VLJQLILHVWKH
µFRQWDFWEHWZHHQWKHWHFKQRORJLHVRIGRPLQDWLRQRIRWKHUVDQGWKRVHRIWKHVHOI¶
(Foucault,1988:19). This is the notion that the rationality of government is 
reproduced in the subjectivities of citizens resulting in choices, comportments 
and normalised judgements which advance the existing power relations in 
society.  
This explains why security acts less as a direct threat of force but more as 
a threatening prospect structuring the fears and paranoia of other citizens, 
shaping and proscribing the choices of the activists and the public and 
constraining action or resistance. The orientation of Muslim cultural politics 
towards reframing public views and building political will and capacity indicates a 
form of resistance that, consciously or unconsciously, challenges the kind of 
power that acts upon the subjectivity of other citizens (Foucault, 1994a,b,c). Such 
a power acts by producing complicity for extraordinary security measures 
(Vertigans, 2010), reducing the capacity or opportunity for challenge by 
normalising the discourse of the dangerous Muslim (Kundnani, 2007; 2014) and 
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fuelling Islamophobic ideas through the proliferation of new forms of knowledge 
about impending threats and the possibilities of risk and danger within too much 
diversity (Goodhart, 2004; Grillo, 2005; 2007). As Kumar (2012:175) has warned 
DµVHQVHRIIHDUDQGSDUDQRLD¶ZKLSSHGXSDJDLQVW0XVOLPVµFDQWKHQEHXVHGWR
squash dissent and win consent for violations of civil liberties at home and wars 
DEURDG¶3DUWLFLSDQWV¶GRQRWQHHGWREHDZDUHRIWKHVHIRUPVRI power in order to 
resist their effects, as the consequences can be experienced without the 
mechanisms and conditions that make them possible being visible. Cultural 
politics constitute forms of resistance directed at the effects of such powers 
which are tangible to activists even if the technologies that produce them remain 
obscured. While Foucault argues that violence, as a direct force, is always 
present in society, his view of the state in modern societies suggests that such 
forms of violence are successfully disguised through practices of 
governmentality. Arguments about the rise of the security or law-and-order state 
ZKLFKOHJLWLPDWHVLWVDXWKRULWDULDQLVPWKURXJKDQHZµSROLWLFVRIIHDU¶)HNHWH
2004; McGhee, 2010) suggests that modern governance is reliant on cultural 
dynamics to keep the balance of powers in place to the advantage of some and 
detriment of others, invoking the governmentality thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
Appropriating Foucauldian theorisation of power this chapter argues that 
the cultural politics of young adult Muslims are a response to two dominant forms 
of power in contemporary societies like Britain, one a direct form of domination 
through the securitisation of citizenship and the other an imperceptible form of 
power made palpable by FoucaXOW¶VQRWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\ Conducting 
SROLWLFVWKURXJKFXOWXUDOFRQWHVWDWLRQUHIOHFWV)RXFDXOW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWPRGHUQ
technologies of power operate through knowledge, discourses and 
governmentality that shapes and structures the subjectivities of citizens to 
reproduce existing power relations in society. While the securitisation of 
citizenship represents a rise in more violent and direct modes of power, this is 
also predicated on inscribing in citizens subjectivities of fear and paranoia that 
necessitate extraordinary state measures to ensure their protection.  
This is not to suggest that participants consciously plan and conduct 
activism with the intention of targeting the forms of power that Foucault has 
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articulated. Rather it is argued that Foucault¶VDQDO\WLFVRISRZHUSURYLGHD
compelling explanatory account for understanding how cultural politics becomes 
the dominant site in which these participants invest their energies and resources. 
What is significant in the discourses and grammars of action explored in this 
thesis is not that they directly reference the shapes and forms of power described 
by Foucault but rather that the nature of power relations described by Foucault is 
presumed by these political repertoires and are also challenged, appropriated 
and subverted through these actions.  
  





This thesis began with ambitious aims to explore and comprehend the 
political and civic activism of young adult Muslims in Britain against a complex 
and contentious socio-political backdrop of global proportions that has catapulted 
Muslim citizenship into a number of polarising debates around diversity, cohesion 
and security. These issues and the conflicts they engender raise some tough and 
uneasy questions which do not have straightforward answers. It is not surprising 
then that while the aims of the study are ostensibly simple, to find out how young 
Muslims participate in British civil society, beyond electoral politics in sites 
identified as VXESROLWLFDO%HFN2¶7RROHDQG*DOH), the research 
journey has encountered a multifaceted tapestry of conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical richness. This complexity is negotiated through a set of manageable 
questions focused on elaborating the nature and range of activism, identifying the 
key objectives and aims of mobilisation and understanding the relationship 
between parWLFLSDQWV¶SROLWLFDOUHSHUWRLUHV and subjectivities and the social, 
economic and political context in which they are performed or constrained.  
This chapter summarises and synthesises the findings that respond to 
these research questions by reflecting on the main conclusions of the thesis, 
organised around a central argument that the activism of young Muslims in this 
study constitutes a social movement to counter multiple challenges to Muslim 
citizenship in Britain, captured by the umbrella term Islamophobia. Following a 
summary reminder of the main research findings, the chapter reflects on the 
contribution to knowledge made by the cultural politics framework of this study. 
The chapter also offers some reflections on the implications this has for politics, 
policy and society beyond this empirical case study, as well as alluding to future 
research possibilities and outputs that emerge from this study.  
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Summary of findings  
The argument for this thesis is built incrementally by demonstrating that the 
diverse forms of mobilisation in which participants engage display the distinctive 
grammars of action associated with social movements. Based on the work of 
leading social movement scholars Chapter 3 distils some defining features of 
social movements which include:  
x Collective identity/solidarity 
x Political or cultural conflict (with or without clearly identified 
opponents/challenge or defence of extant authority) 
x Informal (dense) networks/some degree of organisation 
 
These defining features are successfully identified in the activism of young 
adult Muslims through an elucidation of the nature and range of activism in 
Chapter 5 and active processes of collective identity construction in response to 
social conflict described in Chapter 6. The political repertoires displayed by 
young adult Muslims in Chapter 5 reveal a number of characteristic features of 
social movements including individualised, decentralised, non-institutional and 
horizontally networked modes of activism in pursuit of political objectives that are 
non-materialistic, symbolic and ethically informed by religious and human rights 
LGHDOV3DUWLFLSDQWV¶PRWLYDWLRQVWRDFWUHYHDOµORZQHJRWLDELOLW\¶0HOXFFL
1996:102) in that they have little interest in seizing power, making them less 
achievable through mainstream political channels. Adding fuel to this is 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ODFNRIWUXVWRUUHVSHFWIRUPDLQVWUHDPLQVWLWXWLRQVZKLFKDUHVHHQDV
epitomising the values and practices that are being challenged through activism. 
Their aspirations to establish a different kind of social order and norms of political 
participation necessitate breaking with established and available patterns of 
political engagement and pursuing alternative ways of living, acting and 
expressing political agency, through lifestyle politics, religious and cultural 
education, art, academia, blogging and other creative expressions of political 
agency.  Many participants organise their political and civic projects through 
networks in both their daily lives as well as online through digital technologies 
where they can exercise individual control and at the same time generate unity 
and solidarity with other like-minded activists. This is underlined by an almost 
unanimous dismissal of what is thought to be false knowledge circulated by 
untrustworthy mass media and politicians with vested interests. Participants form 
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their own alternative networks and systems of knowledge, becoming cultural 
producers to disseminate alternative social codes and norms through social 
media as well as local events and initiatives like film screenings, lectures, 
workshops and discussions. These findings support social movement theorists 
who argue that the role of the individuals in collective action is becoming more 
pronounced due to the rapid proliferation of digital communication networks 
(Castells, 2012; Della Porta et al, 2006; Hands, 2011). While claims that new 
forms of internet based communication radically alter the nature of political 
participation are yet to be borne out, this research supports growing evidence 
that digital networks play a very crucial and increasingly productive role in 
activism (Della Porta et al, 2006; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Hands, 2011). 
However, it is unable to settle ongoing debates between those who view the 
internet as representing a potentially radical shift in politics (Castells, 2012) and 
those who doubt the efficacy of internet activism to substantively change the 
power dynamics of society (Fenton, 2008).  
The case for considering the activism of young Muslims as a social 
movement continues in Chapter 6 by demonstrating how collective identity is 
achieved despite plurality, intersectionality and hybridity within the group where 
tensions between multiple valued aspects of personal identity and different 
subject positions delineated by class, gender and age, as well as different levels 
of religiosity and practice, can fragment solidarity and unity. A collective Muslim 
identity emerges from shared objectives of affirming and defending faith identities 
which are currently the object of stigmatisation and marginalisation, particularly in 
the protracted shadow of 9/11. The way in which Islamophobia is challenged 
through the production of a collective identity based on religious signification 
despite varied levels of religiosity, including the absence of religious belief among 
some participants, suggests a need to µaffirm what others deny¶ (Melucci, 
1989:46). This captures the political structuring of Muslim faith identities, further 
evinced by the way in which participants interpret and project Islamic ideals 
strategically in congruence with their political and civic imaginaries and choices. 
This is not to imply that faith has a purely instrumental role in the lives of 
participants since this would not only be simplistically reductive but also without 
empirical support. Rather it is argued that such a strategic deployment of faith as 
a political ideology is inevitable in the context of this research where the focus is 
on political subjectivities. It is argued that the politicisation of Islam owes more to 
increasing levels of Islamophobia post 9/11, as well as the securitisation of Islam 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  225 
which is necessary µfor disciplining and µproducing¶ µgood Muslims¶ compliant with 
the secular order¶ (Mavelli, 2013:179). Furthermore, the way in which Islam is 
interpreted through subjective, reflexive and ethical idioms and performances by 
participants subverts the view of religious faith as an anachronistic retreat to 
tradition motivated by rejection of Western ideals of freedom and democracy. 
Here faith can be seen as an identity marker that has become politicised through 
social denial, misrecognition and denigration but is also reinvented and 
appropriated by participants through agency and choice in ways that reflect their 
European lifestyles and sensibilities (Cesari, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Ramadan, 2009; 
Roy, 2004). Like other marginalised groups conducting identity politics, or the 
politics of difference, Muslims are placed in a paradoxical position where a 
singular marker of identity as the object of stigmatisation has to be prioritised 
through strategic essentialism in order to turn negative difference into positive 
difference (Modood, 2010b). Religious identification serves dual purposes by 
allowing young adult Muslims to contest pressures from within the group to 
conform to outdated, traditional practices and defy oppressive forces of 
Islamophobia that they view as endemic in British society.   
The orientation and configuration of this social movement in relation to the 
EURDGHUVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WLVH[SOLFDWHGE\DQDO\VLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
attitudes and perceptions of mainstream politics (Chapter 7) and citizenship 
(Chapter 8). This provides an insight into the social and political opportunity 
structures that demarcate the possible range of responses available to young 
Muslims. Chapters 7 and 8 resonate political choices, ideals and praxis that are a 
recognisable hallmark of social movements, revealing affinities with a recent 
wave of progressive movements like the Arab Spring and Occupy that µignored 
political parties, distrusted the media, did not recognize any leadership¶ (Castells, 
2012:4). Negative and dismissive attitudes to politics and politicians are therefore 
anticipated and widespread, although it is evident that this does not unanimously 
preclude the possibility of engagement with mainstream politics, provided there is 
structural modification to accommodate difference and dissent. Participants seek 
reform rather than destruction of political institutions but pursue alternative ways 
to achieve political influence in society because of the failure of the existing 
system to tolerate alterity or pluralism. This accords with what Melucci 
(1996:103) describes as a rejection of political mediation or representation by 
social movements because it µtends to reproduce the control mechanisms they 
fight against¶.  
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3DUWLFLSDQWV¶reasons for eschewing mainstream politics are influenced by a 
range of pathologies associated with politics, including its domination by self-
interested politicians from a male, white, upper or middle class background which 
translates into an intransigent system predicated on a suppression of alternative 
identities, interests and perspectives. While ideological disagreement plays a 
significant role, differences in identity are also a major factor in the view of 
mainstream politics as an alien and hostile space, which compels participants to 
demanGµGHVFULSWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶$lso known as mirror representation 
(Phillips, 1995), descriptive representation requires members of the minority 
group to directly represent their interests in corridors of power. Although the 
symbolic value of having role models in positions of power in government is seen 
as decisive for minorities to participate in politics, the intransigence of the political 
structure is viewed as so obdurate that current Muslim representatives (including 
MPs and councillors) are written off as co-opted pawns who simply perform a 
tokenistic function. However, while mainstream politics is seen as an antagonistic 
and compromising route to social change, conventional forms of dissent and 
protest politics through marches, demonstrations and public agitation are also 
considered to be ineffectual and, more importantly, riskier for Muslims under 
securitised conditions of citizenship. While these constraints are compelling 
enough reason to pursue cultural politics, further inducement comes from 
concerns about public apathy and passivity which are seen as being complicit in 
maintaining and reproducing unequal and unjust power relations in society. In 
other words public consciousness is the primary target of activism in cultural 
politics that seek to µtranslate their actions into symbolic challenges to the 
dominant codes¶0HOXFFL in order to establish an alternative social and 
political order.  
Participants¶ perspectives on citizenship explored in Chapter 8 provide 
insights into how dominant codes are symbolically challenged by this British 
Muslim social movement. Citizenship represents a contentious and conflicted 
concept to participants as it invokes tensions over the conditionality and 
precariousness to which Muslim belonging to Britain is currently subject. On the 
one hand citizenship, as identification with Britishness, is problematic because 
government policy criminalises Muslims and renders their identities as suspect 
and risky (Brown, 2010; Kundnani, 2007; Mythen et al, 2009; Pentazis and 
Pemberton, 2009; Vertigans, 2010) while on the other hand failure to express 
such identification is also hazardous and undermines much needed concessions 
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and support from the state. Citizenship is articulated through two different 
approaches contrasted in two alternative models of activism or active citizenship. 
What is referred to as µexplicit resistance¶ is distinguished by overtly critical and 
counter-hegemonic notions of citizenship while µimplicit resistance¶ can be seen 
as complicit in reproducing hegemonic notions of active citizenship based on 
individual responsibility and duty that are emblematic of neoliberal and nationalist 
ideologies (Isin and Wood, 1999; Davies, 2012; Marinetto, 2003; McGhee, 2008). 
However, the underlying civic values in both approaches which prioritise ideals of 
faith, humanity, community and universality are starkly contrary to both of the 
hegemonic models of active citizenship. It is argued that the two approaches to 
activism are different political strategies of resistance rather than oppositional 
modes of action, as both are united in their efforts to challenge the values and 
rationalities of neoliberal and nationalist models of citizenship in different ways. 
Despite differences in approach and the tensions this generates the activists are 
well connected through supportive networks that actively engage in the 
production of a collective Muslim identity to contest Islamophobia in a post 9/11 
context.   
Participants¶ discourses in Chapter 8 reveal a normative ideal of post-
national citizenship that transcends the constraints imposed by the nation-state 
and flouts neoliberal rationalities based on personal gain and market oriented 
efficiency. Demonstrating a strong commitment to civic responsibility and 
participation these young Muslims defy fears that negative associations with 
Britishness, or strong identification with the Islamic ummah, weaken the value 
and relevance of citizenship. More importantly their politics mirror contemporary 
patterns of engagement through µnew cultural politics¶ that have µeffectively 
questioned the master identity imposed by the modern nation-state¶ (Isin and 
Wood, 1999:155). To put it bluntly the framing of citizenship as a duty to Islam by 
participants in this study reflects efforts by a growing number of critical citizens to 
universalise citizenship beyond the nation-state through µthe rise of new forms of 
allegiances and loyalties¶ with µthe right to participate in the cultural field both as a 
producer and as a consumer¶ (Isin Wood, 1999:157). These demands for 
citizenship on revised terms support Modood¶s (2010:39) assertion that although 
µMuslims raise distinctive concerns, the logic of their demands often mirrors those 
of other equality seeking groups¶.  
Finally in Chapter 9 Muslim cultural politics is examined through macro 
theories of power to map the field of possibilities and constraints within which 
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activism is situated. Foucauldian analytics of power elucidate the cultural politics 
of young adult Muslims as a strategic but cautious response to two dominant 
forms of power in contemporary societies like Britain - one an imperceptible form 
of social control captured by the notion of governmentality and the other a direct 
form of domination wielded through the securitisation of citizenship. To reiterate 
governmentality signifies a rationality of government where power is exercised in 
YDULRXVOHYHOVRIVRFLHW\µWKURXJKWHFKQLTXHVWKDWZLOOPDNHSRVVLEOHZLWKRXWWKH
full awareness of the people¶the fulfilment of the ends of the state (Foucault, 
1994a:217). Governmentality operates by producing in citizens particular kinds of 
subjectivities and dispositions that directs their conduct towards realising the 
objectives of the state. Securitisation on the other hand represents an escalation 
in more direct and violent forms of power in recent years justified on the pretext 
of an imminent threat, like militant Islam, which necessitates extraordinary 
measures to curtail certain civil liberties (Brown, 2010; Mavelli, 2013; McGhee, 
2008). Both forms of power are concomitant and undifferentiated in their effects 
on Muslim political and civic activists who adopt cultural politics to negotiate 
precarious and hostile political and legal conditions in a post-9/11 context. 
Securitisation itself is understood through governmentality since the exceptional 
powers seized by the state and security agencies at the cost of civic freedoms 
have to be normalised and legitimised through public consent.  
Foucault¶s theory of governmentality brings into focus diffused and 
imperceptible forms of power that operate by µimplanting in citizens the aspiration 
to pursue their own civility, well-being and advancement¶ (Rose, 2006:147). This 
plays out at two levels, firstly in the internalisation of domination evident in 
discourses of citizenship that reproduce neoliberal and nationalist perspectives 
and secondly through inducing docility in the public that passively concedes civic 
freedoms as direct forms of power proliferate in the security state. This framing 
draws attention to the state¶s own cultural politics that contribute to the 
marginalisation and criminalisation of Muslim citizens as emphasised by a 
number of recent academic works (Brown, 2010; McGhee, 2008; Pero, 2013; 
Vertovec, 2011). Lentin (2014:1271) has argued that the backlash against 
diversity in the post-FRQWH[WLVPDUNHGE\µWKHculturalization of politics in 
which cultural, rather than socio-economic or political frames¶DUHLQYRNHGWR
describe and address social challenges. This positions the state itself is the 
purveyor of cultural politics, a point that is fully elaborated in Chapter 9 where 
Foucauldian theories of power and governance are deployed to make sense of 
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the political activism of young adult Muslims at a macro scale. The salience of 
culture and the cultural forms through which power is exercised in society at 
present is cited as a compelling explanation for the dominance of cultural politics 
among young adult Muslims in this study.  
 
Knowledge claims and contribution   
In these concluding reflections I would like to address some of the possible 
political and normative implications of the findings and also contextualise the 
claims being made in the light of extant literature on the topic discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
The empirical background of Muslim politics and citizenship in Chapter 2 
states WKDWH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJHRQWKHWRSLFLVGRPLQDWHGE\µDVHULHVRIKLJKO\
pathologising crisis narratives on ethnic minority young people¶(O¶Toole and 
Gale, 2013:17) engendered by an inordinate amount of attention on issues of 
segregation and disengagement or extremism and terrorism, as well as the 
tendency to conduct research that speaks down to young Muslims rather than 
speaking to them (Garner and Selod, 2015; Spalek and Lambert, 2008). In order 
to gain a more balanced picture this research shifts attention to the relatively 
unfamiliar area of Muslim politics conducted through non-electoral and 
subpolitical forms of activism. The importance of these forms of mobilisation 
follows from growing evidence of changing political repertoires among citizens in 
WKH:HVWWKDWKDYHUHVXOWHGLQIDOOLQJOHYHOVRIHQJDJHPHQWLQµstate oriented 
activities¶ 1RUULVRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVDQGWKHDGRSWLRQRIµQHZFLWL]HQ
politics¶through direct forms of action beyond voting and elections (Dalton, 
2008:8-9). This study follows O¶Toole and Gale (2013) in arguing that ignoring 
this area of political participation contributes to a pathological view of Muslims 
because it promotes the belief that Muslim disengagement is a product of Islam's 
incompatibility with democratic secular politics, and that Muslims are only 
interested in the politics of violence and terrorism. As the findings summarised 
above confirm Muslim identity politics is deeply influenced by but not dictated by 
faith. The cultural politics of Muslims is conducted through grammars of action 
that draw on social imaginaries and political subjectivities common among a 
number of other progressive social movements seeking to expand the meaning 
of citizenship by promoting social equality and justice. However, these findings 
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also vindicate claims that extraordinary burdens and pressures are being brought 
to bear upon Muslim citizenship which renders regular and mainstream political 
processes less accessible and feasible for Muslims (Brighton, 2007; Brown and 
Saeed, 2014; O¶Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012). As this study reveals participants¶
political choices are indeed restricted due to the exceptional demands placed on 
Muslims by the securitisation of citizenship and the compulsion to conform to 
narrow ideals of citizenship.  
Literature on theoretical perspectives reviewed in Chapter 3 argues for the 
relevance of a cultural politics model to understand the politics of young adult 
Muslims. The findings of this study demonstrate that the emphasis on cultural 
politics is not simply a matter of epistemology where the use of a particular 
conceptual lens singles out the relevant features of the data but rather it follows 
from the distinctive characteristics and political repertoires presented by the 
participants. This research offers fresh empirical support for Nash's (2001) 
assertion that there are two arguments for the cultural turn in political sociology. 
The historical argument suggests that cultural politics play an µunprecedented 
role¶ in contemporary forms of collective action and the epistemological case, 
drawing on a conceptually different view of politics influenced by Foucauldian 
theory, claims that culture is µuniversally constitutive¶ of politics (Nash, 2001:77). 
Both these cases resonate strongly in this study. To reiterate the concept of 
cultural politics, Nash (2010:37) argues that:  
«FRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFDOVRFLRORJ\FRQFHUQVFXOWXUDOSROLWLFVZKLFKLVWKH
interpretation of social meanings that support, challenge, or change the 
definitions, perspectives, and identities of social actors, to the advantage of 
some and the disadvantage of others, across state and society. 
As this research reveals, the collective and individual mobilisations of 
young adult Muslims exemplify such forms of contestation through an active 
struggle to renegotiate the meanings citizenship and political participation in the 
wake of the war on terror that has placed Muslims on the margins of British 
society and rendered their presence precarious and contingent (Brown, 2010; 
O¶Loughlin and Gillespie, 2012; McGhee, 2008; Meer, 2010; Modood, 2007, 
2010; Parekh, 2008). This is not to say that participants¶ actions and orientations 
can be understood with reference to culture alone since this is only one aspect of 
social life that intersects with the material and structural as well as the emotional 
and the psychological factors. While the cultural dimension is overriding and 
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significant in the political repertoires investigated in this study, it is also worth 
remembering how theorists understand the role of culture in contemporary 
societies.  
Modern culture is relentlessly material in its practices and modes of 
production. And the material world of commodities and technologies is 
profoundly cultural. (Hall, 2005b:233) 
Under advanced capitalism the cultures of production and the production of 
culture are interwoven and the clear distinction between economy and 
culture may not be possible to sustain. (Isin and Wood, 1999:152).  
These understandings imply culture is not discrete and separable from 
other social objects and experiences in a way that focusing on it elides other 
important ways of understanding social relations and subjects. What is being 
argued here is that the notion of cultural politics does not preclude transformation 
of social structures and material conditions of life but rather presumes these 
goals as they are seen as being predicated on cultural hegemony. Hence, while 
Islamophobia is the significant target of activism its relation to economic and 
material disadvantage is not explicitly stated but taken as read.   
Chapter 3 also devotes a great deal of attention to Foucauldian analytics of 
power which it views as a strong theoretical entry point to new and diverse social 
practices and activities as sites of political struggle. The thesis reveals the 
explanatory value of Foucauldian theory for explicating Muslim cultural politics by 
highlighting the reciprocal relationship where the research data is elucidated by 
Foucault's theorisation of power but the findings also offer a case study to 
support his ideas. However, applying Foucault's analytics of power should not be 
taken as a structural argument to explain Muslim politics. The arguments 
presented in this thesis are not intended to suggest that the participants are 
without agency or choice in allowing the rationalities of governmentality to wash 
over them uncritically. This is because Foucault¶s theory of power can have 
structural and determinist connotations but agency and resistance is the very 
condition of the power relations he has theorised. Foucault (1997:292) states that 
power relations are: 
 «PRELOHUHYHUVLEOHDQGXQVWDEOH,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWSRZHUUHODWLRQV
are possible only insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were 
completely at the others disposal and became his thing, an object on which 
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KHFRXOGZUHDNERXQGOHVVDQGOLPLWOHVVYLROHQFHWKHUHZRXOGQ¶WEHDQ\
relations of power.  
Therefore, while governmentality explains the participants¶ discourses and 
actions, the forms of contestation and resistance mounted through diverse forms 
of activism is evidence of agency and creativity in subversion of power. However, 
even though agency is a condition of power relations this also does not imply free 
rein since social agents are always acting within the limits of µthe field of 
possibilities¶ created by prevailing power relations (Foucault, 1994b:341). Such 
constraints have already been discussed in detail in previous chapters and the 
summary above.  
It should be noted that the salience given to cultural politics in this thesis is 
not intended to make a normative argument about the relative superiority or 
significance of such forms of participation over other political modes of action 
such as party politics or trade unionism. While it is argued that the cultural politics 
adopted by participants are shaped by the nature of power in society, articulated 
E\)RXFDXOW¶VWKHRULVDWLRQRINQRZOHGJe, discourse and governmentality, it does 
not follow that such forms of engagement are being advocated by the research. 
This thesis has focused on exploration, description and explanation of the 
political and civic activism of young adult Muslims, avoiding normative 
statements or evaluations as far as it is possible for any research output to do so. 
However, this thesis is bound to raise questions about the efficacy and practical 
value of its findings which necessitates responses which cannot avoid normative 
implications as the following discussion makes more explicit.  
 
Implications of research 
There are two important implications arising from this thesis that are 
suggestive of the value and potential of cultural politics conducted by social 
movements in strengthening political participation and citizenship. Firstly by 
framing Muslim activism through a model of cultural politics and social movement 
theory this thesis offers a challenge to pathological views of Muslim citizenship, 
opening up new possibilities for addressing issues of cohesion, diversity and 
security. Secondly the thesis raises questions about how political success and 
efficacy can be measured and assessed in the light of these politics and their 
normative vision of society. 
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The first argument concerns the role of Muslims in politics and society to 
which this thesis has made an important contribution by adding to a growing 
corpus of much needed literature on different forms of British Muslim politics 
(Akhtar, 2012, 2013; Ansari, 2009; Back et al, 2009; Briggs, 2010; 2¶/RXJKOLQ 
and Gillespie, 2012; 2¶7RROHDQG*DOH2¶7RROHHWDO0DUVKHWDO
2007; Modood, 2007; 2010; Meer, 2010; Solomos, 2005). By adopting an 
ethnographic research strategy and interview methods that prioritise the voice 
and agency of participants this thesis has been able to challenge some of the 
essentialist and damaging assumptions made about the disengagement of young 
Muslims from mainstream political processes and British citizenship. The thesis 
has presented findings that support a modest body of earlier research suggesting 
that young Muslims share with many other critical citizens the propensity to 
favour direct forms of political participation (Norris, 2002; 2011; Marsh et al 2007) 
which signal their desire to be included in British society rather than indicating 
separation. This research argues that these forms of activism can only be seen 
as participation in democratic processes if evidence of the changing political 
subjectivities and practices of citizens in the West is taken seriously (Beck, 1997; 
Cohen and Kennedy, 2007; Dalton, 2008; Hay, 2007; Marsh et al, 2007; Norris, 
2002; 2011; Nash, 2010). The insights gained from adopting this theoretical lens 
reveals the common sensibilities, repertoires of action and moral and ethical 
concerns reflected by other µHJDOLWDULDQ³SURJUHVVLYH´PRYHPHQWV¶1DVK
2010:234) that primarily aim to reshape society and make citizenship and the 
nation more inclusive of marginal actors (Adamson, 2011; Briggs, 2010; 
McGhee, 2008; O¶Toole and Gale, 2013). However, to appreciate the 
democratising potential of these mobilisations requires expanding the narrow 
view of citizenship defined by the state and revitalising the concept to meet the 
GHPDQGVRIWKHµQHZVW\OHRIFLWL]HQSROLWLFV¶'DOWRQ.  As Isin and Wood 
(1999:4) state the notion of citizenship needs to be more inclusive:  
«citizenship is conceived more broadly not only as a set of legal 
obligations and entitlements which individuals possess by virtue of their 
membership in the state, but also as the practices through which 
individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to 
expand or maintain existing rights.  
This calls for state recognition of these dynamic modes of active citizenship 
instead of  the exclusionary rhetoric that condemns dissent or protest by young 
people, particularly Muslims, as expressions of deviance and disorder which 
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threatens national security (Briggs, 2010; Brown and Saeed, 2014; Dobbernack 
et al, 2012; Frost, 2008; Kennelly, 2011; Shukra et al, 2012). The activism of 
young Muslims in this study reflects a strong civic consciousness which draws on 
Islamic faith as well as values of participatory and pluralist democracy to demand 
greater recognition and inclusion of Muslim identities in the national imagination. 
However, bridges between such critical political subjects and the mainstream 
political institutions require that the voices, views, interests and ideals of these 
young people are given respect and credibility as a starting point. This thesis has 
tried to highlight some of the political aims and priorities of participants in the 
Midlands and while the sample is too small to generalise it is highly likely that 
many of the issues raised by participants reverberate concerns felt by other 
young Muslims across the country, if not also in other Western countries where 
Muslims live as a minority group. This claim is based on the networked nature of 
activism where participants share and co-produce political and cultural 
messages, imaginaries and action systems with other activists and like-minded 
citizens nationally and transnationally in a complex web that constitutes a distinct 
social movement. While this research focuses on one section of this interwoven 
mesh, there are good reasons to believe that the themes raised by this research 
have resonance with other activists further afield.   
The second point to be made about the participation of young adult 
Muslims in a social movement premised on cultural politics is the question 
regarding the efficacy of such forms of activism in creating political change. 
Given continuing concerns about the legitimacy of politics (Beck, 1997; Hay, 
2007; Stoker, 2006) and the democratic deficit posed by diminishing engagement 
in the electoral system (Norris, 2002; 2011) the question is serious one. As Isin 
and Wood (1999:2) point out: 
To put it simply the political question or perhaps anxiety of our times is 
whether cultural politics can form an effective resistance to injustice, 
inequality, domination and oppression engendered by advanced capitalism 
and institutionalised by neoliberalism. (Isin and Wood, 1999:2) 
It would be useful to begin with some obvious critiques of subpolitical and 
cultural forms of politics that are associated with social movements. A primary 
objection would be that their overemphasis on cultural change is unlikely to 
stimulate any concrete programmes or institutional forms that can translate the 
political imaginaries of activists into social realities (Fenton, 2008). This invokes 
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concerns about increased individualisation in politics theorised by Beck (1994; 
1997) and Giddens (1991) which can diminish the capacity for collective action 
(Rheingans and Hollands, 2013). Another problem is that political actions that 
ignore the state have the effect of absolving the most powerful forces of 
domination in society and diminishing their accountability (Faulks, 1999). A 
further problem with cultural politics relates to critiques of postmodernist 
approaches to politics which are said to celebrate difference and marginality µas 
an expression of resistance¶ but which can also represent µthe cultural logic of 
late capitalism¶ (Blackman and France, 2001:180). As µdifference is itself 
attractive to the market as a selling feature¶ youth cultures of marginality can be 
µtaken up and exploited economically within a global market-place¶ (Blackman 
and France, 2001:180).  
While acknowledging that these questions are of vital importance, providing 
definitive and exhaustive responses is beyond the scope of this work, since this 
would demand a different kind of focus and research design to the one this study 
adopted. Seeking answers to such questions certainly indicates the future 
direction of research in this area, particularly as the outcomes and consequences 
of social movements are not only hard to define but remain under-researched 
(Earl, 2007). While these interesting questions emerge from the present study, 
their answers must be deferred to further investigations that follow on from the 
point where this research culminates. In the context of this chapter it is only 
possible to offer some tentative comments in response to the above critiques by 
citing the relative significance of cultural politics and their place in the larger 
political landscape in general.  
It should be clear that this discussion does not refer to the cultural politics 
of the state since these are indisputably a source of power and domination in 
society as previous discussions have stated. The value of cultural politics, as 
typically conducted by social movements, is above all in the symbolic work that is 
done under its rubric. Isin and Wood (19VWDWHWKDWWKHµIUDJPHQWDWLRQ
incoherence and symbolism of cultural politics are precisely its political 
VWUHQJWKV¶,VLQDQG:RRGFRQWHQGWKDWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHLQJGUDZQE\
many critics of cultural politics invokes classic disagreements over the politics of 
redistribution and recognition involving theorists like Nancy Fraser, Iris Young, 
Anne Phillips and Seyla Benhabib. However, these academic debates demarcate 
lines that have lost their visibility in the endeavours of social movements that 
GLVSHQVHZLWKVXFKDQDO\WLFDOFDWHJRULHVUHPRYLQJGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQµFXOWXUH
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and economy, culture and social, and, hence between redistribution and 
UHFRJQLWLRQ¶,VLQDQG:RRG7KHILQGLQJVRIWKLVVWXG\VXSSRUWWKLVYLHZ
and in doing so quesWLRQ*LGGHQV¶:210-214) distinction between 
µHPDQFLSDWRU\¶politics as being concerned with liberating citizens from 
H[SORLWDWLRQDQGRSSUHVVLRQDQGLQFRQWUDVWµOLIHSROLWLFV¶EHLQJVLPSO\FRQFHUQHG
with choice, lifestyle and self-actualisation. The young Muslim participants in this 
study clearly do more than just exercise choice to enhance self-actualisation. 
They consciously construct collective identities to serve a much broader social 
project aimed at emancipating Muslim citizens from an oppressed and 
disadvantaged social position that has both symbolic and material aims and 
consequences. This thesis agrees with Rheingans and Hollands (2013:551) that 
WKLVµtoo easy a separation¶EHWZHHQemancipatory and life politics is untenable in 
the face of contemporary movements such as Occupy and the student 
campaigns in Britain that struggle for both symbolic and material forms of justice.  
Critiques of cultural politics that are premised on their inability to 
demonstrate immediate or measurable political gains fail to appreciate difficulties 
involved in not only defining political gains but also measuring them, particularly 
where cultural change is the desired outcome (Earl, 2007). While some social 
movements have policy and legal change as their targets (Della Porta and Diani, 
2006) the role of many social movements is in bringing about deeper and more 
enduring social and cultural changes, sometimes through paradigm shifts from 
the grassroots. Social movements reveal their results or outcomes in gradual and 
diffused changes with momentous impacts over time, such as the effects of the 
feminist movement that has transformed gender roles and attitudes over 
generations (Earl, 2007; Nash, 2010). The cultural politics of social movements 
are prefigurative in their aims to reshape society by changing dominant codes 
and meanings through diffusion and ultimate normalisation of new political values 
and ideals. The most important function of social movements is that they bring 
new and thus far invisible, unimagined or marginalised issues and causes into 
the public sphere (Nash, 2010). As Melucci (1989:12) highlights in his seminal 
work on social movements:  
[Collective action] raises questions that transcend the logic of instrumental 
effectiveness and decision-making by anonymous and impersonal 
organizations of power. Contemporary social movements stimulate radical 
questions about the ends of personal and social life and, in so doing, they 
warn of the crucial problems facing complex societies. 
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This prophetic function of cultural politics in shaping the subjectivities of 
fellow citizens is all the more explicable in the light of the theorisation of power 
presented in this thesis, since this is the domain in which the cultural politics of 
WKHVWDWHFDQEHGHWHFWHGLQWKHµFRQGXFWRIFRQGXFWV¶)RXFDXOWE
through governmentality. In order to resist such forms of power participants have 
to act outside mainstream political institutions and fight on cultural ground. 
Despite their limited access to power and the numerous challenges that confront 
their struggles, social movement actors DLPWRµFUHDWHIDU-reaching and deep-
rooted changes in perspective, the redefining of interests, and, hence the 
UHFRQILJXUDWLRQRIKLHUDUFKLFDOVRFLDOUHODWLRQV¶1DVKIt is worth 
concluding with Beck¶V (1997:100) reminder that the power of subpolitics should 
not be underestimated in the age of reflexive modernity:  
In a society without consensus, devoid of a legitimising core, it is evident 
that even a single gust of wind, caused by the cry for freedom, can bring 
down the whole house of cards of power.   
 
Limitations of study and future prospects 
As most research is an abstraction from social life, the account presented 
here is provisional and based on a relatively modest piece of work involving a 
limited sample of Muslim activists. Therefore, the generalisation claims made by 
this research can only stretch as far as to argue that given similar conditions and 
participant profiles the results are likely to reflect similar outcomes. This claim is 
strengthened by the congruence and convergence found between some of the 
findings in this study and other similar works conducted previously (Akhtar, 2013; 
Briggs, 2010; Brown and Saeed, 2014; 2¶/RXJKOLQDQG*LOOHVSLH0DUVKHW
al, 2007; O'Toole and Gale, 2013; Stacer-Portwood, 2013). This suggests the 
findings are likely to have resonance beyond this case study.  
As already specified, the issues of security and terrorism were not explicitly 
foregrounded in the design and aims of this research and therefore their 
treatment has been somewhat contextual and peripheral. However, security 
emerges as an important and almost dominant theme in the study, albeit in a 
subtle and shadowy way, leading to suggestions that the relative scarcity of 
action around the issue of security during fieldwork might be linked to the 
constraining impact of securitisation. However, during the writing phase of this 
Active citizenship, dissent and power  238 
thesis events took a slightly different turn with a number of new campaigns 
around securitisation emerging in the research field, including protests against 
the arrest of Moazaam Begg and campaigns to challenge the new counter-
terrorism bill anticipated in 2015. As fieldwork had ceased by this stage the thesis 
was not able to incorporate these fresh developments into the analysis. Hence, 
these represent vitally important areas for future investigation, especially since 
the implications of such developments remains unclear. They could be reflective 
of a maturation of Muslim political capacities or an intensification of securitisation 
or more likely a combination of both factors and others that are yet unknown. 
Security around Muslim citizenship in the West remains a crucial concern, as 
witnessed by the frenzy surrounding the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 
January 2015 and the subsequent political responses which signalled an even 
greater will on the part of European states to encroach on civil liberties through 
increased regulation and surveillance of citizens. In this respect there is a 
continuing need for research to investigate how the securitisation of citizenship is 
impacting on Muslims and other citizens in the West. 
Similarly other important areas for future research stem from the 
underdevelopment of a number of key themes that are prominent in the data but 
had to be regretfully relegated to the sidelines in order to maintain an analytical 
focus on broader issues related to politics and citizenship. Therefore, important 
themes like gender, social media and class which all present themselves as 
significant dimensions for deeper analysis could not be fully explored due to 
limitations of space and time. However, these areas present openings for further 
research into promising lines of inquiry.  
The topic of gender identities and activism is a particularly important one 
with a rich potential for further study since the role played by women activists in 
the social movement being theorised in this study is decisive and conspicuous. A 
number of female participants display strong leadership qualities, evident in their 
ability to mobilise and inspire others to support and follow them. However, in the 
context of this exploratory study such a focused examination of the role of gender 
could not be justified since this required engagement with a body of literature that 
could potentially be the subject of another full doctoral thesis.  
The research carried out during this doctoral study also identified the area 
of Muslim activism as a promising one to contribute to some of the nascent 
debates on the democratising potential of new media (Castells, 2012; Earl and 
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Kimport, 2011; Hands, 2011). Although data was collected from social media 
sites with the intention of conducting a full discourse analysis this became an 
overly ambitious plan that was distracting from the main themes of the study and 
was placed in abeyance for future paper-writing and further research 
opportunities. Debates about online activism and the role of social media in 
promoting or shaping political participation is an area of continuing interest 
across disciplines but stands in need of further empirical evidence and 
theorisation. This study highlights the importance of social media in facilitating 
organisation and networking opportunities but this only touches the surface of the 
topic which represents an exciting and fruitful area for future research activity.  
 
Going forward 
Although the main purpose of this study is clearly to produce an academic 
treatise it would be disingenuous to claim that the intended target audience was 
limited to scholars in this field. The writing of this thesis has always been 
conscious of the diverse readership that may have an interest in the themes 
covered here, not least of all government officials, politicians, media 
professionals, lobbyists of various persuasions, as well as activists themselves. 
While this thesis may not make for easy reading by many of these readers, due 
to the sociological language and conceptual framing, it is intended that the study 
form the basis of more accessible publications in the future, including a book. 
This is because it offers important insights that may help to dispel some of the 
negative myths and stereotypes about Muslim citizens and in doing so alleviate 
some of the pressures that render their citizenship precarious and challenging. 
This is important not simply in relation to Muslims but touches on issues of 
difference and diversity that should concern all marginal individuals and groups 
who can in principle be targeted by the same processes and prejudices that are 
currently directed at people associated with Islam. In identifying the barriers and 
obstacles experienced by young Muslims to participation in British politics and 
citizenship the findings of this thesis can be a valuable resource to government, 
policy-makers and other stake-holders interested in addressing concerns around 
youth disengagement, integration, security, social cohesion and citizenship. Most 
importantly the research has allowed voices that are often muted or absent in the 
public sphere to speak out and it would be an insult, added to existing injury, if 
these discourses were not taken to a wider audience.  
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Appendix 1: Participant profiles 
Fictional 
names 
Gender Age City of 
residence 
Role 
Abid Male 25 City 1 Poet and charity worker 
Aliya Female 37 City 1 Communist activist 
Ameer Male 33 City 1 Community activist 
Amna Female 31 City 1 Student activist  
Arya Female 19 City 2 Student and youth activist 
Basma Female 25 City 1 Student activist and 
student union elected 
officer 
Beena Female 21 City 1 Student activist 
Changez Male 20 City 1 Student activist 
Chohan Male 22 City 2 Charity volunteer 
Dania Female 23 City 1 Former student activist and 
pro-Palestine activist 
Hanif Male 20 City 2 Student activist 
Haseena Female 21 City 1 Student activist 
Imran Male 17 City 1 Former anti-war activist. 
Aspiring politician. 
Irum Female 28 City 1 Community activist  
Kasim Male 35 City 1 Community activist 
Khalid Male 19 City 1 Community and youth 
activist 
Khayam Male 23 City 2 Community activist and 
charity worker 
Khizar Male 21 City 2 Student activist and SU 
President candidate 
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Laila Female 19 City 1 Student activist 
Maz Male 23 City 1 Student union elected 
officer   
Mona Female 27 City 1 Political photographer, 
blogger and graphic artist 
Parveen Female 25 City 1 Activist blogger and 
journalist 
Rabia  Female 23 City 2 Student activist and 
student union elected 
officer 
Romana Female 20 City 1 Student activist 
Saif Male 27 City 2 Academic activist 
Salman Male 27 City 1 Community activist 
Sameera Female 21 City 2 Student activist 
Sara Female 19 City 1 Student activist 
Shoaib Male 22 City 1 Student activist  
Tamara  Female 20 City 2 Student union elected 
officer   
Tehmina Female 25 City 2 Community activist and 
charity volunteer 
Yasir Male 31 City 1 Community activist 
Yousaf Male 34 City 2 Activist journalist 
Zahir Male 27 City 1 Youth and community 
activist 
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Appendix 2: Organisations involved in 
the research  
Organisation Type of activism 
Ceasefire Magazine Online social justice publication 
Craft Space Local community project 
Engage National campaign group 
Envision Youth empowerment campaign 
Hear My Voice Local youth empowerment group 
Himmah  Local social justice campaign 
Injustice (Anti-extradition campaign) Local political campaign 
Islamic Society of Britain National religious society 
Mercy Mission Local voluntary social welfare group 
MPACUK National campaign group 
Muslim Association of Britain National religious group 
National Union of Students Student representative body 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign National campaign group 
Stop the War Coalition National anti-war campaign group 
Student Islamic Societies Student cultural/religious society 
Student Palestine Societies Political student society 
UN International Citizens Service International voluntary aid service 
Young Muslims Advisory Group (No 
longer active) 
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Appendix 3: Recruitment materials  
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Appendix 4: Information for participants 
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Appendix 5: Consent Form  


















Active citizenship, dissent and power: The cultural politics of  




Anisa Mustafa, BA (Hons), MA 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
